VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0144/01 0360930
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050930Z FEB 10
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3280
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9688
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1073

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused February 5 
news coverage on the court ruling made Thursday that a former KMT 
legislator was guilty of fraud for her possession of dual U.S. and 
Taiwan citizenship; on former Vice President Annette Lu's interview 
with President Ma Ying-jeou Thursday in her capacity as the founder 
of Formosa Media; and on other domestic political issues.  In terms 
of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" discussed the recent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and 
the tensions between China and the United States.  The article urged 
the Ma administration not to turn Taiwan into an enemy of democratic 
countries by tilting toward China.  An op-ed in the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily" said the Obama administration's excessively high 
expectations for China have unfortunately resulted in the recent 
tensions between Washington and Beijing.  An editorial in the 
conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
discussed the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and concluded that "what the 
U.S. is selling is a sense of security.  And Taiwan is happily 
buying it despite the exorbitant price."  End summary. 
 
A) "Taiwan Must Never Degenerate into Becoming the Enemy of the 
Democratic Camp" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 680,000] (2/5): 
 
"... When [U.S. President Barack] Obama was plagued by the financial 
crisis in 2009, Sino-U.S. relations were on unusually friendly 
terms.  But given the gradually eased financial storm and the fact 
that China is taking advantage of the difficult and unfortunate 
circumstances of the United States to make much ado of 'the dream of 
the rise of a big nation,' it appears that Obama has been ready to 
adjust his China policy starting in 2010.  Under such a 
circumstance, President Ma Ying-jeou, who has just received 
courteous treatment during his transits through the United States, 
will probably need to figure out whether Washington offered him such 
treatment because of his tilting toward China or an attempt [by the 
U.S. side] to drag Ma from the wrong road of tilting toward China? 
... 
 
"For now, it is none of Taiwan's business as to how Beijing is going 
to battle with Washington and whether it is able to win the battle 
against Washington.  This is China's business.  But still, Taiwan 
needs to watch out so that it will not suffer as an innocent 
bystander.  First, if Taiwan's economy continues to be locked into 
that of China's, a move that will tie trade and economics across the 
Taiwan Strait together, it will be extremely difficult for the 
island to escape its fate should any trade conflicts emerge between 
China and the United States. ...  Second, the Ma administration sees 
Taiwan as a part of China -- an effort that will distance [Taiwan's] 
strategic interests from those of democratic countries.  Should 
China and the United States start to vie with each other 
strategically in the future, Taiwan will degenerate from being a 
democratic ally in Asia to becoming an enemy of the democratic 
allies in Asia.  The consequences will be inconceivable. ..." 
 
B) "Behind Obama's Hard-line [Attitude] towards China" 
 
Emerson Chang, Director of Nan Hua University's Department of 
International Studies, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" 
[circulation: 520,000] (2/5): 
 
"... First, the fact that the Obama administration had held 
excessively high expectations for Obama's visit to China in 
November, 2009 is a [reason for] the recent tensions between the two 
countries.  Since taking over the helm, Obama has sought to draw a 
clear line between his administration and the previous Bush 
administration in terms of foreign relations.  He upholds 'smart 
power' as his guiding principle, uses listening, negotiation and 
contacts as his key [skills], puts a special emphasis on pragmatism 
and flexibility, with which he seeks to mend the United States' 
international image and foreign relations. ...  In his Tokyo 
address, Obama stressed that [the United States] will not seek to 
contain China, and he also pointed out that China's rise is 
conducive to world security and prosperity -- a move that smashed 
the doctrine calling China a threat and provided the most powerful 
justification for the path of peaceful development upheld by China. 
[Such a speech] can be regarded as the biggest gift a U.S. state 
leader has ever brought to Beijing during his visit to China since 
the two nations established diplomatic ties. 
 
"What Washington sought in return was hoping that China can 'build a 
positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for 
the 21st century, and will take concrete actions to steadily build a 
partnership to address common challenges,' as specified in the 
'Obama-Hu joint statement.'  In other words, Obama expected to use 
goodwill and reconciliation in exchange for China's friendly 
cooperation.  The first touchstone testing such expectations was 
whether Beijing would agree, as specified in the 'joint statement,' 
to adhere to 'providing for full transparency' when carrying out the 
carbon dioxide reductions at the Copenhagen summit. ... 
 
 
"The failure of the Copenhagen talks confirmed the general public 
view that Obama has been too weak and has made too many concessions 
with regard to his China policy.  Obama, as a result, tasted the 
bitter fruit of losing face. ... The Google incident showed that 
Obama did not adopt a weak attitude toward China, and the State 
Department's announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, its 
reiteration of the Taiwan Relations Act and turning a blind eye to 
the three Sino-U.S. communiqus have further demonstrated Obama's 
remorse over the 'Obama-Hu joint statement.'  Such a development, 
however, forced China to heighten and expand its level of protests 
so as to maintain face. ..." 
 
C) "What Is the U.S. Really Selling Taiwan?" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (2/5): 
 
"Washington and Beijing have been locking horns over the United 
States government's latest arms sales to Taiwan, as well as some 
other thorny issues, such as U.S. President Barack Obama's planned 
meeting with the Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. 
It remains to be seen what will become of the relations between the 
two superpowers -- and theirs with Taiwan.  But one question needs 
to be asked about the arms sales:  What is the U.S. really selling 
Taiwan?  Or what does Taiwan think the U.S. government is selling? 
... 
 
"The Obama administration has not actually approved any new items 
for the package. ...But the Obama administration package excluded 
some of the promises that Bush had made to Taiwan: diesel-powered 
submarines and F16C/D jet fighters.  This is the hardware.  On the 
political side, the package comes as Washington's reiteration of its 
Taiwan Relations Act, which obliges it to sell defensive weapons to 
the island. ...  The hardware that the U.S. is selling Taiwan is not 
sufficient to defend the island from the hundreds of Chinese 
 
missiles targeting Taiwan.  What the U.S. is selling is a sense of 
security.  And Taiwan is happily buying it despite the exorbitant 
price. ...  The sense of security does not come from the hardware, 
but rather from the implications attached to the weapons.  The 
president may not really want to buy the weapons -- a time when 
Taiwan least needs to arm itself -- judging from the gradually 
easing tensions across the Taiwan Strait. 
 
"But Ma needs to assure the nation -- particularly the 
pro-independence opposition camp -- that he will not surrender the 
nation if the occasion arises.  He needs to play the game of 
maintaining military balance across the strait.  Such a game does 
not depend on the number of troops or strength of the weapons on 
each side of the strait, but is maintained by the ambiguous position 
taken by the U.S.  For both Taiwan and China, U.S. arms sales 
represent the possibility of U.S. intervention in cross-strait 
military conflicts.  That is what Beijing has been protesting about. 
...  Would the U.S. really intervene? ...  The sense of security may 
be false, not only because the U.S. may never come to Taiwan's 
defense, but also because the island actually lacks the 
determination to defend itself.  Buying the weapons is not 
necessarily a demonstration of such determination, although the U.S. 
government has always insisted that Taiwan needs to illustrate its 
position by buying the defensive weapons offered to them. ...  Some 
observers say the air force may not have the pilots to fly F16C/D 
jets even if the U.S. sells them to Taiwan.  So the weapons systems 
Taiwan is getting from the U.S. may just be toys, or a Linus blanket 
that makes us feel safe." 
 
STANTON