VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3312 0131559
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 131552Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0000

UNCLAS STATE 003312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA RS
SUBJECT: COOPERATION TO MEET SUPPLY OF HELIUM-3 FOR IAEA 
SAFEGUARDS IN LIGHT OF SHORTAGE 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 7. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2. (SBU) Helium-3 (He-3) is an important but rare isotope 
used in several civilian applications including medical 
imaging and diagnostics, cryogenics, and neutron detection. 
The enormous increase in demand for He-3 over the past few 
years has resulted in a severe shortage of the gas.  The 
United States has been a principal supplier but does not have 
enough He-3 in stock to meet current international demand. 
Diplomatic efforts are underway to raise awareness of the 
shortage and find solutions.  In the meantime, International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to monitor nuclear 
material are already hampered by the shortage in the He-3 
supply.  Since He-3 is produced by both the United States and 
Russia, Washington would like to reach out to Rosatom to 
request that they also supply He-3 to the IAEA to support 
international nuclear safeguards efforts. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶3. (SBU) He-3 has been typically produced by the radioactive 
decay of tritium (H-3).  It is used in a wide range of 
applications, including medical imaging, oil/gas exploration, 
cryogenics and low temperature physics, and neutron 
detection.  Since He-3 is inert and non-toxic, it has found 
broad application in neutron detection.  As a result, the 
increased deployment ) both domestically and abroad ) of 
nuclear security-related radiation detection systems has been 
a major contributor to the significant reduction of the U.S. 
He-3 stockpile.  The United States can no longer meet either 
its domestic nor international needs for He-3.  The United 
States is actively working to mitigate the effects of this 
shortage, and diplomatic efforts are underway to raise 
awareness of the shortage and find solutions. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Some of the work of the IAEA to ensure proper 
safeguards in nuclear facilities and to strengthen 
international inspections in order to prevent misuse of 
nuclear materials has been dependent on the use of He-3 for 
safeguards instrumentation.  In particular, nuclear material 
accountancy measurements are essential to IAEA safeguards. 
He-3 is a critical component of coincidence and multiplicity 
counting devices used for such measurements. 
 
¶5. (SBU) He-3 has been traditionally produced for worldwide 
commercial use only by the United States and Russia.  Russia 
has been selling He-3 at market price.  Russia supplies He-3 
to the manufacturers of Russian portal monitors and to other 
international customers.  It is estimated that Russia 
supports industrial needs for He-3 by supplying thousands of 
liters of the gas to the open market per year.  The United 
States has been essentially the only supplier of He-3 for 
IAEA safeguards instrumentation, providing gas for their 
equipment at a discounted price.  The manufacturers of the 
IAEA safeguards equipment have been mostly U.S. laboratories 
and U.S. companies, which in turn purchase the He-3 needed in 
the instrumentation from Reuter Stokes.  We note that the 
He-3 supply process involves not only the supplier country 
and the IAEA customer, but also the manufacturers of He-3 
detectors. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In past years, the United States used its He-3 
reserves to support international monitoring efforts. 
However, the United States can no longer meet the demand for 
He-3.  A concerted international effort is needed, with 
cooperation from other countries and users to increase 
supply, decrease demand, and investigate alternative 
technologies to those using He-3.  Given Russia,s historical 
production of He-3 for commercial purposes, the United States 
would like to reach out to our Rosatom counterparts to obtain 
Russia,s support in providing their He-3 for IAEA 
international safeguards. 
 
END BACKGROUND. 
 
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ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Embassy Moscow is requested to contact the 
appropriate official(s) in Rosatom and deliver the message 
summarized in the talking points in paragraph 8.  Embassy may 
also draw on the background in paragraphs 3-6 as needed. 
 
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TALKING POINTS 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Post can draw from the following points for use in 
its outreach discussions with Russian counterparts. 
 
-- In the past decades, Russia and the United States have 
been harvesting and storing helium-3 (He-3) from the 
radioactive decay of tritium. 
 
-- Applications for He-3 are diverse, including medical 
imaging and diagnostics, oil/gas exploration, and cryogenics. 
 
-- He-3 is the preferred material for neutron detection.  It 
provides fewer false positives than other techniques, is 
inert and non-toxic, has a large thermal neutron cross 
section, and allows the manufacture of smaller and lighter 
equipment. 
 
-- There has been an enormous increase in demand for He-3 
over the past few years for radiation detectors based on 
neutron detection technology.  This equipment is used for 
nuclear security and safeguards activities in nuclear 
facilities and at international borders, as well as for big 
science R&D projects (e.g. fusion and large neutron sources). 
 
-- As a consequence of the increased demand, there is a 
worldwide shortage of He-3.  Greater international 
cooperation is needed to increase the supply and decrease the 
demand for this valuable resource. 
 
-- The United States has been supplying He-3 for IAEA 
safeguards instrumentation by providing the gas to the 
companies that manufacture He-3 tubes for use in the IAEA 
safeguards equipment. 
 
-- Due to the shortage, the United States will have to cut 
its allocation of He-3 for IAEA safeguards significantly. 
This could hamper the ability of the IAEA to provide 
safeguards equipment around the world. 
 
-- The United States requests that Russia supply some of the 
He-3 needed for international nuclear safeguards in support 
of the IAEA in order to meet this expected shortfall. 
 
-- In particular, nuclear material accountancy measurements 
are essential to IAEA safeguards.  The devices currently used 
to perform these measurements are coincidence and 
multiplicity counting devices, all dependent on the use of 
He-3. 
 
-- Examples of safeguards equipment that the IAEA uses, and 
which use He-3, are: 
 
- Epithermal neutron multiplicity counters used for impure 
plutonium verification and U-235 verification; 
 
- Active well coincidence counters used for accountancy 
measurements at conversion and enrichment plants, and during 
dismantlement processes; 
 
- Uranium neutron coincidence counters employed in UO2 fuel 
fabrication plants and reactors for accountancy measurements; 
 
- Portable radiation detection equipment for IAEA human 
inspection applications worldwide; 
 
- Spent fuel monitors used at reactor sites; 
 
- UF6 verification equipment for enrichment plants; 
 
- Plutonium in-process verification equipment for 
reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants; 
 
- Waste assay systems used in enrichment, reprocessing, and 
fabrication plants. 
 
-- We understand that Russia,s current capacity to supply 
He-3 is limited.  However, based on our shared 
nonproliferation goals for supporting IAEA safeguards work * 
particularly as more countries pursue nuclear energy programs 
* the United States seeks Russia,s assistance in freeing up 
capacity to supply the IAEA with the He-3 it needs to do its 
work. 
 
-- The work of the IAEA is crucial to ensure proper 
safeguards in nuclear facilities worldwide. 
 
-- The United States urges Russia to approach the IAEA and 
open discussion on whether some of the IAEA,s He-3 
requirements can be met with a Russian supply to 
manufacturers of He-3 tubes dedicated for use in IAEA 
safeguards instrumentation. 
 
END OF TALKING POINTS 
 
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REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINTS OF CONTACT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Washington thanks Post for its assistance.  Please 
inform State of any response or comment from Rosatom by 
January 19, 2010.  Department points of contact for this 
matter are Jonathan Sanborn (SanbornJB@state.gov; 
202-647-9730), Brendan Plapp (PlappBB@state.gov; 
202-647-6109), and Zaira Nazario (NazarioZD@state.gov; 
202-647-8229). 
CLINTON