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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 000136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/21/10 
 
INDEX: 
(1) MOFA tells SDP: Difficult to arrange inspection tour of U.S. 
military bases in Guam (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(2) SDP team told inspection tour to Guam difficult to arrange 
because U.S. side will only accommodate "government officials"; team 
sent to Iwo Jima (Sankei) 
 
(3) Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano: Possible delay in final solution 
on Futenma relocation beyond May (Sankei) 
 
(4) Three days until Nago mayoral election: Shop owner rejects 
building of new military base (Asahi) 
 
(5) Japan's future course - 50th anniversary of revision of 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Part 2-2): Significance of U.S. military 
presence (Yomiuri) 
 
(6) Japan's future course - 50th anniversary of revision of 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Part 2-3): A sense of solidarity between 
Japanese and U.S. units under the alliance (Yomiuri) 
 
(7) 50-year-old Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; (Part 1): Armed with no 
exit strategy, DPJ administration examines secret pacts; distrust in 
underdeveloped foreign policy deepening (Nikkei) 
 
(8) Actions are more important than a statement (Nikkei) 
 
(9) Interview with Professor Joseph Nye: Further redefinition of 
Japan-U.S. alliance from military, civilian perspectives (Asahi) 
 
(10) Filing suit against foreign companies in Japan to be made 
easier (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) MOFA tells SDP: Difficult to arrange inspection tour of U.S. 
military bases in Guam 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full) 
January 21, 2010 
 
Tokyo - The Social Democratic Party (SDP) disclosed on Jan. 20 that 
it has been told by the U.S. side that its planned inspection tour 
of U.S. military bases in Guam from Jan. 25-27 will be difficult to 
arrange. The SDP was informed in writing by the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was 
notified by the U.S. side on the same day. 
 
The written message cited the following reasons: the bases in Guam 
are very busy and they have no authority to answer questions 
relating to the relocation of the Futenma Air Station. 
 
In reaction to this, SDP House of Representatives member Kantoku 
Teruya said: "The SDP believes that Guam is the best relocation site 
for the Futenma Air Station, so an inspection tour of Guam is 
indispensable. The U.S. side is saying that it can only explain the 
facts (as reasons for rejecting the visit). The facts are enough for 
us. We are furious at this response." The SDP will persist in 
demanding the realization of the inspection tour to Guam. 
 
(2) SDP team told inspection tour to Guam difficult to arrange 
 
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because U.S. side will only accommodate "government officials"; team 
sent to Iwo Jima 
 
SANKEI ONLINE (Full) 
11:52, January 21, 2010 
 
In connection with the issue of the relocation of the U.S. forces' 
Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa), it was learned on 
Jan. 21 that the Andersen Air Force Base has rejected the plan by a 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) team to visit the U.S. territory of 
Guam, which the party regards as a candidate relocation site. This 
was disclosed by DPJ Secretary General Yasumasa Shigeno at a news 
conference on Jan. 21. The reason given by the U.S. side for 
rejecting the visit was that "we can only accommodate government 
officials." 
 
The SDP asked Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano to coordinate 
the visit for them, but Hirano was unsuccessful. Shigeno stated at 
the news conference that the decision not to accept a visit from the 
SDP, which is a ruling coalition party, is "regrettable." He added, 
"If they refuse to accept an SDP team, we will look into the 
possibility of a visit by a delegation of the ruling parties." 
 
Meanwhile, the SDP sent House of Representatives members Kantoku 
Teruya and House of Councillors member Tokushin Yamauchi to Iwo Jima 
(Tokyo) on Jan. 21. The SDP has cited this island, along with Guam, 
as a possible relocation site. 
 
(3) Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano: Possible delay in final solution 
on Futenma relocation beyond May 
 
SANKEI ONLINE (Full) 
12:42, January 21, 2010 
 
At a news conference on the morning of Jan. 21, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Hirofumi Hirano said that with regard to the government's 
commitment to reach a conclusion on the relocation site of the U.S. 
forces' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa) by the end of 
May, "the Japanese government will be in a position to draw up our 
proposal after negotiating with the local governments and the United 
States (in May)," and a final solution based on Japan-U.S. talks may 
be delayed until June or later. 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stated last December that "May is the 
target date for reaching a final solution between Japan and the 
U.S." It appears that there is already disagreement within the 
government on the target date for Japan and the U.S. to reach 
agreement at this early stage. 
 
Discussing the current plan to relocate the Futenma base to the 
coastal area of Camp Schwab, Hirano said: "I don't think the Okinawa 
Governor (Hirokazu Nakaima) has agreed to this." He pointed out that 
while Nakaima agrees to constructing a replacement facility in the 
coastal area of Camp Schwab, he has set the condition of moving the 
runways further offshore than the location under the existing 
relocation plan. Hirano indicated that Nakaima has not agreed to the 
existing plan. 
 
Furthermore, with regard to the "Okinawa base issues examination 
committee" of the government, the Social Democratic Party, and the 
People's New Party, where the committee members are supposed to 
submit their proposals for the relocation site by the end of 
 
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January, Hirano pointed out that there is a possibility that this 
may be delayed until February or later. 
 
(4) Three days until Nago mayoral election: Shop owner rejects 
building of new military base 
 
ASAHI (Page 34) (Full) 
January 21, 2010 
 
Hisatoshi Tanaka 
 
The election campaign vans of the two camps in the mayoral election 
pass every 30 minutes through an intersection in the center of Nago 
City. The loudspeakers blare out the names and theme songs of the 
two candidates. 
 
"Susumu (neophyte candidate Susumu Inamine) moves forward (susumu in 
Japanese)!" 
 
"Go! Go! Yoshikazu (incumbent Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro)." 
 
The Shimabukuro camp was the first to cruise in a campaign van, and 
the Inamine camp followed suit from Jan. 20. There are also groups 
of campaigners marching around holding placards. Shoppers can hardly 
be seen in this area now, but at one time it was the busiest 
shopping district in northern Okinawa. 
 
Morimasa Inamine, 78, sits at the back of his shop plastered with 
posters declaring "closing-down sale" and "everything 300 yen." He 
does not react to the loud noise of the campaign vans. His is a 
variety store selling cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, snacks, and 
so forth. He has operated this business with his wife Chizuko, 79, 
for years. He gets about 10 customers each day. The store, which his 
father started 55 years ago by selling surplus goods from the U.S. 
forces, will close at the end of March. 
 
Construction work to remove the arcade behind his shop started on 
Jan. 18. This area will be redeveloped as a two-story reinforced 
concrete building to house a shopping mall. The total cost of the 
project is approximately 1.6 billion yen, most of which will be 
funded by the northern Okinawa economic development budget, which 
was allocated in return for accepting the relocation of the U.S. 
forces' Futenma Air Station. 
 
While Inamine would like to continue to run his business, rent for a 
shop in the new building will be several times what he is paying 
now. Even though both mayoral candidates pledge a "prosperous city," 
there is no guarantee that shoppers will return. All five of his 
children have grown up. Inamine thinks it's time to close his 
business. 
 
Inamine has kept his distance from elections. He thinks such should 
be the "merchant's ethic." The last time he cast a vote was in the 
1997 referendum on whether to accept the Futenma's replacement 
facility. He voted "no." 
 
At the height of the Battle of Okinawa, he fled into the mountains 
with his mother, elder sister, and younger brother. He has memories 
of the crimes and accidents involving U.S. soldiers after the war. 
"If military bases can bring prosperity, Okinawa would have been 
prosperous a long time ago." 
 
 
TOKYO 00000136  004 OF 011 
 
 
This time he will vote. Since there has been a change of 
administration, a solution to this issue that has profoundly 
affected Nago will be possible. "It is shameful to build yet another 
military base after keeping bases (in Okinawa) for over 60 years." 
 
(5) Japan's future course - 50th anniversary of revision of 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Part 2-2): Significance of U.S. military 
presence 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
January 18, 2010 
 
"If Japan sends a message conveying that the U.S. military is 
unnecessary, as the Philippine government did, (Japan-U.S. 
relations) will inevitably deteriorate." Daniel Inouye, a 
Japanese-American Democratic Senator, made the above remark when he 
met with Liberal Democratic Party President Sadakazu Tanigaki at 
party headquarters on Jan. 15. Inoue was concerned about the current 
state of Japan-U.S. relations, which have been strained over the 
relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. 
 
In the Cold-War era, the Republic of the Philippines was a key 
strategic foothold for the U.S. military. But in 1991 the Philippine 
Senate refused to ratify a treaty designed to allow the continued 
presence of Subic Navy Base. Taking the refusal to mean that the 
Philippines judged the presence of U.S. forces unnecessary, the U.S. 
withdrew its troops from that nation. Afterward, the U.S. military 
significantly reduced its support for the Philippines, and as a 
result, the Chinese military invaded the Spratly (Nansha) Islands, 
over which both China and the Philippines claimed sovereignty. 
Inouye said, "The move to relocate the Futenma facility to an 
isolated island could result in sending the wrong message to the 
U.S. concerning its military presence in Japan." 
 
Under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, U.S. military bases are 
regarded as strongpoints for the defense of Japan and for peace and 
stability in the Far East region. A senior Defense Ministry official 
said: "U.S. Marines have received training, hearing instructors say 
they should be prepared to die for Japan." A senior official of the 
Singaporean government commented: "In view of the East Asian 
situation, the U.S. military presence in Japan is far more 
significant for its neighbors" than was the presence of the Subic 
Navy Base. 
 
In 2003, which marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 
U.S.-South Korea alliance, the U.S. forces in South Korea, which has 
been exposed to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, were 
drastically reorganized under the government of President Roh Moo 
Hyun. At that time, there were 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, 
but the number was reduced to 28,500. The U.S. military unit 
stationed near the demilitarized zone is scheduled for redeployment 
south of Seoul. 
 
Bearing in mind the possibility that North Korea might wage a battle 
against South Korea, many South Koreans, particularly conservatives, 
expect the U.S. to participate in such a battle with the aim of 
preventing casualties among U.S. military personnel stationed near 
the DMZ and their family members. Thus there are concerns that the 
U.S. soldiers' redeployment south of Seoul might signal the U.S. has 
no intention of continuing to commit itself to South Korea's 
protection. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000136  005 OF 011 
 
 
In recent years, East European countries such as Latvia have been 
eager to draw in U.S. forces, against the backdrop of a growing 
Russian military threat. But the U.S. government has made a somewhat 
cool response. A senior Foreign Ministry official explained why the 
U.S. is not eager to protect East European countries: "The U.S. has 
coolly calculated the risk to its own soldiers and their families 
entailed by venturing to protect those countries." 
 
In contrast to countries that recently have keenly sensed a threat, 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's theory of a security arrangement 
without the permanent presence of U.S. forces is close to an 
arm-chair theory. His argument for U.S. troops to be sent to Japan 
only in the event of an emergency demonstrates his different view of 
the significance of the U.S. military presence. 
 
If the U.S. judges it is meaningless to continue to protect Japan, 
the U.S. military will voluntarily withdraw the Marines from 
Okinawa. The common view among experts on security issues, including 
Inouye, a former soldier, is that in such a case, the Senkaku 
Islands, over which China claims sovereignty, will without doubt be 
occupied by the Chinese military." 
 
(6) Japan's future course - 50th anniversary of revision of 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Part 2-3): A sense of solidarity between 
Japanese and U.S. units under the alliance 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
January 19, 2010 
 
Japan and the U.S. will hold a joint exercise (Exercise Keen Edge) 
starting on Jan. 22, based on the scenario of an emergency on the 
Korean Peninsula. The exercise will begin with a scene of 
servicemembers transporting Japanese and American residents in South 
Korea to Japan. 
 
A ballistic missile that they failed to shoot down strikes the Tokyo 
Metropolitan area. U.S. military bases, such as Camp Zama in 
Kanagawa Prefecture and Yokota Air Base in Tokyo, are exposed to 
attacks by terrorists and guerrillas. 
 
The scenario has been kept confidential, so this is only one scene. 
Keen Edge is the largest-ever exercise using computer simulation by 
linking the Defense Ministry's Central Command Post in Ichigaya, 
Tokyo; Self-Defense Force bases across the nation; U.S. Pacific 
Forces in Hawaii; and U.S. forces in South Korea and in Japan via 
the Internet. 
 
Japan and the U.S. prepared the scenario of an emergency on the 
Korean Peninsula, reflecting that recent moves in North Korea are at 
an alert level due to such issues as the transfer of power and 
economic disorder. A senior Defense Ministry official also said: 
"Exhausted with the fight on terror, the U.S. military has failed to 
make full arrangements to respond to contingencies in South Korea 
and in Japan. In the prior coordination process, a U.S. military 
official even told us to increase scenes in which U.S. troops are 
attacked. They are serious." 
 
Joint exercises by the Self-Defense Force (SDF) and the U.S. 
military moved into high gear in the 1980s. At that time, the U.S. 
expected Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" to play an 
important role in containing the Soviet Union. That is why the U.S. 
decided to provide only the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) with 
 
TOKYO 00000136  006 OF 011 
 
 
its state-of-the-art Aegis system. 
 
With the end of the Cold-War and the Gulf War in 1991 as a turning 
point, Japan-U.S. relations significantly changed. Based on the 
judgment there is no need to strengthen SDF troops, who are not 
allowed to engage in operations with U.S. troops, joint drills 
between the U.S. Air Force and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) 
sharply decreased, and the U.S. Air Force began to send reservists 
and state soldiers standing by in the U.S. to joint exercises with 
the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). Remembering the situation at 
that time, the senior Defense Ministry official said: "For the U.S. 
military, which shifted priority to multinational exercises, 
training between the U.S. and Japan was not the first priority." 
 
This situation, however, completely changed in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001. In the Indian Ocean 
and Iraq, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel engaged in operations as 
members of the coalition of the willing. In Japan, the SDF and the 
U.S. military have discussed how to defend key facilities. The 
bilateral relationship has developed to the extent that they discuss 
even equipment and training of special units although such details 
are highly confidential. 
 
Last April, in response to North Korea's launch of the ballistic 
missile Taepodong 2, Joint Staff Chief Ryoichi Oriki, Japan's top 
military officer, talked with U.S. Pacific Command Chief Timothy 
Keating on the phone many times. 
 
Oriki said: "We two commanders were able to confirm information on 
many matters, ranging from moves by the North Korean military to 
unit redeployment in Japan and the U.S. I realized that the 
bilateral alliance is not just a piece of paper; I felt a sense of 
solidarity." 
 
The Japan-U.S. alliance is now being roiled by the relocation of the 
U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. Speaking before 
the GSDF and U.S. military personnel when he visited Japan for an 
exercise with the GSDF last December, Benjamin Mixon, commander of 
U.S. Army, Pacific, said: "Many people have presented different 
views from political motives. ... The SDF and the U.S. military have 
strengthened their ties to this extent. The ties will never waver. 
(Japan and the U.S.) as a team must be powerful." 
 
(7) 50-year-old Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; (Part 1): Armed with no 
exit strategy, DPJ administration examines secret pacts; distrust in 
underdeveloped foreign policy deepening 
 
NIKKEI (Page 1) (Abridged) 
January 21, 2010 
 
A meeting was held between foreign and defense officials of Japan 
and the United States at the U.S. Department of Defense in Virginia 
on Jan. 14. During the meeting, one participant said: "We cannot 
afford to pass up the golden opportunity of the 50th anniversary (of 
the bilateral security treaty). Let's work hard to prevent distrust 
in the bilateral alliance from growing." 
 
Earlier, on Jan. 12, an agreement was reached between Foreign 
Minister Katsuya Okada and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to 
begin talks to strengthen the bilateral alliance on the occasion of 
the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty. The two countries immediately began looking into specific 
 
TOKYO 00000136  007 OF 011 
 
 
steps. 
 
According to persons concerned, Japan and the United States are 
trying to focus on China's rapid military buildup with the aim of 
confirming the significance of the bilateral alliance. Their plan is 
to analyze the situation, share the results of the analysis, and 
draw up a future vision for the bilateral alliance before President 
Barack Obama's planned visit to Japan in November. 
 
Japan and the United States are still plagued by the issue of 
relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. "We want to 
strengthen our alliance, but nothing will start unless the Futenma 
issue is settled," a U.S. official said during the Jan. 14 meeting. 
 
On Jan. 19, Japan and the United States issued a joint statement 
commemorating the treaty's 50th anniversary. The statement could 
have borne the signatures of Prime Minister Hatoyama and President 
Obama, but it ended up with just the signatures of four of the 
cabinet ministers of the two countries due to a lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of the White House, according to the sources. 
 
The security treaty requires Japan to provide bases and the United 
States to defend Japan. During the Cold War when Japan and the 
United States were exposed to the tremendous threat of the Soviet 
Union, there was no need to consider the significance of the 
security treaty. It has been over 20 years since the Soviet Union 
collapsed, and today both Japan and the United States are less 
appreciative of the bilateral alliance. 
 
"It is acceptable to deepen the bilateral alliance, but not 
acceptable to expand it, because that would be suggestive of 
military expansion," a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) executive 
warned the government last fall. Since then, the expression of 
"expanding the alliance" has rarely been used in policy speeches. 
Even one DPJ lawmaker seriously asked a government official why U.S. 
forces in Japan are necessary. 
 
The United States' trust in the alliance with Japan has also been 
shaken. In late December, the White House hastily held a director 
general-level National Security Council meeting to strictly discuss 
Japan. "Does Japan really want to resolve the Futenma issue?" a 
senior official asked. The State Department reportedly managed to 
confirm the policy of holding talks on the bilateral alliance by 
convincing the frustrated official to look at the overall picture of 
the alliance with Japan. 
 
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that has turned 50 appears to be 
suffering from fatigue. With the change of government in Japan, 
contradictions that have long been sealed off are about to come to 
light. In a conference room in the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo's 
Kasumigaseki district, some experts have been sifting voluminous 
diplomatic documents on the Japan-U.S. secret pacts that were 
purportedly concluded during the revision of the security treaty in 
¶1960. The investigation that was launched on orders from Foreign 
Minister Okada is now in its final stage. 
 
Japan has three non-nuclear principles, including one prohibiting 
the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite that, 
the existence of a secret pact allowing U.S. warships carrying 
nuclear weapons to call at Japanese ports has come to light. Japan 
is advocating denuclearization as the only country to have suffered 
an atomic attack on one hand and is protecting itself under the 
 
TOKYO 00000136  008 OF 011 
 
 
U.S.' nuclear umbrella on the other. The secret agreement shows that 
Japan's security policy that contains such double standards has 
reached its limit. 
 
The Hatoyama administration will soon face the tough question of how 
to bridge the gap between the realities being exposed by the secret 
pact and the three non-nuclear principles prohibiting the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. 
 
Several ambassadors in Tokyo recently expressed their concerns to 
the Japanese side that Japan might become another New Zealand. 
Turning around its policy in the 1980s, New Zealand did not allow 
the U.S. military to bring nuclear weapons into the country. 
Reacting strongly, the United States has stopped meeting its defense 
obligations that are required as New Zealand's ally. 
 
If Japan allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons into the 
country with the aim of avoiding such a situation, questions would 
be raised about consistency with the three rules. The Hatoyama 
administration has begun to probe the contradictions in the 
Japan-U.S. alliance. But the administration remains unable to come 
up with measures to be taken after uncovering the truth about the 
secret pacts. The announcement of the results of the investigation, 
planned for January, might be put off until February or even later. 
 
(8) Actions are more important than a statement 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
January 20, 2010 
 
Hiroyuki Akita, editorial board member 
 
Yesterday marked the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty. What should Japan and the United States do to keep 
the bilateral alliance based on the security treaty sound and extend 
its life? 
 
A joint statement released by the foreign and defense ministers of 
Japan and the United States praised the role of the bilateral 
alliance and included many expressions of their determination to 
further strengthen it. If those who don't know anything about the 
present bilateral relationship read this statement, they would 
probably be under the illusion that the solidarity between Japan and 
the United States is strong and the two countries have enjoyed a 
honeymoon-like relationship. 
 
However, the reality is completely different from the content of the 
joint statement. There remains a rift over the Futenma issue between 
Tokyo and Washington. Relations between Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama and President Barack Obama have become strained. The fact 
of the statement being signed by the four ministers, not by the two 
leaders, reflected such an atmosphere. 
 
On the afternoon of Jan. 15 in Washington an audience of 
approximately 270 turned out at a symposium for the 50th anniversary 
of the revised security treaty. One attendee said: "Some panel 
members contended that the United States should patiently observe 
Japan, which recently experienced a change of government, but some 
others expressed concern about the future of the bilateral 
alliance." 
 
If the Hatoyama administration fails to demonstrate its 
 
TOKYO 00000136  009 OF 011 
 
 
determination to strengthen the security treaty through actions, the 
joint statement will be no more than a mere composition written by 
bureaucrats and its advocacy of providing political leadership would 
be merely nominal. 
 
Needless to say, what Prime Minister Hatoyama should do is to 
resolve the Futenma relocation issue by May as he promised. This is, 
however, just the beginning of a long road. 
 
Moreover, in order to bring the alliance near to "equality" in the 
true sense, Japan should assume more responsibilities and roles. 
Those would include, for example, "tangible contribution" to 
Afghanistan and creating a system necessary for Japan's defense. 
 
The Hatoyama government terminated the Maritime Self-Defense Force's 
refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and has postponed formulating 
a set of new national defense program guidelines. Despite its 
advocacy of an equal Japan-U.S. alliance, the Hatoyama 
administration has taken actions that run counter to its assertion. 
Japan won't be able to gain the U.S.'s understanding if it seeks a 
position of equality without assuming responsibilities. 
 
The 1960 revision of the security treaty, which includes the U.S. 
obligation to protect Japan, was a great step toward an equal 
Japan-U.S. relationship. In order to continue such an effort, the 
Hatoyama government should take decisive action rather than make a 
statement pleasing to the ear. 
 
(9) Interview with Professor Joseph Nye: Further redefinition of 
Japan-U.S. alliance from military, civilian perspectives 
 
ASAHI (Page 17) (Full) 
January 19, 2010 
 
Interviewer: Hiroshi Ito 
 
The Japan-U.S. relationship, like NATO in Europe, has been a great 
success in international politics. While it started in response to 
the East-West Cold War, this was redefined at the time of former 
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and has 
contributed to stability and prosperity in East Asia in the 
post-Cold War era. Looking back on the last 50 years, we can say 
that this has been a good and close alliance relationship, and one 
needs to take special note of the fact that the Japan-U.S. alliance 
has adapted to changes in the environment after the Cold War. 
 
Security issues emerged in East Asia soon after the end of the Cold 
War, namely, North Korea's development of nuclear arms and the rise 
of China. With the redefinition of the alliance after the Cold War, 
Japan and the U.S. have worked together to deal with the North Korea 
issues, and with regard to China, they have created a framework for 
China's participation in international politics and developed a 
stable long-term trilateral relationship with China. 
 
The triangular relationship among the three countries will probably 
continue to be good. We must not forget that Japan and the United 
States are both democratic countries and are allies. The Japan-U.S. 
relationship is the closest in this triangle, and the U.S. should 
have closer relations with Japan. On this basis, China should be 
incorporated as a "responsible stakeholder." On the other hand, 
preventive measures should be taken against offensive behavior. 
Japan and the U.S. should have an intelligent long-term strategy 
 
TOKYO 00000136  010 OF 011 
 
 
toward China. 
 
Japan has expanded the role of its Self-Defense Forces in the 
international community in the past decade. This should be welcome, 
but that is not all that has changed in the past 10 years. Japan has 
also come to play a greater role through the United Nations. A 
typical example is the climate change issue. 
 
As the Japan-U.S. alliance marks its 50th anniversary, the alliance 
should be redefined further. 
 
There are two aspects to this. One is the question of regional 
security. The bilateral alliance is still important for stability in 
East Asia. A case in point is North Korea's nuclear and missile 
issues. 
 
In addition, I think it would be good for the alliance to become a 
framework for working together in new areas. Climate change is a 
good example, and there are numerous other issues that the two 
countries should jointly deal with, such as world economic 
stability, pandemics, and public health issues. The alliance should 
be redefined further from both the military and the civilian 
perspectives. 
 
It is not surprising that a sort of friction has arisen between 
Japan and the U.S. There should be a clear recognition that this is 
not an indication of the future of the alliance relationship. The 
administration is currently in a transition period, and the present 
state of the relationship is not what the alliance is going to be in 
the future. 
 
With regard to the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air 
Station, while the current plan is not perfect, I don't think there 
are better options. The existing plan is the product of over 10 
years of careful consideration. All the other alternative plans that 
had been discussed before were thought to be dysfunctional in an 
emergency. 
 
The pursuit of a perfect solution is dangerous. This would take 
another 10 years, which would mean that the burden on the people of 
Okinawa would continue and would increase. 
 
However, since Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has said that he will 
reach a conclusion by May, we should be patient until then. 
 
The Hatoyama administration advocates an "equal Japan-U.S. 
relationship," but it should be careful and make sure that the word 
"equal" is not misunderstood. Militarily speaking, the Japan-U.S. 
alliance is not totally equal. Japan decided not to possess military 
capabilities at a level comparable to America's for historical and 
domestic political reasons. To be honest, I don't think the Japanese 
people want that (such a level of military capability). Therefore, 
it is unwise to pursue an "equal alliance" in this aspect. 
 
However, if we look at the new areas relating to the redefinition of 
the alliance, there are areas where Japan will assume a leadership 
role in the future - such as climate change. For sure, it will be 
possible to build an equal relationship in such areas. 
 
It is also desirable for the U.S. for Japan to have good relations 
with China and other countries in the region. I can understand the 
concept of an "East Asian community." However, whether the U.S. 
 
TOKYO 00000136  011 OF 011 
 
 
accepts this concept will depend on what it means. 
 
If it means the exclusion of the U.S., it will also not be 
beneficial for Japan and China. This is because if U.S. products are 
excluded, the U.S. will shut out Japanese and Chinese products. 
 
(10) Filing suit against foreign companies in Japan to be made 
easier 
 
NIKKEI (Page 4) (Full) 
January 16, 2010 
 
The international jurisdiction legislative subcommittee of the 
Legislative Council of the Justice Ministry, an advisory panel 
reporting to the justice minister, on Jan. 15 drafted an outline for 
preparing legislation for international jurisdiction, which 
stipulates in what cases it is possible to hold court in Japan 
regarding civil complaints involving more than one country. The core 
of the outline is that in the event a Japanese consumer files a 
lawsuit against a foreign company, if the company has an address in 
Japan, the suit can be filed in Japan The aim of the legislation is 
to facilitate international transactions by clarifying where a case 
will be brought before the court. 
 
At present, since there are no regulations on international 
jurisdiction under the Law of Civil Procedure, law courts are 
handling individual cases based on precedents. If a lawsuit is filed 
abroad when it can be filed in Japan, the litigator may have to 
shoulder a great burden in cost and time. In view of a possible 
increase in trouble with foreign trade partners as Internet-based 
trading expands in the future, the government has decided to 
consolidate domestic rules. 
 
Specifically, it will be made possible for a consumer to file a 
lawsuit against a foreign company if his or her current address or 
address at the time of the conclusion of the contract is in Japan. 
If a company in Japan did business over the Internet with a foreign 
company without an office in Japan, it can file a complaint against 
the company with regard to business the company conducted in Japan. 
 
ZUMWALT