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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 002900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/18/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Why haven't U.S. bases in Japan been reduced? (Asahi) 
 
(2) Postponement of Futenma conclusion makes goal of reducing burden 
on Okinawa even more distant (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting 
(Part 2): Improvising Prime Minister, resembling the shogunate's 
handling of the arrival of the black ships (Mainichi) 
 
(4) U.S. Embassy dismayed by newspaper reports on Futenma issue 
referring to alleged "crisis" in Japan-U.S. alliance (Shukan 
Bunshun) 
 
(5) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 2): Prime Minister Hatoyama 
should explain to public the importance of national security 
(Yomiuri) 
 
(6) What the "equal alliance" theory lacks (Sankei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Why haven't U.S. bases in Japan been reduced? 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Excerpts) 
December 18, 2009 
 
Kuniichi Tanida, senior writer; Hirotsugu Mochizuki in Washington 
 
Alarmed by North Korea, China-Taiwan relations in post-Cold War era 
 
It has been three and a half years since the governments of Japan 
and the United States reached an agreement focusing on plans to 
reduce the burden on Okinawa. The core plan to relocate the U.S. 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan) has hit a snag. In 
its manifesto (campaign pledges), the Hatoyama administration 
pledged to review the modalities of the U.S. bases in Japan. This 
pledge is now faced with the harsh reality of the situation. Why are 
there still so many U.S. bases in Japan today, 20 years after the 
end of the Cold War? This article discusses how the position of the 
U.S. bases in Japan might change under the Obama administration's 
new military strategy. 
 
At present, there are U.S. military bases/installations in 85 places 
in Japan with 36,000 troops. Their total area is generally 
equivalent to half the size of the 23 wards in Tokyo. Of them, there 
are 33 bases/installations in Okinawa. Their total area comes to 229 
square kilometers, or 75 percent of all U.S. bases in Japan. 
 
In 1990, just after the end of the Cold War, there were 105 
bases/installations (325 square kilometers), including 43 in Okinawa 
(242 square kilometers). This means the number has decreased 
somewhat but not dramatically. 
 
What is more, these facilities are used solely by the U.S. military. 
In addition, the U.S. military has been jointly using the 
Self-Defense Forces' training ranges and other places since the 
1980s. Today the U.S. military uses land area totaling 1,027 square 
kilometers (134 places), which is twice the size of 484 square 
kilometers (120 places) in 1980. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002900  002 OF 010 
 
 
One of the reasons why U.S. bases are concentrated in Okinawa is 
because the number of bases on mainland Japan has dropped by 60 
percent since 1972, the year Okinawa was returned to Japan, compared 
to Okinawa's 20 percent. 
 
The numbers of troops and bases in Europe have drastically decreased 
since the end of the Cold War. Why not in Japan? Military 
commentator Shoji Fukuyoshi explained it this way: "The United 
States wanted to deploy its forces in the Asia-Pacific using Japan 
as a base, and Japan was aiming for a cheap security system heavily 
relying on the U.S. forces. Since their interests matched, they did 
not make efforts to reduce the presence of U.S. forces in Japan." 
 
Throughout the Cold War era, U.S. bases in Japan were improved as 
bases to replenish military supplies such as ammunition and fuel to 
contain the Soviet Union. 
 
The United States has attached importance to the bases in Japan 
largely because the U.S. forces withdrew from the Clark and Subic 
bases in the Philippines following a major volcanic eruption and the 
Philippine Senate's rejection of renewing a treaty in 1991. The new 
situation in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era is another 
factor. North Korea's suspected nuclear programs and the tensions 
between China and Taiwan prompted the United States to keep its 
troops in the area surrounding Japan. 
 
In 1996 Tokyo and Washington shared the view that the Japan-U.S. 
security arrangements were essential for the peace and stability of 
the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries issued a joint security 
declaration and confirmed to maintain 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia. 
"U.S. Forces Japan has now become, both in name and reality, the 
base supporting the U.S. forces deployed globally," Fukuyoshi said. 
 
A schoolgirl rape incident occurred in Okinawa in 1995, triggering a 
furious anti-base movement. This prompted Japan and the United 
States to set up the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to 
aim at the realignment and reduction of U.S. bases. But the planned 
reversion of the bases has made very little progress because the 
majority of them have relocation as a condition. 
 
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, 
the U.S. forces have shifted their focus to the war against 
terrorism in such countries as Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Even so, the United States has not changed its stance of attaching 
importance to the bases in Japan. In the realignment of U.S. forces 
that started in 2002, the Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture) and Kadena 
(Okinawa Prefecture) bases have been positioned as the Main 
Operating Bases (MOBs) overseas. 
 
Okinawa still essential for Marine Corps 
 
The hollowing out of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa has long been 
pointed out in the post-Cold War period. That is because the Marine 
Division composed of core units, such as the infantry and the 
artillery, has only a small number of regular troops, with many 
coming from the continental United States on a rotational basis. 
 
Some 12,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Okinawa. Of them, the 
2,000-strong 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which conducts maritime 
surveillance aboard assault ships along with helicopters, is the 
only unit that is ready to be mobilized in actual warfare. Many 
 
TOKYO 00002900  003 OF 010 
 
 
experts take the view that the regular troops in Okinawa only have 
the ability to rescue U.S. citizens in a contingency on the Korean 
Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait and to carry out rescue operations 
following a major disaster. 
 
Around 1990, a plan was discussed to totally withdraw the U.S. 
Marines in Okinawa to Hawaii amid the trend of reducing the presence 
of U.S. forces in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Blocked by 
the relocation cost, the plan did not materialize. Since then, the 
idea of withdrawing the U.S. Marines from Okinawa and a theory 
denouncing the permanent presence of troops have been discussed 
repeatedly. 
 
In connection with the planned relocation of Futenma Air Station, 
there have been calls from the coalition parties and local 
governments for the total shift of the base functions to Guam. 
 
Takushoku University Professor Takashi Kawakami, who is 
knowledgeable the U.S. Marine Corps, thinks the theory denouncing 
the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa might resurface. This is because 
chances of a Taiwan Strait contingency are diminishing due to the 
honeymoon-like relationship between Beijing and Taipei. "If the 
Obama administration, which attaches importance to China, stops 
regarding China as a threat, the meaning of their (the U.S. Marine 
Corps) presence (in Okinawa) might be lost," Kawakami said. 
 
According to a former senior Marine Corps officer who has served in 
Japan, there is the deep-seated view in U.S. forces that the Army, 
Navy, and Air troops in Japan can sufficiently serve as a deterrent 
against China and other countries without the Marine Corps. 
 
But it seems that it would not be easy for the United States to 
leave Okinawa, where its troops have stationed for more than 60 
years. The Marine Corps is becoming visibly discontent over the 
relocation of Marine Corps command personnel to Guam which goes hand 
in hand with the Futenma relocation plan. 
 
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee this past June, U.S. 
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway hinted at the need to 
modify the existing plan, saying there are problems with building 
training areas on Guam and the area surrounding it. On Okinawa, huge 
jungle training and urban warfare facilities have been constructed 
over a long period of time. It would be difficult to build similar 
facilities on Guam in a short period of time. "It appears that some 
in the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa are regarding the developments 
in Japan as a chance to maintain their presence in the prefecture," 
Kawakami said. 
 
(2) Postponement of Futenma conclusion makes goal of reducing burden 
on Okinawa even more distant 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
December 17, 2009 
 
"Of course, relocating the facility out of the prefecture or the 
nation is the best option. But I wonder if there is any place that 
will accept a new facility." Kenei Yamashiro, 70, grumbled when he 
saw a headline in a newspaper saying that "possible relocation sites 
other than Henoko will be explored" at a community hall near his 
residence. His house is located right under the flight path of 
aircraft heading to and from the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air 
Station in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. 
 
TOKYO 00002900  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
The return of the land to Japan that has been used by the Futenma 
airfield is a long-held desire for local residents, because they 
have been suffering from the noise of helicopters and transport 
planes, as well as the danger of accidents. When Japan and the U.S. 
officially agreed to construct an alternative facility for the 
Futenma airfield in the Henoko district in Nago City, Okinawa 
Prefecture, the words, "congratulations on the return of the 
airfield," were printed on the pamphlets that were distributed at a 
regular general meeting. 
 
But the Hatoyama administration has pushed the existing plan back to 
square one. Yamashiro expressed his anxiety, grumbling: "Will any 
progress be made on the Futenma issue during my lifetime?" 
 
In addition to the Futenma plan, the 2006 bilateral accord on the 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan also includes measures to 
transfer 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and to return U.S. 
military bases in the southern part of Okinawa to Japan. The accord 
gives priority to maintaining the current level of deterrence by 
stepping up Japan-U.S. joint training and to reducing the excessive 
burden on Okinawa. 
 
The Futenma relocation plan, which took more than ten years to 
arrive at after many twists and turns, is the core in the accord. 
Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and Nago Mayor Yoshikazu 
Shimabukuro approved the existing plan on the condition that the 
planned construction site be moved further offshore. Following their 
approval, the central government's negotiations on the plan with the 
prefectural and municipal governments were about to enter the final 
stage. 
 
The Hatoyama administration, however, began to indicate that the 
government would try to find ways to move the facility out of the 
prefecture or even the nation. This stance has rekindled the once 
abated argument against the relocation of the facility within the 
prefecture. Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha, who is strongly opposed to the 
existing plan, has said that he welcomes the government's policy 
stance, remarking: "The Futenma issue has begun to move forward 
toward a new solution. 
 
But this means that there is no other option available for the 
Ginowan mayor. He seemed aloof when he told reporters at the 
prefectural government building yesterday: "I will just sit and 
watch the situation until the spring. The government can take its 
time to look for a possible replacement site." 
 
If the government's conclusion is delayed further, the reduction of 
the burden on Okinawa will be delayed further, and the Futenma base 
might become a permanent fixture as a result. The U.S. forces have 
dealt with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
missiles, as well as such threats as terrorism. If the overall plan 
for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is delayed, it could 
have an adverse effect on Japan's national security. 
 
The Hatoyama administration, however, has little sense of crisis. 
Hatoyama has only repeated the words "the feelings of the people in 
Okinawa." Some officials at the Foreign Ministry and the Defense 
Ministry have criticized the prime minister's stance as trying to 
justify the postponement of the issue by highlighting only the 
aspects of the feelings of the people in Okinawa that are convenient 
for him. 
 
TOKYO 00002900  005 OF 010 
 
 
 
How does Hatoyama intend to ensure Japan's national security and 
reduce the burden on Okinawa simultaneously, in light of national 
interests? He has yet to lay out a roadmap. 
 
(3) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting 
(Part 2): Improvising Prime Minister, resembling the shogunate's 
handling of the arrival of the black ships 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
December 17, 2009 
 
Takahiro Hirata, Yasushi Sengoku 
 
The discussion papers presented by the U.S. side to the Japanese 
side during the bilateral U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment talks 
in autumn 2004 proposed to "relocate the U.S. Marines' air corps 
from the Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa) to Kadena 
Air Base (KAB) (straddling the towns of Kadena and Chatan and 
Okinawa City in Okinawa), return Futenma to Japan, and scrap the 
plan to relocate the Futenma base to northern Okinawa under the 1996 
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement." 
 
These documents also included other proposals, including: relocating 
the U.S. Marines' air corps from the Iwakuni base (in Yamaguchi 
Prefecture) to KAB; relocating the Marines' housing and troops from 
Camp Zukeran (in Okinawa) and Camp Kuwae (also in Okinawa) to KAB; 
and relocating one squadron of the U.S. Air Force on Kadena to Guam. 
It was evident that the U.S. side wanted to concentrate the Marines' 
functions on the KAB, while reducing the Air Force's fighters, in 
order to reduce the burden on Kadena. 
 
However, this "Kadena integration plan," like the one Foreign 
Minister Katsuya Okada proposed recently, failed in the face of the 
opposition of the municipalities adjacent to KAB, which had long 
suffered from KAB's noise. 
 
The USFJ realignment talks started as part of the U.S. forces' 
transformation on a global scale. While the deadline set in the 1996 
SACO agreement for the return of Futenma "in five to seven years" 
had lapsed, the plan to construct a replacement facility in waters 
off Henoko in Nago City in northern Okinawa (adopted by a cabinet 
resolution in 2002) was going nowhere. Then Director General 
Fukushiro Nukaga of the Defense Agency described this situation as 
"not even one pile could be driven into the seabed for a survey due 
to the actions of the opponents to building this base." 
 
In February 2005, Japan and the U.S. identified a number of "common 
strategic goals" that they would work together for, including 
dealing with international terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. In the subsequent realignment talks, 
the U.S. shifted to the so-called "Nago lite" option, which would 
require only reclamation of the shoals on a smaller scale, while the 
(then) Defense Agency, which feared that construction work could not 
proceed due to the protest actions at sea, advocated a land-based 
facility in Camp Schwab (in Nago City). In May 2006, Japan and the 
U.S. reached agreement on a realignment road map which included 
building two V-shaped runways in the coastal area of Camp Schwab as 
Futenma's replacement facility, the relocation of some 8,000 Marines 
in Okinawa to Guam, and the return of U.S. bases south of the KAB. 
 
Looking back on the negotiations, former Vice Defense Minister 
 
TOKYO 00002900  006 OF 010 
 
 
Takemasa Moriya said: "Talking about reducing the burden on Okinawa, 
the U.S. would only brush us aside unless we talked about the 
strategic issue of what to do with the role and capability of the 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF)." 
 
The Hatoyama administration came to power while prospects for 
starting the construction work under this agreement remained 
uncertain due to difficulties in coordinating with the local 
communities. With Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama deciding on Dec. 15 
to reconsider the relocation site, it is now possible that the 
process for Futenma's return may go back to square one. 
 
A source involved with the Japan-U.S. negotiations expressed grave 
concern about the Prime Minister's improvising by deferring a 
decision. "This resembles closely the Edo shogunate's handling of 
the arrival of the black ships." 
 
The fact that plans for reinforcing cooperation in the military 
aspect, such as the consideration of joint operational plans, have 
not been discussed along with Henoko relocation is also a source of 
frustration on the U.S. side. 
 
Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, who was 
responsible for the USFJ realignment talks on the U.S. side, has 
been involved with the study of the Japan-U.S. alliance at a think 
tank in Washington after leaving his post. He wrote a report in 
November recommending that there should be no excessive expectations 
for Japan in such areas as the SDF's overseas missions, but the SDF 
should take responsibility for Japan's defense. This paper, which 
openly admits the U.S.'s disappointment with the bilateral alliance, 
has created a stir among Japanese officials concerned with foreign 
affairs and defense. 
 
The troop structure of the USFJ may change and options for Futenma 
relocation may broaden depending on the SDF's role. Officials 
concerned about the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance all agree that 
"the only way forward is to start anew from strategic discussions." 
Yet, the Hatoyama administration's security strategy remains a 
mystery. 
 
(part two of three-part series) 
 
(4) U.S. Embassy dismayed by newspaper reports on Futenma issue 
referring to alleged "crisis" in Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
SHUKAN BUNSHUN (Page 48) (Full) 
December 24, 2009 
 
Sankei Shimbun says: "U.S. Ambassador flies into a rage"; Yomiuri 
Shimbun reports: "U.S. postpones talks on alliance"; and Asahi 
Shimbun claims: "Futenma issue deadlocked, casts shadow on 
alliance." Both leftist and rightist newspapers toe the same line in 
claiming that "the alliance is in peril" in their reporting on the 
issue of the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air Station. 
 
However, the U.S. Embassy is dismayed by such reporting. A U.S. 
Embassy official says: "Sankei sensationally wrote 'U.S. Ambassador 
flies into a rage,' but that is absolutely untrue. We are 
diplomats." 
 
According to a U.S. diplomatic source, American diplomats are 
strictly prohibited from criticizing other countries, so nothing 
 
TOKYO 00002900  007 OF 010 
 
 
like that could have happened. 
 
The same source says: "As for the report that the alliance talks 
were postponed, no schedule had been drawn up in the first place. 
It's impossible to postpone something that has not been scheduled. 
The Japanese newspapers seem to want to stir up a crisis, but the 
alliance relationship is broad and wide. The Futenma issue has no 
impact at all on the alliance, and there is no crisis. This would be 
quite clear if they would ask the U.S. side..." 
 
A U.S. expert on the bilateral relationship also laughs about it, 
saying "reports by the Japanese newspapers on the U.S.in general, 
not only on the Futenma issue, are full of mistakes, so I am not 
surprised." 
 
It is said that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has 
repeatedly pointed out discrepancies with the facts at news 
conferences. 
 
However, according to a MOFA official, "We have not seen any 
corrections. As a result, the mistakes are being circulated as 
facts." 
 
What does the United States think of the present state of the 
alliance relationship? Prominent international political scientist 
Patrick Cronin, senior advisor at the think tank, the Center for a 
New American Security, says: 
 
"During a time of major political change, there is bound to be an 
agonizing review of policy and a period of uncertainty. However, a 
time like this is an excellent opportunity to reinforce the alliance 
with the broad support of public opinion. Fortunately for Japan, 
President Obama understands the situation in Japan and has said that 
'the U.S. government should not create a source of a crisis' and 
'should be patient'." 
 
While the Japanese newspapers really like President Obama, they are 
getting in his way in this case. 
 
A Japanese expert on diplomacy expresses his concern: "I hope that a 
real crisis will not come about as a result of such sensational 
reporting..." 
 
(5) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 2): Prime Minister Hatoyama 
should explain to public the importance of national security 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
December 17, 2009 
 
Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should have resolved the issue of 
relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station before the end 
of the year, by persuading the Social Democratic Party (SDP). I 
understand that the Prime Minister has been undergoing hard times in 
allying with the SDP. However, he must not make any concessions on 
national security. He must be tough in carrying out foreign policy. 
In order to keep faith with the United States, the current 
administration should follow and implement the previous government's 
policy. The administration needs to show its consistent position at 
home and abroad, through thorough discussions in the ruling 
parties. 
 
TOKYO 00002900  008 OF 010 
 
 
 
Former Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, the grandfather of Yukio 
Hatoyama, clearly displayed his government's policy course to the 
public and fought against militarists. He had a strong ideological 
faith. However, Yukio Hatoyama's management of the coalition 
government seems like "soft serve ice cream." 
 
The Prime Minister said to U.S. President Barack Obama in their 
meeting in November, "I want you to trust me," with the aim of 
strengthening Japan-U.S. ties. The President must have completely 
trusted the Prime Minister's words. But the U.S. side found there 
was inconsistency between his words and actions. 
 
I cannot see the Hatoyama administration's attitude toward national 
basic policies, including the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The 
administration has bowed to the international situation and people's 
opinion. I cannot see its clear stance to preserve the basis of 
national security. It is impermissible for the government to make 
its position unclear toward fundamental national policies under the 
pretext of the coalition government. 
 
Going back to the time when he was an opposition party member, the 
Prime Minister appears to have thought that the LDP governments' 
U.S. policy and security policy excessively relied on the United 
States. However, such thinking was the "wishful thinking" of an 
opposition party member. In reality, politics is inseparable from 
military affairs. The Prime Minister fails to understand that. At 
the time when I formed my cabinet, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of 
the previous government stated, "The Japan-U.S. alliance has no 
militaristic meaning." His comment stained the Japan-U.S. 
relationship. So, I clearly said in the United States, "The 
Japan-U.S. alliance is a military alliance." The papers front-paged 
my comment. I think this awakened the whole Japan regarding the U.S. 
Japan Security Treaty, and the Japanese people recognized the 
significance and role of security. 
 
Next year is a historic year to celebrate the 50th anniversary of 
the reversion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It is an important 
year for the Hatoyama government to clarify its basic attitude 
toward the security treaty. 
 
Amid the changing international situation, the government should 
examine how the bilateral security treaty has contributed to Japan 
and stability in Asia and its importance and merits and demerits. 
The government can then let the public know how it will manage and 
determine Japan's security. It should issue a formal statement at 
the beginning of next year. For the government, issuing a statement 
would be an important and adequate task for the 50th anniversary. 
 
I hope Prime Minister Hatoyama comes up with a clear basic security 
policy through an in-depth discussion in the cabinet of the 
coalition government. If the cabinet fails to unite, Japan would be 
unable to respond to a contingency situation. 
 
(6) What the "equal alliance" theory lacks 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Abridged) 
December 16, 2009 
 
Masamori Sase, Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy 
 
Although no one has pointed it out, the Democratic Party of Japan's 
 
TOKYO 00002900  009 OF 010 
 
 
theory to build a "close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance" has an 
interesting feature. Because this relationship is called an 
"alliance," it is clear that Japan and the United States are tied 
together by the bilateral security treaty. But one would be 
hard-pressed to find any mention of the "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty" 
in DPJ documents or comments by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada. The prime minister's policy speech 
that discussed his intention to build a close and equal Japan-U.S. 
alliance and the foreign minister's speech before the House of 
Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that discussed his 
determination to forge a strong Japan-U.S. relationship that can be 
sustained for the next 50 years are no exception. It seems almost as 
if the two ministers are trying to keep the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty under cover. 
 
Under the treaty, the United States is required to defend Japan, but 
Japan is not required to defend the United States. As such, some 
people call the treaty one-sided. I, however, call it asymmetrically 
bilateral because Japan is required to provide the United States 
with military bases. In any case, Japan and the United States are 
not required to perform the same kind of duties, so they can hardly 
be called equal under the treaty. 
 
Is the idea of shifting the one-sided or asymmetrically bilateral 
system to a purely bilateral setup compatible with the equal 
Japan-U.S. alliance theory? 
 
Of course it's compatible. In order to realize an equal Japan-U.S. 
alliance, the Hatoyama administration must consider specific ways to 
achieve it. 
 
Japan and the United States concluded the security treaty 50 years 
ago when there was a huge difference between them in terms of 
national strength, and that can explain to some extent why the pact 
had to be asymmetrically bilateral. Japan grew into a major economic 
power during the mid-1970s, and Japan's position of being a 
"free-rider" in the security treaty became an issue between the two 
countries. Taking that seriously, many Japanese controversialists 
pointed out the need to turn the one-sided security treaty into one 
that is purely bilateral, creating a considerable impact on the 
government and the Liberal Democratic Party. However, the government 
did not take a step toward a constitutional revision even though the 
matter was closely connected to the Constitution. The constitutional 
revision argument eventually sank into oblivion. This was followed 
by the emergence in the 1980s of the world's incredulity at the 
second largest economy heavily relying on the largest economy in 
terms of national security. But there were few people in Japan who 
raised questions about such a fact. 
 
The DPJ recently criticized the former LDP administration as being 
subservient to the United States, declaring that the party will say 
what it needs to say to Washington. I do not think that Japan's 
diplomacy blindly followed in America's footsteps, as seen in the 
fact that Tokyo succeeded in making Washington accept the ex post 
facto interpretation of the right to collective self-defense. In any 
event, the point is that Japan should have made independent efforts 
for its own security even under the one-sided treaty but that was 
difficult due to the constitutional interpretation and as a result 
that made Japan appear to be subservient to the United States. 
Saying what must be said is good in the context of an equal 
Japan-U.S. alliance. The question is, what do the prime minister and 
the foreign minister think about making independent efforts? 
 
TOKYO 00002900  010 OF 010 
 
 
 
Exemplified by calls for revising the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces 
Agreement and Okada's statement before becoming foreign minister 
urging the United States to abandon the preemptive use of nuclear 
weapons, DPJ lawmakers have been sticking to the motto of saying 
what they have to say. If Japan makes independent efforts even under 
the one-sided pact, that will help reduce the country's dependence 
on the United States for its national security, pushing it closer to 
an equal alliance with the United States. But neither the prime 
minister nor the foreign minister has expressed their resolve to do 
so - not even once. 
 
The previous LDP administration had at least a sense of guilt about 
the one-sidedness of the existing security treaty with the United 
States. But today, for the prime minister and the foreign minister, 
it is like a vested interest They are taking it for granted. It is 
questionable whether the Japan-U.S. alliance can be sustained over 
the next 50 years and can be strengthened further. 
 
Just between the security treaty concluded in 1951 and the existing 
one of 1960, then Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama declared in his 
policy speech that the government's basic defense policy was to 
swiftly establish an autonomous national defense system to realize 
the early withdrawal of the occupation forces, while maintaining the 
policy of a close and cooperative relationship with the United 
States, taken by the previous Yoshida administration. He attached 
importance to both the alliance and independent efforts for national 
defense. I would like to tell the prime minister, who loves and 
respects his grandfather, that the equal Japan-U.S. alliance theory 
with no regard to independent efforts is a sloppy idea that is 
disrespectful toward his grandfather. 
 
ROOS