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RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0152/01 0151710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151709Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0078
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 000152 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHINGTON DC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV EAGR MX
SUBJECT: Calderon's Environmental Agenda: Policy and Promises 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  President Calderon's environmental agenda, 
released with the 2007-2012 National Development Plan, is organized 
around an ambitious principle of environmental sustainability.  The 
agenda aims to promote efficient and rational use of natural 
resources, a competitive economy, and job generation without 
endangering the environmental heritage of future generations.  To 
date, however, Calderon has yet to implement the basic tools 
necessary to execute and enforce these environmental goals.  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Calderon sees himself as an outspoken champion of climate 
change.  His leadership in international negotiations and domestic 
policy on this issue are widely acknowledged both in Mexico and 
abroad.  However, his administration has struggled to address the 
broader environmental agenda, which includes water use, 
biodiversity, sustainable forest management, wildlife management, 
hazardous waste, scientific research and environmental education. 
Most critically, Calderon's environmental strategy has fallen short 
on policy and program implementation.  His environmental agencies 
have failed to develop the expertise and financing necessary to 
enforce environmental law and achieve his long-term objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
Enforcement 
 
----------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (U) In January 2008, President Calderon appointed Patricio 
Patron Laviada as head of the Environmental Attorney's Office 
(PROFEPA).  A member of Calderon's National Action Party (PAN), 
Patron Laviada's tenure as governor of Yucatan has been criticized 
for a lack of expertise and for placing economic interests above 
environmental protection.  Last August, the Mexican press held him 
responsible for allowing the illegal construction of an exclusive 
hotel in a mangrove on an environmentally fragile Caribbean island. 
Patron's defenders point out that after his PROFEPA appointment, he 
closed hotels constructed in protected areas in the state of 
Quintana Roo and halted illegal beach recovery projects in Cancun. 
However, many have interpreted Patron's actions more as political 
revenge against Quintana Roo's governor, who supported the 
opposition Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), than 
environmental stewardship. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) As a result of this controversy and other environmental 
issues, academics, congressmen and NGOs have called for improved 
environmental enforcement at every level of government.  Some 
environmentalists have advocated that PROFEPA should abandon its 
traditionally administrative role to become an autonomous 
independent organization with real judicial independence. 
Left-wing congressmen recently proposed that the environmental 
attorney become an elected post, rather than a presidential 
appointment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Costs vs. Environmental Expenditure 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U) According to the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI), environmental costs of economic activities such 
as mining, transportation, agriculture and livestock from 2003 to 
2006 averaged 8.8 percent of GDP, equivalent to USD 69 billion.  In 
contrast, during the same period, the federal and local governments 
spent an average of only USD 4.5 billion on environmental 
 
MEXICO 00000152  002 OF 004 
 
 
protection, equivalent to 0.6 percent of GDP. In 2009, the federal 
budget allotted USD 1.015 billion for environmental conservation, 
52 percent of which was allocated to water supply and sanitation 
through the National Water Commission (CONAGUA).  The remaining 48 
percent funded the rest of the programs and agencies within the 
Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT). 
 
 
 
¶6.  (U) To reduce environmental costs, Calderon will have to 
provide economic disincentives to environmentally harmful 
practices, such as those employed by illegal developers, and 
decrease wasteful subsidies.  Persistent gasoline subsidies have 
encouraged fossil fuel consumption and discouraged development of 
efficient public transportation.  Artificially low water prices 
have discouraged efficient use of water for agriculture, human 
consumption, and industrial use. 
 
 
 
 
 
Natural Protected Areas 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (U) Natural protected areas in Mexico remain vulnerable due to 
lack of funding, coordination, and support.  For example, Mexico 
enjoyed a notable increase in newly-designated protected areas 
during the previous and current administrations, many of which were 
decreed under international recognition categories, such as Ramsar 
(Convention on Wetlands of International Importance) and World 
Heritage sites.  However, many of these protected areas lack 
funding for long-term management and upkeep.  SEMARNAT's Commission 
of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP) manages 173 natural areas 
totaling over 60 million acres.  The fact that only a small 
percentage of these areas have designated staff and equipment has 
never been formally addressed by CONANP's director. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (U) Lack of coordination among government programs and 
enforcement mechanisms has also stymied Calderon's sustainability 
goals for natural areas and wildlife.  For example, responsibility 
for endangered species has been split between CONANP's Action 
Program for Species Conservation and SEMARNAT's Priority Species 
Program.  The result is long-standing confusion about which agency 
is responsible for key decisions.  The negative impact of this 
confusion is well-illustrated by the case of the Mexican wolf. 
This endangered species has long been ready for a controlled 
reintroduction, but an ongoing conflict between the agencies about 
the most optimal release site has delayed the program indefinitely. 
 
 
 
 
¶9.  (U) The fate of natural protected areas in Mexico is 
intertwined with the status of Mexico's poor indigenous 
communities, which are often owners of vast natural resources. 
Expert technical support and cultural understanding is necessary to 
effectively enforce environmental regulations in indigenous areas. 
In the past, the GOM has simply paid communities to stop exploiting 
their forests and marine resources.  However, without proper 
re-training or education, the members of these communities were 
unable to find alternative sources of income.  Government handouts 
were quickly spent, and communities returned to their previous 
harmful methods of fishing and logging.  Unlike former Environment 
Secretary Julia Carabias (1994-2000), who was successful in 
implementing environmental programs by merging academic efforts and 
public policy, the Calderon administration has not tapped the 
necessary expertise to implement policies tailored to the complex 
needs of poor indigenous communities. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (U) At the request of CONANP, the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) supports efforts to diversify sources of income 
for populations living within protected areas and to help generate 
incentives for ecosystem protection.  USAID also assists with the 
preparation of a pilot project on Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation that is anticipated to become a new 
mechanism for payment for environmental services.  In addition, in 
 
MEXICO 00000152  003 OF 004 
 
 
response to a request from CONANP, USAID is supporting the 
strengthening of the existing legal framework for management of 
protected areas, including assistance in developing official norms 
regulating mining and tourism activities within these zones. 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss of Mexican forests 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (U) Over the past fifteen years, Mexico has developed some 
successful policies that support conservation, ecotourism, and the 
sustainable use of forests.  Nonetheless, deforestation continues 
to have a devastating effect upon the country's landscape.  Mexico 
has lost 27 percent of its original vegetation, and one-third of 
the remaining vegetation is in recovery after initial 
deforestation. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (U) One of President Calderon's most visible efforts to combat 
deforestation is the creation of the ProArbol (ProTree) program. 
The primary mission of the program is to plant more trees in 
Mexico.  However, while the United Nations credits Calderon with 
planting 250 million trees in 2007, Greenpeace reports that only 
ten percent of those trees survived.  Experts have called for a 
change in the way that ProArbol's success is measured: from simply 
counting the number of individually planted trees to measuring the 
square footage of robustly restored forests.  The former head of 
the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) in charge of ProArbol 
resigned last March in the face of strong criticism.  The new 
director, Manuel Rojo, announced revised rules for 2010, which will 
favor forest conservation and restoration.  He will be forced to 
work with a reduced budget of USD 25.5 million in 2010 due to 
lawmakers' skepticism regarding ProArbol's results. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (U) Mexico's forests have tremendous economic potential. 
However, Mexico's production of timber goods fell significantly 
from 9.4 million to 6.5 million cubic meters in 2005, and has not 
recovered.  Mexico's growing domestic demand for timber goods is 
increasingly met with imports, contributing to a widening 
commercial deficit (estimated at USD 5.8 billion in 2008).  Key 
obstacles to a more competitive forestry sector include red tape, 
massive subsidies that make agricultural activities more profitable 
than forestry (and which therefore indirectly encourage land use 
change), a large illegal timber products market, and a lack of 
infrastructure and financing for sustainable forestry activities. 
At CONAFOR's request, USAID is developing a set of recommendations 
to improve existing public policies and programs that aim to 
stimulate production from sustainably managed forests. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (U) COMMENT:  Calderon has achieved some limited victories on 
his environmental agenda.  He has enforced Mexico's participation 
in major international agreements, including the Convention for 
Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework Convention 
for Climate Change, the Montreal Protocol, and the Convention for 
International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES).  He has also 
pioneered a groundbreaking program that gives landowners 
flexibility in determining their own land conservation plans. 
However, his administration has suffered more setbacks than 
successes.  For example, Ricardo Medina of the NGO Unidos para la 
Conservaci????n cites the hasty decentralization of game permits, 
undertaken with little regard to training or environmental impact, 
as one of Calderon's greatest environmental failures. 
Inconsistencies in regulations and criteria among different 
agencies and, in many cases, among different divisions in one 
ministry, are also widely regarded as persistent stumbling blocks 
in this Administration. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (U) The challenges to Calderon's vision of a sustainable 
nation will extend beyond the daunting task of squeezing funding 
out of Mexico's strapped budget.  It will also require effective 
management of programs, strict enforcement, collaboration and 
 
MEXICO 00000152  004 OF 004 
 
 
extensive training. Despite the best efforts of USAID and others, 
Mexico's environmental sustainability will ultimately be dependent 
upon political will and the ability to recognize the economic value 
of its natural resources, the value of environmental services and 
the costs of environmental deterioration and degradation.  With his 
presidency half over and his PAN party severely weakened after 
congressional elections last July, for Calderon this may be a goal 
more aspirational than achievable.  END COMMENT. 
FEELEY