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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8998
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8436

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 002880 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/16/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Commentary on GOJ's Futenma relocation policy: Discuss the image 
of the alliance, bring trust back to the Japan-U.S. relationship 
(Asahi) 
 
(2) Editorial: Postponement of Futenma decision will further 
endanger Japan-U.S. alliance (Nikkei) 
 
(3) Shaky Japan-U.S. security arrangement (Part 1): Danger of 
national defense without continuous presence of U.S. forces (Nikkei) 
 
 
(4) Shaky Japan-U.S. security arrangement (Part 2): Call for 
reducing military bases in Japan beginning to emerge in U.S. 
(Nikkei) 
 
(5) What does the Hague Convention stipulate? (Asahi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Commentary on GOJ's Futenma relocation policy: Discuss the image 
of the alliance, bring trust back to the Japan-U.S. relationship 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
December 16, 2009 
 
The government has postponed a solution to the Futenma issue until 
next year and decided to look for new relocation sites. With this, 
there is now a possibility that the existing relocation plan that 
calls for building a replacement facility in the coastal area of 
Henoko in Nago City, Okinawa, may be scrapped and Japan may 
renegotiate this issue with the U.S. The U.S. side is beginning to 
suspect that the Hatoyama administration intends to scale back the 
Japan-U.S. alliance. The only way to find a solution is to engage in 
a "strategic dialogue" on the ideal form of the security alliance, 
even if this would seem a roundabout way. 
 
With the government policy confirmed by the three ruling parties on 
Dec. 15, the current plan should probably be regarded as void. This 
will force the U.S., which has insisted that the current plan is the 
"only feasible plan" so far, to make an about-face and is certain to 
invoke a strong reaction. 
 
The distrust of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who told President 
Obama "trust me" when he sought the early implementation of the 
current plan at the bilateral summit in November, will be further 
aggravated. With the procrastination that went on after the summit, 
U.S. government officials have now come to say "We don't trust him" 
without any qualms. This is an unprecedented situation. 
 
The foremost reason why the situation has become so serious lies in 
the Hatoyama administration's basic stance on managing the 
alliance. 
 
On top of the Futenma issue, the Hatoyama administration regards the 
secret nuclear agreement, the Status of Forces Agreement, the 
omoiyari yosan (so-called sympathy budget, i.e. host nation 
support), and other issues that affect the very foundation of the 
security alliance as a "negative legacy" from the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) administration and is working on rectifying or revising 
them. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002880  002 OF 009 
 
 
While it is true that from Japan's perspective, there are indeed 
many points that require revision, the problem is that the U.S. does 
not necessarily think of them all as a "negative legacy." Sheila 
Smith, senior researcher at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations 
who is a supporter of the U.S. Democratic Party, points out that, 
"Complaints about the LDP should not be confused with complaints 
about the U.S. government." 
 
Particularly with regard to the current Futenma relocation plan, 
there is a strong sense on the U.S. side that they accepted the plan 
only because the Japanese government proposed it and guaranteed that 
it will be implemented. The Obama administration's position on this 
point remains unchanged. On the other hand, the Hatoyama 
administration asserts that since there has been a change of 
administration through an election, it is a matter of course to 
review policies. The two sides are not on the same page at all. 
 
Even if renegotiations start in the new year, discussions on Futenma 
relocation alone will probably not solve the problem because the gap 
between the two sides is too wide. 
 
The U.S. side is now concerned and suspicious that the steps taken 
by the Prime Minister to settle the issues related to the "negative 
legacy" are a manifestation of his intent to scale down the alliance 
and reduce its capability. 
 
When he was president of the old Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
(before its merger with the Liberal Party in 2003), the Prime 
Minister contributed an article in a magazine in 1996 asserting that 
the Japan-U.S. security treaty is a "relic of the Cold War" and that 
Japan should do away with its "excessive reliance on the U.S." and 
"shift to a security treaty without the permanent stationing of 
troops." Behind such argument is the thinking that the present 
alliance framework is overkill, and Japan is being made to bear an 
unnecessarily heavy burden. 
 
On the other hand, the U.S. side openly claims that the present 
alliance framework is a "great bargain" (according to Lieutenant 
General Edward Rice, U.S. Forces Japan commander). It argues that 
thanks to the alliance, Japan is able to enjoy the current level of 
deterrence and security with a total defense budget of approximately 
5 trillion yen, which is less than 1 percent of its GDP. There is, 
again, an enormous gap in the perception of the two sides. 
 
Delving deeper into this debate, there is another perception gap 
with regard to the level of threat that Japan needs to prepare 
against. The "threat" that the DPJ talks about in its manifesto only 
refers to "North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches." The 
U.S. side reckons that along with North Korea, the alliance also 
needs to deal with the "changes brought about by China's rise" (in 
the words of Ambassador to Japan John Roos). In the U.S. 
administration, Okinawa is regarded precisely as the strategic base 
for engaging with China. 
 
If the Prime Minister and the administration are thinking of 
reducing Japan's "reliance on the U.S.," it should discuss this 
squarely with the U.S. in a way that is visible to the people. 
 
The article written by the Prime Minister in the past asserted that 
the reduction of U.S. forces can be achieved by setting up a new 
multilateral framework for security dialogue in East Asia and 
creating an international environment that will prevent 
 
TOKYO 00002880  003 OF 009 
 
 
"contingencies in the Far East" from occurring. It is believed that 
his present concept of East Asian community is an extension of this 
theory. 
 
The "new deliberation process for deepening the Japan-U.S. alliance" 
agreed upon by the two leaders in November has not started as a 
result of the Futenma problem. Why not commence this forum for the 
two administrations to discuss the basic question of the ideal form 
of the alliance as a prerequisite to the Futenma relocation talks or 
simultaneously with the talks? 
 
Only by doing this can the U.S. side's suspicions be cleared and 
clues to restoring trust be found. This may also make possible 
"frank discussions on pending issues between the two countries 
within a relationship of trust," as the Prime Minister stated in his 
policy speech (to the 173rd Diet session on Oct. 26). 
 
(2) Editorial: Postponement of Futenma decision will further 
endanger Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
December 16, 2009 
 
The government's decision to postpone determining a relocation site 
for the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa will end 
up endangering the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is already in a 
critical state. People are concerned about the Hatoyama 
administration's steps hollowing out the Japan-U.S. alliance and its 
inclination towards China in contradiction of the Prime Minister's 
claim that the Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's 
foreign policy. 
 
Holding a meeting yesterday of the Ministerial Council on Basic 
Policies at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei), the 
government decided to put off determining the relocation site for 
Futenma until next year. The government also decided to (1) allow 
the three ruling parties to look into candidate relocation sites, 
including the existing plan; (2) propose to Washington the 
establishment of a Japan-U.S. consultative body; and (3) include in 
the fiscal 2010 budget relocation-related spending based on the 
existing plan. 
 
Although there was an idea to make a decision by next May, the 
government has given up on it due to opposition from the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). The existing Japan-U.S. agreement was barely 
salvaged by the decision to include the relocation costs in the 
fiscal 2010 budget. The future of talks among the three ruling 
parties and Washington's response remain to be seen. The decision to 
postpone a conclusion will contribute to making the Futenma base, 
which divides and occupies a residential area in Ginowan, a 
permanent fixture on Okinawa. 
 
As ministers responsible for the management and operation of the 
Japan-U.S. alliance, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense 
Minister Toshimi Kitazawa repeatedly urged Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama to confirm the Japan-U.S. agreement before the end of the 
year. However, the Prime Minister put consideration for the SDP 
ahead of their advice. 
 
"The realignment road map that we've already agreed to is the best 
plan," State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly said on Dec. 14. There 
are no signs that the gulf between Japan and the United States will 
 
TOKYO 00002880  004 OF 009 
 
 
be bridged. 
 
Foreign Minister Okada has repeatedly expressed alarm about the 
current state of the Japan-U.S. alliance. The alliance has already 
suffered damage on the diplomatic front. 
 
If a formal Japan-U.S. summit in Copenhagen is scrapped, Japan will 
lose the chance to persuade the United States on the issue of global 
warming. Is Prime Minister Hatoyama, who is enthusiastic about 
environmental issues, aware that his decision will result in such a 
consequence? 
 
"Japan-U.S. ties are strained," said Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka in Shanghai on Dec. 
¶14. "It is a realistic approach to first strengthen Japan-China ties 
and then resolve the problems with the United States." This 
statement will also cause international doubts about the Hatoyama 
administration's foreign policy. 
 
The Yamaoka statement reflects a logic that reverses the places of 
the traditional Japan-U.S. relationship and the Japan-China 
relationship. It also includes content leading to negation of (the 
Japan-U.S.) alliance. In its manifesto (campaign pledges), the 
Hatoyama administration pledged to form an equal and close 
partnership between Japan and the United States. If the Yamaoka 
statement is designed for Japan to deal with the United States with 
China's help, it is not a concept to form an equal partnership with 
the United States; nor is it compatible with the goal of forming a 
close partnership with the U.S. 
 
In the grip of DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, the Hatoyama 
administration's foreign policy appears from the standpoint of other 
countries to be moving away from the United States and inclining 
towards China. This will spread anxiety among Southeast Asian 
nations, which have mixed feelings about China. 
 
(3) Shaky Japan-U.S. security arrangement (Part 1): Danger of 
national defense without continuous presence of U.S. forces 
 
NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
December 15, 2009 
 
The issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station 
has been rattling Japan-U.S. relations. How will the Japan-U.S. 
alliance work for Japan's national interest? Set off by the conflict 
over the Futenma issue, such a question is being posed to both Japan 
and the U.S., prior to the 50th anniversary of the revision of the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty next year. 
 
A  Hatoyama vision with no hope for success 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has been slow to move to reach a 
conclusion on the Futenma issue. A person who discussed this issue 
with Hatoyama said: "Even now Mr. Hatoyama seems to have in mind the 
idea of realizing a security arrangement without the continued 
presence of U.S. forces." 
 
The main reason for the current standstill on the Futenma issue is 
the strong opposition from a junior coalition member, the Social 
Democratic Party, to the existing plan to relocate the facility 
within the prefecture. But senior members of the government and the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) have said that the prime minister 
 
TOKYO 00002880  005 OF 009 
 
 
has little awareness of the need to protect Japan's security with 
the U.S.'s military power. 
 
Hatoyama came up with a policy vision entitled "a Japan-U.S. 
arrangement without the continued presence of U.S. forces" in the 
latter half of the 1990's, when he was president of the former DPJ. 
 
In February, when he was serving as party secretary general, he 
stated that if a missile defense network is completed, "Japan's 
security will be ensured even under the defense-only policy and 
without depending on U.S. power." 
 
Under the current security system, the U.S. is obligated to defend 
Japan, but Japan is not obligated to defend the U.S. The question is 
to what extent Japan will be able to ensure its security without the 
continued presence of U.S. forces. 
 
Andrew Marshall, a famous military strategist who still heads the 
Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment although he is now 87 
years old, secretly produced with researchers this spring an 
internal analysis paper entitled "Japan's future defense system." 
Marshall thoroughly investigated Japan's resources, population 
dynamics, public opinion, and other things to determine its options 
20 years hence. 
 
Although the paper's contents have not been released, according to a 
person involved in producing the paper, the conclusion was that 
there was no better option for Japan than the Japan-U.S. alliance. 
The paper predicts that it would become difficult for Japan to 
counter rising China without the Japan-U.S. alliance owing to its 
fiscal deficits and dwindling birthrate and aging population. 
 
The U.S. military has maintained a powerful war-making capacity. The 
U.S. has deployed about 50 F-15 fighters at Kadena Air Base in 
Okinawa and about 40 F-16 fighters at Misawa Air Base in Aomori. In 
Okinawa, there are about 18,000 Marines, and the Seventh Fleet has 
deployed 17 warships, including one aircraft carrier and nine Aegis 
destroyers, in Japan. Behind the deployment of warships are China's 
military buildup and North Korea's nuclear development. 
 
Marine units are said to be units in readiness to cope with crises 
on the Korean Peninsula and in Taiwan. But a security authority 
said: "Should Marines leave Japan, it will become difficult to 
prevent crises on the peninsula or in Taiwan from spreading to 
neighboring countries. Accordingly, in the event that a conflict 
breaks out on the Senkaku Islands, it will likely become difficult 
to make a quick response." If Japan intends to boost its 
self-defense capability, a huge defense budget will become 
necessary. The nation's defense budget amounts to approximately 4.7 
trillion yen, slightly more than 0.9 PERCENT  of the nation's gross 
domestic product (GDP). With this low percentage, Japan is not 
included in the list of the top 100 countries. 
 
Barrier to equipment, operations 
 
Look at other U.S. allies' defense budgets. According to the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the ratio of defense spending as 
a portion of GDP is 2.7 PERCENT  in the case of South Korea and 2.4 
PERCENT  in Britain and Australia. 
 
If Japan is willing to raise the percentage to the level of South 
Korea, it needs to add approximately 14.1 trillion yen to the 
 
TOKYO 00002880  006 OF 009 
 
 
defense budget. That figure would account for slightly less than 60 
PERCENT  of the social-security-related expenses in the government's 
general outlays. A sharp increase in Japan's defense budget might 
provoke a fierce response from China and South Korea. 
 
In addition, there is a high barrier to operations. The Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's operation system is premised on joint 
operations with the U.S. Navy. The MSDF possesses equipment mainly 
for antisubmarine operations and minesweeping, missions for which 
the U.S. has insufficient equipment. A senior MSDF official said: 
"Under the current system, the MSDF cannot fight in a serious 
emergency situation on its own, separately from U.S. forces." Its 
missile defense system, too, depends on U.S. spy satellites for 
intelligence gathering. 
 
While depending on the U.S. and being lightly armed, Japan became an 
economic power. If it intends to change this pattern, Japan must be 
prepared to shoulder enormous expenses and risks. The Hatoyama 
administration has decided to delay the compilation of an outline of 
defense policy until next year. With no discussion conducted on 
national security, the Japan-U.S. alliance is now under strain. 
 
(4) Shaky Japan-U.S. security arrangement (Part 2): Call for 
reducing military bases in Japan beginning to emerge in U.S. 
 
NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
December 16, 2009 
 
"Is no decision a decision?" U.S. government officials have been 
reacting coolly to the Hatoyama administration's decision (to delay 
a conclusion) on the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' 
Futenma Air Station. In Washington, the Hatoyama administration's 
flip-flop has been treated as if it is a funny story. 
 
Michael Green, former senior Asian desk director of the National 
Security Council (NSC), explained clearly: "Since there is no other 
option than the existing plan, delaying a conclusion is a risky 
strategy. The delay might derail the whole plan for the realignment 
of U.S. forces." In the administration of President Barack Obama, 
there is not much of a celebratory mood for the 50th anniversary 
next year of the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. 
 
Vacuum in military power 
 
In the Philippines, relations with the U.S. turned sour under 
President Corazon Aquino, who assumed the post after overthrowing 
the pro-U.S. Marcos administration in 1986. The Mutual Defense 
Treaty signed between the two countries lost its substance. 
Eventually, the U.S. started withdrawing its troops in 1991 (the 
withdrawal process ended in 1994) after nearly 100 years of 
deployment since the U.S. took control of the Philippines from Spain 
at the end of the Spanish-American War. 
 
Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base on Luzon Island were the 
U.S. military's largest bases overseas. The Defense Department 
insisted that the presence of the two bases was indispensable from 
the security strategic point of view in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
White House, however, decided to move the line of defense in the 
South China Sea to Guam, also taking into consideration the expenses 
needed to reconstruct the facilities damaged in a volcanic 
eruption. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002880  007 OF 009 
 
 
China took advantage of the vacuum in military power. China sent its 
troops to islands for which the sovereignty status remains unknown, 
such as the Parcel Islands and the Spratly Islands, and had 
effective control over these islands. Upset by China's moves, the 
Philippines started efforts to call back the U.S. military, but the 
U.S. remained unresponsive, although the two countries resumed joint 
military exercises in 2000. 
 
Many of the troops at the bases in the Philippines were transferred 
to Okinawa. Kadena Air Base is now the U.S. military's largest 
facility overseas. Removing the military capacity there would mean 
the U.S. military would lose its command of the East China Sea. 
Okinawa is indisputably the cornerstone of the U.S. military 
strategy in the Pacific region. 
 
Even so, U.S.-China relations have changed subtly over the past 
several years. It is now inconceivable that the U.S. will have a 
military conflict with China, because China is the largest holder of 
U.S. government bonds. Meanwhile, the East China Sea is still an 
important line of defense for Japan. 
 
"Why do we have to protect Japan?" 
 
U.S. finances are now in a critical situation, as seen from its 
decision to suspend the planned production of the superior fighter 
F-22 Raptor. Since Japan has offered host nation support (the 
so-called omoiyari yosan or "sympathy budget"), the U.S. military's 
maintenance expenditures in Japan are less than those in the U.S. 
But the Hatoyama administration has proposed reducing sympathy 
budget allocations. If the sympathy budget is actually cut back, an 
increasing number of people in the U.S. are expected to begin to 
say: "Why do we have to defend Japan?" 
 
When the Iraq war began in 2003, the U.S. military ordered the 
mobilization its 34th air combat team stationed in Inzirlik Air Base 
in Turkey. But the Turkish government, which has jurisdiction over 
the base facilities, banned the use of the base. The U.S. military 
was pressed to review its strategy and moved the combat team to a 
base in another country. Later, the U.S. set up a military base in 
Romania. 
 
In the process of reorganizing U.S. forces in South Korea in 2004, 
the planned reduction in the number of troops by more than 10,000 
drew a great deal of attention. For the U.S., however, it was more 
important to move its troops from an area near the military border 
with North Korea to the southern part of Seoul. A U.S. soldier was 
quoted as saying that although U.S. troops should fulfill the 
obligation of defending South Korea, it would be irrational if U.S. 
troops were killed before South Korean troops did. 
 
Former deputy under secretary of defense Lawless, who was involved 
in negotiations on the Japan-U.S. accord reached in 2006, said: "The 
U.S. will leave Japan if Japan asks it to." An argument calling for 
scaling down the Japan-U.S. alliance has begun to emerge in the U.S. 
This argument is not necessarily only intended to apply pressure to 
Japan to have it follow what the U.S. says. 
 
White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs made a statement in a press 
conference on Dec. 7 strongly urging Japan to implement the existing 
Futenma relocation plan. The questioner was Helen Thomas, 89. She 
has been a member of the White Press Corps since the days of the 
Kennedy government. 
 
TOKYO 00002880  008 OF 009 
 
 
 
In asking about the current state of Japan-U.S. relations, she 
brought up the war that occurred more than 50 years ago. She said: 
"Today is National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day. What approach is 
the President going to take towards the Japanese who are seeking the 
relocation of the base facility?" Although Japan believes the 
bilateral alliance remains firm, for Thomas, who was already 21 
years old when World War II began, the current state of the alliance 
is no more than just a single scene in history. 
 
(5) What does the Hague Convention stipulate? 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Full) 
December 15, 2009 
 
Question: I have heard there have been a lot of cases in which 
problems occur when international marriages end in divorce and one 
party takes their child back to his or her country. I have often 
seen the Hague Convention referred to in articles about such cases. 
 
Mitsusada Enyo: The Hague Convention is formally called the 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
The convention was adopted in 1980 in the Hague, the Netherlands; so 
it is commonly called the Hague Convention. At present, 81 countries 
have acceded to the convention. Among the Group of Seven (G-7) 
members, Japan is the only country that has not yet acceded to it. 
The United States and European countries have called on Japan to 
sign the convention. 
 
Question: What will happen if Japan accedes to the convention? 
 
Enyo: In signatory countries, if one parent takes his/her child to 
his/her home country without consulting the other parent, the other 
parent can request to have the child returned to the country where 
the child lived before resolving the question of which parent should 
eventually have the custody of their child. Even after a couple is 
divorced, they are still the parents of their children. The concept 
of the convention is that if one parent changes their child's living 
conditions and removes the child from the other parent wrongfully, 
it will put the child at a disadvantage. In the U.S. and Europe, 
there are many countries in which both parents have custody of their 
children even after they get divorced. Therefore, child abduction is 
strongly criticized in the U.S. and Europe. 
 
Question: How many have child abduction cases happened? 
 
Enyo: There are no accurate statistics. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), however, has revealed that foreign governments have 
reported the following numbers of child abduction cases as of 
October 2009: the U.S. government has claimed 73 cases; the British 
government, 33; the Canadian government, 33, and the French 
government, 26. It appears that since international marriages have 
increased, problems have increased. In September, an American man 
was arrested for allegedly abducting his two children, who had 
returned to Japan with his ex-wife. 
 
Question: I don't think it's good for one parent to take his/her 
child from the other parent. So, Japan should accede to the 
convention. 
 
Enyo: Wives suffering from domestic violence by their husbands have 
strongly opposed the idea of Japan becoming a signatory country. 
 
TOKYO 00002880  009 OF 009 
 
 
Also Justice Minister Keiko Chiba is cautious about creating a 
system under which Japanese wives are obliged to return their 
children to their father's country when they have run into 
difficulties with their non-Japanese husbands. The justice minister 
said, "I'm concerned about victims of domestic violence. Japan uses 
a 'sole custody system' in which the custody of children is only 
given to one parent. So, there is a strong belief in Japan that 
mothers should have the custody of their children. This may be one 
reason why Japan is negative about acceding to the Hague 
Convention. 
 
Question: What is the Japanese government's position? 
 
Enyo: MOFA and the Justice Ministry have been studying the matter, 
but they appear to have been unable to deal with the problems. They 
should first study the child abduction situation, and then sort out 
the issues involving domestic law and the advantages of becoming a 
signatory country. 
 
ROOS