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Viewing cable 10STATE6355, OUTREACH ON LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10STATE6355 2010-01-22 02:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO4520
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPOD RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #6355/01 0220225
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220216Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0346
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4698
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 1600
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 2159
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 4271
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2164
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU IMMEDIATE 9960
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2567
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 5876
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 7308
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 1838
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 0875
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 6132
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2912
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 8504
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0035
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 6297
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 1672
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 1905
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1453
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 1932
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 2846
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5988
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6614
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 3757
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 7703
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 3153
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 8503
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 7105
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 0082
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 3698
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 7359
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6610
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1753
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 8902
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 9434
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1143
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8116
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA IMMEDIATE 2588
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 1713
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 0008
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 2262
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4729
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3836
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 2958
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 2896
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2589
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 8081
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE 4586
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 8907
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0633
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 2227
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 7551
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 4442
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1998
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR IMMEDIATE 7812
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0600
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 3171
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 5839
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0943
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE 8369
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 3830
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5723
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 2006
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8919
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6899
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 9550
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 STATE 006355 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN AF
SUBJECT: OUTREACH ON LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 2082 (NOTAL) 
     B. (B) STATE 4108 (NOTAL) 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. The United States 
expects the main headlines of the London Conference on 
Afghanistan on January 28 will be the announcement of an 
international trust fund to support Afghan-led reintegration 
efforts and the wide endorsement of NATO,s plan for 
conditions-based, province-by-province transition to Afghan 
lead.  The conference will provide a valuable opportunity for 
the international community to demonstrate its support for 
the Afghan government's ambitious agenda as outlined in 
President Karzai's inaugural speech. This cable outlines our 
overall priorities for the London Conference, and requests 
posts convey and seek support as appropriate for these points 
from host governments by January 25.  Embassies Moscow, 
Beijing, Ankara, Berlin, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh see also 
paragraphs 8-11.  END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
STATE 00006355  002 OF 016 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) On January 28, approximately 77 delegations will 
meet in London to discuss security, economic development and 
governance, and international coordination in Afghanistan. 
Secretary Clinton will lead the U.S. delegation to the 
conference, which will be chaired by UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon, 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and UK PM Gordon Brown. 
 
3. (SBU) The U.S. is seeking the following desired outcomes 
of the London Conference: 
 
-- Reintegration. The London Conference will demonstrate 
strong international support for Afghan-led reintegration 
efforts by announcing a reintegration trust fund. The 
governments of the United Kingdom and Japan are working 
closely with the government of Afghanistan (GoA) and the 
United Nations Development Program to outline the structure 
of the trust fund and will also demarche key donor capitals 
to seek announcements of initial commitments at the London 
Conference.  A specific U.S. commitment has not yet been 
determined. 
 
-- Transition. On January 20, the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) provisionally approved a plan for conditions-based 
security transition to the GoA.  After consultations with 
 
STATE 00006355  003 OF 016 
 
 
non-NATO ISAF contributors, the NAC plans to finally approve 
the plan before January 28.  The plan outlines the security 
criteria and the process for authorizing and implementing 
province-by-province transition.  Transition will need to 
take into account governance and development factors in each 
province which the NATO Senior Civilian Representative will 
develop in consultation with the GoA and international 
civilian stakeholders over the next month in Afghanistan. The 
London Conference will welcome this ISAF plan, look forward 
implementing transition as soon as conditions allow, and note 
that transition planning is not an exit strategy from 
Afghanistan. 
 
-- Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  The London 
Conference will endorse the concept of annual targets for 
ANSF growth, but will stress the primary importance of the 
quality as well as the number of ANSF. The London Conference 
will endorse ANSF force-level targets for 2010 and 2011 
approved by the JCMB on January 20 and will urge the 
international community to provide all necessary support to 
reach those targets.  The JCMB approved growing the Afghan 
National Police to 109,000 in 2010, 134,000 in 2011, and 
growing the Afghan National Army to 134,000 in 2010 and 
171,600 in 2011. 
 
 
STATE 00006355  004 OF 016 
 
 
-- Development and governance.  We expect Afghanistan to 
present plans on governance and anti-corruption reform at the 
London conference.  On corruption, the government of 
Afghanistan plans to establish an Independent Oversight Board 
to oversee the functions of the High Office of Oversight 
(HOO, the main anti-corruption body in Afghanistan), second 
prosecutors to the HOO to give it enforcement capabilities, 
prioritize the passage of legislation to enforce the 
requirement for asset declarations by Afghan officials, and 
improve administrative procedures.  On governance, 
Afghanistan intends to establish an independent merit-based 
civil service appointment and vetting process, seek 
Parliamentary approval for a sub-national governance policy 
clarifying the roles and responsibilities of provincial and 
district officials, and implement targeted programs to 
improve service delivery in key districts. 
 
-- International Civilian Coordination.  The UN may announce 
plans to strengthen its presence in Afghanistan in order to 
reinforce UNAMA's preeminent role in the coordination of 
civilian assistance. Similarly, NATO may announce plans to 
strengthen the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in order 
to coordinate the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and 
other civilian assistance delivered through ISAF channels, 
support UNAMA's preeminent role in civilian assistance, and 
 
STATE 00006355  005 OF 016 
 
 
coordinate political aspects of the ISAF mission.  We hope 
the international leadership team can be introduced at the 
London Conference, including a new UN Special Representative 
of the Secretary General (SRSG), NATO Senior Civilian 
Representative (SCR), and EU/EC single representative. 
 
-- We are not seeking comment on Afghanistan's elections at 
the London conference. 
 
4.  The outcomes of the London Conference will lay out an 
agenda for Afghanistan and the international community in the 
coming months. We will work with the Government of 
Afghanistan and other partners to produce more detailed plans 
and programs on reintegration, anti-corruption, governance, 
development, and other critical issues. When planning is 
sufficiently advanced to warrant another meeting of Foreign 
Ministers, the Government of Afghanistan will host a 
conference in Kabul, presumably this spring. 
 
5.  (SBU) Our asks from our partners for the London 
conference and afterward include: 
 
-- Support for inclusion of the above outcomes in the 
conference communique and public messaging. 
 
 
STATE 00006355  006 OF 016 
 
 
-- Pledges of contributions to an international reintegration 
trust fund. 
 
-- Commitment of additional institutional trainers and 
mentoring teams, and trust fund donations to support the 
ANSF. Although this is not a pledging conference for security 
assistance, both the London Conference and the NATO Defense 
Ministerial meeting on February 4-5 in Istanbul provide 
opportunities to demonstrate the international community's 
continuing commitment to enable Afghan forces to begin to 
assume security responsibility. 
 
Posts should adapt these requests and talking points as 
appropriate to host country circumstances. 
 
TALKING POINTS 
-------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Posts may draw from the following points when 
raising the London Conference with host governments.  See 
also REF B for more detailed points on security transition. 
Specific national requests for ANSF mentors and trainers and 
points for use with the media on our overall Afghanistan 
strategy will be sent SEPTEL.  Please inquire from host 
governments whether they expect to make any announcements at 
 
STATE 00006355  007 OF 016 
 
 
London. 
 
Security 
 
-- The United States' main priorities for the London 
Conference include endorsement of a plan to implement 
transition of security responsibility to full Afghan 
leadership and support for Afghan-led reintegration. 
 
-- The transition plan is a tangible demonstration of 
progress in the overall stability and security of Afghanistan 
and Afghan ownership and responsibility.  Transition will 
proceed gradually on a province-by-province basis based on 
rigorous security, governance, and development conditions. 
 
-- Transition of individual provinces to Afghan lead will be 
undertaken with extensive consultations among the Afghan 
government, NATO/ISAF, UNAMA, and other key stakeholders, and 
will take place only when it is clear that security, 
governance, and development conditions have been met and can 
be sustained. 
 
-- Transition is not an exit strategy for ISAF, although it 
is an important step toward fulfilling ISAF's mission.  ISAF 
will retain supporting, enabling, and mentoring/advising 
 
STATE 00006355  008 OF 016 
 
 
roles throughout transition. The United States will also 
maintain a civilian commitment to Afghanistan over the long 
term. 
 
-- Transition neither implies the commitment of the 
international community is wavering nor does it presage an 
imminent reduction in ISAF forces. 
 
-- On the contrary, now is the time to reinforce our 
contributions in Afghanistan, as President Obama stated in 
his December 1 address, in order to create the conditions 
that will allow us to begin the process of drawing down 
combat forces in the summer of 2011. 
 
-- While London will not be a pledging conference, we will 
welcome any additional civilian or military contributions 
that Allies or partners might announce there.  At NATO's 
Defense 
Ministerial meeting on February 4-5 in Istanbul, we will 
encourage nations to outline plans to deploy forces pledged 
in December as rapidly as possible and to commit the 
institutional trainers and mentors needed to develop the 
ANSF. In particular, the JCMB's increased ANSF targets can 
only be met with additional institutional trainers, mentors, 
and financial contributions. 
 
STATE 00006355  009 OF 016 
 
 
 
Reintegration 
 
-- Equally important will be international support for a 
process of Afghan-led reintegration of insurgents who choose 
to give up the fight. 
 
-- The international community offered support to government 
of Afghanistan principles for a reintegration program on 
January 20.  The aim of reintegration is to stabilize local 
areas by providing an honourable exit to low and mid level 
insurgent commanders and fighters who are not committed to 
insurgent ideology and who are prepared to cease support for 
insurgent activity and rejoin society. 
 
-- Our support for reintegration is distinct from and should 
not imply any plans for reconciliation of senior leaders of 
the Taliban and other insurgent groups.  The United States 
only supports reintegration for individuals and groups 
interested who cease support, whether active or passive, to 
insurgency, criminality, and violence; who are willing to 
participate in a free and open society; and who respect the 
Afghan Constitution and have no existing association with 
Al-Qaeda. 
 
 
STATE 00006355  010 OF 016 
 
 
 -- The Afghan reintegration program will build upon former 
and existing reintegration programs, and will address 
shortcomings of past reintegration initiatives.  While 
specific programmatic elements will not be announced until 
after a national Grand Peace Jirga (traditional council 
meeting), key elements will be instituting appropriate 
safeguards and monitoring measures to ensure accountability 
of reintegrated insurgents. 
 
-- The U.S. strongly supports this process and encourages you 
to do so as well.  Reintegration must be Afghan-led, but it 
will also require the strong political and financial support 
of the international community.  To demonstrate that support 
and ensure that financial resources are available as soon as 
operationally required, the London Conference will announce 
an international trust fund for reintegration, the Peace and 
Reintegration Trust Fund. 
 
-- The UK, Japan and government of Afghanistan expect 
$300-500 million will be required to sustain the 
reintegration program over several years.  We will be looking 
to our international partners at the London Conference to 
provide support to this important initiative. 
 
-- It is especially important for Muslim countries to 
 
STATE 00006355  011 OF 016 
 
 
demonstrate concrete support for reintegration through trust 
fund commitments, even if they are not specific at this time. 
 
-- The exact mechanics of fund administration remain under 
discussion, but there will likely be opportunities to provide 
assistance via UNDP or the Afghan Ministry of Finance. 
 
-- Along with a possible contribution to the Peace and 
Reintegration Trust Fund, the U.S. will use other civilian 
and military funds to support Afghanistan's reintegration 
efforts. 
 
-- We envision international funds will be used towards 
providing economic support to communities, deradicalization 
and assimilation, conflict resolution, community security, 
stipends and relocation, administration, training, safeguards 
and third party assessments and auditing.  In no event will 
these funds be used to simply pay insurgents to stop 
fighting. 
 
-- All of these programs will be coordinated with the 
government of Afghanistan.  The programs will be tailored to 
the unique conditions at the local level and may vary 
community to community. They will benefit law abiding 
citizens in communities throughout Afghanistan and will not 
 
STATE 00006355  012 OF 016 
 
 
be exclusively targeted at one political group or 
geographical area. 
 
Development and governance 
 
-- We also want the London conference to bolster Afghan 
efforts to fight corruption and promote good governance, 
human rights, and economic development. 
 
-- At the January 20 JCMB, the Afghan government shared its 
plans for a series of reforms that will boost its ability to 
combat corruption, provide more public services to its 
people, and effectively manage international aid. We expect 
the Afghan government to present these plans at the London 
conference. 
 
-- We support these reforms as the next step toward improved 
governance and accountability in Afghanistan, recognizing 
that the Afghans will need to take additional actions to 
implement these reforms in the coming months. 
 
-- In order to support Afghanistan in these efforts, we 
expect to announce significant progress toward Afghanistan's 
qualification for debt relief from the Paris Club and the 
international financial institutions.  On January 25 and 
 
STATE 00006355  013 OF 016 
 
 
January 26, we anticipate that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank Executive Boards will certify that 
Afghanistan has completed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative, which would qualify Afghanistan for one 
billion dollars in debt forgiveness.  After final 
negotiations, the Paris Club could provide the debt relief as 
early as its March 2010 meeting. 
 
International civilian coordination 
 
-- Strengthening the coordination of international assistance 
to Afghanistan is the final theme of the conference. 
 
-- As the international community increases the support 
provided to the GoA's ambitious agenda, it becomes 
increasingly important that assistance be closely monitored 
and coordinated. 
 
-- We are working with the UN to help UNAMA fulfill its 
preeminent role in coordinating civilian assistance and with 
NATO to strengthen the role of the NATO Senior Civilian 
Representative in order to coordinate the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), certain assistance, political 
aspects of the ISAF mission, such as reintegration and 
provincial transition. 
 
STATE 00006355  014 OF 016 
 
 
 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ISSUES 
----------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) FOR MOSCOW AND BEIJING:  In preliminary planning 
meetings in London on the draft joint communique to be 
published at the conference, Russian and Chinese 
representatives expressed concern about the communique 
endorsing a NATO document on transition.  The London 
Conference is being used to welcome and provide wide 
international endorsement of the outcomes of other processes, 
including JCMB decisions, World Bank and IMF decisions, and 
ad hoc negotiations on the reintegration trust fund. 
Welcoming NATO transition planning fits into this framework 
and should not be seen as a replacement for other important 
international fora, such as the UN Security Council.  Posts 
may want to note previous compromises, such as the language 
used at the Afghanistan conference at The Hague in March 2009 
endorsing the ISAF mission. 
 
8.  (SBU) FOR ANKARA:  The conference will also welcome 
recent actions taken in regional forums to support the 
government of Afghanistan, including the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey trilateral summit on January 25 
and the Afghanistan Neighbors Summit in Istanbul on January 
 
STATE 00006355  015 OF 016 
 
 
26.  We encourage regional partners to support and 
participate in these types of forums and look forward to 
talking further with Turkey about ways to bolster 
international support for regional initiatives. 
 
9. (SBU) FOR RIYADH AND ABU DHABI: Saudi Arabian and Emirati 
support for the reintegration trust fund is vital for both 
practical and symbolic reasons. Saudi Arabia has previously 
expressed interest in Taliban mediation initiatives, and they 
should be encouraged to demonstrate political support for 
Afghan-led, internationally-supported reintegration by 
announcing commitments to the trust fund at the London 
Conference.  The UAE is supportive of the reintegration trust 
fund, but has concerns about how and when the money will be 
spent.  The UAE should be reassured that the US shares its 
concerns and will work to ensure that the fund is 
transparent, effective and quick to disburse money to worthy 
projects. 
 
10.  (SBU) FOR BERLIN:  Germany continues to seek endorsement 
of end-state targets for ANSF levels at the London 
conference.  While the Afghan Minister of Defense has also 
sought a longer-term international commitment, the JCMB only 
endorsed 2010 and 2011 targets, and United States is only 
ready to comment on figures for the next two years. 
 
STATE 00006355  016 OF 016 
 
 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINT OF CONTACT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (U) Please report results of demarche request by cable 
by January 25, 2010.  Please direct questions and slug cables 
to Jarrett Blanc in S/SRAP and Tom Gramaglia and Carolyn 
Coberly in SCA/A. 
CLINTON