VZCZCXRO8357
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0335/01 0261627
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261627Z JAN 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5119
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON HOLD FOR AMBASSADORS HOLBROOKE, EIKENBERRY, WAYNE 
 
DEPT FOR GWI, S/SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, SCA/A 
DEPT PASS AID/ANE 
CENTCOM FOR USFOR-A AND CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JJONES 
DASD FOR DSEDNEY 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: Analysis of UNAMA's Proposed New Donor Coordination 
Arrangements 
 
REF:  KABUL 215 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: In preparation for the London and Kabul Conferences, 
outgoing United Nations SRSG Kai Eide recently submitted a proposal 
to the Afghan Government (GIRoA) and international community 
partners to improve consultation and coordination of assistance in 
institution building and economic development.  The proposal 
recommends: 1) the main donor countries and institutions second up 
to 20 Senior Advisors to the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) to form an Advisory Group on Donor Coordination 
and Aid Effectiveness, reporting to the SRSG; 2) ISAF appoint a high 
level representative responsible for political and civilian efforts; 
and 3) the EU merge its two missions to enable it to take greater 
responsibility for coordinating efforts of all European Union (EU) 
member states.  While the UNAMA proposal has merits, we have 
concerns regarding the proposal's practicality, the UN's ability to 
recruit its own senior level talent, and the possible establishment 
of a parallel 'donor cabinet of Advisors,' thus creating an 
additional layer of administration between GIRoA and the 
international community.  While GIRoA and international community 
unanimously support UNAMA, the current draft of the proposal does 
not support efforts to develop Afghan capacity and could shift 
leadership away from GIRoA.  Specifically, the proposal duplicates 
the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP) efforts to provide 
coaching and initiative development in priority Ministries.  CTAP is 
already underway, with its efforts Afghan-led and demand-driven. 
This cable provides our analysis, critique, and suggestions of both 
the UNAMA proposal and Terms of Reference for consideration prior to 
operationalizing the approach.  End Summary. 
 
UNAMA Proposal and Advisors' Terms of Reference 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (U) Kai Eide's proposal, dated January 19 in anticipation of 
discussion at the January 28 London Conference, recommends that: 
 
--1) the main donor countries and institutions in economic 
development and governance "second" 15-20 Senior Advisors, reporting 
to the SRSG; 
 
--2) ISAF appoint a high level representative responsible for 
political and civilian (including development and governance) 
efforts; and 
 
--3) the EU should merge its two missions to enable it to take 
greater responsibility for coordinating efforts of all EU member 
states. 
 
¶3. (U) The Senior Advisors seconded to UNAMA must be senior career 
officers of the donor government with the ability to influence donor 
policy. The proposed role of the advisors is: 
 
--1) to develop capacity of a newly-created Secretariat, possibly 
staffed by CTAP, within the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in 
coordinating national development programs; 
 
--2) coach and support other Ministers, in consultation with the 
MoF; 
 
--3) to assist the SRSG in identifying weaknesses in ministries, 
their need for support and impediments to donor coordination; and 
 
--4) to maintain a link to their respective donors. 
 
¶4. (U) Concerns over the proposal begin with the likelihood that 
enacting it may result in a parallel 'donor cabinet of advisors' 
that might duplicate the responsibilities of the GIRoA and/or work 
without a specific mandate or metrics to gauge and monitor its 
actions.  Lines of authority and responsibilities are also unclear; 
for example, individuals would report to the SRSG (who is often out 
of country), a Minister, and their respective home agency.  This 
makes for a confused picture.  Not all donors will have Senior 
Advisors represented in this new UNAMA Advisory Group, so a regular 
system to facilitate information flow to all engaged donors and the 
GIRoA is needed.  Furthermore, the proposal lacks details on how 
UNAMA will improve communication with the GIRoA to set priorities, 
let alone how the SRSG would manage 20 advisors reporting 
individually to him.  SRSG Eide told Ambassador Eikenberry on 
January 23 that he only expected five to ten of the new Advisors to 
be senior enough to command the respect of the Provincial 
Governors. 
 
¶5. (U) Efforts to have Embassy staff work at UNAMA met with too many 
administrative difficulties to come to fruition, and UNAMA and 
 
KABUL 00000335  002 OF 003 
 
 
international community in Kabul already face great difficulties in 
attracting and retaining senior-level staff to take new and 
replacement positions in Kabul. (Reftel describes the staffing 
shortages at UNDP and UNAMA which have a direct impact on upcoming 
elections.) 
 
¶6. (U) UNAMA's recommended approach seems to duplicate the role that 
CTAP already offers by placing qualified advisors in Ministries 
while working to improve the professional capacity in the 
Ministries.  While CTAP (ironically formulated by the MoF and UNAMA) 
is consistent with "Afghanization," it has not yet reached its full 
potential.  The proposal recognizes CTAP as a 'good vehicle'; 
Mission offices believe it is a vehicle to which more members of the 
donor community can contribute, rather than placing additional 
advisors through UNAMA.  The resulting addition of UNAMA Advisors 
coaching and supporting ministries while located outside of 
ministries, could dilute capacity building efforts and move 
leadership away from government. 
 
¶7. (U) The section pertaining to the recommendation for a Senior 
Representative within ISAF to direct PRT efforts is consistent with 
COMISAF, NSC, and USNATO PermRep Ambassador Daalder's 
recommendations.  The proposal lacks information, however, regarding 
how a senior ISAF PRT representative would coordinate with UNAMA. 
In previous drafts, there was a call for an ISAF representative to 
be located at UNAMA; this suggestion still seems reasonable, and the 
ISAF position within UNAMA could be developed in conjunction with 
the Senior Advisors positions as a way to fully integrate and 
coordinate PRT efforts.  We are concerned as to how a US PRT Senior 
Representative would report to a non-US Senior Advisor. 
 
¶8. (U) We strongly agree with UNAMA's suggestion for the EU/EC 
missions to merge. 
 
Recommendations 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (U) We suggest the following Recommendations for the Proposal and 
terms of reference: 
 
- The proposal should avoid creating a parallel 'donor cabinet of 
advisors' that could duplicate the role of GIRoA officials rather 
than building their capacity. 
 
- We should not undermine CTAP or other good ongoing programs 
through this proposal.  The CTAP is placing qualified advisors in 
Ministries while working to improve the professional capacity in the 
Ministries. 
 
- Donor coordination should also focus on program implementation 
mechanisms, so the international community can co-fund, co-plan and 
co-implement assistance using agreed upon systems. 
 
- The proposal needs to explain how UNAMA will set priorities with 
GIRoA and the donor community. 
 
- The proposal should clearly build in a role for Afghan partners. 
 
 
- The proposal needs clear definitions of how the senior ISAF PRT 
representative will coordinate with UNAMA. 
 
- Reporting and responsibility lines need to be well defined, 
especially where the PRT and Senior Advisor come under different 
Chiefs of Mission. 
 
- The proposal should define a regular system to facilitate the 
information flow to all engaged donors and the GIRoA. 
 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (U) COMMENT:  We need further information to analyze the merits 
of the proposal.  For example, we need to understand what 
responsibility the Chief of Mission (COM) will have for the new 
Advisors: whether they will reside at the Embassy; whether they will 
be under COM authority; and whether the Embassy will be responsible 
for their security and life support, including daily transport to 
their UNAMA assignments.  Also, the incoming SRSG may have differing 
views on how to improve consultation and coordination between the 
GIRoA and international community. 
 
¶11. (SBU) UNAMA, under Eide's leadership, has played a commendable, 
proactive role in engaging GIRoA on capacity development while 
 
KABUL 00000335  003 OF 003 
 
 
building functional relations with the donor community.  Any 
expectations to have Advisors in place soon are overly optimistic. 
A new SRSG may require more time to approve the proposal and help it 
evolve into a program.  Recruiting qualified senior advisors will 
require cooperation and shared effort by the donors with UNAMA, and 
filling positions may take several months.  We recommend that USUN 
engage the UN at the HQ level, even as we continue discussions with 
UNAMA and the donor community in Kabul.  END COMMENT. 
 
RICCIARDONE