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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/07/10 
 
INDEX: 
(1) PM Hatoyama to appoint "anti-Ozawa" Yukio Edano as his assistant 
in charge of administrative reform (Mainichi) 
 
(2) Hatoyama administration's diplomatic issues (Asahi) 
 
(3) "Japan@the World" column: The administration's diplomatic 
ability put to test (Asahi) 
 
(4) Alliance of subordination -- 50 years after revision of 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Part 1): Futenma issue (Akahata) 
 
(5) MOFA sets up office to accelerate study on accession to Hague 
Convention (Asahi) 
 
(6) Local suffrage for permanent foreign residents: Fear of current 
status of Japan's ethnic Koreans becoming perennial (Yomiuri) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) PM Hatoyama to appoint "anti-Ozawa" Yukio Edano as his assistant 
in charge of administrative reform 
 
MAINICHI (Top play) (Full) 
Evening, January 1, 2010 
 
Nariyuki Tanaka, Tetsuya Kageyama 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama began on Jan. 7 arrangements to 
appoint former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Policy Research 
Committee Chairman Yukio Edano, 45, as his assistant. Edano will be 
in charge of administrative reform, and Hatoyama intends to ask him 
to support the work of State Minister for Administrative Reform 
Yoshito Sengoku, who will be serving concurrently as state minister 
for national strategy after Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii's 
resignation. A formal cabinet decision on this appointment will be 
made shortly. Edano is one of the most prominent DPJ Diet members 
who distance themselves from Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa. He has 
not held an important post so far, but will now occupy an 
influential position in the government. 
 
Edano was the overall coordinator for the government's budget 
screening process last November and took the lead in negotiating 
with the ministries. In December, he became one of the 12 Diet 
members tasked with assisting the National Strategy Office and 
Government Revitalization Unit. 
 
However, the Diet Law stipulates that only 17 Diet members can join 
the administration as prime minister or cabinet ministers, 22 as 
senior vice ministers, 26 as parliamentary secretaries, 5 as prime 
minister's assistants, and 3 as deputy chief cabinet secretaries, 
making a total of 74. Therefore, Edano had not been able to join the 
administration legally up until now. With his appointment as 
assistant to the Prime Minister, he will now be able to participate 
in government meetings, among other things. It is expected that he 
will take charge of the reform of independent administrative 
agencies and public welfare corporations after his formal 
appointment. 
 
Edano is a leading Diet member who distances himself from Ozawa. In 
the presidential election of September 2008, he had once indicated 
his intention to run against Ozawa. It is believed that the 
 
TOKYO 00000042  002 OF 010 
 
 
appointment of Edano is at the request of Sengoku, who also 
distances himself from Ozawa. It is possible that this may annoy the 
Ozawa camp. 
 
Two close confidants of Hatoyama, Yoshikatsu Nakayama and Katsuya 
Ogawa were appointed as prime minister's assistants at the time the 
Hatoyama cabinet was launched in September. Satoshi Arai, who became 
an assistant in October, is a close aide to Deputy Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan and is in charge of national strategy. Seiji Aizaka, who 
took up the post in December, is responsible for decentralization of 
power, assisting Internal Affairs Minister Kazuhiro Haraguchi. 
 
(2) Hatoyama administration's diplomatic issues 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
January 6, 2010 
 
Futenma relocation:  High hurdle for continued use of Futenma 
heliport facility 
 
Keiichi Kaneko 
 
In reference to the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air 
Station in his press conference at the beginning of the year, Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama clearly stated on Jan. 4: "I promise to 
reach a conclusion by a certain date." He intends to decide on a 
replacement site for the Futenma base and reach an agreement with 
the U.S. government in May. However, gaining understanding from 
local municipalities is the main premise for the central government 
to decide on a relocation site. In addition, it is extremely 
difficult for the government to obtain the U.S. government's consent 
to its plan. 
 
As the second-best plan, the idea is being floated that the 
continued use of the present Futenma heliport facility should be 
allowed after relocating part of training activities based on 
Futenma to an island in the prefecture. Yet, the government has to 
clear two hurdles: one is to secure local understanding and the 
other is to convince Washington. 
 
Last fall Hatoyama could have made an anguished decision to go along 
with the plan to relocate Futenma to the Henoko district in Nago 
City, Okinawa Prefecture. However, he postponed a conclusion for the 
present because he gave priority to maintaining the coalition 
framework. Last December Democratic Party of Japan Secretary General 
Ichiro Ozawa expressed a negative view toward the relocation of 
Futenma to Henoko. As a result, the possibility of implementing the 
existing plan has gradually diminished. 
 
One result of the change in government is probably that the new 
government has obtained the opportunity to review the diplomatic 
strategies of former governments, Japan-U.S. relations, and the 
presence of U.S. forces in Japan. Although we feel impatient, we 
should wait for the Hatoyama administration to find a better 
option. 
 
Secret deal issue: ban on introduction of nuclear weapons to become 
focal point 
 
Masahiro Tsuruoka 
 
This year, the committee of experts, chaired by University of Tokyo 
 
TOKYO 00000042  003 OF 010 
 
 
Professor Shinichi Kitaoka, will formulate a report on the Foreign 
Ministry's investigation into secret Japan-U.S. agreements, 
including the secret accord on introducing nuclear weapons. This 
year also will likely be a year of Japan's nuclear policy to be 
called into question head on. 
 
The secret accord on introducing nuclear weapons was reached between 
Tokyo and Washington in 1960 when the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was 
revised. The secret nuclear deal stipulates that calls at Japanese 
ports by U.S. ships and by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons do not 
fall into the category of nuclear introduction, for which prior 
consultations between the two countries are required. The Japanese 
side's documents supporting the existence of records on discussions 
were discovered through the ministry's investigation. In connection 
with the secret accord concluded in 1972 when Okinawa was returned 
to Japanese rule, the document, signed by then Prime Minister Eisaku 
Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon, had been kept as a personal 
memento of Sato. 
 
If the committee acknowledges the existence of the secret accord on 
introducing nuclear weapons, the discrepancy with the three 
non-nuclear principles of not producing, possessing, or allowing 
entry of nuclear weapons to Japan will become the subject of 
debate. 
 
During the campaign for the House of Representatives election last 
year, Hatoyama pledged to call for Washington's assurance not to 
bring nuclear weapons into Japan. Until the House of Councillors 
election this summer, he has to give consideration to the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), one of the junior coalition partners, which 
has called for giving the three non-nuclear principles legal force. 
However, the legislating of the three principles goes against the 
U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND). Moreover, such 
a move might have an impact on the foundation of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance, which shelters Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 
 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave Japan warning last 
autumn, saying: "Japan should not have any negative influence on 
extended deterrence or Japan-U.S. relations." Hatoyama will be 
forced to make a tough decision. 
 
(3) "Japan@the World" column: The administration's diplomatic 
ability put to test 
 
ASAHI (Pages 1, 15) (Full) 
January 7, 2010 
 
Yoichi Funabashi, chief editor 
 
Will the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration grow into an 
administration with vitality? This year will truly be a year in 
which it will be put to the test. 
 
The toughest test will be foreign and security policy. Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama stated at his news conference on Jan. 4: "In 
a sense, half of national administration has to do with foreign 
policy and security." It is evident that he had the conflict with 
the U.S. over the Okinawa base issues in mind when he made this 
statement. If the administration suffers a major setback in 
Japan-U.S. relations, the DPJ may be dismissed by the people as a 
political party not qualified to handle foreign policy. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000042  004 OF 010 
 
 
The world is undergoing major changes. Both the bipolar world of the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the unipolar world 
dominated by the U.S. in the post-Cold War period have ended. 
International affairs have begun to revolve around the G-20 born 
after the Lehman shock and the G-2 consisting of the U.S. and China. 
Along with the power shift toward the newly emerging economies, such 
as China and India, a power fusion is taking shape, under which the 
U.S. and China are moving toward some form of symbiotic 
relationship. For over the past 30 years, Japan has focused its 
global policy on the G-7 or G-8, the club of the industrialized 
nations (Japan and Western countries), but this policy is hollowing 
out with the advent of the G-20 and the G-2. 
 
However, it remains unclear to what extent the G-20 or the G-2 can 
serve as a framework for world order in the 21st Century. Both may 
end as mere processes for crisis management. 
 
What is certain is the rise of Asia and the Pacific and the onset of 
the low-carbon society. In that sense, the DPJ administration was 
right in advocating as policy ideals the "East Asian community" and 
"25 percent reduction in Japan's greenhouse gas emissions." 
 
However, how can these ideals be realized? What diplomatic 
groundwork is required for their realization? Before taking the 
reins of government the DPJ had not held a proper debate on these 
ideals. It now has to undergo "on the job training." 
 
It appears that the world economy is finally moving toward 
post-Lehman shock recovery. 
 
The newly emerging economies, particularly China, are driving this 
process. According to the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the 
newly emerging economies and the developing countries contributed to 
as much as 80 percent of economic growth after the Lehman shock. 
Growth in Asia and the Pacific has been particularly strong. The 
movement of wealth from Europe and America to Asia and the Pacific 
is also proceeding apace. 
 
Along with this, the influence of the newly emerging nations has 
also grown. A new force termed BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, 
and China) ascended the international stage at the 15th Conference 
of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(COP15) in Copenhagen in late 2009. They jointly resisted the 
"legally binding emission reduction goals" proposed by the advanced 
nations. Earlier the term BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 
was used to refer to the major high-growth nations, but this was 
mere market jargon. The BASIC is a bloc that speaks out on global 
governance. This one is a political term. 
 
For sure, this is probably a natural occurrence, since for the first 
time in history we are in an era when the majority of the world's 
population is speaking up on the world order. 
 
Asia and the Pacific hold the key to this process. Nine of the G-20 
are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
conference. As U.S. President Barack Obama stated, "Growth relying 
excessively on U.S. consumption and Asia's exports to the U.S. is no 
longer sustainable." Asia needs to generate demand within the region 
and promote closer regional integration. 
 
It is important to share the fruits of such growth and opportunities 
with the world. If only to promote this process, Japan needs to make 
 
TOKYO 00000042  005 OF 010 
 
 
greater efforts to push for free trade agreements (FTAs) with Asian 
countries, as well as with the U.S. Yet neither the "new growth 
strategy" presented by the Hatoyama administration nor the section 
on the Japan-U.S. FTA in the DPJ's manifesto make mention of a 
Japan-ROK FTA (or a Japan-China-ROK FTA, to go a step further), 
which would form the core of the "East Asian community." This is 
probably from concern about the liberalization of agricultural 
imports. But then, this is also precisely where a change of 
administration can make a difference. Another issue is that the APEC 
members of the G-20 should begin unofficial consultations to work 
for more organic links between APEC and the G-20. Fortunately, Japan 
will be hosting the APEC Summit this November. This will be an 
opportunity for Japanese diplomacy to play its role. 
 
Coming to the advent of the G-2, no such organization exists at this 
point. Both the U.S. and China deny any such special relationship. 
The U.S.-China dialogue, in a way, is necessary because they have 
more issues on which they are in conflict than issues they are able 
to agree on. In spite of this, their financial integration has given 
birth to a de facto G-2. 
 
China purchases U.S. bonds with the dollars from its trade surplus 
with the U.S., and the U.S. funds its fiscal deficits with these 
bonds. Although the U.S. wants to see the appreciation of the 
Chinese yuan, imprudent initiation of this process may lead to a 
sharp decline in the value of the dollar. The U.S.-China 
relationship has come to be called MADE (economic mutually assured 
destruction), the economic version of the nuclear "balance of 
terror" termed MAD (mutually assured destruction). 
 
There is an increasing number of areas in which the U.S. will 
require China's cooperation, not just in economic growth, trade, and 
finance, but also with regard to nuclear weapons, terrorism, global 
warming, building of peace, and so forth. Harvard University 
Professor Iain Johnston observes that, "China has become an insider 
in the international system." The G-2 can be regarded as the U.S.'s 
means to make China even more of an insider in order to rationalize 
the U.S. world strategy. 
 
For sure, there is strong criticism of China in the U.S. If the U.S. 
pushes forward with "integration" unwelcome by its own people, it 
may be at risk of being driven into isolationism. Furthermore, 
depending on the direction the G-2 takes and how it is handled, this 
may destabilize relations with the European Union (EU), Japan, 
Russia, India, and other countries. 
 
Japan can serve as an "automatic stabilizer" between the U.S. and 
China by stabilizing its own relations with these two countries. It 
should think about a policy dialogue among Japan, the U.S., and 
China to promote this process. Here it should not be forgotten that 
the Asian and Pacific nations regard the Japan-U.S. alliance as a 
public property in the region. The ROK, Australia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam have conveyed their "concerns" unofficially to the U.S. 
regarding the Hatoyama administration's view of the U.S. and policy 
toward the U.S. This should be taken seriously. 
 
Certain Obama administration officials think that there is a latent 
tendency of "breaking away from the U.S." in the Hatoyama 
administration's foreign policy and are skeptical about the real 
substance of its policy. Is this in response to the decline of U.S. 
power? A reflection of the growing economic dependence on China? The 
beginnings of an independent policy line? Or is it an indication of 
 
TOKYO 00000042  006 OF 010 
 
 
isolationism? World Bank President Robert Zoellick, who came to 
Japan via India last month, shook his head and asked: "Both China 
and India are devising ways to use the U.S. However, Japan seems to 
be thinking of ways to break away from the U.S. Why is that?" 
 
Japan will have to rebuild the foundation of its foreign policy in 
the age of the G-20 and the G-2. This foundation will consist of 
regional integration in Asia and the Pacific and the Japan-U.S. 
alliance. It will have to reconfirm the Japan-U.S. alliance as a 
force for stability and deterrence in the region, as well as 
redefine the alliance in the new era after the Cold War and the 
post-Cold War period. Japan will need to have such juggling skills. 
 
A transition period offers both opportunities and risks. Japan 
should not act recklessly. Single-mindedness is also dangerous. "On 
the job training" is fine. Japan should acquire the skills for 
survival by adopting a multifaceted approach in dealing with issues. 
 
 
(4) Alliance of subordination -- 50 years after revision of 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Part 1): Futenma issue 
 
AKAHATA (Page 1 & 2) (Excerpts) 
January 3, 2010 
 
U.S. initially calls for relocation of Futenma base 
 
Half a century has passed since the current Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty was signed on Jan. 19, 1960. Now that many military alliances 
across the world have been dissolved or have become dysfunctional, 
the Akahata is investigating from multiple angles the current state 
of the Japan-U.S. alliance, which contains strong elements of risk 
and subordination. The investigation begins with the issue of 
relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. 
 
A gray U.S. military helicopter flew over children at the Aragusuku 
Children Center in Ginowan City, which is located only 100 meters 
from the Futenma Air Station -- the base of the U.S. Marine Corps 
Helicopter Squadron. The center has been designated as an evacuation 
site in the event of a U.S. military aircraft crashing on Second 
Futenma Elementary School, which is adjacent to the Futenma base. 
 
A female employee said: "Students and their parents who transfer 
here from other schools are surprised at the noise of helicopters, 
which sounds like the noise on a battlefield. Some families move 
away after a year or so because they can't take the noise." 
 
Hatsu Gima, 70, a worker at the day nursery "Akachan (baby) House," 
also said: "It's hard because the roaring sound wakes up the 
sleeping children and they start crying. We have suffered the 
thundering noise of helicopters for too long. I want to be rid of 
this noise as soon as possible. Everybody is hoping to live in a 
quiet town." 
 
Japan and the U.S. took up the relocation of the Futenma base for 
the first time in 1988, seven years before an incident in which a 
schoolgirl was raped by U.S. Marines in 1995. An electronic mail 
dated March 6 in 1995 that was circulated in the Marine Corps 
Headquarters in Okinawa notes: "(Then) Okinawa Governor Junji 
Nishime cited problems with the seven sites whose return (his 
government) has demanded when he visited (the U.S.) in 1988. One of 
the sites was the Futenma base" 
 
TOKYO 00000042  007 OF 010 
 
 
 
In response to the request from Nishime, the Japanese government and 
the U.S. military agreed to hold meetings of a facility adjustment 
subcommittee under the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. 
 
In the latter half of 1970s, the Marine Corps Helicopter Squadron 
was moved to the Futenma base from the Hamby Air Field (in 
Chatan-cho) when the airfield was returned to Japan. Around that 
time, the population in the city also began to increase sharply 
(from 54,000 in fiscal 1975 to 90,000 at present). 
 
The frequency of occurences of noise generated by helicopters grew 
from about 18,000 in fiscal 1985 to over 30,000 in fiscal 1995. 
Crashes involving Futenma-based aircraft have occurred one after 
another. Even Junji Nishime, who is a leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party's conservative politics in Okinawa, had to demand 
the return of the Futenma base because it has become "the most 
dangerous base in the world." 
 
The U.S. side noted in a document produced by the Japan-U.S. 
subcommittee in 1990: "It would be possible to return the Futenma 
base on the condition that the facility would be relocated to an 
appropriate site," according to the electronic mail. 
 
U.S. had information of illegal state of Futenma 
 
Following an agreement reached between then Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale to return the Futenma 
airfield to Japan, the U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters prepared a 
document in which it was noted that "the return of the Futenma base 
would mean the loss of the U.S. military's capabilities." 
 
On the Futenma base, there is a 2,800 meter-long runway, which can 
accommodate even the takeoff and landing of fighters and large 
transport planes, so the base must have great strategic value for 
the U.S. military. 
 
Despite this fact, why was the U.S. looking for possible relocation 
sites before 1995? The reason can be found in the U.S. Marine Corps 
Futenma Air Station Master Plan drawn up by the U.S. Department of 
the Navy. 
 
In this document, the phrase "clear zone" appears frequently. The 
document says: "The clear zone of the Futenma Air Station is an area 
in which the safety of takeoffs and landings is ensured, with no 
obstacles." The size of the clear zone is set at 450 to 690 meters 
wide and about 900 meters long from the edge of a runway. Under the 
U.S. Federal Aviation Act, it is prohibited to build any structures 
in a clear zone. 
 
But Ginowan Municipal Government's Policy Office head Shigeo 
Yamauchi said: "Based on our examination of a map and the basic 
register of residents after obtaining the master plan in 2007, we 
found 3,600 citizens residing in and about 800 houses and 18 public 
facilities, hospitals, and day-care centers situated in the clear 
zone." 
 
The master plan also includes the results of an examination of the 
details of the buildings in the clear zone. The U.S. military was 
aware of the "illegal state" of the Futenma base as of 1992. 
 
The U.S. military expanded the Futenma functions as much as possible 
 
TOKYO 00000042  008 OF 010 
 
 
in and after the 1970s. As a result, "the clear zone, which had been 
within the base, has been expanded beyond the base site," said 
Okinawa University Emeritus Professor Moriteru Arasaki. 
 
In August 2004, a U.S. military helicopter crashed into the campus 
of Okinawa International University. It was almost miraculous that 
nobody was killed in this accident. Parliamentary Defense Secretary 
Akihisa Nagashima recently made this comment: "The Futenma base is a 
vulnerable part of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Another incident could 
immediately blow up the bilateral alliance." 
 
(5) MOFA sets up office to accelerate study on accession to Hague 
Convention 
 
ASAHI (Page 6) (Slightly abridged) 
January 7, 2010 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is moving forward in its 
study on Japan's accession to the Hague Convention, which sets down 
rules on "child abduction" cases in which one parent in a failed 
international marriage takes a child to his or her home country 
without the other parent's consent, including rules on returning 
children to their countries of residence. It has created an office 
in the ministry in charge of this matter and will engage in 
consultations shortly with the U.S., which is involved in the 
largest number of cases pertaining to Japan. However, there are 
still many issues that need to be resolved before Japan can accede 
to the convention. 
 
"Child abduction" has become a problem for the Western countries 
that are signatories to the Convention, and at meetings of foreign 
ministers and on other occasions there has been growing pressure on 
Japan to sign the treaty. 
 
Since Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada assumed office, he has 
indicated that Japan will "actively" consider the matter of signing 
the treaty. Last December, MOFA set up a new "office on issues of 
parental rights on children" staffed by nine officials in charge of 
Europe and America and international treaties. The new office will 
not only deal with cases at issue with other countries, but will 
also be responsible for studying Japan's accession to the treaty in 
the future. 
 
MOFA has also set up with France a forum for consultations on 
specific cases. At its first meeting in December, the French side 
provided a list of 35 cases and explained eight serious cases in 
which the Japanese mothers who took the children away refused the 
French fathers' requests to visit the children or even refused to 
accept letters and photos from them. The Japanese side promised to 
offer assistance, such as by relaying messages. 
 
According to the "parental rights office," foreign governments have 
reported the following numbers of cases of "child abduction": 73 
from the U.S., 33 from the UK, and 36 from Canada (as of October 
2009). 
 
However, there are many hurdles to clear before Japan can sign the 
treaty. Since there are reportedly many cases in which Japanese 
wives fled home to Japan with their children because their former 
husbands have inflicted violence on them, some people feel strongly 
that these mothers and children need protection. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000042  009 OF 010 
 
 
Furthermore, the concept of family is different between Japan and 
the Western countries. While the Western countries recognize "joint 
parental authority," under which both parents exercise parental 
rights, Japan only recognizes "sole parental authority," under which 
only one parent has parental rights, and there is a deep-rooted 
notion that the mother should have custody of the children. 
 
Legislation will also be required before Japan can accede to the 
Hague Convention. However, only MOFA officials are currently engaged 
in consultations with the U.S. and France from the Japanese side, 
and the officials of the Justice Ministry and courts are not 
involved. In reality, MOFA can only serve as a "liaison" for now. 
 
(6) Local suffrage for permanent foreign residents: Fear of current 
status of Japan's ethnic Koreans becoming perennial 
 
YOMIURI (Page 13) (Full) 
January 6, 2010 
 
Taikin Tei, Tokyo Metropolitan University professor 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Ozawa has 
expressed his intention to submit a bill granting local suffrage to 
permanent foreign residents this year. I would like to present two 
reasons that I am opposed to the bill. 
 
The local suffrage bill for permanent foreign residents appears to 
be generally understood as Japanese political circles' favorable 
response to a request filed by Japan's ethnic Koreans, but this is a 
misconception. Many ethnic Koreans intend to continue living in 
Japan. They want to obtain Japanese nationality if an opportunity 
arises. It has long been said that there are 600,000 ethnic Koreans 
in Japan with special permanent residency status. However, the 
number has now dwindled to approximately 400,000. That is because 
nearly 10,000 ethnic Koreans annually obtain Japanese nationality. 
Ethnic Koreans who marry Japanese do not let their children have 
Korean or North Korean nationalities. 
 
Most ethnic Koreans were born in Japan. They have South Korean or 
North Korean nationalities. However, they lack a sense of belonging 
to their home countries and awareness that they are foreigners in 
Japan. If local suffrage is granted to such people, their 
ill-defined status will continue perpetually. They are dummy Koreans 
and dummy foreigners. They find it difficult to explain their 
status. The local suffrage bill for permanent foreign resident is 
intended to preserve ethnic Koreans as foreigners eternally. 
 
Second, we must oppose the bill, because there is fear that local 
suffrage for permanent foreign residents will encourage foreign 
government's interference in Japan's domestic politics. According to 
the statistics compiled at the end of 2008, there are 420,000 
special permanent residents - those who came to Japan before or 
during the War from Japan's former colonies, such as the Korean 
Peninsula and Taiwan. There are 490,000 general permanent foreign 
residents. Most of them are from China, Brazil or Peru. Chinese 
permanent residents are likely to increase in the future. 
 
Some say that since the suffrage bill for foreign permanent 
residents only covers local elections, it would not affect the basis 
of the sovereignty of the people. However, the borderline between 
national politics and local politics is unclear. Since such issues 
as the Self-Defense Forces, U.S. military bases, nuclear power 
 
TOKYO 00000042  010 OF 010 
 
 
plants, the Takeshima/Dokdo islets, and the Senkaku islands 
(referred to as Diaoyu by China and Tiaoyutai by Taiwan) are closely 
linked to national policies, there is a strong possibility of 
permanent foreign residents voting in ways that conflict with 
Japan's diplomatic and security policies. 
 
Will the Chinese government be able to remain indifferent to 
permanent Chinese residents in Japan? There may be occasions when 
the Chinese government politically tries to use them, as the South 
Korean and the North Korea governments did. Immigration meant 
separation from home countries in the past. However, a situation in 
which immigrants maintain not only cultural bonds with their home 
countries but also political bonds is seen throughout the world. 
There are people who believe that the Japanese archipelago does not 
belong only to the Japanese both in Japan and outside Japan. 
 
It is very interesting that the Korean Residents Union in Japan 
systematically stepped up its efforts (to influence) Japan's 
national politics during last year's Lower House election campaign. 
They reportedly invited candidates running on the tickets of leading 
political parties to exchange views with them and urged them to 
support the idea of granting local suffrage to permanent foreign 
residents. I could have predicted that the Korean Residents Union in 
Japan would demand rights to vote in national election sooner or 
later. Their behavior seen during the Lower House campaign period 
was indeed a preparatory exercise for that. 
 
In the meantime, Japan's ethnic South Koreans will be able to take 
part in national elections in South Korea starting in 2012 following 
the amendment to that nation's public office election law. They will 
be able to exercise their right to vote in South Korea's 
presidential elections and general elections. As a result of this, 
however, they are bound to come under fire for receiving special 
privileges. 
 
ROOS