VZCZCXRO5005
OO RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0275/01 3451755
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111755Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6755
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0113
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0014
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0168
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0203
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000275 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE RS KZ GR PREL
SUBJECT: OSCE MINISTERIAL FOCUSES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY 
DIALOGUE 
 
USOSCE 00000275  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The seventeenth OSCE Ministerial Council, 
held December 1-2, 2009 in Athens, focused mainly on the 
ongoing European security dialogue known as the Corfu 
Process. Although Russia,s proposed European security treaty 
(EST) dominated the headlines, the U.S. achieved its highest 
priority goal for the Ministerial of keeping the dialogue on 
European security firmly anchored in the OSCE,s Corfu 
Process discussions, which will continue in 2010 under the 
Kazakhstani chairmanship. In addition, other important 
decisions were taken on the OSCE Chairmanship in 2012, 
strengthening Vienna Document 1999, countering transnational 
threats, energy security, small arms and light weapons, 
weapons of mass destruction, Roma-Sinti, and participation of 
women in political life. The improved atmosphere among 
participating States throughout the Fall brought consensus on 
the traditionalbroad-ranging Ministerial Declaration within 
reach, failing ultimately on the same critical stumbling 
blocks as in prior years:  the Istanbul commitments and 
disagreements over Georgia. It also proved impossible to 
adopt decisions on Freedom of Media and Rule of Law, largely 
important for their symbolic value. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Negotiations in Athens on the Corfu Process 
declaration and decision were contentious and protracted. 
While most delegations negotiated in good faith, Russia 
consistently tore apart the draft decision and generally 
indicated they only wanted general brainstorming discussions 
and no concrete results from the Corfu Process. The Russians 
eventually overplayed their hand, infuriating delegations to 
the point that at the Ministers, working lunch on December 
1, Foreign Ministers isolated Russian FM Lavrov, insisting 
that there had to be both a declaration and a decision to 
take the process forward in a concrete way. Lavrov apparently 
personally rewrote the decision, removing most of the 
objectionable language his delegation had inserted the night 
before. While consensus was finally achieved on the basis of 
this draft, we are under no illusions that Russia would have 
agreed to the text absent such pressure from the U.S. and our 
allies. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Agreement on the Corfu Process declaration and 
decision was also complicated by Kazakhstan's insistence on 
including in the documents a positive acknowledgement - if 
not endorsement - of its proposal to hold an OSCE Summit in 
¶2010. Following Kazakhstani threats to veto the declaration, 
Deputy Secretary Steinberg and Kazakhstani FM Saudabayev 
personally negotiated last-minute language that closed the 
deal. Ministers noted "positively" the Kazakhstani proposal 
and committed to review progress on the substance and 
modalities of the proposal in the coming year, to determine 
if the substance would merit a high-level meeting.  At the 
last moment, Uzbekistan surprised everyone by reopening the 
declaration to change the word "positively" back to the 
previous language "with interest."  Subsequently, the 
Kazakhstani Ambassador confirmed that due to tensions between 
the two countries Uzbekistan did not want a summit to take 
place during the Kazakhstani Chairmanship. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In addition to the Corfu Process declaration and 
decision, Ministers adopted 19 decisions and declarations. 
The most important decisions included: the choice of Ireland 
as the OSCE,s Chairman-in-Office in 2012, countering 
transnational threats (co-sponsored by Russia and the United 
States), the OSCE,s role in energy security, small arms and 
light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition, 
early childhood education for Roma-Sinti, and supporting 
increased participation of women in political life. Also of 
note, all 56 OSCE ministers issued a declaration reaffirming 
commitments on non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons of mass destruction, and adopted a 
decision to work to strengthen arms control and CSBM 
instruments, specifically including Vienna Document 1999. 
There were also positive 3 2 and Ministerial statements on 
Nagorno-Karabakh that referenced progress in the settlement 
process. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Corfu Declaration is the most important 
political declaration to be adopted at an OSCE Ministerial 
since Oporto in 2002.  Moreover, the improved atmosphere 
among participating States throughout the Fall due to the 
Corfu discussions brought consensus on the traditionally 
broad-ranging Ministerial Declaration within reach, though it 
 
USOSCE 00000275  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
ultimately failed. The main stumbling blocks continue to be 
Istanbul commitments and disagreements over Georgia. Major 
disagreements with Russia over Georgia, OSCE activity in 
Afghanistan, and in the human dimension, also limited 
substantive progress on other U.S. priorities though the US 
and Russia did come to agreement on a CFE paragraph to be 
included in the broad-based Ministerial Declaration--had 
there been one. Azerbaijan and possibly Georgia indicated 
they were prepared to block consensus if a JCG convened in 
Athens moved to adopt the CFE paragraph.  Attempts to 
negotiate a statement on the Transnistria conflict in Moldova 
faltered again this year over long-standing disagreements on 
the Istanbul Commitments, the presence of Russian 
peacekeepers in the Transnistrian region, and other issues. 
Decisions on Freedom of Media and Rule of Law, largely 
important for their symbolic value, were ultimately blocked 
by Uzbekistan (the latter together with Turkmenistan). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Comment: We achieved our highest priority, to 
provide for the continuation of a comprehensive, open-ended 
discussion of European security, anchored within the OSCE,s 
Corfu Process. Nevertheless, the intensity of negotiations, 
and the willingness of Russia and incoming Chair Kazakhstan 
to play hardball presage another tough year for the OSCE. 
Another factor we will need to take into account is that the 
Central Asian countries are not united and have their own 
political differences with Kazakhstan, as well as Russia. 
The year of the Kazakhstani Chairmanship should prove 
interesting indeed and will require close coordination 
between the EUR and SCA bureaus and posts. 
FULLER