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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000011 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/15 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB MARR EC
SUBJECT: NO REAL THREAT TO CORREA ON THE HORIZON 
 
REF: 09 QUITO 1055; 09 QUITO 849; 09 QUITO 877; 09 QUITO 951 
09 QUITO 1043; 0...




id: 243921
date: 1/15/2010 18:08
refid: 10QUITO11
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO1043|09QUITO1055|09QUITO841|09QUITO849|09QUITO877|09QUITO951|10QUITO5
header:
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DE RUEHQT #0011/01 0151808
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0649
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RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000011 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/15 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB MARR EC
SUBJECT: NO REAL THREAT TO CORREA ON THE HORIZON 
 
REF: 09 QUITO 1055; 09 QUITO 849; 09 QUITO 877; 09 QUITO 951 
09 QUITO 1043; 09 QUITO 841; 10 QUITO 5 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Hodges, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Workers, students, teachers, and indigenous groups 
have announced protests against the government during January 2010, 
as is often the case for this time of year.  At the same time, 
President Rafael Correa has alleged a military-led attempt to 
destabilize the government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
resigned, and Correa's popularity dropped again in the polls. 
However, these events are unlikely to threaten the stability of the 
Ecuadorian government, or the tenure of President Rafael Correa, in 
the near future.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
UNCOORDINATED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Indigenous leaders are calling for assemblies of their 
communities on January 20, in part due to regularly-scheduled 
internal congresses, but also to decide on whether to mobilize 
political protests and what kind of strikes they will hold to 
protest the closure of a Shuar radio station (Ref A) and the 
government's "lack of respect."  The indigenous are by and large 
the most intimidating group when it comes to threats of 
mobilization, having already organized demonstrations (alone or 
with others) that resulted in the ouster of three presidents since 
¶1997.  However, the political organizations representing the 
indigenous nations have lost influence, internal unity, and the 
sympathy of the general population in recent years.  The Correa 
administration claims to have the support of the indigenous people 
except for a few of its leaders, although his adherents in those 
communities are likely fewer in number than when he was first 
elected.  Indigenous mobilizations have been so far unsuccessful in 
changing the more controversial laws during the Correa 
administration; demonstrations in January 2009 failed to persuade 
the GOE to redraft the mining law, and in September 2009 the GOE 
refused to make significant changes to the draft water law.  The 
demonstrations in September resulted in the death of one protester 
and many injuries among the police, but only a few hundred 
indigenous people participated in each location, in contrast to the 
tens of thousands who took to the streets in 2000 and 2005 (Ref B 
and C). 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Other groups also plan to mobilize this month. University 
students called for protests in all provincial capitals on January 
6, but less than two hundred marched in Ecuador's largest city, 
Guayaquil, and the protestors in Quito were so few that the event 
did not even make the local papers.  The Montubio ethnic minority 
cancelled the protest it had planned for January 11 after 
conversations with the government.  Workers have scheduled a 
protest for January 15, but they usually organize demonstrations in 
January to protest the minimum salary wage increase that is 
announced around that time each year (see septel on labor 
organizations).  Teachers protested throughout 2009 with few 
results, and have not yet set a date for their January strike.  The 
public is used to these protests and no serious disruption of 
public order is expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ALLEGED POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Correa himself is the most vocal source of claims of alleged 
attempts by the military to destabilize the government. In his two 
most recent radio addresses, Correa discussed emails circulating in 
the barracks allegedly sent by supporters of former President and 
retired Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, who leads the Patriotic Society 
Party.  The emails supposedly report that Correa intends to 
eliminate certain benefits for the military. Correa has provided no 
substantiation for his allegations, and none has been made 
available by other members of his government.  Military leaders 
immediately declared their loyalty to the Government of Ecuador 
(GOE), while the Gutierrez supporters claimed ongoing political 
persecution by Correa.  The publicity may be interpreted as a 
government strategy to gather public support for the committees to 
defend the citizen revolution, announced during the August 10 
inauguration (Ref F), and a way to undermine the prestige of the 
Patriotic Society Party.  In fact, the Correa administration has 
made significant efforts to keep the troops happy, for example by 
increasing their salaries and making a show of modernizing military 
equipment. 
 
 
 
RESIGNATION OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The resignation of Minister Fander Falconi on January 12 
over Correa's accusations of loss of sovereignty during 
international negotiations on an Amazon rain forest conservation 
effort does not jeopardize the stability of the government (Ref G). 
The President had announced that he would make more changes in his 
cabinet in the beginning of 2010.  A change in the cabinet is, in 
any case, quite common in the Correa administration:  since Correa 
took office in January 2007, one or more members of the cabinet 
have been changed 54 times with no significant impact on the 
administration's direction. 
 
 
 
CONTINUING DECLINE IN POPULARITY 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to local polling, approval for Correa's 
performance in December 2009 was between 42 and 54 percent.  While 
this indicates a fall of 20 or 30 percent points (depending on the 
pollster) in comparison with December 2008 figures, the Ecuadorian 
president was still the most popular public figure of 2009 
according to end-of-year surveys.  As President Correa likes to 
point out, his government has won six consecutive elections in 
three years, an uncommon political event in Ecuadorian history.  He 
holds the current record for popularity among all presidents in 
Ecuador since 1979, with over 70 percent approval rating in 2007. 
In the Ecuadorian context, an approval rating of over 40 percent is 
still remarkably high. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) As reported earlier, the social and political movements are 
not unified and there does not appear to be an opposition figure to 
rally around at this time.  These groups have even scheduled their 
demonstrations on different dates, allowing them to air their 
particular grievances, but losing an opportunity for the show of 
unity that made them so effective in 2000 and 2005.  Hence, the 
government can deal with discontent by negotiating with, or 
ignoring, each group separately.  Embassy contacts - including some 
among the protesting organizations - note that Ecuadorians have no 
real interest in tossing out the current president; they may not 
like him much, but there is no stomach for instability.  Polling 
 
results bear this out, as two-thirds of Ecuadorian citizens say 
they would not approve of revoking the President's mandate (refs D 
and E). 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Another factor that should not be discounted is that 
Correa's political support among lower and lower-middle classes is 
solid, due in large part to his dramatic increase in social 
spending since taking office.  In addition to doubling cash 
transfers to poor families and the elderly, his government has 
greatly increased spending on health and education, particularly in 
rural areas, where approximately 5 million of Ecuador's 14 million 
citizens reside.  The beneficiaries of this fiscal largesse, 
traditionally ignored by past governments, form a large and stable 
political base for Correa, and are likely to oppose any political 
change that would potentially disrupt these pro-poor programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
CORREA STILL HOLDS THE REINS, DESPITE HIS PUBLIC FEARS 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) The political opposition is still weak and disorganized, and 
it lacks a credible political leader.  Within his political 
movement, Alianza PAIS (Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance), 
Correa still runs the show.  At the National Assembly, some PAIS 
assembly members have shown nascent signs of independence from the 
Executive, but this has not yet translated into legislative action. 
Over the past few years, President Correa managed to alienate 
several of the key founders of the PAIS movement, including Alberto 
Acosta (former President of the Constituent Assembly, Gustavo 
Larrea (former Coordinating Minister of External and Internal 
Security), and more recently Fander Falconi, without significantly 
damaging his own political support.  Of the original group, only 
the current Coordinating Minister of Politics, Ricardo Patino, is 
still in the government.  Hence, Correa is so far walking away as 
the winner of the political contest. 
 
 
 
10.(SBU) While Correa does not appear to have any significant 
competitors for power in the wings, it has not stopped him from 
announcing imminent threats to his regime and the "citizen 
revolution," usually during his Saturday TV and radio addresses. 
His most recent allegations of conspiracies to destabilize the 
government came on January 2, when he first raised the rumors of 
discontent in the military and, in the same address, alleged that 
"right wing foundations based in the United States" were working 
with indigenous groups to destabilize the regime.  In January 2009 
he used his radio address to allege that retired military officers 
were attempting to destabilize his government at the behest of a 
"certain political party."  In May 2009 it was the "oligarchy's 
puppets" working against him, and in September 2009 it was once 
against the teachers and indigenous threatening to create 
instability.  (These are just few illustrative examples.) 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) While Correa is politically weaker than even six months 
ago, and continues to alienate groups, the latest political events 
in Ecuador are probably no more than business as usual.  Indigenous 
groups, teachers, students, and workers have thus far been unable 
to coordinate their actions, which prevents them from having a 
serious impact on government stability.  Rumors of significant 
disaffection in the military do not look likely to translate into 
 
anti-government moves at this point.  The political opposition is 
weak and unable to coordinate.  Even Correa's traditional (and 
favorite) opponents, the business leaders and wealthiest 
Ecuadorians, have done little more than talk about creating an 
opposition force, without achieving any significant public 
presence.  While disparate opposition groups were able to coalesce 
and topple former President Bucaram in little more than five weeks 
in 1997, it appears the current movements are weaker and less 
organized than ever, barring some unforeseen event that brings them 
suddenly together.  The divide in ideological orientation of 
opposition groups - some on the far right and others on the far 
left - also augurs poorly for the prospect of any joint action. 
HODGES 

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