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Viewing cable 10AITTAIPEI135, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10AITTAIPEI135 2010-02-04 08:45 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0135/01 0350845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040845Z FEB 10
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3269
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9686
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1071
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000135 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused February 4 
news coverage on the possible change in control of a local 
department store; on the legal cases involving former President Chen 
Shui-bian and his family; and on the year-end five city and county 
magistrates' elections.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, a 
column in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed the U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan and the possible sanctions Beijing will impose on 
U.S. companies selling weapons to Taiwan.  The article said the 
sanctions will damage China first before they harm the United 
States.  A column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" also said Beijing 
is facing a dilemma in the wake of Washington's announcement of arms 
sales to Taiwan.  End summary. 
 
A) "How Is Beijing Going to Punish the United States?" 
 
Columnist Antonio Chiang wrote in his column in the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily" [circulation: 530,000] (2/4): 
 
"Beijing reacted unyieldingly against the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, 
pledging to impose sanctions on relevant U.S. companies.  Beijing 
also warned that international cooperation between China and the 
United States would be affected as well.  Such open challenging is 
more of an emotional nature ..., and its consequences will damage 
China first before they harm the United States.  The U.S. companies 
that will be punished by Beijing for selling weapons to Taiwan 
include the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, and the Boeing Company. ... These companies are all 
important members of 'China's lobbying group,' and it will be 
interesting to learn how Beijing is going to impose sanctions on 
them. ... 
 
"China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it will suspend 
military exchanges between the two countries, postpone the deputy 
ministerial-level consultations on strategic security, arms control 
and non-proliferation issues, call off the visit by the U.S. 
secretary of defense, and cancel the meeting between China's chief 
of the general staff and the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.  In reality, such exchanges are more of symbolic significance 
than substantive importance -- it is hardly worth it to have them 
but not bad enough to discard them.  Having these programs either 
canceled or postponed will only make Washington breathe a sigh of 
relief. 
 
"When it comes to international issues, Washington badly needs 
Beijing's assistance, particularly on Iran and Pyongyang's nuclear 
issue.  The chances are slim though for China to abandon cooperation 
with the United States and return to its old ways of boycott.  On 
the Iranian issue, the move will surely make Europe feel repugnant. 
As for North Korea's nuclear problem, which is of vital importance 
to China, if Beijing holds a passive attitude, it will lose its 
leading role on the matter. 
 
"It is due to the United States that China is able to see its 
international position rise dramatically in the past few years. 
Beijing teaming up with Washington does more good for China than for 
the United States.  If Beijing decides to adopt a passive manner and 
boycott, it will create a lot of difficulties for Washington, but it 
will also put China's international position, international image 
and its influence in an unfavorable position. Which side will lose 
more if Hu Jintao has to change his [planned] visit to the United 
States?  It is foreseeable that China's sanctions on the United 
States will be much talk but little action. ..." 
 
B) "How Is Beijing Going to Give Equal Consideration to the Two 
Aspects?" 
 
Journalist Wang Ming-yi wrote in the "Observation from Beijing" 
column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 120,000] 
(2/4): 
 
"During the process of China's peaceful rise, there are two 'general 
aspects' that have always been the 'unbearable heaviness of being' 
in the minds of the leaders in Beijing:  One aspect is the strategic 
cooperation between the United States and China, and the other is 
the peaceful development of cross-Strait [relations].  The problem 
is that these two aspects often stand on opposite sides to each 
other.  The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan that has again got on the 
diplomatic nerves between Washington and Beijing lately have put 
Beijing in a dilemma. ...  But given the rise of China's national 
strength in general and its increasing confidence in 
decision-making, Beijing will nonetheless exercise restraint in its 
measures to protest against [the sales] and impose sanctions on U.S. 
companies manufacturing weapons systems.  Even if [U.S. President] 
Obama's scheduled meeting with the Dalai Lama in late February will 
likely trigger another round of protests, it is certain that 
Washington and Beijing, in consideration of the overall situation, 
will try to keep their relationship in a state of 'fighting but not 
breaking up.' ... 
"Previous experience with the interactions between Washington, 
Beijing and Taipei shows that arms sales have always been a 
complicated and difficult matter.  Beijing should have learned by 
now that not only the Republican Party, but also the Democratic 
Party, will sell fighter jets to Taiwan.  By the same token, not 
just Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have purchased weapons and 
missiles, but it will be unlikely for Ma Ying-jeou to give up arms 
procurements.  [At the end of the day,] it all comes down to the 
lessons Beijing's leaders will learn from the complicated 
interactions in international politics." 
 
STANTON