VZCZCXRO8032
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHVB #0032/01 0141120
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141120Z JAN 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9812
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000032 
 
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SUBJECT: CROATIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT DISCUSSES FOREIGN POLICY 
PRIORITIES 
 
ZAGREB 00000032  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  President-elect Josipovic's first foreign 
policy priority will be supporting Croatia's EU accession, 
where his clear views on some key issues -- including 
corruption and cooperation with the ICTY -- should give a 
boost to Croatia's prospects for expeditious completion. 
Josipovic's second key foreign policy objective will be 
improving relations with neighboring countries.  He is one of 
the only national Croatian political figures willing to 
entertain publicly that Croatia might withdraw its ICJ case 
against Serbia, although he has said that this could only be 
done if Serbia first took additional steps to resolve 
outstanding issues.  While personally opposed to the 
Croatia-Slovenia border Arbitration Agreement, he has pledged 
to support implementation of the agreement.  On BiH he has 
stressed that Croatia should not tell the Bosnian Croat 
community in BiH what to do. Post's assessment is that 
Josipovic, given his reputation as a reformist politician and 
respected legal scholar who has never exhibited a 
particularly nationalist streak, should be able to make 
significant contributions to both the EU and regional 
cooperation objectives. END SUMMARY. 
 
First Priority: Croatia Joining EU 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In discussions with the media on January 11 and 12, 
president-elect Ivo Josipovic elaborated on his foreign 
policy priorities.  First, he stressed the importance of 
Croatia becoming a member of the EU and underscored that the 
fight against corruption would be a vital part of this effort 
as well as being intrinsically valuable for Croatia's own 
domestic interests.  Josipovic added that the EU had stricter 
criteria for Croatia than other countries that joined in the 
past, but that Croatia would be able to meet the benchmarks 
and be a better country for it. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Regarding the ICTY, Josipovic has consistently 
called for Croatia to cooperate with the court and even 
drafted the original law regarding Croatia's cooperation.  He 
also told the press on January 12 that as president he would 
not pardon anyone who was convicted of murder, rape, being a 
member of organized crime, or war crimes. 
 
Second Priority: Good Neighborly Relations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Serbia and Kosovo: Josipovic emphasized good 
neighborly relations as the second key foreign policy 
objective for his presidency.  Elaborating on this theme, 
Josipovic said that ties between Serbia and Croatia had 
progressed in the last ten years.  He cited cooperation on 
missing persons, the procedure for returning cultural items, 
and Serbia's progress on war crimes issues as areas of 
improvement.  The major outstanding issue was that Ratko 
Mladic and Goran Hadzic had not yet been turned over to the 
ICTY.  Josipovic is one of the few national Croatian 
political figures willing to entertain publicly the 
possibility that Croatia might withdraw its ICJ genocide case 
against Serbia, although he has stated that this could only 
be done if Serbia first took additional steps to resolve 
outstanding issues.  He also said that Serbia's counter-suit 
for genocide at the ICJ lacked legal grounds.  (Note: 
Josipovic served as the head of the legal team that drafted 
Croatia's genocide case against Serbia at the ICJ.  End 
Note.)  Josipovic believed that Serbia would eventually 
reconcile itself with Kosovo becoming an independent country, 
but expressed understanding for the GoS's current stance on 
the issue.  When asked if he would first travel to Belgrade 
or Pristina, Josipovic said a visit to Belgrade would likely 
be first. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Slovenia: On the Arbitration Agreement to settle the 
border dispute with Slovenia, Josipovic reiterated his view 
that it was a result of Slovenian "blackmail," and said that 
Croatia had lost rights accorded to it under international 
law by accepting the agreement.  However, Josipovic stressed 
that as president he would respect what had been decided. 
(Note: Josipovic was one of the few members of Sabor to vote 
against moving ahead with the Arbitration Agreement.  As an 
international law expert, he is clearly bothered by its ad 
hoc nature.  However, contacts within the SDP have told us 
that they believe his decision to vote against it was as 
much, or more, about political positioning in the prelude to 
the presidential campaign, as it was about any sense that 
Croatia genuinely could have secured a better outcome.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) BiH: On January 12, when asked in an interview about 
RS PM Dodik's calls for a referendum for the RS to succeed 
 
ZAGREB 00000032  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
from the BiH, Josipovic stated that he viewed such a step as 
not in accordance with Dayton and unacceptable to the 
international community and BiH.  He also stressed that he 
did not think Croatia was in a position to tell the Bosnian 
Croat community what to do.  In an interview with BiH media, 
Josipovic denied that he had explicitly supported a third 
entity in BiH, emphasizing that he would honor any compromise 
agreed to by all three constituent peoples. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Josipovic's election should boost Croatia's 
prospects in the two key areas that he outlined as his 
foreign policy priorities.  First, Josipovic's strong record 
of support for the ICTY process will add weight and gravitas 
to GoC efforts to resolve the concerns among a small number 
of EU states regarding Croatian cooperation with the Court. 
Josipovic's strong stance against corruption and his own 
clean reputation should also be an added boost to the 
anti-corruption efforts underway, and further allay EU 
concerns on that issue.  In regional relations Josipovic, as 
the legal expert who worked on the case, will be able to 
speak authoritatively on the merits of dropping the Croatian 
ICJ genocide case against Serbia, under the right 
circumstances.  Additionally, he could provide the GoC with 
cover should it be needed on the Arbitration Agreement with 
Slovenia.  Josipovic, with a reputation as an international 
scholar who strongly supports human rights, is less likely to 
provoke negative reactions among non-Croatian audiences in 
the region, who might have found a staunchly nationalist 
Croatian president a more difficult interlocutor.  END 
COMMENT. 
FOLEY