VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #0152/01 0252244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 252244Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8940
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS TOKYO 000152 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SAMORE, HOLGATE, CONNERY; DOE FOR NA-1 D'AGOSTINO, 
NA-4 AOKI, NA-20 BAKER, NA-24 WHITNEY, NA-25 MUSTIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PTER ASEC JA
SUBJECT: DOE DEPUTY U/S AOKI DISCUSSIONS WITH GOJ ON 
NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT, PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE 
 
REF: TOKYO 120 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  During meetings with DOE Deputy Under 
Secretary for Counterterrorism Steven Aoki January 20-22, GOJ 
officials discussed Japan's expected role at the Nuclear 
Security Summit, and reaffirmed their intent to expand 
bilateral cooperation on nuclear safeguards and security 
technology, as declared in the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement 
last November.  Discussions with several ministries and 
specialized agencies also revealed what appeared to be 
incremental progress in strengthening the security of nuclear 
facilities in Japan.  One surprising development was a clear 
statement from the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that 
it would support a bilateral arrangement for the sharing of 
classified or other sensitive information on nuclear and 
radiological security.  On another issue of longstanding U.S. 
interest, the Cabinet Office responded favorably to a 
proposal to deepen bilateral cooperation on emergency 
response, including measures aimed at responding to potential 
nuclear/radiological terrorist threats.  End summary. 
 
----------------------- 
Nuclear Security Summit 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a meeting January 20, MOFA Director General for 
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Toshio Sano told 
Aoki, who was in Tokyo for an International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) seminar on strengthening nuclear security in 
Asia, that Japan was planning for the Prime Minister to 
attend the Nuclear Security Summit in April.  Many of DG 
Sano's questions were directed towards planning for the Prime 
Minister's attendance.  In addition, he noted that Japan had 
submitted two comments on the draft communique and work plan: 
 one on making sure language enabled and did not hinder 
peaceful uses and one on personnel.  He asked about the 
schedule for receipt of a revised communique/work plan prior 
to the February meeting in The Hague and said he hoped both 
documents could be finished at that time. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Sano also asked about the Summit relative to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference 
(RevCon), indicating that he thought the Summit could be used 
to influence the RevCon.  In reply, del noted the intention 
was to keep the Summit separate and narrowly focused so as 
not to be viewed as a precursor to the RevCon, or as a 
mechanism to pre-work RevCon issues, although the U.S. hopes 
positive momentum from the Summit will carry over to the 
RevCon. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Referring to his meeting with White House WMD 
Coordinator Gary Samore in December, Sano said he had not 
been able to provide complete information regarding what 
Japan is doing domestically to secure nuclear materials, and 
went on to describe improvements that Japan has made since 
9/11.  He pointed out that close ties now exist between 
Japanese Government regulators and industry on security. 
With the likely usage of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel by all of the 
Japanese utilities, the Government has decided to require all 
nuclear reactors, in addition to Japan's fuel cycle 
facilities, to receive 24/7 protection from on-site armed 
police officers reinforced by Coast Guard patrols offshore. 
Japanese laws were revised in 2005 to comply with 
INFCIRC/225/Revision 4, establishing domestic requirements 
for a design basis threat, a physical protection inspection 
system, and information confidentiality.  Moreover, Japan is 
conducting security exercises and implementing a radioisotope 
export licensing system and registration system.  Aoki made 
the point that while the steps Sano described were all 
positive, perception still lags reality and the Summit would 
be an opportunity for Japan to go on record regarding its 
efforts to improve the security of its nuclear power program. 
 While Aoki referred several times to the idea of making 
announcements at the Summit, Sano remained noncommittal. 
(Note:  Before Aoki's arrival in Japan, Sano told embassy 
officials (reftel) that Japan did not see the Summit as a 
"pledge" conference and was not planning to make any 
announcement regarding security at Japanese nuclear 
facilities.  In his meeting with Aoki, however, Sano did not 
repeat this message, even though Aoki brought up the point 
about announcements throughout the conversation.  End note.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In a subsequent informal conversation on the 
margins of the IAEA seminar, Sano told Aoki that he had been 
tasked with identifying deliverables for the Summit.  He had 
already decided to put forward the cooperative activities on 
 
 
safeguards and security identified in the Obama-Hatoyama 
statement and a Japanese offer to host a regional training 
center for nuclear security experts.  Aoki suggested that a 
comprehensive overview of Japanese actions to improve 
physical protection standards and agreements on research 
reactor fuel conversion could constitute another deliverable. 
 
------------------------ 
Cabinet Office Support for Summit, Emergency Response 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In a meeting January 22, Deputy Chief Cabinet 
Secretary for Crisis Management Ito told Aoki that Japan is 
actively preparing for the Nuclear Security Summit and will 
do whatever it can to support it.  Aoki expressed 
appreciation for Japan's leadership role for the Summit and 
noted the U.S. looks forward to deepening cooperation on 
security and counterterrorism issues.  Ito said Japan 
acknowledges the nuclear terrorism threat is real and Japan 
wants to work with the U.S. on counterterrorism and emergency 
response.  In the meeting with Ito, as well as in earlier 
discussions with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (MEXT), the Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA), and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
(JAEA), Aoki reiterated the U.S. offer to hold joint 
workshops and exercises on nuclear/radiological emergency 
response.  Aoki said Japanese officials would be welcome to 
observe U.S. exercises at the national, regional and facility 
level.  Ito recalled that the Cabinet Office had planned to 
send observers to the Empire 09 exercise last June, but the 
officials had been forced to remain in Japan to deal with the 
H1N1 outbreak last spring.  Aoki briefly described the U.S. 
proposal, originally made in 2007, to hold a workshop in 
Japan in which U.S. experts could demonstrate 
nuclear/radiological search equipment and techniques.  He 
went on to say that, while it had not been possible to hold 
the workshop, the U.S. offer still stands.  Ito responded 
that he would look into what had prevented Japan from 
accepting the U.S. offer and Aoki promised to write Ito a 
letter describing the workshop proposal in more detail, 
together with any offer the U.S. could make for Japanese 
observers to attend a future U.S. exercise. 
 
------------------------ 
Nuclear Security in Japan:  Incremental, but significant 
progress? 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In contrast to previous occasions, when GOJ 
officials had given a somewhat defensive response to pressure 
on nuclear security issues, there now seems to be a much 
greater sense of ownership of the nuclear security agenda on 
the part of Japanese Government agencies.  Aoki's meetings 
with DG Sano and with other ministries all revealed 
incremental, but possibly significant, changes in the 
security posture at Japanese facilities.  Using the 
introduction of MOX as a forcing function, Japan has decided 
that all power reactors must adopt security measures 
previously reserved for fuel cycle facilities, including 24/7 
armed police and Coast Guard presence.  Officials of NISA, in 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, on January 22 
appeared comfortable acknowledging the need for armed 
response forces, and posting police on-site at nuclear 
facilities achieves that without requiring fundamental 
changes in Japanese law barring the possession of firearms by 
private entities. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) There were also numerous signs that Japan is making 
positive changes in how government bodies coordinate on 
nuclear security matters.  In their January 22 meeting, NISA 
Deputy Director General for Industrial Safety Shingo Naito 
told Aoki that Japan is enhancing coordination among 
regulatory bodies, security organizations, and facility 
operators.  In one indication of the enhanced coordination, 
Naito said he himself is a former official of the National 
Police Agency.  The previous day, Shintaro Mitarai, Director 
General for Nuclear Security in the Japan Nuclear Energy 
Safety Agency (JNES), which provides technical support to 
NISA, told Aoki that he, too, is a former police official. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In his meetings with both NISA and JNES, Aoki 
stressed the U.S. interest in continuing to expand 
cooperation with Japan and noted that one area of particular 
interest is physical protection performance testing and field 
exercises.  NISA official Shin-ichi Motegi on January 22 
 
 
explained that in the system instituted under Japan's revised 
national law, regulators conduct inspections annually to 
check compliance with regulations and that training and 
exercises are also carried out.  He referred briefly to one 
performance exercise conducted last October, which included 
coordination with local police.  However, he acknowledged 
that Japan needs to conduct such exercises more widely at its 
nuclear facilities. 
 
------------------- 
Information Sharing 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In contrast to previous discussions, DG Sano 
indicated MOFA would support the U.S. and Japan concluding an 
agreement that would allow bilateral exchanges with key 
technical agencies in Japan involving classified or other 
sensitive information on physical protection.  Aoki 
referenced this MOFA position on January 21 while meeting 
with MEXT Deputy Minister Yasutaka Moriguchi and on January 
22 with NISA.  Both ministries indicated they would follow up 
with MOFA, with NISA in particular commenting they were 
unaware of what might have caused MOFA to reconsider its 
previous position that information exchanges should be done 
under existing mechanisms. 
 
------------------------ 
Expanding Nonproliferation, Security Cooperation 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In his meeting with Aoki on January 21, MEXT 
Deputy Minister Moriguchi reaffirmed his ministry's interest 
in expanding cooperation on nuclear detection technology, 
forensics, nonproliferation and security.  Describing MEXT's 
priorities in this area, Moriguchi reiterated the proposal he 
made last October to NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino, 
which included joint development of technologies for 
nondestructive assay of plutonium in spent fuel, ultra-trace 
isotopic measurements, and plutonium in-process monitoring. 
With the proposal having been endorsed by the President and 
Prime Minister last November, it remained for the experts to 
work out details.  To that end, a team from MEXT and JAEA 
will visit Washington and Los Alamos in February to flesh out 
specific themes for increased cooperation.  Moriguchi 
stressed that MEXT wants to make real contributions at the 
technical level in advanced safeguards technology and 
forensics.  He said MEXT has sought funding to support 
expanded cooperation in the fiscal year 2010 budget that the 
Diet will be debating soon and he had "no doubt" the funds 
would be approved since the Prime Minister had already given 
his approval. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Moriguchi also noted MEXT's interest in 
collaborating, in coordination with the IAEA, to offer 
additional training and assistance for human resource 
development in countries with emerging nuclear power 
programs.  In a separate meeting, JAEA Executive Director 
Sohei Okada described human resources development as 
"especially important," saying Japan "definitely" wants to 
see that on the agenda for the upcoming meetings in the U.S. 
on safeguards cooperation.  (Note:  The Japanese emphasis on 
human factors and capacity building seemed to reflect a high 
level of concern about the ability of regulators in nearby 
countries -- e.g., China, Vietnam -- to perform, and a 
corresponding interest in helping with training and other 
human capital issues.  End note.) 
 
------------------------ 
Research Reactor Reduced Enrichment 
------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Moriguchi took the opportunity to raise MEXT's 
concern about the disposition of fuel at the Yayoi research 
reactor.  He noted that discussions with DOE and the Savannah 
River Site had not resulted in much progress and he asked 
Aoki to look into the matter.  Aoki responded that, first, 
the U.S. and Japan had done a lot in the area of research 
reactor conversion and return of U.S.-origin fuel.  He 
suggested Japan might want to consider announcing at an 
appropriate time, possibly at the Summit, the conversion of a 
critical assembly in Kyoto.  As for Yayoi, Aoki countered 
that he understood there were real technical obstacles that 
prevented the material being shipped to Savannah River.  He 
stressed that the USG wants the effort to succeed and DOE 
will continue to work with Japan to find a solution.  Options 
that have been considered included down blending the 
 
 
material, in Japan or in a third country.  Ultimately, Aoki 
added, the solution may come down to resources.  MEXT agreed 
to look at providing funds to support disposition, but asked 
the U.S. to have another look at the technical feasibility of 
returning the fuel to the U.S. 
 
--------------- 
Cradle to Grave 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In his meetings with DG Sano on January 20 and 
with Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Shunsuke Kondo on 
January 22, Aoki gave an update on current U.S. thinking 
about the cradle to grave nuclear fuel management concept. 
He stressed that the USG did not intend this as a challenge 
to states like Japan with existing fuel cycle programs.  Aoki 
noted that U.S. internal deliberations were still in 
relatively early stages.  Kondo discussed a formulation that 
would call for "user countries" to hold ownership stakes in 
regional fuel centers that would provide assurance of supply. 
 
¶15.  This cable was cleared by Deputy Under Secretary Aoki 
prior to his departure from Tokyo. 
 
 
ZUMWALT