VZCZCXRO7717
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHC #7528/01 0260732
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 260725Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6055
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5800
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8964
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 7541
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 8765
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3373
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC 7752
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC 6303

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 007528 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR PGOV ECON PK
SUBJECT: MANPADS ASSIST VISIT (MAV) AT LAHORE AIRPORT 
 
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2826 
     ¶B. ISLAMABAD1642 
     ¶C. LAHORE 183 
 
¶1. (SBU) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 
2 for action request and paragraph 13 for suggested 
talking points.  Washington leaves to post discretion as 
to the timing for approaching Pakistani authorities, given 
the current negative media environment surrounding U.S. 
passenger screening procedures. 
 
¶2. (SBU) By interagency agreement, Embassy Islamabad and 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) should 
coordinate to offer the Government of Pakistan (GOP) a 
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) Assist Visit 
(MAV) for Lahore Airport.  Embassy Islamabad and TSA 
should communicate to appropriate government officials 
that undertaking an MAV is necessary for approval of new 
Last Point of Departure (LPD) flights to the United 
States, but it will not guarantee a positive U.S. decision 
on Pakistan International Airlines' (PIA's) outstanding 
request for non-stop flights.  The MAV is one way to enhance 
their chances of route approval if appropriate remediation 
measures are conducted.  Embassy Islamabad should 
also advise that the USG is prepared to consider GOP 
requests for technical assistance in mitigating the 
threat posed by MANPADS; however the completion and funding 
of MAV-recommended mitigation measures is the responsibility 
of the host government 
 
------- 
CONTEXT 
------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In 1999, the U.S. signed an "Open Skies" 
agreement with Pakistan that allows for non-stop flights 
between the two countries if certain criteria, including 
security provisions, are met.  Since PIA requested 
permission for a non-stop flight, the GOP has believed 
that it was on the verge of receiving approval on several 
occasions.  Changes in the local security situation, changes 
in related areas of U.S. policy, or unrealistic Pakistani 
expectations led to confusion and disappointment on the part 
of the GOP and diminished the credibility of U.S. 
commitments.  A repetition of this situation should be 
avoided since it could distract from the strategic 
partnership we are attempting to develop. 
 
¶4. (SBU) PIA currently operates a flight from Lahore to 
New York.  The inbound flight departs Lahore and, per TSA 
requirements, stops in Manchester for security screening. 
All passengers, luggage and cargo are offloaded and 
screened; after successful screening, the flight departs 
for New York.  The plane returns non-stop from New 
York-JFK to Lahore. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In August 2009, TSA conducted its most recent 
security assessment of Lahore Airport, which did not 
include an MAV, and found that Lahore Airport met basic 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) security 
standards.  No MAV was proposed to the Pakistanis at that 
time. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Since that time, however, it has become clear 
that the absence of a clear picture on the MANPADS threat 
and Pakistani mitigation measures will prevent the USG's 
necessary thorough consideration of PIA's request. 
Completion of an MAV would contribute to filling in the 
picture, but it is less clear how Pakistan could mitigate 
the threat.  Challenging security conditions and political 
turmoil will further complicate the implementation of 
necessary mitigation measures by the GOP. 
 
STATE 00007528  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
MAV REQUIREMENTS & COMPONENTS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) TSA developed the MAV program to assist foreign 
government officials in identifying potential 
vulnerabilities and, upon the host nation's request, to 
recommend measures to mitigate the risk of an attack using 
MANPADS and other stand-off attack weapons against 
aircraft.  TSA conducts MAVs in cooperation with host 
government aviation security and law enforcement personnel 
responsible for the target airport.  The five-day MAV 
program takes the form of a jointly conducted assistance 
visit aimed at identifying vulnerabilities, sharing best 
practices and, as requested by the host government, 
proposing possible measures to help mitigate MANPADS 
threats using techniques recommended by ICAO and the U.S. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The MAV team provides training to host government 
participants while performing ground and aerial surveys of 
the locations around the airport that could be used as a 
potential MANPADS launch sites.  After completion of the 
surveys, the MAV team presents an out-brief of the initial 
results to the host government participants.  If requested 
by the host government, the team will develop a list of 
recommended mitigation measures.  The MAV team spends 
approximately 60 days preparing the written report, which 
is classified as "CONFIDENTIAL RELEASABLE TO ."   The report is delivered to the U.S. Embassy 
for dissemination to the appropriate host government 
authorities.  Completion and funding of MAV-recommended 
mitigation measures is the responsibility of the host 
government. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The challenging security environment in Pakistan 
will likely cause additional delays, especially if the 
security situation further deteriorates in and around 
Lahore or intelligence reports find a specific threat to 
aircraft flying non-stop to the United States. 
Re-inspections of Lahore Airport will likely be necessary 
if security conditions change. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
SIMILAR ROUTES & OTHER MANPADS MITIGATION PROGRAMS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The British Department of Transportation 
conducted a MANPADS assessment in 2006 for Islamabad 
Airport only.  They also provided basic threat training 
and mitigation strategies for Islamabad to the Pakistani 
military, police, and security personnel. There was very 
little work done in Lahore due to the lack of British 
Airways service there. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Decisions in 2008 by British Airways and 
Lufthansa to cease service to Pakistan were based on the 
deteriorating local security situation following the 
bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad.  The airlines 
decided that low passenger volume and profitability of the 
routes would not justify the necessary additional security 
measures.  Neither the British nor the German governments 
formally participated in the air carriers' decisions to 
end service to Pakistan, but government participation in 
these decisions is implicit do to the subject carriers being 
national carriers.  The possible threat posed by 
MANPADS was known to the governments and airlines involved 
but does not appear to have played an important role in 
the decisions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
MANAGING PAKISTANI EXPECTATIONS & MEDIA INQUIRIES 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The conduct of an MAV creates the possibility of 
media reports and speculations linking American officials 
 
STATE 00007528  003 OF 003 
 
 
with the perceived safety and security of passengers 
traveling through Lahore Airport. Analysts agree that the 
GOP is likely to address the issue with the media once an 
MAV occurs. While we cannot guarantee the discretion of 
local officials, we must ensure that no disclosure occurs 
from U.S. officials.  Any public affairs response to media 
attention should emphasize the joint, cooperative nature 
of the MAV as part of broad aviation security cooperation 
with host nation officials participating as partners. 
 
-------------- 
TALKING POINTS 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Post should draw on the following talking points 
in engaging with Government of Pakistan officials. 
 
-- The MAV is an assistance visit to a foreign government 
to share experiences and best practices in addressing 
MANPADS threats, based on International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and U.S. standards. 
 
-- During the five-day program, the MAV team provides 
training to host government participants while also 
performing ground and aerial surveys of the locations 
around the airport that could be used as potential launch 
sites for a MANPADS attack on commercial aviation. 
 
-- After completion of the surveys, the MAV team presents 
an out-brief of the initial results to the host government 
officials.  If requested by the host government, the team 
will develop a list of recommended mitigation measures. 
After returning to Washington, the MAV team prepares a 
written report, to be delivered via the U.S. Embassy to 
the appropriate Pakistan authorities. 
 
-- It is then the responsibility of Pakistan to determine 
the implementation of any mitigation steps.  U.S. 
authorities would consider requests for additional technical 
support in implementing those measures, but remediation 
activities will be at the expense of the GOP. 
 
-- Agreeing to undertake a MAV will not guarantee a 
positive decision on PIA's outstanding request for 
non-stop flights to the United States.  Also, depending on 
the time delay between the MAV and implementation of 
sufficient mitigation measures, it may be necessary to 
conduct additional inspection visits to reconfirm other 
aspects of airport and aviation security. 
CLINTON