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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0568/01 3501422
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161422Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0425
INFO RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0965
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0931
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1307
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1038
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1180
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0365
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0815

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000568 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/MNSA SANBORN, ADAMS 
DOE FOR NA-24 WHITNEY, LOCKWOOD, MURPHY 
NRC FOR NMSS MARSHALL, GRICE; OIP - SCHWARTZMAN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP TRGY ENRG AORC IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/SAFEGUARDS: YEAR-END ROUND-UP OF DISCUSSIONS 
ON POTENTIAL SAFEGUARDS MEASURES FOR U.S./URENCO CENTRIFUGE 
PLANT 
 
REF: ZUBAREV-GOODMAN EMAIL 6/11/09 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  On November 25, Msnoff and STATE/ISN 
colleagues met with Neville Whiting, IAEA Section Head 
responsible for implementing safeguards in the United States, 
to discuss prospects for safeguards implementation at the 
Louisiana Energy Services (LES - a U.S. subsidiary of Urenco) 
gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) under construction in 
New Mexico.  The IAEA intends to visit the LES site in 
January 2010.  Plans for this pending visit follow a June 
2009 meeting hosted by the IAEA, including both the U.S. and 
Urenco, on the application of safeguards at the LES facility. 
 The IAEA is interested in using safeguards at LES as a test 
bed for novel approaches to safeguards at enrichment 
facilities that could be applied in the future. 
DDG/Safeguards Heinonen has made clear, however, that while 
he welcomes development of new tools, he wants the IAEA to 
retain full latitude as to what tools are actually 
used/installed in any given facility worldwide (i.e., 
availability of a new tool does not necessarily mean the IAEA 
will choose to deploy it worldwide).  This report includes a 
summary of the various discussions to date on safeguards at 
LES. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary contd.: The November meeting and continuing 
preparations in the Safeguards Department for 2010 extend the 
process set out when representatives of the USG and Urenco 
met with a large IAEA team June 15 to discuss possible 
safeguards measures for the LES GCEP.  IAEA officials said 
then they were interested in applying safeguards only if the 
United States funded the service  and if the IAEA were 
permitted to try out approaches that would be useful 
elsewhere, e.g. in Iran.  The IAEA presented the outlines of 
a proposal to reduce inspection effort through use of remote 
monitoring and short-notice random inspections.  The United 
States provided a paper on technical measures under 
consideration to improve GCEP safeguards.  Drawing on 
elements of that paper, the IAEA presented the outlines of a 
safeguards approach that would rely on expanded use of 
operator data and randomized inspections to improve 
effectiveness and reduce inspection burdens.  Representatives 
of the Dutch/German/UK consortium Urenco expressed cautious 
interest but raised a number of reservations, particularly 
about potential impacts on operations and competition in the 
U.S. enrichment market.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Path Forward on Safeguards at LES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a recent meeting with Neville Whiting of the IAEA 
Safeguards Department's Operations B regional inspector 
staff, U.S. representatives noted that the USG and LES have 
agreed on a date for an IAEA site visit--January 21, 2010. 
Whiting found the date agreeable, and expects to complete his 
report on possible safeguards measures at the LES plant in 
mid-December.  The report will lay out innovative ideas for 
the future of inspections at centrifuge facilities, using LES 
as a test bed.  His hope is to have the sides review the 
report prior to the LES site visit.  Speaking for the USG, 
Steve Adams of ISN/MNSA suggested holding a closeout meeting 
in Washington immediately following the site visit to discuss 
the facility and the concepts in Whiting's paper.  As a 
follow-on in the February/March timeframe, the U.S. and IAEA 
could have more formal bilateral discussions on the 
application of safeguards at LES, in addition to discussing 
other issues related to safeguards in the United States 
(e.g., changes to the Eligible Facility List).  Whiting 
indicated that IAEA participants in the site visit would 
likely include the same participants as in the initial June 
meeting:  Herman Nackaerts (Director, Safeguards Operations 
B), Neville Whiting (Section Head, Safeguards Operations B1), 
Jill Cooley (Director, Safeguards Concepts and Planning), 
Bruce Moran (Section Head, Safeguards Concepts and 
Approaches), Alain Lebrun (Acting Unit Head, Safeguards 
Technical Support). 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Whiting emphasized that this is an opportunity to be 
innovative and serve as a benchmark for a new transparency 
regime.  He noted that the only way for this effort to be 
worthwhile would be if novel approaches were pursued at the 
GCEP to serve as a model for safeguards at enrichment 
facilities in other countries, particularly countries of 
concern.  Whiting added that while there are several possible 
scenarios, his approach will be to highlight the 3 or 4 
primary measures that are most essential for effective 
safeguards at a centrifuge plant. 
 
---------------- 
Early Background 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) At an April 20-21, 2009 U.S.-IAEA meeting on 
safeguards implementation in the United States there was a 
preliminary discussion of the possibility that the IAEA might 
select a gas centrifuge enrichment plant in the United States 
for application of safeguards under the U.S.-IAEA safeguards 
agreement (also known as the Voluntary Offer Agreement or 
VOA).  In particular, the National Enrichment Facility (NEF), 
under construction in Eunice, New Mexico by Louisiana Energy 
Services (LES - a U.S. subsidiary of Urenco), was scheduled 
to begin operation by the end of 2009.  The IAEA suggested 
holding a meeting in June to discuss the matter further, and 
suggested that Urenco be invited. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On May 21, Michael Whitaker and Brent McGinnis (Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory) and MsnOff met with IAEA officials 
Chris Charlier (Safeguards Operations B - the Section Head 
responsible for safeguards in the United States), Bruce Moran 
(Safeguards Concepts and Planning), and Alain Lebrun 
(Safeguards Technical Support) for informal discussions of 
possible U.S. and IAEA objectives for GCEP safeguards.  The 
IAEA indicated that its principal objectives were (1) to 
improve efficiency in verifying non-diversion of declared 
material, (2) to improve effectiveness at detecting 
undeclared LEU production, and (3) to improve timeliness in 
detecting undeclared HEU production.  Participants discussed 
technical measures involving automated use of operator 
weighing systems, non-destructive assay methods for measuring 
enrichment and flow in header (feed and withdrawal) pipes, 
tagging and tracking cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 
and other technical measures.  The IAEA expressed particular 
interest in use of weighing systems.  There was general 
agreement that it was important to get Urenco buy-in for 
whatever approach was proposed, and to invite them to a more 
formal discussion in June. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On June 12, MsnOff met with Charlier to preview the 
IAEA's proposed safeguards approach.  As outlined by 
Charlier, the IAEA planned to propose the use of data from 
the operator's weighing system and of mass spectrometry data 
on enrichment levels of feed, product and tails.  Combined 
with mailbox declarations (secure and unalterable daily 
reports of operating data to an IAEA computer on-site) and 
random inspections to verify samples of the reported data, 
this would allow more effective safeguards with lower 
inspection effort by reducing the time spent on mechanical 
tasks such as verifying cylinder weights and enrichment 
assays.  In a separate discussion, DDG/Safeguards Heinonen 
confirmed to Deputy Nuclear Counselor his support for this 
effort, with the understanding that his primary interest was 
not to apply safeguards in the United States but to develop 
methods that could be used in other countries, particularly 
to detect undeclared nuclear activities. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
U.S. and IAEA Presentations in June 2009 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) An IAEA Secretariat team hosted USG and Urenco 
representatives to an in-depth discussion June 15.  Herman 
Nackaerts, Director of Safeguards Operations B (SGOB - the 
 
 
Division responsible for safeguards in, among others, all 
nuclear weapons states) opened the meeting by noting the 
conditions under which the IAEA was willing to apply 
safeguards to a U.S. enrichment facility.  First, the United 
States would have to pay the cost of safeguards operations. 
Second, the IAEA would have to learn something that it could 
apply to other facilities.  Third, the IAEA would apply a 
comprehensive safeguards approach covering the entire 
facility. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Mark Laughter (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) 
summarized the U.S. concept paper ("Summary of Advanced GCEP 
Safeguards Efforts in the United States"), which had been 
provided to the IAEA and Urenco in advance (ref e-mail). 
Based on the UAEA objectives cited above (para 3), the paper 
listed twelve types of safeguards measures under development 
at the DOE National Laboratories, seven of which involve 
unattended monitoring measures.  The majority of these 
measures would be available in the relatively near term (five 
years or less). 
 
¶10. (SBU) Jill Cooley, Director of Safeguards Concepts and 
Planning, then presented the outlines of the IAEA's proposed 
safeguards approach: 
 
-- Use of operator process load cell data at feed and 
withdrawal stations to measure mass flow through the process 
area. 
 
-- Use of online enrichment monitors at the unit headers 
rather than cascade headers (a unit consists of several 
cascades). 
 
-- Use of data from accountability scales (these provide more 
precise mass measurements). 
 
-- Integration of accountancy scales with surveillance to 
identify cylinders automatically at key points. 
 
-- Use of operator data from online mass spectrometers. 
 
-- Maintaining continuity of knowledge by having the operator 
apply IAEA seals to cylinders. 
 
-- Use of mailbox declarations for reporting data. 
 
-- Remote monitoring through periodic transmission to the 
IAEA of some accountancy-related data. 
 
The safeguards approach would involve one annual PIV; all the 
other inspections would be done on a randomized basis.  The 
IAEA could also call a short-notice inspection if data 
reported through remote monitoring indicated unusual 
operating conditions.  SGTS Acting Unit Head Alain Lebrun 
said that applying formal authentication measures to all data 
streams would be prohibitively expensive, and he anticipated 
that only the accountancy scales would need to be 
authenticated.  He warned that unattended systems only save 
money when done right. 
 
--------------- 
Urenco Concerns 
--------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Peter Friend, Urenco Director of safeguards and 
security from Capenhurst, UK, expressed a number of concerns 
with what he called a "long shopping list."  First, he noted 
that there were four companies providing enrichment services 
internationally and only one of them (Urenco) was subject to 
IAEA safeguards.  He referred to the two other planned U.S. 
enrichment facilities - the USEC American Centrifuge Plant at 
Portsmouth, Ohio and the Areva centrifuge plant (using Urenco 
technology) planned for Eagle Rock, Idaho, and said it seemed 
a little unfair that only the Urenco plant was being 
considered for safeguards.  Second, Friend noted that the 
construction schedule at the LES plant was tight, with first 
 
 
cascade operations scheduled for November 2009.  Urenco did 
not want anything to interfere with commissioning this plant, 
and noted that new safeguards measures were easier to 
contemplate at an operating plant, such as Almelo in the 
Netherlands. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Responding to specific measures proposed, Friend 
warned that enrichment measures sensitive enough to detect 
diversion of a significant quantity per year might be able to 
reveal classified centrifuge performance data.  He thought 
unattended use of accountability scales was probably doable. 
Online enrichment monitors are expensive and not very 
accurate and Urenco might be able to allow direct gas 
measurement instead, but he wasn't sure Urenco would be 
willing to share mass spectrometry data.  Friend was unsure 
of the value of containment and surveillance measures and 
noted that this might require some improvement in cylinder 
identification.  Regarding mailbox declarations, he wanted 
the declared data to remain on-site and not be transmitted to 
Vienna.  There was some discussion of possible compromise 
approaches allowing summary data to be transmitted to Vienna. 
 With those caveats, Urenco was generally supportive of IAEA 
safeguards and would cooperate with the authorities.  Friend 
did not put any markers down to the effect that what was 
being proposed was unacceptable, noted that Urenco had a 
longstanding relationship with the IAEA, and expressed the 
view that all centrifuge enrichment facilities around the 
world should be under international safeguards.  Later, 
Friend raised two additional concerns: First, what would 
happen if operator data system failed?  Second, he did not 
want the IAEA to learn of operational problems before the 
operator. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Nackaerts summed up by saying he was encouraged. 
He identified three types of issue that needed further 
discussion: technical issues, concerns about intrusiveness, 
and information sensitivity.  He suggested that one advantage 
of trying new measures at LES was that it offered greater 
prospects for reducing inspection effort.  At Urenco's 
European plants, where Euratom safeguards are also applied, 
new measures might reduce inspection effort by 40% from the 
current level of roughly 120 person-days of inspection (PDI) 
per year.  At LES, the inspection effort could be reduced to 
30 PDI per year, a 75% reduction.  He said the IAEA would 
prepare a written proposal, taking into account the 
discussion, and aim to share it with the United States and 
with Urenco by the end of July.  Friend suggested that the 
IAEA use the design of an existing Urenco facility at Almelo 
in the Netherlands as the basis for such a proposal.  The 
proposal would be in the form of a baseline and additional 
options, and would include a cost estimate.  This would 
enable the United States and the IAEA to make their 
respective decisions (on funding and selection) on whether to 
apply safeguards at the LES plant.  Nackaerts also made a 
request for design information to aid in developing a 
safeguards approach and cost estimates.  Friend suggested 
using design information from recent additions to the Almelo 
plant for that purpose. 
 
¶14. (SBU) June 2009 Meeting Participants: 
 
IAEA 
---- 
Herman Nackaerts, Director, Safeguards Operations B 
Neville Whiting, Section Head, Safeguards Operations B1 
Jill Cooley, Director, Safeguards Concepts and Planning 
Bruce Moran, Section Head, Safeguards Concepts and Approaches 
Alain Lebrun, Acting Unit Head, Safeguards Technical Support 
 
United States 
------------- 
Dunbar Lockwood, Department of Energy 
Steve Adams, Department of State 
Jon Sanborn, Department of State 
Karolina Walkin, Department of State 
Jane Marshall, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
 
Mark Goodman, UNVIE 
John Murphy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
Brian Boyer, Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Mark Laughter, Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
 
Urenco 
------ 
Peter Friend, Capenhurst 
Jack Rollins, LES 
Theodoor Botter, LES 
 
¶15. (U) Subsequent USG-IAEA consultations in November 
involved Steve Adams (ISN/MNSA), Mathew Sharp (ISN/MNSA) and 
Elena Thomas (UNVIE) for the USG, and Neville Whiting (SGOB1) 
from the Agency. 
DAVIES