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OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHJA #0048/01 0140419
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140419Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4275
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000048 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, EAP/INR, S/CT, INR 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE 
NCTC 
NSC FOR D.WALTON 
KUALA LUMPUR FOR G.CHAPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PINS ASEC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 109980 
 
¶1.   (SBU) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified -- 
Please handle accordingly. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The following is the draft text of the 2009 Country 
Report on Terrorism for Indonesia.  Please treat as Sensitive 
until the report is finalized for submission to Congress. 
 
Begin text: 
- 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
The Government of Indonesia reacted strongly and decisively 
to the July 17, 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Ritz Carlton and 
J.W. Marriott hotels, which killed nine people (including the 
two bombers) and injured over 50 people in the first attacks 
in Indonesia in almost four years. 
 
The Indonesian government's successful counterterrorism 
efforts leading up to and stemming from the bombings led to 
the arrests of 14 operatives and the deaths of nine, 
including Noordin Muhammad Top, the Malaysian leader of a 
splinter Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group based in Indonesia.  Top 
was believed to have overseen the 2003 Jakarta J. W. Marriott 
bombing, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy, and the 
2005 Bali bombings and was number one on Indonesia,s most 
wanted list for several years. 
 
As in the previous bombings, Westerners were targeted.  The 
Marriott suicide bomber entered a private dining room where a 
regular breakfast meeting of prominent business community 
representatives, primarily expatriates, was held.  The bomber 
set off an improvised explosive device (IED) that killed six 
people, including the 18 year-old bomber.  Approximately five 
minutes later, a second bomber set off an IED in the Ritz 
Carlton restaurant, killing himself and two others.  An 
undetonated bomb was later discovered in a J.W. Marriott 
guest room where one of the bombers stayed during the two 
days before the attacks. 
 
The level of planning for the attacks, including the planting 
of a JI operative in the hotels, floral shops for at least 
two years prior to the bombings, indicated Top,s network's 
capabilities had grown in sophistication.  As the 
investigation developed, it became apparent the network was 
larger in numbers and geographical reach than previously 
thought.  The ages of the Marriott bomber and other 
operatives indicate Top and his associates successfully 
recruited youths with no previous criminal records.  Family 
links between operatives, including by marriage, were evident 
throughout the network. 
 
PASSAGE OR IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO 
TERRORISM OR TERRORIST FINANCING 
Regarding terrorism legislation, the Parliamentary Commission 
on Security and Defense proposed revisions to the 2003 
Terrorism Law.  As of the end of 2009, Parliament had not yet 
begun to review the revisions.  It was not clear when they 
would begin to do so. 
 
One proposed revision to the law would allow a suspect to be 
detained for two years without trial should his/her 
activities be deemed an endangerment to Indonesia's security. 
Under the current law, the Indonesian police must formally 
name a subject as a terrorism defendant within seven days 
after the arrest and can then be detained for up to four 
months without charges. The suspect must be released after 
the four month period expires if no hard evidence links him 
to terrorism. 
 
Another proposed revision to the law would allow the police 
to crack down on individuals and groups that glorify 
terrorism and openly preach hatred against those of a 
different faith. This particular law would target radical 
clerics who support radical jihad, or war, in their religious 
lectures. 
 
Another proposed revision to the law includes the 
 
JAKARTA 00000048  002 OF 003 
 
 
establishment of a Counterterrorism Coordination Agency 
composed of governmental and social components, including 
representatives of most of the GOI Ministries, the Attorney 
General's Office, the National Police (INP), the State 
Intelligence Agency (BIN), and the Armed Forces (TNI). 
 
The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Social 
Affairs would head the body and answer directly to the 
president.  The agency would coordinate GOI CT policy and 
activities, and serve as a central crisis center in the event 
of a terrorist attack.  It has not yet been determined 
whether the agency would have operational capacities. 
Elements of the agency would also coordinate with the 
Religious, Education, and Information Affairs Ministries to 
implement counter- and de-radicalization programs. 
 
A final proposed revision to the law would allow the 
Indonesian military (TNI) and the State Intelligence Agency 
(BIN) to work more closely with the police, directed by the 
Counterterrorism Coordination Agency, to counter terrorist 
acts, including piracy, air hijacking and hostage-taking. 
 
Regarding developments in terrorist financing legislation, 
the Indonesian government made substantial efforts to draft 
effective terrorism financing legislation that meets FATF 
standards and creates an effective mechanism to freeze 
terrorist assets pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. 
 
An Indonesian interagency team headed by PPATK, the 
Indonesian Financial Intelligence Unit, worked to draft new 
terrorism financing legislation.  This draft law addresses 
criticisms raised in the Asia Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG) 2008 evaluation of Indonesia, which noted 
significant deficiencies in Indonesia,s statutory and 
regulatory framework to combat money laundering and terrorism 
financing. 
 
The draft legislation is a significant improvement over 
previous terrorist financing legislation as it creates a 
mechanism to trace, freeze, seize and confiscate terrorist 
assets pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, and clarified and 
broadened the definition of support to a terrorist 
organization.  The draft legislation does not specifically 
address the use of non-profit organizations (NPOs) and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to finance terrorism, a 
sensitive topic.  Although PPATK interlocutors assert the 
draft legislation will apply to non-profits, it is unclear 
whether there would be political will to apply the 
legislation to non-profits.  The GOI initiated a review of 
its domestic NPO sector in July 2009, as requested by the 
APG.  The review, expected to be completed in July 2010, is a 
key part of the government's effort to improve regulation and 
oversight of the NPO sector.  To date, there has been only 
one successful terrorism financing prosecution in Indonesia, 
a function of poorly drafted legislation, and a lack of 
training for police and prosecutors. 
 
The number of Suspicious Transaction Reports received 
averaged over 1,960 per month in 2009, through November 
(compared to over 900 per month in 2008).  Through November 
2009, there have been 26 money laundering convictions, 6 of 
which occurred in 2009. 
 
The Victim and Witness Protection Agency LPSK is in the 
process of developing procedures to assist victims of crime, 
including terrorist activities, and to shelter witnesses from 
criminals including terrorist organizations. 
 
INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS PERTAINING TO DERADICALISM AND 
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
The Government of Indonesia continued counter violent 
extremism (CVE) programs, but concrete, systemic information 
as to the effectiveness of the programs is not available to 
date.  The National Police and the Ministry for Political, 
Legal, and Security Affairs offered counter-violence programs 
to youth across the country, including sports events, 
television programs, and traditional puppet shows (a strong 
cultural forum in Indonesia). 
 
JAKARTA 00000048  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION OF TERRORISTS INTO 
MAINSTREAM SOCIETY 
The Indonesian National Police continued its prisoner 
assistance program to de-radicalize convicted terrorists, 
primarily with the assistance of two former terrorists, Ali 
Imron and Nasir Abas who were convicted for their 
participation in the 2002 Bali bombings and subsequently 
agreed to assist police with deradicalization efforts.  The 
program identified individuals who might be open to more 
moderate teachings and focused on providing spiritual support 
to the men and modest financial support to their families. 
 
BORDER SECURITY 
A Presidential Regulation was issued in 2009 calling for a 
new national identification card system.  Every Indonesian 
citizen and legally resident foreigner aged 17 years old or 
above (or is married if below age 17) will be required to 
apply for the card.  Each card/citizen will be assigned an 
identification number.  The card will contain bio data, 
including fingerprints and a photo.  The Indonesian 
government expects to implement this program in 2011. 
 
BILATERAL COOPERATION 
The United States and Indonesia continued to enjoy excellent 
cooperation on issues related to international terrorism. 
The Indonesian government has worked closely with the United 
States on terrorism cases and indicated its interest in 
ongoing assistance and cooperation.  Although there is no 
mutual legal assistance treaty in place, there is 
considerable sharing of information between Indonesia and the 
United States, and mechanisms exist for the formal transfer 
of evidence. 
 
- 
End text. 
 
¶3.  (U) Mission point of contact for this report is Poloff 
Brigid Weiller: weillerbr@state.gov. 
 
HUME