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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8015
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000012 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MA AU
SUBJECT: ICG FAILS TO DELIVER FOR MADAGASCAR 
 
REF: 09 ANTANANARIVO 887 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000012  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On January 6, the African Union (AU) convened a 
meeting of members of the International Contact Group on Madagascar 
(ICG-M) in Addis Ababa to discuss the country's ongoing political 
crisis, and develop a common position towards regime leader Andry 
"TGV" Rajoelina's recent unilateral departure from the negotiation 
process.  While there was consensus on the ultimate need for free 
and fair elections to bring an end to this crisis, members were 
divided on several key issues, including the possibility for a 
return to the framework reached during talks in Maputo and Addis 
Ababa from August to November 2009, the utility of targeted 
sanctions to bring political actors back to the negotiating table, 
and the likely success or failure of elections held in the current 
political climate.  The U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Phillip 
Carter, was in the majority in supporting a return to dialogue under 
renewed international mediation with a more focused mandate. 
France, represented by Secretary of State for Cooperation and the 
Francophonie Alain Joyandet, strongly supported a move to elections 
as soon as possible, declaring the Maputo/Addis agreements 
unworkable and deflecting blame from Rajoelina for their failure. 
The resulting communique is weak, unclear, and leaves much to be 
resolved.  AU Chairperson Jean Ping has inserted himself into the 
mediation, and appears to be personally taking the reins from 
current senior Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
mediator Joaquim Chissano; his planned trip to Madagascar in the 
near future is unlikely to resolve an impasse that he clearly 
underestimates, and the ICG's punt on sanctions will necessitate 
further dialogue once he fails to deliver. END SUMMARY. 
 
SOME COMMON GROUND 
------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) To all in the ICG, the status quo is considered 
unsustainable and will likely lead to further instability and 
political unrest in Madagascar.  There was general agreement that 
Malagasy parties need to be held accountable should they continue to 
pose obstacles to credible elections.  This view was vocally 
supported by delegations from Uganda and Nigeria, and the EU 
delegation confirmed that their current deliberations under Article 
96 of the Cotonou treaty would result in a termination of foreign 
assistance by late February 2010 if the status quo persisted. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Furthermore, ICG members unanimously supported free and 
fair elections as the only real solution to Madagascar's ongoing 
political crisis, despite differences on the timeline and conditions 
under which they could be held.  There was broad agreement as well 
that the ICG should avoid assigning blame for the recent breakdown 
of negotiations, and seek only to condemn unilateral moves from any 
party; the standard language of "consensus and inclusivity" 
permeated the discussion.  Similarly, the members agreed on the need 
to apply pressure on all parties in Madagascar, and ensure that the 
three former presidents too understood the need for flexibility on 
their part in developing a durable solution.  Seeking to identify 
the international community's own role in the failure of 
negotiations, all parties agreed that the mediation effort under 
Chissano had suffered from an unclear structure, and would benefit 
from a clearer mandate that resolved any real or perceived conflicts 
between SADC and the AU. 
 
DIVISIONS HARDEN 
---------------- 
¶4. (SBU) There was fundamental disagreement on a number of issues 
that was not resolved by the end of the day; chief among them was 
the question of how and when to hold elections.  In line with recent 
statements from Paris, the French delegation advocated conditional 
support for Rajoelina's election plan, stating that it was a 
positive development that should be applauded, despite its 
unilateral origins.  They were joined by the delegations of the 
Francophonie (OIF) and the Indian Ocean Commission (COI) in their 
regret that the ICG had failed thus far to resolve the crisis or 
present plausible alternatives, and stated that the ICG should 
accept that elections are the only way forward, and use our 
influence to ensure that a transparent and credible process unfolds 
to facilitate them. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The rest of the ICG disagreed, some forcefully.  The United 
States was joined by the European Union, Britain, Japan, Uganda, 
Nigeria, COMESA, Russia and China in expressing the need for a 
return to inclusive dialogue before any election plans can be 
discussed.  Ambassador Carter raised concerns about the transition 
government's ability to maintain order, rein in human rights abuses 
and attacks against the media, and provide even a minimum of 
political space for opposition politicians given their track record 
over the last year.  The Japanese delegation proposed that the ICG 
announce publicly that it would not support such elections, and if 
they are held, that the results would not be recognized.  Among 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000012  002 OF 002 
 
 
others, the Ugandan and Nigerian delegations made similar 
statements, all focusing on the need to condemn Rajoelina's 
unilateral actions and return to negotiations before any discussion 
of elections. 
 
¶6. (SBU) This division, which isolated France and its francophone 
allies, repeated itself in two other key issues: the possibility of 
reviving the Maputo and Addis accords, and the utility of imposing 
sanctions against Rajoelina and his regime.  Andre Parant, Africa 
advisor in the French Presidency, asserted privately that "Maputo is 
dead", summing up the root of the intra-ICG conflict: most members 
consider the Maputo and Addis accords a plausible base that the 
Malagasy parties simply failed to implement in good faith.  The 
French delegation believes that its death was a predictable 
consequence of a flawed process, and that it should be left in the 
past.  French delegates on several occasions contradicted Chissano's 
assertion that the controversial "Maputo III" resolutions, drawn up 
by the three opposition movements in early December, were nothing 
more than positions for further negotiation; Joyandet himself made 
clear his belief that they represented a move no less unilateral 
than Rajoelina's own withdrawal from talks the following week.  For 
the rest of the ICG members, these agreements - which represent four 
months of negotiations - should serve as the framework for renewed 
talks. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On the topic of sanctions, most ICG participants seemed to 
believe that sticks and carrots may be useful and necessary tools in 
the effort to return Madagascar to constitutional order.  The 
Ugandan representative stated his position explicitly, saying there 
should be "selective sanctions against deviant parties who do not 
cooperate in the restoration of a constitutional government." 
France, however, continued to oppose sanctions, calling them 
counterproductive and more likely to be interpreted as the result of 
blame against one party or another - something to be studiously 
avoided at this time. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Despite general agreement that the mediation team needed to 
be restructured and empowered with a solid AU mandate, this issue 
remained unresolved by the end of the day.  It is unclear whether 
Chissano will retain his position, and in any case he leaves this 
meeting with a very unclear mandate, and no apparent guidance from 
the ICG.  AU Chairperson Jean Ping further muddied the waters by 
suggesting that he would make a personal trip to Madagascar in the 
next week, and would make recommendations to the Malagasy parties on 
how to unblock the situation; they would be given two weeks to 
respond to the ICG in writing - although there is no mention in the 
communique of penalties for non-compliance.  The tacit understanding 
appears to be that the ICG could then take up discussion of 
sanctions, but it is unclear why the French/OIF/COI position would 
change as a result. 
 
TOUGH DECISIONS POSTPONED 
------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: The final communique, released at the end of the 
day on January 6 and likely to be widely distributed in Madagascar 
on January 7, will not please any parties, nor provide comfort to 
the Malagasy people, who had put great store in the ICG to deliver a 
clearer path forward.  The United States stood firmly in support of 
consensus and inclusivity, inserted human rights and political 
freedom into the dialogue, and offered language on accountability 
and negotiations that would have represented progress, but French 
positions ensured that the final wording was weak and unclear, 
leaving the heavy lifting for another day.  For the majority of the 
ICG, unilateral actions taken by Rajoelina are at the crux of the 
stalled mediation process.  There are deep concerns about the 
credibility of the regime's proposed legislative elections slated 
for March 20.  Ping may have to fail in his upcoming mission to 
Madagascar before the ICG can reasonably discuss what measures can 
be taken to press the four Malagasy movements back to the 
negotiation tables and to reestablish a credible electoral process. 
In all likelihood, the ICG will reconvene on the margins of the AU 
Summit within the next month in order to grapple once again with the 
question of restoring democratic rule in Madagascar.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Carter. 
 
MUSHINGI