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P 172308Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 8487
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2359
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9024
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8455

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 002891 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/17/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Basic policy for FY2010 defense budget to include mention of 
"deepening of Japan-U.S. security alliance" (Nikkei) 
 
(2) Weight of Japan-U.S. alliance (Part 1): "Japan fatigue" 
spreading among U.S. officials (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 1): Prime Minister Hatoyama 
must exercise leadership in regaining confidence (Yomiuri) 
 
(4) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting 
(Part 1): PM Hatoyama looks for relocation site other than Henoko; 
SDP wary of solution based on current plan with minor modifications 
(Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Basic policy for FY2010 defense budget to include mention of 
"deepening of Japan-U.S. security alliance" 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
Evening, December 17, 2009 
 
The government decided its basic policy on the FY2010 defense budget 
at a cabinet meeting on Dec. 17. With regard to the Japan-U.S. 
alliance, this policy will include an explicit reference to 
"deepening security cooperation between Japan and the United 
States." It terms North Korea's nuclear and missile issues a 
"serious" problem and points out the need to reinforce missile 
defense capability. The deployment of ground-to-air Patriot missiles 
(PAC-3) will be limited and a request to increase the size of the 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will be turned down. 
 
This basic policy is being formulated in light of the delay by one 
year in revising the National Defense Program Guidelines, originally 
scheduled for end of 2009, and is meant to be a provisional policy 
for defense buildup. While the policy says the government will 
"build up defense capability based on the concepts under the current 
Guidelines," it adopts the stance of reducing defense expenditures 
in response to the position of the Social Democratic Party, which is 
a member of the ruling coalition, and the results of the budget 
screening process of the Government Revitalization Unit. 
 
In light of China's continuous military expansion, the policy points 
out that "military modernization and increasing military activities 
have been observed in the neighboring countries." On the other hand, 
it also calls for the SDF's active participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations (PKO) and other international contribution projects. 
 
(2) Weight of Japan-U.S. alliance (Part 1): "Japan fatigue" 
spreading among U.S. officials 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
December 16, 2009 
 
The expression "Japan fatigue" has been quietly spreading among U.S. 
government officials recently. It signifies their desire to stay 
away from Japan as much as possible, because its prime minister 
lacks the ability to deal with issues due to domestic concerns such 
as maintaining the coalition government. 
 
Following the Hatoyama administration's decision to return the issue 
 
TOKYO 00002891  002 OF 006 
 
 
of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to square 
one, a U.S. government source indicated his sense of fatigue on Dec. 
14, saying: "I don't think I will feel like working on any new 
projects with Japan for a while." A series of responses by Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama has caused Japan fatigue to grow rapidly 
among U.S. government officials. Japan's policy presence could 
weaken as a result. 
 
A close aide to the prime minister emphasized: "The Futenma issue is 
not the sole pending issue between Japan and the U.S." But this 
issue as resulted in throwing Hatoyama's personal view of the U.S. 
into stark relief. In addition, two events that took place in 
December turned out to be the defining factors in the U.S. 
government's negative view toward the Hatoyama administration. 
 
One event was a visit to Washington in early December by Japan 
Research Institute Chairman Jitsuro Terashima, who is said to be 
close to Hatoyama. During his visit, Terashima explained to experts 
on Japan the idea of significantly reducing the U.S. military bases 
in Japan and dispatching U.S. troops stationed in Guam and Hawaii to 
Japan only in times of emergency. The U.S. government interpreted 
this idea as being connected with Prime Minister's instructions to 
look for a new relocation site for the Futenma airfield. Concerned 
U.S. officials have also speculated that Hatoyama might begin to lay 
the groundwork to put his stock argument for a security arrangement 
without the permanent presence of U.S. forces into practice. 
 
The other event was a visit to China by Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa accompanied by a delegation of 
about 140 DPJ lawmakers. Officials in charge of Asian affairs in 
Washington have made this analysis: "The visit might be part of the 
administration's moves to distance itself from the U.S. and to 
approach China." 
 
U.S. officials expected the Hatoyama administration "to be aware of 
the necessity of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the future," as a 
Congress member said. But such expectations have been dashed 
completely. 
 
A senior Foreign Ministry official predicts that "Japan-U.S. 
relations could become heartless in the future." Even if both sides 
are in disagreement over economic or diplomatic issues, there will 
be no problem as long as the bilateral alliance remains firm. But if 
measures to break the current impasse are not taken, the security 
arrangement could be undermined. 
 
Even within the DPJ, an increasing number of members are now 
apparently skeptical of the prime minister's stance toward the U.S. 
Upon hearing about the prime minister's decision to return the 
Futenma issue to square one, a mid-ranking DPJ lawmaker grumbled 
yesterday: "At a time when Japan must cooperate with the U.S. in 
dealing with such economic issues as the yen's appreciation and the 
global recession, if Japan continues to be at odds with the U.S., it 
will become impossible for the government to proceed smoothly, as 
was the case with the previous South Korean government of President 
Roh Moo Hyun." 
 
(3) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 1): Prime Minister Hatoyama 
must exercise leadership in regaining confidence 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
December 16, 2009 
 
TOKYO 00002891  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
Fumiaki Kubo, professor at the University of Tokyo 
 
The Hatoyama administration has sent the relocation of the U.S. 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station back to square one. The Japan-U.S. 
relationship has now been strained more than ever. Next year will 
mark the 50th anniversary of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty. However, it would be difficult for the two countries to 
celebrate the results of the treaty in an amicable atmosphere. 
 
The U.S. Obama administration at first felt strong affinities with 
the Hatoyama government, because both have taken the reins of 
government, advocating the need for "change (reform)." However, the 
Obama administration has been confused by the Hatoyama cabinet's 
position of not adopting a realistic security policy. It would be 
possible for the two governments to cooperate on such issues as 
global environment and nuclear disarmament, but they have failed to 
build mutual trust, missing chances. 
 
The Futenma issue is significant, but a more serious problem is 
probably that the Hatoyama administration's basic security policy 
has been unclear. Are there any security threats to Japan? In case 
threats do exist, will Japan deal with them by itself or will it ask 
the United States for cooperation? On this point, the Hatoyama 
administration has not clarified its position. Since it wavered back 
and forth in making a decision on the Futenma relocation issue, the 
United States has grown distrustful of it. 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) did not include security policy 
in its manifesto (set of campaign pledges) for the August House of 
Representatives election campaign. The DPJ included in its manifesto 
its desire to forge an "equal" partnership with the U.S. However, 
the meaning of the Japan-U.S. equal partnership is not clear. 
 
The rights and obligations of the bilateral security treaty are 
asymmetrical. Japan's obligation is to provide bases to the United 
States, and the U.S.'s obligation is to defend Japan. The United 
States also has the right to use Japan's bases for the peace and 
security of the Far East. Under these circumstances, it is difficult 
to define an "equal partnership" between Japan and the United 
States. For the U.S., an equal partnership would mean Japan's 
exercising the right to collective defense and boosting defense 
spending. 
 
President Barack Obama might be considering Hatoyama as 
"untruthful." Even if the Hatoyama administration harbors 
expectations for U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. side may not give 
consideration to Japan. North Korea has called for excluding Japan 
from the framework of the Six-Party Talks. I wonder how long the 
United States will be able to continue to refuse the North's demand. 
I am concerned about the degree to which Washington pay heeds to 
Tokyo's emphasis on the abduction issue. 
 
The Hatoyama government failed in its U.S. policy from the very 
start. It has given the impression of not cooperating with the 
United States. It is not easy to erase that image. However, it would 
be a blow to the U.S. to lose Japan, which is the U.S's most 
important ally in Asia. Washington, therefore, proposed to shift 
part of the Futenma heliport facilities to a Ground Self-Defense 
Force range in Higashifuji, Shizuoka Prefecture. 
 
The Prime Minister has not exercised leadership, just going with 
 
TOKYO 00002891  004 OF 006 
 
 
public opinion, without persuading or making a decision. He must 
make a decision, while considering the security of the all Japan. 
 
With the relocation of the Futenma base returned to square one, the 
Japan-U.S. relationship has been strained. I would like to ask 
experts how Japan should deal with the issue and their thoughts on 
the historical meaning of the Hatoyama administration's decision to 
return the Futenma relocation to square one. 
 
(4) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting 
(Part 1): PM Hatoyama looks for relocation site other than Henoko; 
SDP wary of solution based on current plan with minor modifications 
 
MAINICHI (Pages 1, 3) (Full) 
December 16, 2009 
 
On Dec. 15, after the government decided to defer a conclusion on 
the relocation site for the U.S. forces' Futenma Air Station (in 
Ginowan City, Okinawa) to next year, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama 
told reporters at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei): 
"We will look for a location other than Henoko. We will create the 
conditions conducive for making a decision (on the relocation site) 
as much as possible." He indicated a strong intention to review the 
existing plan to relocate the Futenma base to the coastal area of 
Camp Schwab (in Henoko, Nago City). 
 
While this can be interpreted as a concession to the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), which advocates reviewing the Japan-U.S. 
agreement, Hatoyama also said, "We will need a few months' time for 
this process." The Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies meeting 
on Dec. 15 participated in by the party leaders failed to agree on 
setting May 2010 as the deadline for reaching a conclusion on the 
relocation site, but since Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano 
has been given full authority over the details of the discussion 
process, May next year is regarded as the de facto deadline. 
 
The SDP remains wary that "(the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)) may 
be thinking of settling this issue by relocation to Henoko after the 
deliberation process, even at the expense of dissolving the 
coalition." 
 
Next May will be a critical juncture in domestic politics. The 
government and the ruling parties plan to submit the second FY09 
supplementary budget bill and the FY10 budget bill to the next 
regular Diet session to be convened in January. There will be a 
House of Councillors election in summer, so the government would 
like to enact without fail the FY10 budget and the related bills, 
which will realize its showcase policies, such as the child 
allowance. This means that the DPJ, which does not control a 
majority in the Upper House, will only need the SDP's Upper House 
members until April. A senior SDP official is worried that "if a 
solution is decided based on the current relocation plan with minor 
modifications after Diet deliberations on the budget, we may be 
forced to bolt the coalition." 
 
On the other hand, the U.S., which demands the early implementation 
of the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment road map agreement, has 
reacted strongly. Hatoyama told reporters in the late afternoon of 
Dec. 15: "If you think of the importance of the Japan-U.S. agreement 
and the Okinawan people's fervent wishes, a quick decision right now 
is bound to fail." Hatoyama met with U.S. Ambassador to Japan John 
Roos at the Kantei that evening. It is believed that he explained 
 
TOKYO 00002891  005 OF 006 
 
 
that Japan is not procrastinating aimlessly and sought the U.S.'s 
understanding. 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was critical, with Secretary 
General Tadamori Oshima remarking that "indecision runs counter to 
the national interest." Meanwhile, DPJ Secretary General Ichiro 
Ozawa gave a speech at a (closed door) party he held in Tokyo on the 
same day, and according to a participant in this party, he said: 
"The U.S. and Japan should have a relationship under which they can 
talk to each other frankly." 
 
(Above sections by Keiichi Shirato, Takenori Noguchi; following 
sections by Shinichiro Nishida, Teruhisa Mimori) 
 
On the afternoon of Dec. 15, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima was 
surrounded by reporters at the Okinawa Prefectural Government 
building. He said: "If the basic policy is not decided at an early 
date, the danger posed by the Futenma base cannot be removed. There 
is no way for me to comment unless I am presented with something 
close to a concrete proposal." He appeared to be distressed at the 
government's decision to defer the Futenma relocation issue. 
 
Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro, 63, of Nago City, who accepts the 
current plan to relocate Futenma to the coastal area of Camp Schwab 
on certain conditions, told reporters at the city hall: "The cabinet 
ministers all say different things. I ask the government to come up 
with a consensus at an early date." 
 
While expectations are high in the local communities in light of the 
decision to reconsider the relocation site, with the current plan 
remaining one of the options, the citizens have been at the mercy of 
the government's vacillations. Incumbent Mayor Shimabukuro will be 
running against Susumu Inamine, 64, who is endorsed by the DPJ, the 
SDP, the Japanese Communist Party, and other groups favoring 
relocation out of Okinawa, in the Nago mayoral election taking place 
in a month (official declaration of candidacy on Jan.17; voting on 
Jan. 24). Acceptance of the Futenma facility will be the main 
issue. 
 
Citizens of Nago often talk about the "Okada shock" these days. A 
meeting was held at a civic hall in Nago on Dec. 5. After members of 
the media were asked to leave, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada gave 
the following answer to a question from the floor: "I understand how 
you feel, but the Japan-U.S. agreement cannot be changed so easily." 
Dead silence fell over the hall for a moment at Okada's surprising 
statement. Most members of the audience were supporters of DPJ House 
of Representatives members elected on a platform of opposing 
Futenma's relocation within Okinawa. 
 
Many participants said: "Local citizens are divided (over the 
relocation issue) and it has been awful. We ask for early relocation 
out of Okinawa or out of Japan." Okada reiterated: "If you continue 
to oppose (the relocation plan), Futenma will remain where it is. 
The U.S. will no longer consent to the relocation of 8,000 Marines 
to Guam." 
 
Chikako Toguchi, 48, who participated in the signature campaign for 
voting "no" in the referendum in 1997 on the construction of an 
offshore heliport to replace the Futenma airfield, stated with 
resolve after attending the Dec. 5 meeting: "We need to win the 
mayoral election and manifest the popular will in Nago once again." 
 
 
TOKYO 00002891  006 OF 006 
 
 
On the other hand, an official of the Inamine camp voiced this 
complaint: "If they continue to behave like this, citizens who have 
great expectations will be angered and exasperated, thinking 'what's 
wrong with the DPJ?' We thought we were at an advantage in this 
election, but it's going to be a tough battle." The situation 
surrounding the mayoral election is becoming increasingly 
complicated. 
 
The Futenma issue started with the rape of an Okinawan school girl 
by U.S. Marines in September 1995. The Japanese and U.S. governments 
agreed on the return of the Futenma base in April 1996 on the 
condition of building a new heliport in Okinawa. The final report of 
the Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 
December called for the construction of an offshore heliport "in 
waters off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa." 
 
A Kantei official who was involved in negotiations with the U.S. 
side on the relocation site relates: "We were unable to find a 
location in Japan that was willing to accept the 20,000 Marines in 
Okinawa. There was also no way we could relocate the USFJ's only 
combat units out of the country and create a vacuum in deterrence 
against China and North Korea." 
 
Another meeting was held at the Nago civic hall on the evening of 
Dec. 10. Former Mayor Tetsuya Higa, who announced his resignation 
after making the decision to accept Futenma's relocation in exchange 
for economic development measures in December 1997, recalled the 
situation at that time and said: "We have not done enough. We need 
to continue our efforts next year." He appealed for support for 
Shimabukuro in the forthcoming mayoral race. 
 
The fact that "economic development for northern Okinawa" is still 
used as a slogan in the election reflects the Hatoyama 
administration's continuing ambivalence even after the change of 
administration. The DPJ used to criticize the LDP-New Komeito 
administration's policy of "imposition of military bases in exchange 
for economic development measures" as a carrot-and-stick tactic. 
 
The Inamine camp says: "We don't want any cabinet minister who does 
not clearly stand for relocation out of Okinawa to come," while the 
Shimabukuro camp says: "An early decision should be made on the 
relocation site." The citizens of Nago are sharply divided once 
again. Yet, what they do share in common is frustration with the 
government. They ask: "What was the past 13 years all about?" 
 
ROOS