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FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 000003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON SENV KGHG EUN SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN'S EU PRESIDENCY: GOOD ON AF/PAK AND 
ENLARGEMENT 
 
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 800 (COPENHAGEN) 
     ¶B. STOCKHOLM 794 (MFA ON PRESIDENCY) 
     ¶C. STATE 128589 (S LETTER TO BILDT) 
     ¶D. STOCKHOLM 780 (E+5) 
     ¶E. STOCKHOLM 776 (PATENT) 
     ¶F. STOCKHOLM 754 (MIDDLE EAST DRAFT) 
     ¶G. STOCKHOLM 723 (LISBON APPOINTMENTS) 
     ¶H. STOCKHOLM 720 (RUSSIA READ OUT) 
     ¶I. STOCKHOLM 711 (GOSSIP ON APPOINTMENTS) 
     ¶J. STOCKHOLM 688 (ENERGY COUNCIL) 
     ¶K. STOCKHOLM 679 (REINFELDT) 
     ¶L. STOCKHOLM 604 (MICROBIAL) 
     ¶M. STOCKHOLM 574 (ENLARGEMENT) 
     ¶N. 2008 STOCKHOLM 857 (EARLY PRIORITIES) 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Swedes pushed forward each of their 
Presidency priorities, from financial sector reform to 
climate change and institutional reform.  Unlike France in 
August 2008 and the Czech Republic in February 2009, Sweden 
did not face a Russian surprise (aided by approving the 
Nordstream pipeline route through its economic zone on the 
eve of the November EU-Russia Summit).  In Embassy 
Stockholm's view, the Swedish Presidency registered two big 
positives for U.S. interests: adoption of the "EU Action Plan 
for Afghanistan and Pakistan," and progress on EU enlargement 
for Turkey and Croatia. 
 
¶2. (C) There were other potential positives, including a new 
U.S. - EU Energy Council and EU-wide patent.  We agree with 
FM Carl Bildt's "wait-and-see" assessment on the new EU 
institutions.  The ability to play positive roles depends on 
the policies the Members States agree to adopt.  However 
these turn out, the Swedes are feeling good that they managed 
the transition to Lisbon with a minimum of intra-EU friction. 
 
¶3. (C) On the climate change priority, there is clear 
disappointment in the Copenhagen result, and some sensitivity 
with the EU's role there, but we assess this can be overcome 
through enhanced engagement with Sweden and the other Member 
States to bring them into a joint approach on China.  End 
summary. 
 
THE SWEDISH WORK PROGRAM 
 
¶4. (U) Sweden had a good idea of what would be expected in 
2009, having held the EU Presidency previously in the first 
half of 2001.  This time around, the Swedes maintained 
(according to their excellent Presidency website) "high 
ambitions but realistic expectations" for the role of a 
country of 9.5 million leading 500 million EU citizens. 
There were 3,300 meetings that were chaired by 160 Council 
working groups.  Notably, only 113 meetings were held in 
Sweden, underscoring that this was a Brussels-based 
Presidency.  One MFA desk officer told us privately that the 
Swedes approached the Presidency with "low expectations" in 
the hopes of "over-delivering." 
 
¶5. (U) The Swedish-led EU work program was largely inherited 
from France and the Czech Republic, the other 2008-2009 
"trio" Presidency holders.  Their priorities included (1) 
economy and employment; (2) climate; (3) the EU as a global 
actor; (4) EU institutional arrangements; (5) enlargement; 
(6) Justice and Home Affairs issues; and (7) the Baltic Sea 
Strategy.  When Sweden held the Presidency in 2001, their top 
three priorities were enlargement, the economy and 
employment, indicating considerable continuity in the 
priorities of the two Presidencies. 
 
OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES 
 
---------------------- 
Economy and Employment 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Objectives:  The economy and employment topped the 
list as the most pressing concerns for the 2009 Swedish EU 
Presidency.  Noting that the "responsibility for labor market 
policy lies with the Member States," the Swedes called for 
enhancing the role of the EU in limiting unemployment, 
establishing a new supervisory structure for the financial 
system, and overseeing long-term growth and employment. 
 
¶7. (U) Outcomes:  In October the EU agreed on a fiscal exit 
strategy through the establishment of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedures, and in December, the European Council agreed on 
principles for exiting from financial support schemes.  A 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000003  002 OF 004 
 
 
joint European Systemic Risk Board with three new supervisory 
bodies on the micro level are also being created: the 
European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European Securities 
and Markets Authority. 
 
------- 
Climate 
------- 
 
¶8. (U) Objectives:  The Presidency aimed to lead the EU to 
achieve a new global agreement on climate at COP-15 in 
Copenhagen.  Six months before taking the Presidency, EU 
Affairs State Secretary for EU Affairs Maria Asenius told us 
that binding commitments from the U.S. and China would be 
Sweden's "top priority" (ref N). 
 
¶9. (C) Main Activities:  In October, the EU adopted a 
comprehensive mandate at the European Council.  The EU put 
together a finance package to "fast start" climate action in 
developing countries with an investment of 7.2 billion euros 
over three years.  Following COP-15, Swedish Environment 
Minister Andreas Carlgren said at a press conference on 
December 22 that the EU Ministers blamed the U.S. and China 
for failing to agree on a binding agreement, although the 
Presidency cited positive aspects including reference to the 
2 degree Celsius temperature target, commitments for funding 
of developing countries in terms of climate change, and 
commitments for countries to report their actions in a 
transparent manner.  In response, Charge called PM Fredrik 
Reinfeldt's climate change advisor Lars Erik Lilejelund, who 
agreed that it was wrong to criticize the U.S. and that the 
EU and U.S. needed a strategy to bring China into serious 
discussions (ref A). 
 
¶10. (C) Outcomes:  Many European leaders, including Sweden's 
Environment Minister, are clearly disappointed with 
Copenhagen, and telling their publics it was a failure.  But, 
it was in fact a big step forward -- especially in moving 
away from Kyoto's unsustainable dichotomy between developed 
and developing country emissions.  Other European leaders, 
including Sweden's PM, are emphasizing this positive step. 
 
------------------------ 
The EU as a Global Actor 
------------------------ 
 
¶11. (U) Objectives: The Swedes hoped to strengthen the role 
of the EU as a global actor with a clear agenda for peace, 
development, democracy and human rights.  The ambition was to 
enhance the EU's ability to act in times of international 
crisis and to strengthen cooperation with important partners. 
 
¶12. (C) Main Outcomes:  FM Bildt spearheaded the "EU Action 
Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan" unveiled at the October 
GAERC.  At a meeting with Charge on December 22, Swedish MFA 
Political Director Bjorn Lyrvall noted that it had been 
difficult to forge consensus among the 27 EU Member States in 
crafting the plan but that document commits Member States to 
actions (ref B).  As the Secretary's congratulatory letter to 
the Swedes of December 16 notes, the plan still needs to be 
"resourced fully" (ref C). 
 
¶13. (C) Other Outcomes:  At the Eastern Europe Energy 
Efficiency and Environment Partnership meeting on November 
26, the U.S. (with a $7.5 million donation) joined other 
donors in raising 90 million euro to finance energy 
efficiency projects in the Ukraine (ref D).  On Iran, the 
Swedish Presidency issued numerous statements on human rights 
issues and the December Council statement leaves the door 
open to pursue a pressure track.  But on the Arab-Israeli 
issues, Bildt's initial draft of the Foreign Affairs Council 
text in December only succeeded in further alienating the 
Israelis (ref F). 
 
----------------------------- 
EU Institutional Arrangements 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) Objectives: The big institutional issues that the 
Swedish Presidency tackled included the Lisbon Treaty, 
supervising the process of appointing the new permanent 
President and the High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy and the new EU Commission. 
 
¶15. (C) Outcomes: One of the more dramatic moments in the 
Presidency came when Czech President Vaclav Klaus asked for 
clarification regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000003  003 OF 004 
 
 
before he would sign the Lisbon Treaty, which ultimately came 
into force on December 1.  PM Fredrik Reinfeldt also 
negotiated with the Council on who would fill the newly 
created positions for Permanent President of the European 
Council (Herman Van Rompuy) and High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Catherine 
Ashton), a process Reinfeldt was criticized for doing 
"secretively" (ref I).  The European External Action Service 
was also approved following the European Council meeting at 
the end of October.  For Sweden, the appointment of EU 
Affairs Minister Cecilia Malmstrom to the European 
Commission's JHA portfolio was, in Bildt's assessment, "the 
most high profile EU appointment of a Swede to date" (ref G). 
 
 
----------- 
Enlargement 
----------- 
 
¶16. (U) Objectives:  Recognizing the pace of enlargement 
would be "determined by the progress of reform in each 
country," Sweden sought to continue the enlargement process, 
particularly with regard to Croatia, Turkey, and the 
countries of the Western Balkans. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Outcomes: EU enlargement continued under the 
Swedish Presidency (ref M).  A new chapter on environment was 
opened in the negotiations between the EU and Turkey. 
Iceland submitted an application for EU membership.  The 
border dispute between Croatia and Slovenian was resolved, 
and the Presidency ended with Serbia submitting its 
application for EU membership to the Swedes in late December. 
 Bildt also singled out Croatia's progress toward EU 
accession and visa liberalization for Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia as other accomplishments. 
 
------------------------ 
Justice and Home Affairs 
------------------------ 
 
¶18. (U) Objectives:  The Presidency's ambition included the 
adoption of a new strategic work program -- the Stockholm 
Program -- on police, border and customs issues, legal 
matters, asylum, migration and visa policy as well as 
individual rights and privacy.  The development of a common 
asylum policy aimed to increase burden-sharing among Member 
States. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Outcomes:  The Stockholm Program was adopted but 
does not contain concrete legislation.  Rather, it is a 
collection of positive principles that will be left to future 
EU presidencies to enact.  An interim SWIFT agreement, 
allowing the U.S. access to European citizen's financial 
transactions, was approved for another nine months beginning 
on February 1.  The U.S. - EU Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance Agreements were ratified, and the "Washington 
Declaration," setting out deepened cooperation on JHA issues 
between the U.S. and EU, was drafted, negotiated and adopted. 
 
------------------------------ 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
------------------------------ 
 
¶20. (U) Objectives: The Swedish Presidency aimed to adopt an 
EU-only strategy for the Baltic Sea to make the region 
cleaner, more dynamic and prosperous, and to increase the 
Baltic Sea's attractiveness and accessibility.  Because eight 
of the nine Baltic Sea States are members of the EU (all but 
Russia), EU regulations offered a coordinating tool to 
promote research, innovation, entrepreneurship and maritime 
surveillance in the region. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Outcomes:  The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea was 
adopted on October 26 at the General Affairs Council.  It is 
intended to serve as a coordinating strategy throughout the 
region yet no extra funding was earmarked for the initiative. 
 In the future, the Baltic Sea Strategy may serve as a model 
for cooperation in other regions such as the Danube or the 
Alps. 
 
OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
¶22. (SBU) Other achievements listed on the 2009 Swedish 
Presidency website: 
 
-- Formation of the U.S. - EU Energy Council with working 
groups on energy security and technology, providing a 
promising new forum for engaging the Euros (ref J); 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000003  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
-- The establishment of a transatlantic task force for 
cooperation on antibiotic/antimicrobial resistance; (ref L) 
 
-- A political agreement that paves the way for an EU-wide 
patent, which would be an important development for U.S. 
commercial interests (ref E); 
 
-- Development of a common maritime surveillance system 
(primarily radar) to enhance information sharing between 
Members States, and more flexibility given to EU battlegroups 
in order to remove some of the barriers to deployment such as 
cost and training.  Both achievements indicate Member States 
are increasingly looking to the EU to address international 
security challenges and to protect the European homeland; 
 
-- A free trade agreement between the EU and South Korea, 
which should enter force in the second half of 2010 although 
uncertainties remain. 
 
SCORECARD -- WHAT THE CRITICS SAID 
 
¶23. (SBU) By the end, the leading Swedish daily newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter assessed that the Swedes did not make "any big 
mistakes."   What the Presidency lacked in "luminosity" and 
"inspiration" was made up the Swedes' ability to listen, be 
reliable, and compromise, the editorial continued.  After the 
tumultuous Czech EU Presidency, the Swedes recognized the 
need to be "flexible and prepared to deal with unexpected 
issues" such as the deepening financial crisis, last-minute 
political wrangling over the Lisbon Treaty with the Czech 
President Vaclav Klaus, and a late-breaking difference of 
opinion about language contained in an EU draft resolution on 
East Jerusalem (ref F).  Recognizing these and other hurdles 
early on, the 2009 Swedish Presidency used the statement 
"taking on the challenge" as their guiding vision, a slogan 
that was later deemed "defensive" and "ironic" by the 
European press. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The most visible failure of the Presidency, 
according to a press statement by Piotr Maciej Kaczynski at 
the Centre for European Studies in Brussels, was the lack of 
transparency that guided how the "President" and the "Foreign 
Minister" were selected.  This assessment is particularly 
biting given that the Swedes strove to achieve transparency 
in both of their EU Presidencies.   However, the Swedes were 
hampered on this issue because there were no procedural rules 
on how the process should be handled. 
 
¶25. (SBU) The individual whose stature was clearly enhanced 
from the Presidency was Swedish PM Fredrik Reinfeldt (ref K). 
 In late 2009, Reinfeldt was named "European of the Year" by 
the Tribune, a French business magazine, citing his 
intelligence, "coolness," and "ability to carry out his job 
at his own pace."  With national elections in fall 2010, 
current opinion polls show Reinfeldt leading in "trust" and 
"status," although his party, the center-right Moderates, has 
lost ground due to domestic issues. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶26. (C)  In Embassy Stockholm (and USEU may have a different 
perspective), we see two big positives from the Swedish 
Presidency for U.S. interests: continued forward movement on 
Af/Pak and EU enlargement.  The differing perspectives on 
Copenhagen indicate the need for more engagement with Europe 
on climate change, in order to get them on board with a China 
strategy.  From the perspective of many Europeans, the main 
achievement was the smooth transition to post-Lisbon.  But to 
quote Bildt at a press conference in Brussels on December 21, 
"institutions without policy are just more bureaucracy."  End 
Comment. 
SILVERMAN