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OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0026/01 0061737
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O 061737Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9656
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000026 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE AND WHA/MEX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO COUNTRY TERRORISM REPORT 2009 
 
REF STATE 109980 
 
¶1.  No known international terrorist organizations have an 
operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents targeting 
U.S. interests/personnel have occurred on or originated from Mexican 
territory.   Mexico continues to confront well-armed, organized 
crime elements in several regions of the country and traditional hot 
spots for narcotics trafficking have seen record levels of violence. 
 Small and weak anti-social groups perpetrated isolated acts of 
vandalism with the intention of disrupting commercial stability and 
raising awareness of their cause.  Although no international 
terrorist organizations have sought to use Mexico as a haven for 
operations, the organized crime syndicates and the consequent 
security problems on the border pose a vulnerability that could 
allow for a future terrorist transit point into the U.S.   The 
Mexican Government remains a highly committed partner and shows no 
sign of complacency in its fight against organized crime and remains 
vigilant against domestic and international terrorist threats. 
 
¶2.  Although incidents of domestic terrorism have not increased over 
the past year, Mexico received threats from a previously active 
group and witnessed the emergence of a new element.  El Ejercito 
Popular Revolucionario (EPR) dissolved talks with the Government of 
Mexico in April and threatened to reemploy violent measures to force 
a response to its demands for a government investigation into the 
disappearance of two of its members.  In 2007, it launched two 
attacks on petroleum pipelines.   In 2009, no acts of terrorism were 
attributed to the EPR.  From May to August, the animal liberation 
front, ALF, claimed responsibility for attacking banks and 
commercial sites throughout Mexico's capital city using propane tank 
bombs. Three bombs were discovered unexploded, while another three 
caused property damage but no casualties. 
 
¶3.  Levels of organized crime and narcotics violence rose 
significantly in the traditional hot spots along the border and in 
marijuana cultivation regions.  Cartels increasingly use 
military-style terrorist tactics to intimidate Mexican security 
forces and establish dominance in specific regions.  In June, the 
Michoacan-based La Familia organization carried out a series of 
retaliatory attacks that killed 12 federal police personnel in 
response to the apprehension of a high-level drug trafficker.  The 
speed, precision, and tactics used by several groups indicated that 
the actions were well coordinated and the perpetrators well trained. 
  The state of Chihuahua experienced an increase in 
narcotics-related deaths as rival cartels used sophisticated 
communications procedures and military weaponry to target and 
assassinate rival cartel members.  There is no apparent evidence of 
ties between Mexican organized crime syndicates and international 
terrorist groups.  The violence attributed to organized crime groups 
on the border, however, continues to strain Mexico's law enforcement 
capacities creating potential vulnerabilities in terms of terrorist 
exploitation seeking access to the U.S through Mexico. 
 
¶4.  Currently, there is no indication that terrorist organizations 
are using Mexico as a conduit for illicit activities.  Nevertheless, 
Mexico's still nascent capacity to counter money laundering suggests 
a potential vulnerability.  The Mexican Attorney General's (PGR) 
Organized Crime Division's (SIEDO) money laundering unit 
investigates and prosecutes money laundering crimes in Mexico with 
mixed results.  The majority of its investigations are linked to 
organized crime and drug proceeds.   Currently, drug proceeds in 
Mexico are laundered primarily in the form of bulk currency 
movements or through currency exchange houses, such as casas de 
cambio and smaller centros cambiarios.  In order to combat the 
illegal movement of funds, Mexican financial institutions typically 
follow international standards such as "know your customer" and due 
diligence advocated by the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) 
Recommendations.  These institutions also terminate the accounts of 
individuals and entities identified on international country lists 
such as the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) Specially 
Designated National and Blocked Persons List.  Furthermore, Mexican 
financial institutions follow the Ley de Institciones de Crdito, 
Artculo 115, Disposicisn 68 y 41 (Law of Credit Institutions, 
Article 115, Sub article 68 and 41) as ordered by the Mexican 
Treasury and supervised by the CNBV or Comisisn Nacional Bancaria y 
de Valores (National Bank and Securities Commission).  This law 
requires banks to consult recognized international and country lists 
of individuals involved in terrorism or other illicit activities and 
submit a "suspicious activities report" within 24 hours to the 
Mexican Department of Treasury's Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) 
on the activities of any individual on that list. 
 
¶5.  The Government of Mexico has stepped up efforts to improve 
interagency coordination as part of its campaign to combat crime and 
prevent terrorism.  It has created a national database known as 
Plataforma Mexico designed to promote greater information exchange 
and overall interoperability across Mexico's numerous and disparate 
police entities.  Tactical Intelligence Operations Units (UNITO) 
represent a new Government of Mexico mechanism that brings together 
all federal agencies in a given state to coordinate intelligence and 
 
MEXICO 00000026  002 OF 002 
 
 
operations.   Command, control, communications, and computer centers 
(also known as C-4 centers) located in several states vary in 
capabilities from simple call centers to analytical cells that 
produce analysis and support the development of operations.   The 
U.S. directly supports programs to help both the Secretariat for 
Public Security (SSP) and the Attorney General's Office (PGR) train 
federal investigators and facilitate greater operational 
coordination and effectiveness. 
 
¶6.  The U.S. and the Government of Mexico worked together to address 
a number of challenges in connection to Mexico's southern and 
northern borders in 2009.  The U.S. deployed two teams to Mexico's 
southern border to conduct assessments.  Its border with Guatemala 
and Belize remains very porous and poses a vulnerability in terms of 
serving as potential terrorist transit point.  The U.S. is working 
with the Government of Mexico to address resource requirements and 
offer some best practices applied effectively at other ports of 
entry.  The U.S. and the Government of Mexico agreed to coordinate 
actions at the northern border ports of entry in order to obstruct 
the flow of illegal arms and currency across the U.S./Mexico border. 
 Pilot programs in Nogales and Eagle Pass are proving to be 
successful by increasing the number of vehicles inspected while 
lowering the wait time at the border crossing.  The U.S. supported 
the establishment of the Mexico Targeting Center, modeled after the 
CBP National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) which should strengthen 
Mexico's ability to target suspicious or illicit cargo entering or 
leaving Mexico.  The Advance Passenger Information system (APIS) 
supports targeting efforts, increases information sharing, and 
enhances intelligence capabilities in connection to efforts to 
identify special interest aliens (SIA) at ports of entry.  The U.S. 
and the Government of Mexico also commenced the Joint Security 
Program (JSP) for Travelers, a pilot program that promotes exchanges 
of immigration officials as part of an effort to streamline the APIS 
referral process, and seeks to identify and track suspected 
terrorists, fugitives, or smugglers. 
 
¶7.  In June 2008, President Calderon signed into law a number of 
security and justice reforms.   The security reforms granted police 
greater investigative authorities and facilitated the ability of law 
enforcement officials to seize the assets of individuals implicated 
in criminal activity.   The justice reforms effected constitutional 
changes that provide for a presumption of innocence in criminal and 
civil prosecutions and allow for evidence-based oral trials 
promoting greater transparency and more confidence in the judicial 
system.  The law provides for the identification of "control judges" 
invested with the authority to issue expeditious warrants for 
wiretaps or the arrest of targets of interest.  Although these 
measures are primarily aimed at organized crime groups, the 
legislation also supports investigations against domestic or 
international terrorists.  The government has eight years to 
implement the justice reform legislation adopted in 2008; to date, 
implementation has been slow and uneven. 
 
¶8.  The U.S. and the Government of Mexico have worked closely to 
implement a robust Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
(ATA) program with associated funding levels expected to rise from 
$503,000 in 2008 to $6 million in 2010.  In 2009, ATA programs 
provided training for 300 Mexican security officials in 18 courses 
or seminars on matters ranging from VIP protection to digital 
security and forensics. 
 
PASCUAL