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DE RUEHUJA #0069/01 0211537
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O 211537Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0016
INFO RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0014
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA

UNCLAS ABUJA 000069 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR NI
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR FEBRUARY 6 TO 11 VISIT BY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY CARSON 
 
REF: ABUJA 38; ABUJA 39 
 
¶1. (SBU) The U.S. Mission to Nigeria warmly welcomes the visit of 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Ambassador Carson to 
Nigeria to visit Lagos, Abuja, and Kano February 6 to 11.  Embassy 
provides the following political, economic, and management 
information.  We will transmit key messages for the trip via 
Septel. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RELATIONSHIP STRESSED BY RECENT EVENTS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During Nigeria's fifty years of independence, the inherent 
strength of our bilateral relationship originated largely from the 
positive view that most Nigerians held of both the USG and the 
American people.  Nigerians remain broadly sensitive to their image 
among Americans, and many crave international approval and respect 
for their perceived role as a regional and continental power.  The 
current relationship has come under strain by the recent listing of 
Nigeria for aviation security purposes as a "country of  interest" 
after the attempted bombing of a U.S. aircraft.  Following a recent 
Federal Executive Council meeting, a Cabinet member publicly echoed 
the call by some Nigerian politicians to sever diplomatic ties with 
the U.S. due to  the country's inclusion on this list.  Nigerian 
officials and many private citizens remain angry at the 
designation, calling it discriminatory and unfair.  The decision to 
put Nigeria on this list could also influence GON decisions on 
peacekeeping and on votes before the United Nations Security 
Council.  Political leaders have recently toned down their rhetoric 
and appear to understand our concerns over outside links with 
extremists.  Nearly all Nigerian Government (GON) leaders remain 
favorably disposed towards approval soon of a memorandum of 
understanding on air marshals.  You can expect a discussion of the 
"country of interest" issue at most of your meetings with GON 
officials. 
 
-------------------- 
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) President Yar'Adua, elected in 2007 and eligible to run 
for a second term in 2011, has remained absent from Nigeria for 
nearly 60 days while undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. 
Vice President Goodluck Jonathan has cautiously assumed some 
presidential duties in the meantime, avoiding the appearance of 
seeking the presidency prematurely.  Divisions between Northern and 
Southern politicians and competition among potential successors for 
the Vice Presidency have complicated decision- making.  President 
Yar'Adua reportedly made several short telephone calls to selected 
senior officials and participated in a radio interview with the 
British Broadcasting Corporation. 
 
¶4. (SBU) During his campaign, President Yar'Adua announced a "Seven 
Point Agenda" to enhance electricity generation, food security, job 
creation, road construction, land reform, education, and stability 
in the Niger Delta.  In his inaugural address, he acknowledged 
"flaws" in the electoral process and promised to redress them. 
Actions, however, have fallen short of promises.  The Electoral 
Reform Committee (ERC) established by President Yar'Adua produced a 
comprehensive set of recommendations on electoral reform, but a GON 
paper recommended adoption of only a few of the recommendations, 
which have languished before the National Assembly.  The February 6 
gubernatorial election in the southeastern state of Anambra will 
present a key test of GON willingness and capability to conduct 
credible elections.  A U.S. and the UK. assessment team has met 
with various civil society groups and the Independent National 
Election Commission (INEC) to assess Nigeria's ability to hold 
credible national elections in 2011. 
 
------------------- 
NIGER DELTA AMNESTY 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Niger Delta largely enjoys a current lull in 
militancy.  By October, the GON persuaded all major militant 
leaders to renounce violence and surrender arms in exchange for 
amnesty, government stipends, training opportunities, and pledges 
greater development for the Delta.  Nigerian officials have 
followed up the amnesty program with a series of consultations with 
Delta stakeholders, including ex- militants.  United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) partners sent a letter to Minister of 
Defense and Amnesty Committee Chairperson Retired General Godwin 
Abbe in December offering to engage on the Niger Delta, but has yet 
to receive a reply.  Concerns exist that full implementation of 
rehabilitation programs may not occur before ex-militants become 
 
 
impatient.  To date, security improved considerably in most areas 
of the Delta, but ex-militants staged protests in Bayelsa, Rivers, 
and Delta States over lack of progress on rehabilitation and 
reintegration. 
 
¶6. (SBU) During the past six months, the GON has undertaken a few 
modest steps against corruption.  In August, for example, Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi ordered the 
audit of Nigeria's 24 banks.  Two rounds of audits led to a 3.9 
billion-dollar bailout of eight troubled banks, replacement of top 
bankers, publication of a "name and shame" list of hundreds of bad 
debtors, and recovery to date of ten percent of the bad debt.  In 
late October, a Nigerian judge convicted the former Nigerian Port 
Authority chairperson on various corruption charges and ordered his 
immediate imprisonment for up to eight years.  Many perpetrators of 
corruption, however, appear to possess little or no fear of 
punishment for their offenses. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The State Department designated Nigeria in 2009 as a 
"Category One" country for its efforts against trafficking in 
persons thanks to the work of the Nigerian Agency for the 
Prevention of Trafficking in Persons.  The Nigerian Drug and Law 
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) agreed to accept assignment of a law 
enforcement advisor at its headquarters to provide technical 
assistance.  The Mission witnessed some progress on long-standing 
extradition cases. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On trade and development, Mission efforts have led to the 
elimination of import bans and decreases in tariffs on key 
products, decreasing the cost of doing business and reducing 
incentives for smuggling.  The Mission helped the GON solve 
regulatory and policy problems to allow increased electricity 
supplies, boost agricultural production, and help establish 
reliable regional and international markets, including use of the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  The Mission has also 
worked toward a healthy restructuring of the oil and gas sector, 
and toward improving aviation safety and security.  During the past 
year, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has provided 
technical assistance to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority 
(NCAA) in preparation for an FAA flight safety audit. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Bilateral military cooperation remains strong.  The third 
African Partnership Station (APS) deployment in the last two years 
will occur in February.  U.S. contractors installed Regional 
Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) radar sites in Lagos and Bonny 
Island, and the Mission is helping to stand up a military 
counter-terrorism unit.  Nigerian troops participated in 
peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Liberia with the help of 
Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA).  The 
GON remains interested in working closely with the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote regional 
security where needed. 
 
---------- 
CHALLENGES 
---------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Important legislation affecting the petroleum industry 
and oil and gas services remain under consideration by the National 
Assembly.  The proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and Local 
Content Bill would respectively affect GON relationships with 
international oil and gas production and service companies 
operating in Nigeria.  Depending on their ultimate content, they 
could affect the willingness of foreign companies to make new 
investments in Nigeria in the oil and gas sector. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Lower oil prices and more "shut-in" oil production in the 
Niger Delta, beginning in late 2008, lowered GON revenues. 
Off-setting this trend, accession by militants to the amnesty 
program allowed production to rebound from an estimated 1.6 million 
barrels per day in August 2009 to 2.0 million barrels per day in 
December 2009, with the prospect of as much as 2.4 million barrels 
per day by mid-2010.  The GON offset the decline in revenue in 2008 
and 2009 by drawing down the Excess Crude Account to fund the 
National Integrated Power Project and distribute additional funds 
to national, state, and municipal governments.  Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth is expected to have declined from 6.4 percent 
during 2008 to something above 3.0 percent during 2009, according 
to the latest IMF estimates.  Meanwhile, total foreign exchange 
reserves declined from 63 billion dollars in August 2008 to 43 
billion dollars at the end 2009, while the Excess Crude Account 
declined from 20 billion dollars in January 2009 to 6.5 billion 
dollars at year's end.  The decline in both foreign exchange 
reserves and the Excess Crude Account may stabilize given the 
steady recovery of both oil prices and oil production in 2009. 
 
¶12. (SBU) In the north, violent clashes erupted in four states in 
 
 
July 2009 after supporters of an Islamic extremist group, "Boko 
Haram," attacked police stations and other government facilities 
provoking police and military sweeps in several states suspected to 
harbor "Boko Haram" members and sympathizers.  The group opposes 
western education models.  Nigeria's Islamic leaders strongly 
condemned the attacks.  The Nigerian army restored order, but 
clashes between security forces and militants reportedly resulted 
in about 700 deaths.  The leader of this group died while in police 
custody, and many "Boko Haram" members remain incarcerated or 
outside public view. 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) A separate outbreak of violence occurred in Bauchi State 
in December 2009 after local residents expressed concern to 
authorities about aggressive, open-air preaching by members of an 
Islamic sect known as "Maitatsine" or "Kala Kato."  Sect members 
reportedly questioned the July crackdown by security forces on Boko 
Haram members and criticized others, possibly including members of 
their own sect.  Security personnel responded to the scene and 
quelled the violence, but clashes resulted in an estimated 40 
deaths.  Security officials said they arrested 20 individuals, and 
claimed to have killed the sect's leader recovered bomb-making 
tools and explosives.  In mid-January, communal violence erupted 
again in Jos, causing numerous deaths, considerable damage to 
property, and displacement of thousands of residents.  The GON 
ordered deployment of military and police units to Jos to restore 
order. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In December 2009, Nigerian national Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab allegedly attempted to detonate an explosive device 
on a U.S. commercial airliner shortly before landing at Detroit's 
international airport.  Nigeria's Muslim community roundly 
condemned Abdulmutallab's reported actions in unconditional and 
unequivocal terms.  Several Muslim organizations issued public 
statements condemning violence as "un-Islamic," emphasizing Islam 
as a religion of peace, and voicing concern that this incident has 
harmed Nigeria's image and interests. 
 
--------------------- 
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 
--------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The Mission faces a broad array of management challenges 
exacerbated by the constraints of operating in a Nigerian 
environment and by recurring recruitment difficulties, especially 
at the mid-level. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Lack of office space remains a critical challenge.  The 
Overseas Building Office (OBO) dedicated the New Embassy Compound 
(NEC) in 2005 after "de-scoping" the Chancery building because of 
insufficient funds to complete the building as originally 
envisioned.  The building's office space did not provide for 
reasonable Mission growth, much less the growth that the Mission 
has experienced during the last five years.  The Chancery lacks a 
multi-purpose room for public and Mission community events; a 
cafeteria/restaurant, despite a dearth of dining facilities in the 
vicinity; and a gym for U.S. and Locally Engaged Staff.  The 
Embassy community attempts to compensate with a canteen operating 
out of cobbled-together shipping containers.  Similarly, the 
Embassy's LES members and contract workers must use converted 
shipping containers to change into work uniforms.  The Chancery has 
numerous shortcomings, including a single, one-lane, main entry 
control point that results in the back up of Embassy vehicular 
traffic on both sides of the main entryway, a poorly-calibrated 
electrical system that requires the Embassy to run constantly on 
generators to protect sensitive equipment, and a poorly installed 
roof that must already be replaced.  The GAO previously 
characterized the Abuja NEC as model case for how not to build a 
NEC.  We would agree. 
 
----------------------- 
USAID NEW ANNEX PROJECT 
----------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) When State Department and other agency personnel moved to 
the NEC in 2005, USAID became the primary occupant of the Old 
Embassy Compound, an assemblage of leased properties, until a New 
Annex Project (NOX) at the NEC could be completed to accommodate 
USAID.  The NOX, originally scheduled for completion in 2006, met 
with repeated delays.  OBO finally terminated the contract in 
December 2009 for the contractor's failure to perform, and the 
contract will need to be re-solicited with a revised scope of work. 
This process will be lengthy, and we are urging OBO to expand the 
scope to meet Mission needs. 
 
¶18. (SBU)  The NOX is designed for an office capacity of 105 
persons, but USAID already has 140 authorized positions and 
 
 
projects office staff needs for 2011 at 155 positions.  (Note: 
Throughout the Mission, we have zero growth and cannot approve 
additional NSDD-38 slots for key policy and programming needs.  End 
Note).  The NOX's scope should be significantly expanded to 
accommodate USAID and other Mission needs, including a 
multi-purpose room, professional kitchen, cafeteria, gym, and so 
forth.  Additionally, if the NOX's modest cafeteria were to be 
significantly redesigned, it could serve the cafeteria needs of the 
entire NEC community as well as provide space for an after-hours 
American Club.  As the leases expire on the Old Embassy Compound 
(OEC) in 2010, and the NOX, in whatever future configuration, is 
still years from completion, USAID has been forced to take under 
provisional lease the "Dumez" building, which needs a collocation 
waiver and substantial security renovations but could provide a 
professional office facility. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The Consulate General is undergoing a major 
rehabilitation project due for completion in 2011.  The project 
will harden the Consular area and allow the Public Diplomacy 
Section to move its operations from office space on Lagos Island. 
The project, however, does not address several key needs, such as 
replacing windows that fall out, renovating decrepit bathrooms 
which do not comply with American Disabilities Act provisions, 
replacing all electrical systems, and providing blast protection 
for facility occupants. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Security concerns dominate "quality of life" issues in 
both Abuja and Lagos.  Travel outside Lagos and Abuja requires RSO 
approval and is generally not recommended for pleasure trips. 
Security costs for the Mission remain high as we must pay per diem 
for Mobile Police (MOPOL) escorts on trips and the high cost of 
fuel.  Travel outside of the Lagos islands generally requires use 
of an armored vehicle and sometimes escorts by armed MOPOL.  Fares 
for commercial to and from Nigeria are expensive.  With the high 
cost of goods and services in Nigeria, the ability of Mission staff 
to go out and experience what little is available is extremely 
limited, which adversely affects morale and recruitment.  We have 
dynamic Community Liaison Offices (CLO) in both Abuja and Lagos 
after experiencing nearly 18 months prior with no full-time CLO in 
either location. 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Mission Nigeria has a critical threat rating for violent 
crime.  Criminals with firearms target both Nigerians and 
foreigners, and have repeatedly shown a willingness to 
indiscriminately use their weapons.  Security constraints 
complicate Mission operations and have a deleterious impact on 
Mission morale.  In Lagos, all official movements must occur with 
armored vehicles.  Night-time movements require an armed police 
escort.  In Abuja, travel outside the capital's ring road is 
generally prohibited after 2100 hours because of increased risk of 
armed robbery or assault.  In 2006, assailants robbed an Embassy 
Motor Pool driver and passenger at gun point on the airport road. 
Airport travel between 2100 and 2300 hours requires an armed police 
escort; travel to/from the airport is generally prohibited from 
2300 to 0530 hours. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The Mission, other diplomatic missions, and many 
expatriates in Nigeria have suffered from violent armed robberies, 
both via attacks in public places and via home invasions.  In March 
2008, assailants shot and wounded a Marine Security Guard (MSG) 
during a home invasion at the Lagos MSG residence.  Also in 2008, 
armed intruders attempted several times to enter the Consul 
General's residential compound.  On June 11, 2009, armed intruders 
shot and killed an Embassy Abuja contract security guard at an 
Embassy residential compound.  The intruders attempted to break 
into one of the houses, and the occupant activated the security 
alarm siren.  They left after the alarm was activated and a react 
team was en route to the compound. 
 
¶23. (SBU) On November 18, 2009, six to eight armed intruders 
breached a security wall at a separate Embassy Abuja residential 
compound.  They restrained the guards and brutalized on-compound 
domestic staff.  They attempted to break into one house and the 
occupant activated the "panic" alarm.  The intruders tried to 
disable the alarm with five AK-47 shots into the exterior wall of 
the resident's safe haven, but missed.  They continued with their 
break-in, opened an exterior security grill, and entered the 
residence.  They then began excavating the mortar anchoring the 
safe-haven security grill.  They continued their demolition work 
until the React Team arrived, at which time they fired two shots at 
the react team and withdrew the way they entered over the compound 
wall. 
 
 
-------------- 
STAFFING NEEDS 
-------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Mission Nigeria has expanded to the point where it is one 
of the three largest Missions in sub-Saharan Africa.  Considerable 
pressure and ample justification exist for all agencies at post to 
grow further.  Post, however, has been forced to freeze Mission 
staffing, except for recent approval of a regional 
counter-terrorism position (to be handled outside ICASS) after the 
December 25 attempted attack on a U.S. airliner, due to the lack of 
available office space, housing, and adequate staffing in 
Management to support current operations, much less additional 
Mission growth.  The Mission has added some LES Management 
positions, but needs more, which would be imprudent without 
receiving more U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) staff to supervise them. 
The Mission has tremendous challenges in maintaining internal 
controls and managing LES performance and conduct.  There are signs 
that the Mission will receive soon another MSP-requested General 
Services Officer (GSO) position in Abuja, and OBO is considering 
the Mission's long-standing request to add another Facilities 
Management position.  The Regional Security Office (RSO) may have 
prospects of adding another Assistant RSO position. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Most Mission agencies and all State Department sections 
face serious challenges in recruiting able personnel to fill their 
USDH positions.  The Mission's inadequate facilities, concerns over 
the working environment, living-space conditions, limited 
in-country personal travel options, the limitations of the American 
International School, a very difficult host country operational 
environment, and the challenges of managing local staff effectively 
discourage many prospective bidders.  These concerns, combined with 
the critical threat security environment and heavy work load 
because of the limited staff coverage for the range of 
responsibilities, make it all the more difficult to staff the 
Mission. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) While the December 25 attempted attack on a commercial 
airliner has complicated bilateral relations, we continue to 
promote key priorities on Electoral Reform, the Niger Delta and 
Regional Security, Anti-Corruption, and Energy and Investment. 
President Yar'Adua's prolonged absence from the country continues 
to affect domestic government operations and relations with the 
international community.  A less than credible election in 2011 
could seriously harm interests here.  Meanwhile, we should not lose 
sight of the long-term challenge of working with Nigerian partners 
on numerous shared interests, including deterring or treating 
HIV/AIDS (PEPFAR funding is about 1.5 billion dollars), addressing 
educational needs, and enhancing law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism capacities. 
 
¶27. (U) Embassy and ConGen Lagos collaborated on this telegram. 
SANDERS