VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0130/01 0340954
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030954Z FEB 10
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3259
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9681
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1066

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused 
February 3 news coverage on an article written by James Kraska on a 
scenario in which the United States lost a naval war to China in 
2015; on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; and on the Taipei City 
government's plan to increase the property tax on luxury apartments 
starting next year. 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" discussed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 
and Sino-U.S. relations.  The article said whichever side backs off 
from the confrontation will be the paper tiger.  An editorial in the 
KMT-leaning "China Times," on the other hand, said that only when 
Taiwan-U.S. relations are stable can cross-Strait relations be 
stabilized.  A separate "China Times" column discussed the U.S. 
military's recent test of its missile interception capability.  The 
article concluded by saying the United States wants to be the number 
one in the world, and it has to contain China after all.  An 
editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" 
discussed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and said President Ma 
Ying-jeou's tacit acceptance of Beijing's "one China" principle may 
have discouraged Washington from providing more sophisticated 
weaponry to Taiwan.  End summary. 
 
A) "Which Is a Paper Tiger, Beijing or Washington?" 
 
Columnist Paul Lin wrote in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
[circulation: 680,000] (2/3): 
 
"New changes have emerged recently in Sino-U.S. relations. 
Following his submissive visit to Beijing last November, U.S. 
President Barack Obama was humiliated by [Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao] at the Copenhagen summit.  Washington was thus forced to 
'toughen up,' using Google's case as a turning point.  Since Ma 
Ying-jeou's transits through the United States and Washington's 
announcement of arms sales to Taiwan both involve the 'core 
interests' recently asserted by China, tension has thus risen 
between China and the United States. 
 
"Washington offered a new level of treatment to Ma primarily and 
evidently because it was worried that Ma's incompetence and 
isolation will hasten his pace to surrender [Taiwan] to China. 
That's why it wanted to support him.  If China did not protest 
against it, such a reception model would also be applicable to the 
future presidents of Taiwan.  If China protests, then the Taiwan 
people will understand that no matter how Ma has tried to curry 
favor with China, they should not expect Beijing to respect Taiwan. 
As for the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, [Washington] was just 
fulfilling a request proposed by the previous DPP administration, 
which was turned down by the KMT then.  Besides, the [arms sales 
package] was a result of various cuts, and it had been notified to 
or negotiated with China in advance -- also a [failure to implement 
fully] the 'Taiwan Relations Act.' ... 
 
"When Beijing and Washington confront each other, whichever side 
backs off is the paper tiger.  The United States normally does not 
'pursue and attack enemy forces with the advantage of a recent 
victory;' China, on the other hand, given its traits of hooliganism, 
will certainly push its luck.  One can tell from Sino-U.S. relations 
over the past few decades that Washington has been making all kinds 
of concessions, while Beijing has lately upgraded Taiwan to become 
its 'core interest,' which will likely expand to include other 
[matters] under the United States' sphere of influence.  Why doesn't 
the United States also call upon the ideals upon which its nation 
was built, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of 
law, its core interests?  The United States was even willing to 
protect the KMT dictatorship; now that Taiwan is a democratic 
country, how will the United States look upon itself if the island 
were sold out to China?..." 
 
B) "Only When Taiwan-U.S. Relations Are Stable Can Cross-Strait 
Relations Be Stabilized" 
 
The KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 120,000] editorialized 
(2/3): 
 
"Even though the U.S. government's announcement of a US$6.4 billion 
worth arms sales package to Taiwan proved that Taiwan-U.S. relations 
remain consistently stable, a certain warning signal has surfaced. 
Such a costly arms sales package has unexpectedly excluded weapons 
of active defensive capabilities such as the conventional submarines 
and F-16 C/D fighter jets, so it was far inferior to our 
expectations.  Frankly speaking, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have 
shown a trend of 'weakening,' and the Ma administration must thus 
address it prudently, because without a stable Taiwan-U.S. 
relationship, there will not be stable cross-Strait relations. ... 
 
"Arms sales are a key indicator to stable Taiwan-U.S. relations. 
The arms sales package this time accounts for 69 percent of Taiwan's 
national defense budget for this fiscal year; the figure may sound 
 
shockingly high, but the weapons are all long-pending ones, and 
there is nothing new in the package.  Normally, Washington is able 
to approve such an arms sales package quickly, but this time it was 
put off for more than six months -- an unprecedented sign in the 
history of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  Thus it appears to reveal a 
certain warning signal.  People started to feel concerned whether 
this will be the last and biggest [U.S.] arms sale [to Taiwan].  One 
indeed cannot rule out such concerns.  It is not long since U.S. 
President Barack Obama took over the helm.  Even though his 
strategists in Asian-Pacific affairs are familiar with cross-Strait 
issues and have a certain understanding of Taiwan's situation, his 
core staff may not necessarily share the same understanding, in 
particular, the perception of China.  It appears that the 
strategists close to Obama have other plans, which will possibly 
create new variables for the future of Taiwan-U.S. relations. 
 
"According to the provisions in the 'Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),' 
the U.S. Congress does not 'enjoin' the executive branch to sell 
weapons to Taiwan.  Strictly speaking, it is not binding for 
Washington to agree to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan.  The real 
strength behind the United States' willingness to provide defensive 
weapons to Taiwan does not lie in the law itself but in its sold 
political commitment to Taiwan's freedom.  Even though there are 
clauses in the TRA related to [Taiwan's] security, Washington's 
political commitment remains essential to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
 The subtlety of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan lies in such 
indescribable 'political commitment,' and its efficacy depends not 
only on whether Taiwan and the United States share the same 
strategic interests but also on the rise of China.  The previous 
U.S. administrations have all tried their utmost to keep the balance 
[between the two directions], but if the Obama administration 
regards the latter more important than the former, the Ma 
administration will have to watch out.  This has nothing to do with 
whether the United States will sell out Taiwan; it is simply a 
consequence caused by the development of the international 
situation. ... 
 
"We can totally understand why Beijing is opposed to U.S. arms sales 
to Taiwan.  On the political level, arms sales involve the relations 
between the United States, China and Taiwan.  Though its nature 
differs from the status of cross-Strait relations, it certainly 
falls under the category of 'shelving the controversies.'  Since it 
is certain that the arms sales issue will not be resolved in the 
short term, why not put it aside.  Beijing's doing the utmost it can 
to seek to smother U.S. arms sales to Taiwan not only will not 
contribute to reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait but will also 
amplify Taiwan's sense of crisis. ...  U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are 
the touchstone of the stability of Taiwan-U.S. relations.  With 
cross-Strait relations improving, the arms sales can be adjusted 
according to Taiwan's defense needs and military transformation, but 
by no means can they be terminated because of [China's] threats. 
..." 
 
C) "Obama Is a Realist plus Opportunist" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 120,000] wrote (2/3): 
 
"The U.S. military tested the 'ground-based mid-course missile 
interception' [defense system] over the Pacific Ocean on January 31, 
but [the test] failed.  It is said they are still trying to figure 
out the reasons for the failure.  Just twenty days ago, China 
successfully tested its mid-course interception capability. ...  The 
United States has started earlier than China in building its 
anti-ballistic missile system, whose scale is also bigger than that 
of China's.  Washington also put the core of its anti-missile 
deployment in the Asia-Pacific. ...  Judging from its entire set-up, 
it is quite obvious that the target of [the United States' 
anti-missile network' is China. 
 
"It goes without saying that [building] such an anti-missile network 
against China is not an easy task. ... But from such a move one can 
tell the relationship between the United States and China. 
Washington still wants to contain the rise of China after all.  Just 
as when President Obama said in his State of the Union address, the 
United States is absolutely the number one. ...  On China's part, 
Beijing probably has no ambition to become the number one.  But 
Washington still feels ill at ease.  It may be right when someone 
says that Obama upholds the 'offensive realism.'" 
 
D) "Ma's Policies Deepen Taiwan's Predicament" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (2/3): 
 
"... However, the procurement package does not include systems 
Taiwan urgently needs to balance the PRC's rapidly expanding and 
upgrading military prowess, notably advanced F-16 C/D Block jet 
fighters, AEGIS frigates or conventional submarines.  Ironically, 
 
Washington's selection of defensive weapon systems may have been 
influenced by Ma's change of Taiwan's strategic concepts from 
preparing for 'decisive battle outside of the territory' forward 
defense based on local air and naval superiority to 'determined 
defense and effective deterrence,' which envisions an army-based 
defense on Taiwan's soil.  Combined with Ma's tacit acceptance of 
Beijing's 'one China principle,' the latter concept indicates to 
international society that the KMT government believes Taiwan's 
eventual annexation by a 'rising China' is inevitable and may have 
discouraged Washington from providing more sophisticated weaponry. 
Moreover, Beijing's overreaction to Obama's decision, including the 
rupture of Sino-American military exchanges and threats to impose 
sanctions on U.S. companies, may very well be calculated to draw a 
red line to block Washington from selling F-16 C/D jets, AEGIS 
frigates or conventional submarines to Taiwan in the future. ... 
 
"The pursuit of normalized relations with China cannot be twisted 
into a justification to surrender Taiwan's hard-won democracy and 
prosperity.  Instead, Ma should remind the world community that 
Taiwan is part of the global democratic alliance against any 
authoritarian state, is resolved to seek peace with, and not at the 
expense of, democracy and dignity, and intensify efforts to persuade 
Washington and other capitals that Taiwan is committed to defending 
our democratic way of life and needs advanced self-defense 
capability to dissuade the PRC from any adventurism." 
 
STANTON