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Viewing cable 10NAIROBI52, SOMALIA - ANTI-OPPOSITION ALLIANCES APPEAR TO GAIN MOMENTUM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10NAIROBI52 2010-01-12 05:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO5386
RR RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0052/01 0120544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 120543Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0388
INFO SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEPADJ/CJTF-HOA J2X CAMP LEMONIER DJ
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000052 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ANTI-OPPOSITION ALLIANCES APPEAR TO GAIN MOMENTUM 
IN SOMALI REGIONS 
 
REF: 09 NAIROBI 2032; 09 NAIROBI 2545 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  On January 10 pro-TFG clan and Ahlu Sunnah Wal 
Jama'a (ASWJ) forces wrested control of much of Beledweyne town 
from Hisbul Islam (HI) and al-Shabaab.  By late evening, following 
day-long sporadic but fierce fighting, clan and ASWJ-allied militia 
brought much of Beledweyne under their control. The alliance on 
January 11 thwarted an early morning HI counterattack. (Note: 
Control of Beledweyne changed hands between clan militia 
sympathetic to the TFG and opposition forces a dozen times in 2009. 
Hiraan and Hiraan-based TFG leaders in recent months have stepped 
up communication with the north Galgaduud faction of ASWJ (ref a). 
End note.) In addition, various clan and local efforts to 
militarily confront al-Shabaab in Galgaduud and Lower Juba appear 
to be gaining momentum against the backdrop of rifts within 
al-Shabaab (ref b). End Summary. 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) On January 10, a clan and ASWJ alliance attacked 
Beledweyne, the capital of Hiraan region, which had been under 
Hisbul Islam control since an early December HI defeat of 
TFG-forces there. (Note: The alliance comprises mostly 
Hawiye/Hawaadle sub-clan militia, largely sympathetic to the TFG. 
The Hawaadle militia has long fought against HI and AS in Hiraan 
and now appears willing to borrow the ASWJ name in order to receive 
logistical support from the powerful north Galgaduud Ayr-clan 
faction of ASWJ. In clan terms, this largely represents an alliance 
between the Hawaadle and Ayr subclans of the Hawiye. End note.) 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) Sheikh Bashir Elmi, the Hawaadle spokesman in Hiraan, told 
us the alliance launched an early morning January 10 attack on HI 
positions at Beledweyne airstrip on the outskirts of the town. By 
late Sunday evening, following sporadic but fierce day-long 
fighting, the alliance had taken control of all of the town except 
for the western district of Howlwadag into which HI fighters had 
retreated. (Note: Howlwadag district is a predominantly 
Hawiye/Galje'el area. Many Galje'el have allied with al-Shabaab and 
Hisbul Islam in order to resist perceived Hawadle subclan 
domination of Beledweyne. The Hawaadle clan, larger than the 
Galje'el and generally better educated, dominates business in 
Beledweyne and has long-occupied the role of senior Hiraan clan. 
End Note.) As of January 11 the alliance reportedly retained 
control of most of Beledweyne. 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) Contacts tell us that Hiraan leader Yusuf Ahmed Hagar 
"Dabageed" has taken up the mantle of chairman of the ASWJ security 
committee for Hiraan and has criticized the TFG for not providing 
enough support to the region. (Note: "Dabageed" is from the 
Hawaadle clan and was formerly a Hiraan governor under 
then-President Abdullahi Yusuf. End note.) 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) In addition, various clan and local efforts to militarily 
confront al-Shabaab in Galgaduud and Lower Juba appear to be 
gaining momentum against the backdrop of rifts within al-Shabaab 
(ref b). Overnight clashes on January 10 were reported in the Lower 
Juba border town of Dhobley after local clan militias attacked 
al-Shabaab positions.  Our contacts tell us that al-Shabaab 
suffered significant loses. In addition, tension remains high in 
Galgaduud region following January 2 ASWJ-al-Shabaab clashes in 
Dhusamarebb.  Our contacts tell us additional clashes are expected 
in the region as the two groups rearm. 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: We think the apparent uptick in anti-Shabaab and 
anti-HI efforts is a positive development and is partially the 
result of and a contributing factor to internal opposition 
divisions. However, "Dabageed's" criticisms of the TFG's and ASWJ's 
apparent efforts to cast all anti-opposition efforts in Hiraan as 
 
NAIROBI 00000052  002 OF 002 
 
 
its work, should serve as a cautionary tale to the TFG. We are 
encouraging the TFG to continue outreach to Hiraan and ASWJ and to 
hone its political messaging.  We are also encouraging local and 
regional leaders to continue their efforts to politically and 
militarily confront al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam. 
RANNEBERGER