VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0536/01 3351415
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011415Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0336
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0809

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000536 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR D(S), P, T, S/SANAC, IO, AND ISN 
DOE FOR NA-20, NA-24, NA-25, NE-1, NE-6 
NRC FOR OIP DOANE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN 
NSC STAFF FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY 
DOS FOR 1000 ITA/OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY 
DOS FOR 1001 ITA/USFCS/TPCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2023 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA:REPLACEMENT NEEDED FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
GENERAL TANIGUCHI 
 
REF: A. (A) UNVIE 322 
     ¶B. (B) STATE 91301 
     ¶C. (C) UNVIE 478 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GLYN T. DAVIES, REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) 
 
---------- 
Summary 
---------- 
¶1. (C) UNVIE requests development of a U.S. position on a 
candidate to replace Deputy Director General Taniguchi as the 
head of the Department of Safety and Security at IAEA.  The 
current DDG,s contract ends August 2010, but will leave 
office sooner.  IAEA Director General-elect Amano could make 
a decision about who will replace DDG Taniguchi as early as 
December.  With an informal field of unattractive options 
taking shape, Mission recommends that USG identify a specific 
candidate whom Ambassador Davies would advocate to Amano. 
The U.S. must begin lobbying for a candidate as soon as 
possible in order to ensure the position is filled with an 
individual from a like-minded country and aligned with U.S. 
views on nuclear safety issues. 
¶2. (C) Absent a specific alternative candidate and concerted 
U.S. lobbying, the position will almost certainly go to a 
French candidate (possibly an internal candidate currently in 
a D-1 position).  This outcome would be undesirable and erode 
U.S. influence in the Department.  The French already have 
undue influence over the Safety Department and often front 
for Areva,s interests.  In considering alternative 
candidates, we must also factor in geographic and gender 
distribution as to the four DDG slots likely to come open 
early in Amano's tenure ) Safety/Security, Technical 
Cooperation, Nuclear Applications and Nuclear Energy, as well 
as the newly announced opening for the head of Legal Affairs. 
 Russia will undoubtedly seek to retain the Nuclear Energy 
DDG position while China seeks the TC DDG slot.  Thus, 
Nuclear Safety/Security is potentially wide-open for a 
like-minded candidate who can support U.S. interests.   End 
Summary 
----------------------- 
Need a Qualified Leader 
----------------------- 
¶3. (C) Ref A (paras 6-7) laid out Mission's views on 
replacing current Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety 
and Security Tomihiro Taniguchi.  Incoming DG Amano appears 
receptive to U.S. views on the appointment, in part as he 
recognizes it as part of the process to maximize the IAEA's 
contribution to meeting President Obama's policy goals in 
nuclear security.  First and foremost, the Department of 
Safety and Security needs a dedicated manager and a strong 
leader.  For the past 10 years, the Department has suffered 
tremendously because of DDG Taniguchi,s weak management and 
leadership skills.  Despite our effective engagement with 
others in his department, Taniguchi has been unable or 
disinclined to resolve internal disagreements, has not 
provided much leadership or direction, has not worked well 
with the other DDGs, and has not supported the very important 
work of the Office of Nuclear Security even to the point of 
diverting limited security funds to safety activities.  This 
attitude has hindered progress that the Department of Safety 
and Security could have made over the last several years. 
¶4. (C)  Taniguchi,s departure provides an opportunity to 
improve the management of this department.  This is 
especially important for the Office of Nuclear Security, 
which will now have more regular budget resources and will 
need firmer direction as it expands over the next few years. 
¶5. (C)  The new DDG for the Department must have experience 
in both safety and security; (Taniguchi only had a safety 
background).   Also the DDG must be able to manage internal 
and external politics and be able to lead the program rather 
than hinder it.  Finally, the ideal candidate must also be 
able to clearly communicate and make decisions. 
 
------------------------ 
A "Reliable Person from 
a Reliable Country" 
------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Lacking a public solicitation to respond to, no formal 
candidates have announced interest in the DDG position. 
Procedurally, for this and each DDG position, DG Amano will 
at some point in his tenure propose a single name to the 
 
Board after he sorts among expressions of interest that reach 
him from Member States.  In anticipation of this process, 
rumors are circulating in the Secretariat and among Member 
State delegations that Australia, Canada, Argentina, and 
France are all interested in the position. 
¶7. (C)  Recently, the most prominent Australian candidate 
(Ron Cameron) accepted a position at the Nuclear Energy 
Agency in Paris, thus lowering the likelihood that Australia 
will nominate someone.  Australia does not have a large 
safety program or a very large security program.  Even if 
Australia puts forward a candidate, the individual would 
probably not have the expertise the U.S. would need to 
support them. 
¶8.  (C)  The first rumors about Canada indicated that the 
former Canadian Ambassador and Board Governor Marie Gervais- 
Vidricaire was interested in the position.  She was one of 
Amano,s earliest and strongest supporters in the DG election 
campaign.  However, the prevailing sentiment among our 
contacts is that she would not be able to get the position 
because she does not have a technical background and her 
husband already works for the Agency at a senior level. 
UNVIE would agree with this assessment, though 
Gervais-Vidricaire was a respected diplomatic interlocutor . 
Although she has demonstrated strong leadership skills as the 
Canadian Governor, it would be best to have technical person 
who is immersed in the issues and the policies of safety and 
security activities rather than a diplomatic generalist to 
head this Department  A more technical person from the 
Canadian regulator or other government organization that has 
both safety and security expertise could be a good 
alternative. 
¶9. (C)  Argentina's Abel Gonzalez is also rumored to be 
interested in the job.  He works for the Argentinean safety 
regulator, has worked at the IAEA before and remains heavily 
involved in IAEA activities.  He is well-liked at the IAEA 
but many Member States do not agree with Argentina,s strong 
stand on issues, particularly its challenge to the 
proposition that nuclear security is a core mission of the 
Agency.  In our observation, including in annual debates in 
the General Conference Committee of the Whole, Gonzalez does 
not believe that safety and security are different 
activities.  It is unlikely that he would be a strong 
supporter of the Office of Nuclear Security and he would lean 
toward absorbing Security into the Safety activities.  As a 
subject matter expert from a G-77 state with an advanced 
civil nuclear program Gonzalez, if he applies, will be a 
strong candidate for the position, however, not one that the 
U.S. should support. 
¶10. (C)  Among the &declared candidates8 this leaves 
France, which already has a strong and unhealthy influence in 
the Department of Safety and Security.  The French currently 
hold several key positions in the safety area, including one 
of the two D-1 positions directly reporting to the DDG, and 
there is a French representative in almost every section of 
the safety department.   Many IAEA staff (both U.S. citizens 
and non-U.S. citizens) have complained to Msnoffs about the 
internal politics played by the French management (favoring 
French staff, giving French staff more opportunities, 
influencing results and documents to favor French industry, 
etc.).  One prominent example of this is the undue influence 
of Andre LaCoste, head of the French Regulatory Body, ASN. 
LaCoste is the Chairman of almost every important 
IAEA-sponsored conference, workshop, and committee in the 
safety field.  He has been the head of the Commission of 
Safety Standards for six years and was Chairman of the Joint 
Convention for Spent Fuel and the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety.  LaCoste has used these positions to influence the 
results of IAEA activities with a very blatant French bias. 
This is coupled with the strong presence at the IAEA of 
AREVA, the French government,s reactor designer and vendor. 
AREVA has business interests in all parts of the nuclear 
industry, including uranium mining, conversion, enrichment 
and fuel manufacturing.   Because AREVA is government-owned, 
AREVA representatives are allowed to participate in IAEA 
meetings as French government representatives, and often do, 
giving AREVA tremendous influence over the activities of IAEA 
and access to other governmental officials.  Indeed, the 
French Deputy Permanent Representative departed Vienna last 
summer is now working on secondment at AREVA, illustrating 
the revolving door between the French IAEA presence and 
industry.  Lacoste,s role  is unhealthy because no one 
 
Member State should have so much influence over the safety 
program, and because it is unfair to other reactor vendors 
(or uranium mining, conversion, enrichment or fuel 
manufacturing companies) that are privately owned, including 
those from the U.S. 
¶11. (C) A recent example of the French influence came during 
a workshop for newcomers (states considering or embarking on 
nuclear power programs) that took place 3-5 November in 
Vienna.  The purpose was to give newcomers an opportunity to 
discuss issues and learn form each other.  The agenda was 
structured to allow each country to have two speakers, one 
from the regulator and one from the industry.  LaCoste was 
the Chairman and France was the only country with four 
speakers, using more than twice the amount of time allotted 
to everyone else.  In addition, the French position that all 
assistance to newcomer countries should be a service that the 
newcomer country should pay for was the only position that 
appeared in the Chairman,s conclusions of the workshop, 
though  that is not the position of any of the other 
&donor8 countries that gave presentations ) U.S., UK, 
Canada, Japan, Korea, China, etc.  Yet at the end of the 
meeting, LaCoste included in the Chairman,s summary an 
assertion that the conference had concluded newcomers were 
asking for too much assistance and that assistance should be 
restricted (or paid for).  When participants raised their 
hands to object, LaCoste said there would be no discussion of 
the Chairman,s, summary and closed the meeting.  Therefore, 
the French position is now &validated8 because an 
international conference of 45 Member States "came" to this 
conclusion. 
¶12. (C)  There are many other examples of French influence on 
safety documents and IAEA forums to benefit French interests 
and promote AREVA, or French IAEA staff discouraging Member 
States from considering other countries, reactor designs. 
All of this suggests the U.S. should provide a strong 
alternative to a French candidate.  If the French manage to 
obtain Taniguchi,s position, Mission is concerned that the 
entire Department of Safety and Security may ultimately be 
indistinguishable from another arm of AREVA.  This will have 
a negative impact on the safety and security work and will 
have a detrimental effect on the U.S. nuclear industry,s 
ability to sell reactors overseas. 
--------------------- 
Time To Lobby is Now 
--------------------- 
¶13. (C)  According to UNVIE contacts, the French are pressing 
very hard for the DDG position and have been lobbying Amano 
heavily, who is indebted to the French for early support to 
his election especially with the EU.  High-level officials in 
the French government routinely called DG ElBaradei during 
his tenure to discuss the hiring of French representatives. 
Because of the importance of this issue to the French 
government, it is likely that President Sarkozy,s office has 
been or will be involved.  Therefore it is imperative that 
the U.S. identify and lobby for an alternative candidate as 
soon as possible.  The U.S. should not wait to find a 
preferred candidate once the French officially announce their 
candidate; it would be much better to find a candidate and 
lobby Amano now and in his first month in office to have an 
influence on the position. 
¶14. (C)  Consistent with earlier private statements to us 
from the Japanese Mission (ref A) that Amano would avoid the 
poor optics of keeping a fellow Japanese as DDG, we heard 
from Amano,s staff that Amano will give Taniguchi a &golden 
parachute8 and remove him from the DDG position in December. 
 This could be in the form of a post as special assistant to 
the DG.  If the DDG position opens in December, the position 
will likely be filled temporarily by rotating the two D-1 
directors in the Department into the DDG position (Mr. 
Philippe Jamet, and Ms. Eliana Amaral). Although not in D-1 
positions, there are two other D-1,s in the Department who 
could potentially also be part of the rotation (Mr. Khammar 
Mrabit and Ms. Anita Nilsson).  Jamet is French and is likely 
to be the French candidate for the DDG position.  This 
rotational experience will make it even more difficult to 
find a candidate who is competitive with Jamet, who would 
also presumably be considered an &internal8 candidate for 
the job. 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶15. (C) It is imperative that the U.S. begin lobbying for a 
DDG safety candidate immediately in order to ensure the best 
interests of the U.S. are met in the Department.  Mission 
urges active discussion in Washington on attributes and 
national obligations that influence our decision, but also 
consideration of specific names.  We will query Amano, about 
how his thinking has advanced and whether he will share with 
us any specific names already brought to him. 
DAVIES