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RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0348/01 0410759
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6544
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000348 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV KCOR PTER IZ
SUBJECT: PRT WASIT: PLAYING ON THE SAME TEAM: THE IRAQI 
POLICE/JUDICIARY RELATIONSHIP IN WASIT PROVINCE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The relationship between the Iraqi Police 
(IP) and judicial personnel in Wasit province appears to have 
improved significantly over the last year after reaching a 
low point marked by violence in late 2008.  Corruption, 
bribery, and failure to work jointly plagued the 
relationship, and came to a head in December 2008 when a 
gunfight broke out among rival security details at a 
courthouse during a PRT engagement.  PRToffs credit sustained 
efforts by both the police and judiciary, effective Iraqi 
Higher Judicial Council policies, and PRT Wasit Rule of Law 
encouragement/training for some of the apparent improvements 
in the relationship one year later.  A highlight of that 
progress is the broad attendance and enthusiastic response by 
both the IP and local judiciary at a forensic seminar last 
month.   End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) During a meeting between the Wasit Chief Judge (CJ) 
and PRToffs on 28 December 2008, gun shots were fired. 
Reportedly, the CJ,s security guards and IP officers 
arriving for a meeting with the CJ exchanged gunfire.  The 
firefight took place in the parking lot in front of the Al 
Kut Courthouse Administration Building.  The CJ, an IP 
officer, and two American 41st Fires Brigade officers 
restored order between the Judge,s staff and the IP.  The CJ 
ordered both the Provincial Director of Police and one of his 
own aides off courthouse property for their role in the 
fight.  All IP personnel left the area, along with one court 
employee who had been involved in the incident.  Several IP 
personnel later returned to the courthouse area and a second 
shooting incident occurred.  Neither incident resulted in any 
injuries.  (Note: This incident previously was reported in 
the January 2009 PRT Rule of Law Situation Report.  End Note) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) This violent manifestation of intra-governmental 
hostility suggested that the investigative and judicial 
system was broken.  But part of the process of healing the 
system occurred at a meeting immediately following the 
shooting. The PRT,s Rule of Law Adviser was at that meeting 
and secured the skeptical CJ,s support to continue regular 
training sessions for Iraqi investigative police conducted by 
provincial judges. The CJ continued the training sessions 
and, a year later, despite personnel changes in Chief Judge 
leadership and investigative judge positions, these courses 
remain a mainstay of the police/judicial nexus.  These 12 to 
15 officer training sessions are four week courses, held two 
days per week with an examination at the end. 
¶4. (SBU) The relationship strengthened further during the 
summer of 2009 when Chief Judge Medhat of the Iraqi Higher 
Judicial Council reassigned virtually all chief judges, 
including those in Wasit. He apparently took this move in an 
effort to break up perceived patterns of corruption.  One 
effect of judicial reassignments in Wasit was that police 
officers and minor court officials were dismissed from their 
jobs when judges, orders were ignored or corruption was 
uncovered. Examples include a newly assigned judge firing a 
police officer who violated the judge,s orders concerning 
abuse of detainees. The prior judge had failed to act. 
Another example is the demotion of a senior Al Kut court 
administrator because he charged unauthorized fees for the 
use of the restroom at the courthouse. Thus, the judicial 
shakeup was an effective agent of change.  Since a police 
officer,s job in Wasit allegedly cost a $1000 bribe at the 
time, the loss had serious financial implications. Police at 
all levels bought in to the concept that judges, orders had 
Qall levels bought in to the concept that judges, orders had 
to be strictly obeyed. The new CJ also began to focus on 
detainee rights and conditions resulting in fewer forced 
confessions and more secure convictions.  Similarly, 
anecdotal reporting of police accepting cash to free arrested 
people declined during this period.  On the judicial side, 
the work of investigative judges in responding to police 
requests for warrants is noteworthy. As an example, the five 
investigative judges in Al Kut, the largest provincial city, 
issue a total of 250 to 300 warrants each day. 
¶5.  (SBU)  At the Wasit Chief Judge,s invitation, the PRT 
Rule of Law team hosted a forensic evidence seminar in 
downtown Al-Kut in late January, which included a 
presentation by a former FBI agent.  Twenty-eight Iraqi 
police attended this half-day conference, along with 
approximately 32 judges from courthouses throughout the 
Province. They all sat together--albeit on opposite sides of 
the room--and were soon involved in an interactive question 
and answer session about proper procedures to follow in 
collecting, preserving and analyzing evidence such as DNA, 
hair follicles, cloth fibers and fingerprints.  The audience 
participation and response was overwhelmingly positive.  Even 
the Provincial Governor expressed his thanks for 
demonstrating what is possible through the use of forensics. 
¶6.  (SBU) Comment:  During the seminar break, policemen and 
judges interacted normally with no hints of hostility or 
tension.   Our conclusion is that the rift of a year ago has 
largely healed. The visible signs of a positively evolving 
 
BAGHDAD 00000348  002 OF 002 
 
 
IP/judicial dynamic are clear. The PRT plans to coordinate 
training opportunities for personal security details (PSD) 
assigned to guard judges and continues to focus its efforts 
on judiciary training of IP officers and introduction to 
basic forensic methods for investigative judges; all of this 
to help bridge the institutional gaps between the Iraqi 
judiciary and law enforcement. An additional gap-bridging 
measure, modeled on a task force in Anbar province, is the 
current effort to form a US Forces/Iraqi investigative task 
force for Wasit to bring US Forces investigative know-how and 
technical assets to bear on Iraqi police investigations. When 
the task force deploys, its work should substantially 
strengthen the IP/judiciary relationship.  End comment. 
HILL