VZCZCXYZ0055
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0264/01 0262148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 262146Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2252
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0027
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA

UNCLAS BOGOTA 000264 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND INL/RM 
DEPT FOR WHA/AND 
WHITE HOUSE PASS DIR ONDCP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR SENV KCRM PTER PGOV CO
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATION PROGRESS IN FORMER FARC STRONGHOLD IMPRESSIVE, 
BUT SECURITY GAINS TENUOUS 
 
REF: 09 BOGOTA 2334; 09 BOGOTA 2786; 08 BOGOTA 3547 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Despite notable progress, including marked 
gains in public security, reduction of coca cultivation, and 
winning support of the local population for governmental 
institutions, the overall situation is fragile in the Macarena area 
of Meta Department -- the former heartland of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the focus of the Government of 
Colombia's (GOC) Plan for the Integrated Consolidation of the 
Macarena (PCIM).  "Success" in the Macarena will be scrutinized 
carefully since the PCIM is the model for intervention in other 
priority areas under Colombia's National Consolidation Plan (PNC) 
and has been touted as a counterinsurgency model for other 
countries in conflict.  While security and citizen confidence in 
the national government have improved, Macarena residents and 
leaders cite remaining challenges in transitioning to the licit 
economy: land titling issues, deteriorated or non-existent tertiary 
roads, and a lack of access to credit and resources.  PCIM 
officials and Colombian military commanders have noted the void 
created in the wake of military clearing operations, especially the 
lack of police presence, and the slow pace of the government to 
establish a meaningful civilian presence in newly consolidated 
areas.  Government action has lagged behind rhetoric about the need 
to establish state presence.  Embassy Bogota is positioned to help 
the GOC address many of the significant challenges facing the PCIM 
and other key zones through Post's Colombian Strategic Development 
Initiative.  Post has also developed an engagement strategy with 
key GOC stakeholders over the next month to focus civilian agency 
attention on consolidation, including the PCIM.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On December 14, NAS, USAID, and MILGP representatives 
visited former FARC strongholds Cano Amarillo and Puerto Rico, 
communities qualified as "in transition" under the PCIM.  While 
these areas have made tangible and significant progress, GOC 
consolidation leaders emphasized the delicacy of the overall 
situation and the need for continued progress.  In Cano Amarillo -- 
a hamlet retaken from the FARC approximately a year ago -- local 
residents and leaders raised concerns about challenges facing 
consolidation and difficulties in transitioning to the licit 
economy.  Unless the GOC addresses the significant challenges 
facing the PCIM, these problems may negatively impact the Embassy's 
Colombian Strategic Development Initiative. 
 
 
 
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PCIM as a Counterinsurgency Model 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶3.  (U) Beginning in 2007, the GOC, under Ministry of Defense 
leadership and with USG support, initiated the PCIM, a pilot 
program to increase state presence in the Macarena region of Meta 
-- six municipal counties which were long a stronghold of the FARC. 
The three PCIM coordinators (civilian, army, and police) act as 
interlocutors with local, regional, and national government 
counterparts, theoretically working together to ensure that the 
clear/hold/build phases of consolidation unfold in a coordinated 
and sequenced fashion.  The military first establishes permanent 
security for communities and then transitions security 
responsibilities to the police while civilian institutions create 
state presence through a range of government services including 
education, health care, and infrastructure projects. 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Colombian government used the PCIM model to create 
the PNC.  Regional coordination center (RCC) coordinators 
responsible for consolidating other priority regions have visited 
the PCIM to draw lessons and the PCIM civilian coordinator has 
advised other RCCs.  Representatives from across the USG, including 
from the missions in Panama, Mexico, Afghanistan, Paraguay, and 
other countries, have met with PCIM staff.  Perceived PCIM success 
to date has also attracted the interest of the governments of 
Holland and Germany -- both of whom are financing aspects of PCIM 
programming. 
 
 
 
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Stronger Participation of Civilian Agencies Needed in PCIM 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
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¶5.  (SBU) The lag in effective participation of civilian 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, and other actors 
undermines the PCIM model of integrated state action.  As the 
consolidation process progresses, better civilian coordination and 
high-level commitment from GOC civilian agencies are essential to 
ensure the delivery of state services to communities that are 
embracing the state as the legitimate authority for the first time. 
The current ad hoc inter-institutional process will result in 
poorly coordinated interventions that lack a long-term, structural 
impact. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Some of the challenges civilian government agencies face 
to effectively participate in the PCIM include rigid bureaucratic 
processes and the inability to adapt to fast changing conditions on 
the ground.  Additional funding for socio-economic programs is 
needed and existing programs need more flexibility to be able to 
respond quickly to take advantage of expanding spaces of security 
and eradication.  Post is encouraging the GOC to deepen civilian 
agency commitment and improve upon steps taken to date, which 
include a demonstrated prioritization of consolidation zones in the 
2010 budget for the Agency for Social Action and a two day 
conference this month convoked by the National Planning Department 
to identify the totality of existing GOC programming as well as 
programming gaps throughout the consolidation zones. 
 
 
 
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Security Improves, but Police Presence Lacking 
 
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¶7.  (SBU) Colombian public security forces have made impressive 
gains in the PCIM's area of operations, pushing the FARC out of key 
population centers and surrounding areas and winning the confidence 
of citizenry who now openly collaborate with government 
consolidation efforts.  Despite these advances, security gains are 
tenuous.  Area military commanders point to severe limitations 
posed by their constitutional inability to act as "civilian" law 
enforcement officials in matters not related to terrorism or armed 
conflict, and tout the need for additional police presence in the 
 
 
area.  As in other areas of Colombia, the FARC is adapting to the 
increased security presence by employing small, mobile units of 
5-10 guerrillas, often in civilian attire.  These groups are 
difficult to identify and move into rural communities to exert 
pressure, extort businesses, gather intelligence, and provide 
logistical support for FARC units that are increasingly isolated 
from population centers.  Instead of engaging Colombian security 
forces directly, the FARC is increasing its use of anti-personnel 
mines and improvised explosive devices to inflict damage. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The transition of security responsibility from the 
military to the police -- a key element of consolidation -- 
continues to lag in the PCIM.  The Colombian National Police has 
established two new police stations in towns outside the municipal 
capitals as a result of the consolidation effort.  They also plan 
to build two more stations by 2011.  Nonetheless, overall police 
presence is limited in transition zones and lags behind military 
clearing operations.  In the absence of a robust police presence, 
common crime is reportedly on the rise in areas of previous FARC 
influence.  The potential for the emergence of organized drug 
trafficking groups operating in areas adjacent to the PCIM is also 
a concern.  Until the Colombian National Police is able to budget 
enough resources to expand and staff permanent bases outside of the 
municipal capitals, permanent security will be elusive. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Recently, the Fiscalia (the Colombian Prosecutor General 
equivalent) assigned a special prosecutor and two investigators to 
the PCIM's RCC in Vista Hermosa.  The special prosecutor is tasked 
to investigate crimes in the PCIM related to terrorism and 
narco-trafficking.  Despite this important support -- which took 
nearly two years of lobbying to secure -- mobility within the PCIM 
presents challenges to investigation efforts.  Attempts to use 
virtual courtrooms have been stymied by the legal requirement that 
the accused be physically represented by counsel, an impossible 
task given the absence of public defenders in the zone. 
 
 
 
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Economic Development Challenges 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Improved security conditions and a significant drop in 
coca cultivation have spurred the transition to legal economic 
activities in the Macarena.  Long-term crops such as cacao, rubber, 
coffee, and African Palm have demonstrated potential as suitable 
alternatives to coca cultivation and drivers of sustainable 
economic growth.  Despite improved conditions, remaining obstacles 
to lasting economic development include deteriorated tertiary 
roads, poor market access for locally-produced products, lack of 
credit, and the need for more government and private sector 
engagement. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Notwithstanding the region's relative proximity to 
Bogota, the country's largest domestic market, inadequate 
infrastructure in the Macarena region limits local farmer access to 
markets.  Under the PCIM, tertiary road and bridge construction 
prioritizes linking rural communities to markets and increasing 
access to government services.  To improve the region's tertiary 
roadways and market access for rural farmers, the GOC must improve 
roads and bridges and undertake new construction. 
 
 
¶12.  (U) The creation of rapid income-generating opportunities to 
replace lost income from the coca economy and lack of credit for 
small farmers also present challenges to economic growth in the 
PCIM.  The GOC, in collaboration with international donors 
including USAID, have initiated pilot programs to address income 
and food security needs post-eradication.  Short-term food subsidy 
programs encourage rural families to remain in the area, but they 
do not represent a sustainable livelihood strategy for families in 
the Macarena.  For many rural farmers, credit is needed to purchase 
essential farming inputs and equipment, make capital investments in 
their farms, and pay day laborers.  The problem is more severe for 
former coca growers who often received financing from the FARC to 
grow illicit crops and earned frequent cash payments for their 
coca.  USAID is working with the GOC's Opportunities Bank policy 
program and the Colombian banking sector to encourage expansion of 
microfinance services to rural areas such as the PCIM. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Involvement of other government agencies and the private 
sector is critical for the success of economic development 
activities in the region.  Under the Progreso program, USAID has 
helped the PCIM establish productive roundtables in the Macarena 
region that bring together government institutions, the private 
sector, and farmers' associations to discuss productive activities 
in the region.  While linkages have been developed between 
departmental-level agencies, the private sector, and local 
producers to provide resources and economic development activities, 
more needs to be done to engage the central government, and the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce in particular, to improve 
small-scale farming. 
 
 
 
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Lack of Progress on Land Titling 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) An unexpected result of the dramatic security 
improvements in much of the Macarena region has been skyrocketing 
property values.  Consolidation staff report that small property 
land values have increased 14-fold in two years in some PCIM areas, 
attributable to better security.  This inflation in land prices may 
expose farmers without land title to conflict and competition for 
land from large land owners and outside investors seeking to 
capitalize on the emerging economic opportunities in the region. 
There have also been anecdotal reports that major drug traffickers 
have sent emissaries to buy land in and around the PCIM, and small 
farmers run the risk of being pushed out by this land grab. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Accelerated land titling is one solution to this 
conflict, yet inefficient land titling is a major challenge and a 
contentious issue in the PCIM.  According to the civilian 
coordinator, no small farmers have received title to property in 
the PCIM since consolidation efforts began.  Complex bureaucratic 
rules governing land titling in Colombia often discourage small 
land holders from pursuing their claims.  In addition, many 
residents in the region reside within territory designated for 
special environmental management due to proximity to three national 
parks.  This designation includes the requirement that claims be 
accompanied by an environmental management plan, a daunting task 
for small-scale farmers.  USAID is supporting GOC efforts to reform 
 
 
the land policy framework, including titling procedures, 
restitution, communal territories, and protected areas.  The 
changes currently being proposed would greatly facilitate 
resolution of the issues mentioned above, not only in PCIM, but for 
the other consolidation areas as well.   Some PCIM residents face 
additional hurdles to land ownership as Colombian law prohibits 
former coca farmers from legally obtaining title to their land for 
five years after growing coca. 
 
 
 
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Coca Cultivation Down 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) The United Nations reported that coca cultivation in the 
PCIM was down 73 percent in 2008 compared to 2007, evidence that 
consolidation and eradication efforts have been successful in 
reducing coca cultivation there (Ref A).  But the progress must be 
seen in the broad context of continued FARC resilience.  The 
FARC-controlled region in the southern PCIM bordering the Macarena 
National Park is still a significant coca cultivation area and 
poses security issues for manual eradicators.  In July 2009, PCIM 
officials, citing security concerns and the relatively small 
amounts of licit agriculture in the southern PCIM, requested aerial 
eradication operations to cut off an important source of revenue 
for the FARC (Ref B).  The request came over a year after a large 
part of the PCIM was declared off limits to spray to accommodate 
consolidation efforts and to implement an ambitious voluntary 
eradication program (Ref C).  Recently, PCIM officials requested a 
second round of aerial eradication for mid-January to combat 
replanting efforts following spray operations in August. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Coca eradication in the PCIM has largely been 
successful, but challenges remain.  PCIM officials acknowledge that 
voluntary and forced manual eradication programs in some parts of 
the PCIM are impossible to implement due to anticipated violence by 
the FARC against eradication teams and participating communities. 
In safer PCIM transition zones, lack of funding for small-scale 
eradication operations has left behind small pockets of coca that 
undermine lasting eradication and perpetuate a culture of 
illegality. 
 
 
 
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Comment 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶18.  (SBU) The PCIM has shown that improved security brings 
significant ancillary benefits, as shown by increased land prices 
in the region as a consequence of citizen security.  While 
challenges continue to face the PCIM, they are not insurmountable. 
Post is watching to see if the recent departure of Vice Minister of 
Defense Sergio Jaramillo, a major proponent of the PCIM model, 
results in less attention and urgency from Bogota on the success of 
consolidation in the Macarena.  On the other hand, the arrival of a 
more operational official to replace Jaramillo might well lead to 
progress on operational challenges such as those cited in this 
message.  Jaramillo's replacement, Jorge Mario Eastman, appears to 
have embraced his role as co-chair of the consolidation process and 
 
 
to recognize the significance of the consolidation plan in the 
national context.  With elections and a possible government 
transition looming, the GOC may grow distracted with the PCIM model 
in 2010, and Embassy Bogota is working to prevent this.  Embassy 
Bogota has developed an engagement strategy with key GOC 
stakeholders over the next month to cultivate VMOD Eastman's 
interest in the PCIM and to increase the focus of civilian agency 
attention on consolidation.  Consolidation efforts have generated 
high expectations among communities for the transformation of the 
Macarena region.  Fulfilling these expectations is crucial to PCIM 
success and progress of the Embassy's Colombian Strategic 
Development Initiative in the Macarena and beyond. 
BROWNFIELD