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Viewing cable 10ISTANBUL19, ALEVI OPENING" MEETS WITH ALEVI SKEPTICISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ISTANBUL19 2010-01-14 05:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Istanbul
VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIT #0019/01 0140516
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD0D3831 MSI2558-695)
P 140516Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9435
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS ISTANBUL 000019 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PHUM PREL TU
SUBJECT: "ALEVI OPENING" MEETS WITH ALEVI SKEPTICISM 
 
REF: 09 ISTANBUL 456 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  The GOT announced plans to discuss at its 
final Alevi workshop Alevi concerns related to the 
recognition of their cem houses as places of worship, ending 
compulsory religious instruction, and opening a special 
institute to train Alevi clerics. The Alevi population does 
not agree on how to define itself and is divided among many 
organizations (reftel), but they are largely unified in their 
skepticism of the GOT's sincerity toward Alevis in the AKP's 
National Unity Project. According to a survey conducted by 
Eurasian Public Research Center, only 11 percent of Alevis 
believe that the GOT is sincere. They point to what they 
perceive as the AKP's strong Sunni Islam bias as a negative 
variable in the likelihood of cem houses being provided 
official status by the GOT.  Additionally, some Alevi 
organizations - such as Pir Sultan Abdal - note that even if 
cem evler were recognized, the Alevis would never vote for 
the AKP given their suspicions of the AKP's religious 
objectives.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU)  Turkish secularist dailies including "Haberturk" 
and "Cumhuriyet" reported recently on the GOT's plans to hold 
its final Alevi workshop in which it will outline a roadmap 
for an "Alevi opening," an aspect of the National Unity 
Project first announced following the AKP's winter retreat in 
Kizilcihamam in early December 2009. According to Haberturk, 
the GOT will discuss with (largely non-Alevi) participants 
four steps proposed for addressing the concerns of the 
Alevis, including the following: 
 
-     Giving the status of places of worship to cem houses. 
-     Altering Article 24 of the Constitution to end 
compulsory religious instruction in schools. 
-     Opening a special institute to train Alevi clerics. 
-     Extending financial support to cem houses and partially 
covering their water and electricity expenses. 
 
Although not clarified in news coverage, the official 
designation as a place of worship automatically provides for 
financial support from the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) in the form of subsidized utilities. Some Alevi 
leaders, however, fear that with Diyanet support also comes 
Diyanet control, and are worried about the Diyanet trying to 
control the messages put forth in Alevi services.  At this 
time, only Sunni mosques and the places of worship of 
officially-recognized minority community foundations receive 
such subsidies (and controls). 
 
3. (SBU) The GOT's ongoing quarterly Alevi workshops have 
received much criticism from largely boycotting Alevi 
organizations who consider them to be empty and gratuitous. 
The leader of the Istanbul branch of Pir Sultan Abdal Alevi 
association labeled them insulting.  He and the association 
board members noted that only one Alevi organization, Ehl-i 
Beyt, participates in these workshops. They label Ehl-i Beyt 
a "shia group in bed with the AKP."  Izzetin Dogan, president 
of the Cem Vakfi (foundation) representing a more moderate 
and less leftist Alevi population, also said he considers the 
workshops "a joke" and insincere.  While most Alevi 
organizations surveyed are encouraged by the idea of an 
"Alevi opening," they remain skeptical of the GOT's sincerity 
given what they perceive as the AKP's Sunni Islam religious 
objectives and perspectives.  Such perspectives, Dogan and 
even Fermani Altun of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation noted, make 
it difficult for the AKP to reconcile their belief that 
Alevism is a heterodox form of Islam with the possibility of 
formally recognizing Alevi cem houses as places of worship. 
According to previous discussions with representatives of the 
Diyanet, the recognition of cem houses as places of worship 
would be akin to the recognition of Alevism as a 
non-heterodox form of Islam - something they would not 
permit. 
 
4. (SBU) "Cumhuriyet" also reported that Alevis are 
suspicious about the GOT's proposed opening. The paper 
reported on an undated survey conducted by Eurasian Public 
Research Center which showed that 33.9 percent of Alevis said 
they are the target of permanent discrimination. Another 36.4 
percent said they sometimes face discrimination. Only 11 
percent believe that the GOT is sincere toward Alevis in its 
National Unity Project. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment.  While the AKP seems keen to reach out to 
many different communities across the country (from Kurds to 
Greek Orthodox to Alevis) during its National Unity Project, 
GOT action on these issues has been insufficient to earn 
support among Alevis.  If the AKP wants to see any electoral 
gains from its efforts, it will need to deliver, and soon, on 
some of its promises.  The AKP was pummeled with public 
criticism for the rapid speed with which they advanced 
discussions about the National Unity Project. The party 
suggested that its current slower pace is in response to this 
criticism, an attempt to allow for the "digestion" of the 
proposed reforms. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment Continued: Lack of engagement with Alevi 
organizations outside of the Eyl-i Beyt, whom many see as in 
bed with the AKP, will likely continue to prevent the "Alevi 
Opening" from gaining traction.  The AKP will have to work 
very hard to prove its sincerity - possibly through action 
rather than words - before other Alevi groups will consider 
joining the workshops. 
DAYTON