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DE RUEHUNV #0539/01 3361508
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021508Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0349
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0228
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000539 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR 
ABELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: DIVIDED BOARD REMAINS SEIZED OF THE 
SYRIA ISSUE 
 
REF: A. UNVIE 00529 
     ¶B. UNVIE 00521 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The IAEA Board of Governors November 27 formally 
addressed Syria for the fifth time in as many boards. 
Despite a critical report by the Director General noting no 
progress on the Dair Alzour investigation and mounting 
questions on uranium traces at the Miniature Neutron Source 
Reactor that foreshadow possible confirmation of safeguards 
failures in the March 2010 report to the Board, the Board 
debate exposed continued divisions on the Syria nuclear 
issue.  Reflecting the same trends from previous Boards, 
like-minded countries (EU, JUSCANZ plus Argentina, ROK, and 
Ukraine) called for Syria to cooperate as requested by the 
Agency and in adherence with its safeguards obligations, 
while the NAM and Arab states insisted that IAEA requests for 
cooperation were beyond Syria's legal obligations and 
welcomed Syrian cooperation to date.  Russia and Switzerland 
called for Syria and other member states, to include Israel, 
to cooperate with the Agency's investigation.  South Africa 
was the most balanced among the NAM members addressing the 
Board, but it also called out Israel.  There were no new 
converts among Board members calling Syria to account, though 
new Board member Ukraine, in its first intervention on the 
subject, came out clearly in the like-minded camp, as did 
fellow newcomer South Korea.  Syria took issue with the 
Agency's continued questions regarding Dair Alzour, claiming 
the facility is not nuclear-related and therefore not subject 
to IAEA safeguards -- in essence disregarding all the 
information and concerns explained by the Agency over the 
course of various reports by the Director General. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Few countries focused on the probable safeguards 
failure by Syria in not declaring the import of uranyl 
nitrate.  Syria downplayed this by saying that uranyl nitrate 
is available commercially and has "nothing to do with 
safeguards."  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Syria Issue Divides 
Board Along Familiar Lines 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Seventeen statements were delivered on the Syria 
agenda item:   Sweden on behalf of the seven EU Board 
members, Egypt on behalf of the NAM, Ukraine, Canada, Cuba, 
Argentina, Switzerland, Venezuela, USA, Japan, Russia, 
Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, South Korea, Turkey, and South 
Africa).  Board members Azerbaijan and Ukraine associated 
themselves with the EU statement.  There are 13 NAM members 
on the Board, although they do not have a unified policy like 
the EU.  Under Rule 50 Iran, Libya, Israel, and Syria spoke. 
Overall, this is the group of speakers we have previously 
heard from, except for Board newcomers Ukraine, Venezuela, 
and South Korea (though ROK has previously addressed the 
issue under Rule 50.)  Brazil, China, and Uruguay  remained 
silent. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Questions on Correctness and 
Completeness of Syria's Declaration 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Relatively few countries focused on the safeguards 
reporting failure by Syria in not declaring the import of 
uranyl nitrate.  Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
Ukraine, (and Israel under Rule 50) joined the U.S. in 
questioning the correctness and completeness of Syria's 
safeguards declarations with respect to the import of 
undeclared uranyl nitrate for the Miniature Neutron Source 
Reactor (MNSR).  Some of these countries also quoted the 
Secretariat's remarks from the November 18 technical 
briefing, in which the IAEA stated that Syria should have 
declared the importation.  South Korea expressed concern 
about the uranyl nitrate, and the EU looked forward to the 
results of the IAEA's November 17 visit to the MNSR for 
follow-up samples.  (Comment: The EU statement did not 
address this as a possible safeguards issue, as EU members 
await further information from the Secretariat.  The French 
Mission informed us in confidence that consideration of the 
French bilateral relationship with Syria led the French 
Ambassador to refrain from deploying a question regarding the 
 
uranyl nitrate her staff had prepared for her use during the 
technical briefing for member states on November, 18.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) NAM members did not address the import of uranyl 
nitrate, although Syria downplayed it by saying that uranyl 
nitrate is available commercially and has "nothing to do with 
safeguards."  (Note:  This Syrians made this claim despite 
the IAEA's explicit statement during the Technical Briefing 
that the uranium should have been reported by Syria for 
safeguards purposes.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
Like-Minded and Others Repeat DG's 
Call for Syrian Cooperation 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The EU, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Korea, and the United States called on Syria to cooperate 
with the Agency's investigation of Dair Alzour, including 
providing access to information, locations, and 
equipment/debris.  Joining the like-minded countries, 
Argentina delivered a strong statement supporting the DG's 
assessment that it is necessary to arrive at a full 
understanding on the uranium particles at Dair Alzour, the 
imagery, and the procurement activities that the Agency 
assesses could be related to the construction of a nuclear 
reactor.  Argentina joined Canada, Australia, and the U.S. in 
calling on Syria to give the Agency access to additional 
sites that might be functionally related to Dair Alzour. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The same countries, along with Ukraine, South Korea, 
and Turkey, called on Syria to establish modalities, as 
recommended by the DG, to protect sensitive information in 
Syria and thus facilitate Agency access to military sites. 
The Ukraine, in its national statement, took issue with 
Syria's refusal to give the Agency access to information and 
locations, especially given the IAEA's mandate on nuclear 
issues.  Ukraine said it needed to have IAEA confirmation 
that there were no undeclared activities in Syria. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Turkey called on Syria to cooperate with the Agency, 
noting that no progress had been achieved on the Dair Alzour 
investigation since September, but expressed more optimism 
than did like-minded countries that Syria would provide the 
necessary cooperation.  Turkey also welcomed Syria's 
cooperation at the MNSR. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The EU, Japan, Australia, and the United States 
called on Syria to sign and implement the Additional 
Protocol. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Japan and Canada remained concern about the 
possible connection between the Dair Alzour site and North 
Korea. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Like-minded countries also called on the DG to 
continue reporting on Syria and to keep this issue on the 
Board's agenda.  No consensus was reached on Canada's call to 
release the DG's report to the public, as Cuba and Egypt (and 
Syria under Rule 50) opposed public release on the same 
grounds as in previous Board sessions. 
 
---------------------- 
Russia and Switzerland 
---------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Russia called for Syria to cooperate with the 
Agency as requested by the DG, but also gave equal weight to 
calling on member states to provide information to the Agency 
that led them to believe it was a nuclear reactor. 
Switzerland expressed "only moderate" optimism that this 
issue would reach an eventual solution, noting that this case 
goes "well beyond nuclear aspects," a probable reference to 
the dissatisfaction with how this issue was brought to the 
Agency.  Switzerland encouraged all parties to assist the 
Agency investigation, but cited this as "first and foremost 
about Syria who should respond to questions by the Agency." 
Switzerland also called out Israel by name as another party 
that needed to respond to the Agency's questions. 
 
--- 
NAM 
--- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The NAM statement, read by Egypt, referred back to 
 
NAM Summit conclusions on the Syria issue, placing the onus 
on Israel.  The NAM reiterated that while considering this 
issue, it is essential not to lose sight of how it was 
brought to the attention of the Agency.  The NAM found it 
regrettable that the Board had not expressed its position on 
Israel's attack on Syria and on the late provision of 
information to the Agency.  The NAM welcomed Syria's 
continued cooperation within the limits of its safeguards 
agreement, essentially rejecting IAEA statements that 
unanswered, outstanding requests are within Syria's 
safeguards obligations.  The NAM statement, as well as 
national NAM statements, focused on the Israeli attack and 
called on "others" to make information available to the 
Agency. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Cuba blamed the lack of progress cited by the DG in 
his report on the bombing of the site and the late provision 
of information to the Agency.  Venezuela said that any 
analysis on this issue was "beset with uncertainties" since 
the facility was destroyed by Israel.  Venezuela explicitly 
said the additional requests of the Agency go beyond the 
legal obligations of Syria's safeguards agreement.  Egypt 
noted that the DG's request for Member States to make 
information available to the Agency "have been ignored," and 
in light of this the Board should question the inclusion of 
this item on future Board agendas.  (Comment: The NAM 
continues to highlight the need for Member States to provide 
additional information to the Agency, which is not a 
safeguards obligation, while rejecting all calls by the IAEA 
for Syria to live up to obligations.  End Comment.) 
 
¶15. (SBU) South Africa associated itself with the NAM 
statement, but said that the Agency should ensure all 
safeguards are applied (within the safeguards agreement) and 
that Syria should establish modalities that would facilitate 
progress in verification.  South Africa strongly encouraged 
Israel to provide the specific information requested by the 
Agency with regards to the munitions used in the bombing. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Under Rule 50, Iran delivered its usual diatribe, 
condemning the "Zionist" regime of Israel and calling on the 
UN Security Council to immediately condemn Israel's attack on 
Syria.  Iran again invoked a resolution from the 1990 General 
Conference (GC/RES/533 that considers the attack of nuclear 
installations a violation of international law.  Iran 
criticized the Board for reporting confidential technical 
details of its investigation on Syria, similar to Iran's 
complaint of the IAEA's reports on the Iran item.  Libya also 
delivered a statement under Rule 50, adding that an end must 
be put to the double standards which are discriminatory and 
"can only bring about radicalization and an upsurge in 
extremism." 
 
--------------- 
Rule 50: Israel 
--------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Israel pronounced that the DG's reports show a 
pattern of noncooperation by Syria, refusing access to sites 
including where the debris is located.  Israel called Syria's 
activities a "gross breach" of its safeguards obligations. 
Israel also requested that it be referred to by its proper 
name. 
 
----- 
Syria 
----- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, 
Ibrahim Othman, delivered Syria's statement last under Rule 
¶50.  Othman thanked Egypt, the NAM, and other friendly states 
for their statements and expressed regret to hear the 
statements of others "leveling accusations against Syria 
despite Syria's cooperation and positive engagement with the 
Agency."  Othman expressed surprise that the Agency continued 
to ask questions about the Dair Alzour facility after Syria 
had explained to the Agency that the previous and current 
buildings at Dair Alzour are not nuclear-related.  Othman 
said that Syria had provided the Agency "all sorts of 
cooperation under the relevant obligations." 
 
¶19. (SBU) As in previous statements, Syria focused on 
Israel's attack on Syria's sovereign territory (a flagrant 
violation of international law) and highlighted Syria's 
self-restraint in not responding to the attack to maintain 
peace and stability in the region.  Othman said that it was a 
 
double-standard to demand Syria provide non-existent 
information about the facility while not holding Israel 
accountable for attacking a sovereign country.  He called on 
Israel, as a member of the IAEA, to submit a list of all 
Israeli bombs that contain depleted uranium and subject all 
nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Othman characterized all cooperation with the 
Agency on the Dair Alzour facility as voluntary cooperation 
beyond its safeguards obligations as the facility is 
non-nuclear.  In this regard, he cited a memorandum of 
understanding between Syria and the Agency that provided for 
a one-time visit to Dair Alzour.  Othman touted Syria's 
cooperation by responding to inspectors' questions during and 
after the visit.  He rejected the Agency's request to view 
debris removed from the bombed site, saying it was "not 
natural" for the Agency to request this and to expect the 
debris to be available.  Othman dismissed the "few natural 
uranium particles" found at Dair Alzour, adding that they 
could not be "scientifically" explained as resulting from 
nuclear activity nor can they be described as undeclared 
nuclear material as there are "only a few particles." 
 
¶21. (SBU) Othman was displeased to see the Agency incorporate 
into the Syria report the "minute quantities" of uranium 
particles found during the Agency's inspections.  He 
downplayed the import of uranyl nitrate because the material 
is commercially available and has nothing to do with 
safeguards.  Othman asked the Agency not to include questions 
regarding the MNSR in future reports. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Othman said that Syria is always ready to cooperate 
with the Agency to bring these issues to closure provided it 
is not done at the expense of its national security and 
sovereignty.  Othman called on the Agency to conduct itself 
with neutrality and not to rely on "non-credible open 
sources" and "desires of certain states whose political 
intents are known to all." 
 
--------------------------- 
U.S. Statement As Delivered 
--------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
 
We thank the Director General for his latest report and 
commend the Secretariat for its professional input of the 
technical investigation in Syria.  Syria's ongoing refusal to 
cooperate with the IAEA remains of serious concern to the 
United States, and, indeed, should concern all supporters of 
the Agency's safeguards system and the international 
nonproliferation regime.  This Board must not allow any 
country to hinder inspectors and attempt to dictate its 
safeguards obligations and the terms by which the Agency may 
meet the verification responsibilities with which it has been 
charged. 
 
We hope future reports will reflect a decision by Syria to 
change course and provide the Agency a full accounting of its 
past and present nuclear program, and allow the Agency the 
access to locations and information it has requested.  Until 
Syria makes such a decision, the IAEA will not be in a 
position to give the international community meaningful 
assurances that Syria is not engaged in undeclared nuclear 
activities.  Indeed, with every new report on Syria submitted 
by the Director General, the Board is presented with mounting 
evidence that Syria's clandestine nuclear activities were not 
limited to the Dair Alzour facility. 
 
For well over a year, the IAEA has been investigating Syria's 
clandestine nuclear activities related to the destroyed 
reactor at Dair Alzour.  Regrettably, Syria has not used this 
time to resolve the serious outstanding questions about the 
reactor and other suspect sites of interest to the IAEA. 
Instead, it has attempted to dictate the terms of the IAEA's 
investigative authority and to actively hinder the Agency's 
efforts to verify the scope and peaceful nature of Syria's 
nuclear activities.  Contrary to its safeguards obligations, 
Syria continues to deny inspectors access to locations and 
information the Agency has deemed essential to fulfill its 
verification mandate. 
 
Syria has not provided credible explanations for the presence 
of undeclared chemically-processed uranium at the site of the 
destroyed reactor.  Syria continues to refuse to provide 
information and supporting documentation about the destroyed 
 
facility at Dair Alzour.  Syria has not adequately addressed 
the Agency's questions about nuclear-related procurement 
efforts.  Syria continues to deny the Agency information 
related to nuclear cooperation with the DPRK.  Worse yet, 
while denying such access, Syria appeared to have sanitized 
the sites upon receiving the IAEA's request to visit them, 
according to the IAEA's review of commercial imagery from 
those sites. 
 
As members of the IAEA Board of Governors, we should not 
tolerate Syria's pervasive undermining of the Agency's 
verification efforts.  This willfully puts into question the 
credibility of IAEA safeguards. 
 
We note with concern Syria's assertions that "due to the 
military and non-nuclear nature of the Dair Alzour site and 
the other three locations, it had no obligation to provide 
more information under its Safeguards Agreement."   This 
amounts to unilaterally seeking to change the terms of its 
safeguards obligations.  As stated clearly in the Director 
General's report, "The presence at the Dair Alzour site of 
particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not 
included in Syria's declared inventory gives rise to 
questions about the correctness and completeness of Syria's 
declaration, which the Agency is obliged to pursue." 
Furthermore, the Director General has rejected Syria's 
unfounded assertions that it has no obligation to provide 
information and access due to the military-nature of a site. 
 
We also note with serious concern that significant questions 
have now arisen about the correctness and completeness of 
Syria's declaration at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor 
(MNSR), a safeguarded facility.  As noted in the Director 
General's report to the September Board, anthropogenic 
uranium of a type not included on Syria's declared inventory 
was detected in the hot cells at the MNSR. 
 
After being confronted with evidence contradicting Syria's 
previous explanation for the origins of the uranium, Syria 
presented the Agency with two additional possible sources for 
the undeclared uranium traces: domestically produced 
yellowcake and "small quantities of imported, but previously 
undeclared, commercial uranyl nitrate."  This raises a 
serious question about Syria's compliance with its safeguards 
agreement. 
 
Article 34(b) of Syria's Safeguards Agreement requires that, 
when any material containing uranium or thorium which has not 
reached the stage where it is suitable for fuel fabrication 
or for isotopic enrichment is imported, Syria shall inform 
the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the 
material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes. 
The uranyl nitrate presence at the MNSR suggests it was 
indeed intended for nuclear-related purposes -- why else 
would it be there?  We also note the Secretariat's statement 
at the Technical Briefing on the Director General's Syria 
report that the uranyl nitrate should have been declared to 
the IAEA for safeguards purposes.   We would, Mr. Chairman, 
ask that this statement be reflected in the Board Chair's 
summary of this item. 
 
We are pleased the Agency was permitted to conduct a follow 
on visit to the MNSR on November 17 and look forward to a 
report before the March Board meeting on whether Syria has 
resolved the Agency's outstanding questions on the origin of 
the undeclared anthropogenic uranium detected at the facility 
and on the safeguards implications of the previously 
undeclared activities. 
 
When considering the importance of the multiple outstanding 
questions, and the mounting evidence that Syria's clandestine 
nuclear activities were not limited to Dair Alzour, the Board 
should not lose sight of the following:  the configuration 
and location of the destroyed reactor suggests that it was 
not intended for peaceful purposes.  Given the gravity of 
this issue and the fact that Syria continues to seriously 
impede the IAEA's verification efforts, the United States 
urges all Board members to join us in demanding that Syria 
fully cooperate with the IAEA investigation without delay by 
granting the IAEA access to any information, debris and sites 
needed to complete its investigation. 
 
Syria's attempts to deceive the IAEA and the international 
community before and during the investigation underscore the 
limitations on the Agency's ability to fulfill its mission in 
a country with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but 
 
without an Additional Protocol.  The importance of verifying 
the absence of undeclared nuclear activity led the 
international community to develop the Additional Protocol in 
order to give the inspectors the tools they need to provide 
the necessary assurance that a country's declaration is not 
only correct, but is also complete, and that its nuclear 
program is therefore exclusively for peaceful purposes.  We 
call on Syria, and on all states that have not yet done so, 
to sign and implement the Additional Protocol without delay. 
 
The existence of undeclared nuclear sites seemingly intended 
for non-peaceful purposes, and the possibility of safeguards 
violations including undeclared nuclear material, are matters 
of grave concern to the entire international community. 
Therefore, in the spirit of transparency, the Board should 
make available to the public the Director General's report on 
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian 
Arab Republic." 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
We look forward to the Secretariat's report before the March 
meeting of the Board of Governors on the progress of the 
Agency's investigation.  And we once again strongly urge 
Syria to provide without further delay whatever access and 
information the Agency deems necessary to resolve all 
outstanding questions. 
 
Thank you. 
DAVIES