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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000011 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL OSCE RS AF
SUBJECT: IS RUSSIA CRACKING OPEN THE DOOR ON OSCE TRAINING 
IN AFGHANISTAN? 
 
 ¶1.  Summary:  We could have an opportunity to advance 
cooperation with Russia through the OSCE in Central Asia and 
potentially open a crack in Russian opposition to OSCE 
training inside Afghanistan.  In an unusually warm and 
persistent manner, Russian ambassador Anvar Azimov has 
requested a U.S. proposal for joint U.S.-Russian training on 
countering transnational threats to be conducted somewhere in 
Central Asia, hinting that this might lead to similar 
training in Kabul.  Mission sees this as a potential 
opportunity to advance US policy goals on "anchoring" 
Afghanistan in Central Asia and promoting greater regional 
cooperation through the OSCE on Afghanistan.  Action Request: 
 Mission requests guidance on response to the Russian 
request.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  The political dialogue at the OSCE on European Security 
("the Corfu Process") could potentially open new areas of 
cooperation with Russia as part of the "reset."  In December, 
the U.S. and Russia co-sponsored a highly-symbolic 
Ministerial decision on transnational threats, summarizing 
much of the Corfu Process discussions on this 
cross-dimensional topic and calling for enhanced efforts to 
address these threats, particularly through greater 
cooperation with OSCE Partner states (including Afghanistan). 
 As a USOSCE initiative, the two delegations in Vienna began 
discussing shortly afterwards projects that the two countries 
could promote to implement this decision, with joint training 
in Central Asia under the auspices of the OSCE as a potential 
next step. 
 
¶3.  The Russian ambassador raised the issue again with the 
Charge on January 13 and asked for a written proposal for 
joint training in Central Asia, with his preference being for 
the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and for the OSCE Border 
Management Staff College in Dushanbe as a second option. 
Going further, he asserted that he might be able to use this 
first step to convince Moscow to change its long-standing 
opposition to OSCE training inside Afghanistan, with joint 
training in Kabul as a second step.  Asked if he had run the 
joint training idea past Moscow, Azimov said he had done so 
informally, but more details are needed.  The Charge 
mentioned that she had also raised the possibility informally 
in Washington (note: primarily S/SRAP and EUR/RPM).  Options 
for joint training could include counternarcotics, border 
monitoring, counterterrorism, and travel document security. 
 
¶4.  On January 18, on the margins of the Security Committee 
meeting, a member of the Russian delegation followed up with 
a specific proposal for counternarcotics training, suggesting 
the Dushanbe site.  Finally, at the opening Corfu Process 
discussion January 19, Azimov announced to the 
delegations--without consulting us and with little context 
--that &it is no secret8 that the United States and Russia 
are jointly preparing a project to implement the co-sponsored 
ministerial decision. 
 
¶5.  Considerable &spade work8 will be necessary to identify 
the right type of project for such joint training.  Post 
intends to work with the OSCE Secretariat to review ongoing 
training activities and proposed initiatives to identify 
opportunities for this training.  In individual discussions 
with the OSCE Mission Heads from Central Asian in Vienna last 
week, we pressed them on the need to actively seek out ways 
to involve Afghanistan in their efforts, particularly with 
respect to border management, counterterrorism and 
counternarcotics.  Poloffs also met with the Center for 
Conflict Prevention Borders Unit last week to review their 
existing and planned activities related to Afghanistan. 
 
¶6.  In another positive move towards greater OSCE involvement 
in Afghanistan, the Kazakhstani CiO informed us January 19 
that they have identified an individual in their Embassy in 
Kabul who will serve  as a focal point for OSCE activities 
with the Afghan authorities. 
 
¶7.  Comment:  An old-school Soviet, Azimov usually opposes 
any idea put forth by the U.S., so his unusual warmth and 
insistence on receiving a formal proposal with more details 
suggests that this is not his personal initiative. 
Additionally, we and Canada both noted a change in normally 
tough Russian language on OSCE work in Afghanistan during 
Azimov's response to Kazakhstani FM Saudabayev at the 
inaugural PC January 14 where many participating States 
emphasized the need to provide greater technical assistance 
to Afghanistan.  Whereas in the past Azimov has never missed 
an opportunity to repeat Russian objections to OSCE training 
inside Afghanistan, this time, after mentioning training at 
Domodedovo, he went on to say "but we are open to other 
 
USOSCE 00000011  002 OF 002 
 
 
possibilities." 
 
¶8.  Comment continued:  We may be reading too much into this 
overture, but the Mission believes we should respond 
positively to this potential opening, while keeping in mind 
comments from OSCE Secretariat staff and OSCE mission heads 
in Central Asia, who have told us that training is often 
hindered by Afghan disorganization and Central Asian 
governments, reluctance to involve Afghans in activities 
within their countries.  Although we suspect the Russians 
would like to do joint counternarcotics training and perhaps 
also promote their interest in holding another visible, but 
not very productive, counternarcotics conference in Vienna 
this year, we have the opportunity to drive this in a 
direction that we believe would be most beneficial for the 
region and our long-term policy objectives. 
 
¶9.  Action Request:  Azimov is expecting a response, at least 
informally, on whether to expect this idea of joint training 
to be made concrete.  Mission requests guidance from 
Washington on how to proceed. 
FULLER