VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0557/01 3451447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111447Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0405
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0218
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0372
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000557 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR T, S/SANAC, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA 
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY 
NRC FOR OIP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP PREL IAEA UN
SUBJECT: FUTURE OF THE AGENCY SPUTTERS BUT WON'T GO OUT 
 
REF: UNVIE 506 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The November 19 final meeting of the Future of 
the Agency (FOA) broke no new ground, though it did provide yet 
another platform for Iran to bemoan "some Member States' insistence 
on politicizing the IAEA."  The remaining time was dedicated to the 
question of Board composition and enlargement.  The U.S. reminded 
other Members that the FOA was born of the recognition that the IAEA 
required a more visionary approach to resource issues and that the 
U.S. would not back away from this uncompleted task.  The Brazilian 
Chair of the process announced his intention to draft a final FOA 
report that could be submitted by consensus from Member States to 
the March Board of Governors.  This unfortunate decision threatens 
to draw on Mission resources at a time when energies would be better 
spent focusing on the budget and Medium Term Strategy.  End Summary. 
 
- 
¶2. (SBU) The final FOTA meeting on "cross-cutting issues" lasted 
only a few hours November 19 and focused mainly on Board composition 
and enlargement.  Enlargement of the Board is the objective of an 
amendment to Article VI of the IAEA Statute, which the 1999 General 
Conference adopted but which awaits ratification by two-thirds of 
Member States.  (The U.S. Senate has not taken up ratification.) 
Ignoring that a process is already in train (or perhaps implicitly 
dismissing the amendment process as stalled), many states, including 
South Korea and Spain, called for a more representative body. 
Canada, on the other hand, pointed out that a larger Board implied 
increasing deadlock or a greater tendency to resort to voting on 
resolutions.  The "Spirit of Vienna," based on consensus 
decision-making, would not fare well under a larger Board. 
 
¶3. (SBU) As in past meetings, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh made the 
bulk of interventions.  Interestingly, Spain took the lead on 
contradicting Iran's claims that "some Member States" were intent on 
politicizing the IAEA's technical work.  Spain pointed out that the 
IAEA was a technical agency operating in a political context; 
countries in violation of their safeguards agreements were a threat 
to global security and therefore created political problems. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The U.S. used the meeting to remind Member States that the 
FOA process had been born of DG ElBaradei's commitment to fund the 
IAEA appropriately and sufficiently.  Stemming from the "Commission 
of Eminent Persons Report" and ElBaradei's own "2020 Report," the 
FOA process was intended to identify the Agency's needs and seek 
funding for them.  The U.S. pledged to continue work toward this 
goal with an expansive stance on the 2011 budget and beyond. 
Germany and Canada were more pointed in their approach, stating, in 
essence, that the FOA had failed to rise above politics, focus on 
the future, or live up to expectations.  These observations were not 
directly contradicted by other participants, though some Member 
States ventured that the discussions had been "educational." 
- 
¶5. (SBU) There was some division over the character of and process 
for producing a final FOA product.  Several G-77 states requested a 
consensus report by Member States to the Board (implying a good deal 
of work to negotiate a text).  Others, including the U.S., Canada 
and the UK, asked only that Brazilian Chair Guerreiro develop his 
own report of broad conclusions that could be circulated informally 
and "noted" by the Board.  Guerreiro resisted this singular 
responsibility and announced he would attempt to develop a consensus 
text for submission to the Board on behalf of all Member States. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On the sidelines of the meeting, the Finnish delegate 
provided Msnoff with a sneak peak at the raw fodder from previous 
FOA meetings that he would submit to Guerreiro for the final report. 
 (The Finns had chaired the first six meetings of the FOA before 
passing chairmanship to the Brazilians.)  The Finnish language was 
appropriately bland, focusing on broad conclusions such as, "science 
and technology are central to the Agency's role."  On Nuclear 
Security, the Finnish language avoided any discussion of regular 
budget funding, stating only that Nuclear Security was a concern "of 
all Member States." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: Both the Finns and the Brazilians harbor hopes 
that the final FOA Report may serve as a starting point for 
discussions of the Budget Working Group and negotiations over the 
2012-2017 Medium Term Plan.  If so, we will at least have extracted 
something of value from the process.  If not, Mission officers will 
find themselves drawn into negotiations over the text of the FOA 
Report at a time when energies would be better spent negotiating the 
budget.  End Comment. 
 
DAVIES