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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #0030/01 0111730
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8041
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2159
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1240
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000030 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR ADDITION OF NOFORN (NF) CAPTION 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/EPS 
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 
TAGS: PTER PREL EAID PGOV PINR MOPS MA NG MR NI
AG, CH, SG, FR 
SUBJECT: AFRICOM COMMANDER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH 
OFFICIALS ON AQIM AND OTHER AFRICA SECURITY THREATS 

REF: A. 09 PARIS 1339 
¶B. NIAMEY 11 

PARIS 00000030 001.2 OF 003 


Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d). 

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: President Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor 
Jean-David Levitte, Sarkozy's Military Advisor, Admiral 
Edouard Guillaud, and others briefed U.S. AFRICOM Commander 
General William E. Ward on January 5 on security issues in 
Africa's Sahel region. The French pressed for additional 
coordination (military assistance, intelligence sharing, and 
development projects) in helping countries confront al-Qa'ida 
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In France's view, Mauritania 
could be the "spearhead" against AQIM, Niger positively 
"surprised" with its recent military engagement, but Mali 
remains "confrontation-averse." Other topics covered 
included France's African military bases, concerns about 
Senegal, the risk of a backlash against China, and 
hostage-taking trends. END SUMMARY. 

¶2. (C) U.S. AFRICOM Commander General William E. Ward was 
invited to Paris for consultations January 5-6. He discussed 
the al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) threat in 
Africa's Sahel region with President Sarkozy's Diplomatic 
Advisor (NSC Jones equivalent) Jean-David Levitte, Sarkozy's 
Military Advisor, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, Guillaud's 
Deputy, COL Eric Bucquet, and Elysee Africa Advisor Remi 
Marechaux. Later in that meeting, and at a subsequent dinner 
hosted by Guillaud (Levitte did not attend) the group 
continued to discuss a broad range of African security 
issues. General Ward was joined by SOCAF's BG Haas and Polad 
Dr. Brown, DAO staff, and Embassy Paris Africa Watcher. On 
January 6, General Ward participated in media events and 
later held meetings with French intelligence and security 
officials (reported separate channels). 

THE AQIM THREAT -- WE NEED CLOSER COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶3. (S) During the initial meeting, Guillaud, Levitte, and 
Marechaux provided France's assessment of AQIM's current 
activities and capabilities (focusing on Mali, Mauritania, 
and Niger), which was strikingly similar to the French 
assessment provided to AF A/S Carson and other USG officials 
on September 10, 2009 during the U.S.-France Sahel Security 
conference in Paris (Ref A). Notably, France views AQIM as a 
limited, but active and dangerous threat composing 
approximately 150 dedicated fighters. The group's intel and 
logistics capacity remains potent, as evidenced by recent 
kidnapping of western hostages, which were quickly moved to 
AQIM comfort zones in Northern Mali ("crossing two thousand 
kilometers of desert in a couple of days8). 

¶4. (S/NF) Guillaud asserted that AQIM represents France's 
greatest security concern, and it is vital that the group 
gains neither legitimacy nor broader operational space. 
Chad, Northern Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Libya, and 
even Tunisia are at risk of AQIM influence if Mali, in 
particular, does not contain it -- with U.S. and French 
assistance. He assessed Mauritania as the most effective of 
the three countries in confronting AQIM and should be viewed 
as the "spearhead." At the same time, Guillaud was "happily 
surprised" by the aggressive tactics used recently by Niger's 
army,s successful fight with AQIM elements in Niger. (Note: 
Marechaux later shared with AF-Watcher a classified report 
clarifying that Guillaud was referring to the late December 
incident also reported in Ref B. End note.) Noting current 
USG policy restrictions vis-a-vis Niger, Guillaud recommended 
the U.S. soften its stance on military cooperation since in 
the mid- to long-term it would be counterproductive for 
security reasons especially as Niger is inclined to fight 
AQIM. In his view, Mali's President Toure remains 
"confrontation-averse." 

¶5. (S/NF) Guillaud and Levitte expressed appreciation for 
the improving coordination between the U.S. and France in 
supporting host country CT efforts, but noted that there 
remained room for improvement. They stated that President 
Sarkozy has personally requested French agencies to reach out 
to U.S. counterparts. France wants better coordination -- 

PARIS 00000030 002.2 OF 003 


not competition -- with the U.S. in a cohesive manner that 
includes discussions of military cooperation, enhanced 
intelligence sharing, and complimentary development 
assistance. Uniquely in the Sahel region, Guillaud claimed 
that he and his staff coordinated all three activities on 
behalf of the GOF. Even projects funded by France's 
development agency (AFD) in the region are approved by 
Guillaud's office. Levitte added that a more open 
U.S.-France approach is necessary to discourage host 
countries from attempting to "play us off each other." He 
emphasized that U.S.-French cooperation should be discreet 
and that there is no need to tell the other countries in the 
region our level of cooperation )- we should stay below the 
radar. (Note: Guillaud is expected to depart his current 
post in approximately one month to become France's new Chief 
of the Joint Staff. End note.) 

¶6. (S/NF) At the same time, there was broad agreement that 
our efforts against AQIM must be centered on adding capacity 
to the host countries' ability (and political will) for 
confronting and defeating AQIM. General Ward added that 
France and the U.S. should maintain a low profile and not 
create the impression of a western presence that could turn 
the region into a new jihadist call to arms. 

¶7. (S/NF) There was agreement that confronting the AQIM 
threat must also have Algeria's participation, but that 
requires a different approach than is envisioned for the 
three sub-Saharan countries. 

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