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RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0053/01 0192118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 192118Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO ZEN/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
ZEN/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
ZEN/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
ZEN/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
ZEN/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
ZEN/HQ USNORTHCOM
ZEN/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
ZEN/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/19 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: GOM'S LOCAL POLICE REFORM PROPOSAL HAS POTENTIAL, BUT NOT A 
CURE-ALL  
CLASSIFIED BY: Gustavo Delgado, Political Minister Counselor; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Calderon government has proposed a new local 
police model that would consolidate the 2000-plus municipal police 
forces into 32 entities run by the state and Federal District 
governments.  The proposal enjoys more support from the political 
opposition than Calderon's earlier efforts to fully nationalize the 
country's police corporations.  The initiative has the potential to 
ease the implementation of reforms, but reorganization without 
meaningful progress on the most critical issues, such as better 
oversight mechanisms and the creation of a real career service for 
police officers, will be merely cosmetic.  End summary. 
 
 
 
The Proposal 
 
---------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) During the November 27 reunion of the National Public 
Security Council, President Calderon publicly backed Secretary for 
Public Security (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna's proposal to consolidate 
Mexico's approximately 2000 municipal police forces into 32 
state-run entities.  Calderon said the council would study the 
proposal as a potential model that could more effectively combat 
crime and make up for the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the 
municipal corporations.  The GOM has billed the move as a means to 
streamline the unwieldy and fractured local structures 
(particularly in states with many municipalities -- Oaxaca alone 
has 570) and aid in efforts to professionalize, fund, and clean up 
the ailing corps.  Such a reform would need congressional approval 
at a minimum and almost certainly a constitutional change requiring 
the support of two-thirds of the states' legislatures. 
 
 
 
The State of the Municipalities 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) The GOM's reform proposal is an attempt to deal with what is 
clearly the weakest link in the policing chain -- the municipal 
corporations.  Counting upwards of 160,000 officers and making up 
about 40 percent of the country's police forces, the municipal 
police are poorly staffed, underpaid, barely trained, and often 
untrustworthy.  According to an SSP study released in October, over 
half the municipal forces counted under 30 officers, and almost 90 
percent have staffs of less than 100, seriously limiting their 
resources to fight crime.  The same study found local police to be 
"easy targets for corruption," with monthly salaries of about only 
300 USD.  In a study released in 2008 conducted by the Superior 
Auditor of the Federation, a budget oversight office attached to 
the Chamber of Deputies, over 50 percent of municipal police were 
found unfit for service.  One in five police had less than an 
elementary education, and only three in ten surpassed that level. 
The more recently conducted SSP survey mirrors these results, 
indicating that 70 percent of municipal officers have below an 
eighth grade education and more than 50 percent are above 35 years 
of age. 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) A separate, independent study released in December 2009 by 
the Justice in Mexico Project that surveyed some 80 percent of 
Guadalajara's 6,873 officers shed additional light on the plight of 
municipal forces.  Respondents reported excessively long working 
hours, with 70 percent working more than 50 hours a week with no 
overtime, and 20 percent saying they worked extremely extended 
shifts.  67 percent of officers feel that raises and promotions are 
not based on merit despite civil service protections in the law, 
and 72 percent believe that procedures for raises and promotions 
are unfair.  A third of the force perceived severe corruption 
problems, with 40 percent showing little trust in their superiors 
and 68 percent saying that corruption is concentrated at high 
levels of local departments.  Even in a developed urban area, 
municipal forces appear to lack the ability to offer officers the 
kinds of incentives (such as better pay and more transparent 
promotion processes) that would insulate them against corruption. 
Corruption in some municipalities is so severe as to prompt 
standoffs between federal and local forces, and municipal officers 
are often implicated in serious criminal matters.  The day after 
the Navy's takedown of Arturo Beltran Leyva in Cuernavaca, 35 
municipal police officers failed to report for duty and allegedly 
"disappeared."  Ten municipal officers in Michoacan State were 
arrested in connection with the murder of twelve federal officers 
in July.  Mexico City daily "La Reforma" reported that 90 percent 
of the 358 officers arrested in Mexico in 2009 for suspected ties 
to drug trafficking were members of municipal forces. 
 
 
 
The Benefits 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Given the myriad deficiencies in Mexico's municipal police 
system, folding the 2,000-plus forces into 31 state entities (32 
including the Federal District) would offer certain advantages. 
First, lack of continuity in local government -- mayors serve only 
3 year terms and are ineligible for re-election -- has been an 
important obstacle to meaningful police improvement.  Security 
expert Daniel Sabet noted that constant changes in municipal 
administrations mean frequent variations in procedures, priorities, 
and even police leadership.  Knowledge is lost, and the opportunity 
for institutionalization of improvements is minimal.  With their 
five year terms in office, governors at least have a bit more time 
to fully implement changes.  Political and economic analyst Juan 
Pardinas, who has advocated for the total nationalization of the 
country's police corporations, told Poloff in December that such a 
reform is the second best option considering the political 
impossibilities of creating a truly national police over the next 
several years.  Combining municipal forces would allow for more 
streamlined procedures, more centralized and consistent oversight, 
and, proponents argue, more resources for professionalization.  In 
theory, these improvements, including the regular application of 
more reliable vetting mechanisms administered by a more trustworthy 
central authority, would also make infiltration attempts more 
difficult for drug traffickers and organized criminal groups. 
 
 
 
The Drawbacks 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) At the same time, some analysts view the proposal as merely 
a sop to Garcia Luna, a sort of consolation prize to compensate for 
his push for a national force under his authority coming to naught. 
David Shirk, Director of the Trans-Border Institute and professor 
at the University of San Diego, told Poloff that centralization is 
often a knee jerk reaction to resolving institutional problems 
rather than the complete and viable solution.  The problem with 
centralization in this case, he noted, is that state governments 
themselves are often plagued with corruption, and the state police 
forces are often nearly as resource-strapped and infiltrated as the 
municipal organizations.  Moreover, Shirk argued that a more 
centralized control structure could simply serve as a more 
centralized corruption mechanism -- one-stop shopping for organized 
criminal groups.  A larger state police force would also 
potentially provide governors, who enjoy a great deal of autonomy 
in states that function almost as fiefdoms, with a larger political 
control mechanism.  Shirk pointed out that the precedent for state 
control of a municipal force was the 1960s takeover by the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Yucatan governor of the 
Merida police when the National Action Party (PAN) won the 
mayorship there. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Experts also argue that the proposed model would not change 
the fundamental problems plaguing the municipal corporations and 
might instead simply distract from these deeply-rooted issues. 
Shirk and other experts say that developing a strong community 
police model -- which has met with some success in Mexico City and 
Queretaro -- is of key importance, and doing so in a meaningful way 
with a state-level organization would be more difficult.  Moreover, 
experts point to the need for better recruitment, the creation of a 
genuine civil service for police with the right kind of incentive 
system, and more public oversight over security functions as among 
the most critical for developing stronger policing organizations 
and items at which most states have not excelled.  Additionally, 
Benjamin Fuentes, Coordinator for Institutional Relations at the 
budget oversight agency Superior Auditor of the Federation, told 
Poloff that the municipal-to-state move alone will do little to 
address the very real budget and funding transparency problems that 
impede improvements to local security systems.  He noted that both 
state and local governments chronically underspend security budget 
resources since they can keep unspent money in accounts that are 
not audited the next fiscal year.  They then use the unspent money 
mostly for electoral purposes.  State governments are often amongst 
the most guilty of such practices. 
 
 
 
Prospects 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) With the Calderon government's proposal to nationalize the 
police dead in congress, the municipal-to-state model may offer an 
alternative parties can sink their teeth into.  Governors reluctant 
to cede any authority to federal authorities have already indicated 
they are willing to discuss the new proposal.  PRI Mexico State 
Governor Enrique Pena Nieto told the DCM in a meeting months before 
Garcia Luna's announcement that he was considering making a similar 
reorganization in his state.  PRI governors from Veracruz and 
Oaxaca -- who in addition to Pena Nieto command powerful 
congressional blocs -- are reportedly warm to the idea. 
Nevertheless, the passage of legislation to alter the current 
police arrangement will be complicated and time-consuming 
regardless of party support, requiring constitutional amendments, 
approval by two-thirds of the states, and reforms to the fiscal 
code. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Folding municipal forces into a single state corporation has 
the potential to ease the implementation of reforms by centralizing 
the command structure and allowing local officers access to greater 
resources.  A more central authority at the state level almost 
certainly would help correct the problems of ensuring effective 
vetting mechanisms and providing for more consistent salaries and 
benefits packages -- both of which are mandated through the new 
National Public Security System legislation.  While such a 
reorganization could merely be cosmetic, if it takes into account 
the proper execution of internal control measures, the creation of 
a stronger civil service system, the appropriation of necessary 
resources and oversight of them, and the improvement of civilian 
participation in the security process, it could be a real step 
toward meaningful police reform in Mexico. 
FEELEY