VZCZCXRO9788
OO RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0061 0151730
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151730Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6295
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0756
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0687
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0590
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0442
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1645
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0002
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BERLIN 000061 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PRAGUE FOR ACTING DCM JOHN LAW 
STATE FOR S/SRAP SENIOR ADVISOR DERECK HOGAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: GERMANY SKEPTICAL ON COORDINATION OF PRT CIVILIAN 
ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: STATE 3595 
 
¶1. (SBU) Post delivered reftel points to MFA AF/PAK Task 
Force Director Ruediger Koenig on January 15, strongly 
encouraging Germany to send a senior official to participate 
in a January  25 meeting with D/SRAP Jones and other Deputy 
SRAPs before the start of Prague PRT Conference.  Koenig 
noted that Germany did not have a D/SRAP per se, but that he, 
working directly under German SRAP Muetzelburg, effectively 
filled that role.  He indicated that because of the press of 
work in advance of the January 28 London Conference, he would 
unfortunately not be able to go to Prague.  However, he noted 
that he would have one of the German MFA officials attending 
the conference, PRT Kunduz Civilian Leader Burkhard Ducoffre, 
represent Germany at the D/SRAP meeting. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Koenig expressed some misgivings about trying to 
coordinate PRT development and other civilian assistance.  He 
noted that in German PRTs, the civilian component was 
distinct from the military component and did not fall under 
the ISAF military chain of command.  In identifying potential 
development projects, the PRT itself played only a 
"transmission" and "monitoring" role with regard to 
development projects.  All the decisions about what projects 
to pursue and the funding for those projects came from either 
the MFA or the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.  German diplomats and aid workers already did 
all the necessary coordination at the local and national 
level to ensure that proposed projects were sustainable, had 
local buy-in, and were carried out in accordance with the 
Afghan National Development Strategy. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Koenig therefore saw little need for further 
"coordination" of the civilian work of PRTs -- especially by 
NATO/ISAF.  He wondered whether the U.S. itself really 
supported the idea of having the NATO Senior Civilian 
Representative (SCR), for example, tell U.S. PRT commanders 
what projects they should or should not do with their 
national CERP funds.  Koenig thought a more useful role for a 
strengthened NATO SCR would be to improve coordination with 
UNAMA, the EU and other international organizations on what 
assistance the ISAF HQ staff was providing to Afghan 
authorities on anticorruption, governance, and other civilian 
activities. 
MURPHY