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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 002757 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/02/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) MD Kitazawa anticipates U.S. request for more Afghan aid after 
President Obama announced new strategy (Nikkei) 
 
(2) U.S. impatient with Hatoyama administration's delay in making 
decision on Futenma relocation (Okinawa Times) 
 
(3) MD Kitazawa indicates need to coordinate with SDP, PNP on 
Futenma relocation issue (Jiji com) 
 
(4) Futenma Air Field relocation: Statement by Governor Hashimoto 
overturns premise that relocation of Futenma functions out of the 
prefecture would be difficult (Okinawa Times) 
 
(5) Coalition partners SDP, PNP "headache" for PM Hatoyama in 
Futenma relocation issue; efforts being made to prevent 
disintegration of coalition (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(6) Testimony acknowledging existence of secret Okinawa accord to 
give pressure for uncovering secret nuclear accord as well: Likely 
to affect discussion on review of diplomatic documents disclosure 
system (Nikkei) 
 
(7) Editorial: Truth revealed on history of secret accord (Tokyo 
Shimbun) 
 
(8) Editorial: Former Foreign Ministry bureau chiefs' testimony must 
be utilized to restore trust in diplomacy (Mainichi) 
 
(9) "Protocol" fading, ahead of international conference on global 
warming (Part 1) (Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) MD Kitazawa anticipates U.S. request for more Afghan aid after 
President Obama announced new strategy 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
Evening, December 2, 2009 
 
In light of U.S. President Barack Obama's announcement of a new 
strategy for Afghanistan, the government is stepping up the 
formulation of concrete proposals for additional Afghan aid, which 
it had pledged at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in November. Japan's 
additional aid measures, consisting mainly of civilian aid, such as 
paying for the salaries of police officers and vocational training, 
are expected to total a maximum of 5 billion dollars over five years 
from 2009. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa indicated on the 
morning of Dec. 2 that the U.S. side is expected to request 
additional aid. 
 
Kitazawa gave a speech at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka 
City, Kanagawa Prefecture, on the morning of Dec. 2. Commenting on 
the new U.S. strategy, he pointed out that "the Obama administration 
is concerned that Afghanistan may turn into another Vietnam or 
Iraq." He added, "There is a strong possibility that the U.S. may 
ask Japan for more aid." 
 
In this connection, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano stressed 
at a news conference in the morning that "in addition to the 5 
billion dollars in aid, we would like to collaborate closely with 
 
TOKYO 00002757  002 OF 011 
 
 
the U.S. and other concerned countries and actively cooperate for 
the stability and development of Afghanistan." 
 
(2) U.S. impatient with Hatoyama administration's delay in making 
decision on Futenma relocation 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
December 2, 2009 
 
Shin Yoshida, member of "Futenma Adrift" series reporting team 
 
Shortly before U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Japan, a 
source knowledgeable about Japan-U.S. diplomacy smiled wryly and 
revealed that the U.S. government itself was skeptical about the 
working group for the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air 
Station that the two governments had just agreed to set up. He said: 
"It is alleged that the working group 'is a kabuki show and has no 
meaning'." 
 
A "kabuki show" is the term used by the Wall Street Journal in an 
editorial in late October criticizing Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, 
asserting that "it doesn't sound like he's thought much about the 
alternatives." However, this source also explained: "The end of a 
kabuki show is known. (What Hatoyama is doing) is just a charade for 
implementing the current relocation plan." 
 
The U.S. government has been applying pressure for a decision on the 
Futenma issue before the end of 2009. 
 
The working group was created to paper over the gap between the two 
countries at the meeting between Hatoyama, who was yet to chart a 
course, and Obama. A Japanese government source said with 
self-derision: "The Ambassador is just a proxy of the secretaries of 
defense and state. The working group is for the sake of making a 
decision on relocation to Henoko." 
 
In anticipation of a change of administration in Japan, the U.S. has 
been contacting senior Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) officials 
since late 2008. Members of the transition team and think tank 
researchers who came to Japan before the inauguration of the Obama 
administration argued that the implementation of the U.S. Forces 
Japan (USFJ) realignment plans is the most desirable option. 
 
At the same time, the departments of state and defense briefed the 
Obama administration on the USFJ realignment plans and prepared for 
the conclusion of the Guam Agreement. The above Japanese source says 
that State and Pentagon persuaded Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, who thought "there is no need for such a big rush," and 
succeeded in having the agreement signed in February. Several 
sources explain that "many years have passed since the SACO (Special 
Action Committee on Okinawa), and the U.S. no longer has the energy 
to renegotiate." It was thought that persuading the new governments 
in Japan and the U.S. would be a much easier endeavor. These sources 
believe that the U.S. stepped up its efforts to persuade the 
Hatoyama administration based on such a line of reasoning. 
 
After Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada indicated for the first time on 
Oct. 23 that he favored a proposal to integrate Futenma's functions 
with Kadena Air Base, U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos, USFJ 
Commander Edward Rice, and other U.S. officials visited the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs on Oct. 29 and 30. They explained that: "The 
security environment has changed in the 13 years after SACO. With 
 
TOKYO 00002757  003 OF 011 
 
 
the rapid buildup of Chinese air power, it will be difficult to 
adopt the Kadena integration plan." 
 
It is said that after a month of discussions, the U.S. side is 
becoming convinced that "the Kadena option will be abandoned sooner 
or later because it is not feasible. The DPJ is no different from 
the Liberal Democratic Party after all." 
 
However, it appears that the U.S. side is still worried because "the 
DPJ's policymaking process is unclear. What is Hatoyama really 
thinking?" Another source knowledgeable about Japan-U.S. diplomacy 
is visibly impatient. He says: "There are growing expectations in 
Okinawa for (Futenma's) relocation out of the prefecture or out of 
Japan. We hope for an early solution." 
 
(3) MD Kitazawa indicates need to coordinate with SDP, PNP on 
Futenma relocation issue 
 
JIJI.COM (Full) 
13:26, December 2, 2009 
 
Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa gave a speech at the National 
Defense Academy in Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture, on the 
morning of Dec. 2. Discussing the relocation of the U.S. forces' 
Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa), he said: "While I 
hope that there will be a solution before the end of the year, the 
Hatoyama administration is a coalition government of three parties. 
I wonder if breaking up the coalition and triggering political 
confusion would be in Japan's interest," indicating that 
coordination with the Social Democratic Party and the People's New 
Party, which demand the relocation of Futenma out of Okinawa, is 
indispensable. 
 
Kitazawa also said: "I don't think the Japan-U.S. relationship will 
become extremely unstable even if a solution isn't reached by the 
end of the year." 
 
Regarding the schedule of the bilateral working group on the Futenma 
issue, Kitazawa said: "Working level discussions will take place on 
Dec. 4, and this can be upgraded to the ministerial level if 
necessary." 
 
(4) Futenma Air Field relocation: Statement by Governor Hashimoto 
overturns premise that relocation of Futenma functions out of the 
prefecture would be difficult 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
December 2, 2009 
 
(Commentary) 
 
Concerning the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma 
Air Station, Osaka Governor Toru Hashimoto said, "If we receive a 
proposal from the government, we in the Kansai region will do our 
utmost to come up with a plan." This statement by the governor has 
overturned the premise adopted by the past administrations, which 
cited the lack of other possible relocation sites outside the 
prefecture as one reason for regarding the relocation of the Futenma 
facilities outside the prefecture as difficult. 
 
In the process of the U.S. Forces Japan realignment talks, former 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi once said, "It is all right to 
 
TOKYO 00002757  004 OF 011 
 
 
consider relocating facilities outside the prefecture or the nation" 
(October, 2004) However, he withdrew this view less than a year 
later under the banner that local governments were reluctant to 
accept the Futenma functions. He said, "Many municipalities are in 
favor of my view as a general argument but against it when it comes 
to specifics. They all view the facilities as an unwelcome 
stranger." 
 
Among ministers of the present administration, those who are in 
favor of relocation within the prefecture cite the time needed to 
find an alternative site as a reason for that. Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada, for instance, said, "There is (no option for) 
relocating outside the prefecture, since the amount of time 
available is limited." 
 
The people of Okinawa are dissatisfied that there is no indication 
that the government has sounded out or held talks with 
municipalities outside Okinawa Prefecture about whether they would 
accept the Futenma facilities in order to reduce the burden of 
Okinawa. Hashimoto made the above statement in response to a 
question asked by reporters. He said, "The government has never 
consulted me on the matter." 
 
It is not clear whether he made the statement with the acceptance of 
a helicopter unit in mind or he was referring to the transfer of 
F-15 fighter drills from Kadena Air Base following the integration 
(of the Futenma facilities) into it. It remains to be seen whether 
the Hashimoto statement will directly lead to the relocation of the 
Futenma functions outside the prefecture. 
 
However, concerning the excessive concentration of U.S. military 
bases in Okinawa, Hashimoto said, "The people must be aware of the 
situation and some municipality must accept (the Futenma 
functions)." 
 
(5) Coalition partners SDP, PNP "headache" for PM Hatoyama in 
Futenma relocation issue; efforts being made to prevent 
disintegration of coalition 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
December 2, 2009 
 
Koki Miura 
 
How to handle the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People's New 
Party (PNP) is now a headache for Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in 
dealing with the issue of the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma 
Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa). The foreign and defense 
ministries are working for a solution based on the current plan to 
relocate the Futenma base to the coastal area of Camp Schwab in Nago 
City before the end of 2009, but the SDP is poised to oppose 
relocation within Okinawa, hinting at the possibility of breaking 
away from the coalition. The Prime Minister, who is focused on the 
U.S. and Okinawa in responding to this issue, finds himself in 
distress in his own "home ground." 
 
Hatoyama met with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense 
Minister Toshimi Kitazawa at the Prime Minister's Official Residence 
on Dec. 1 to discuss the Futenma issue. They agreed that the 
coalition's disintegration should be avoided at all costs. In late 
afternoon Hatoyama spoke to reporters. "We are also considering how 
the other parties are thinking," emphasizing that consideration is 
 
TOKYO 00002757  005 OF 011 
 
 
being given to the SDP and the PNP. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano also stated at a news 
conference that "the three parties coming to an agreement is an 
absolutely necessary process," indicating that a decision will be 
made based on an agreement among three parties. 
 
In connection with the Futenma issue, SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima 
demanded at the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies on Nov. 30 
the creation of a working group for three-party consultations. "All 
options should be looked into," she angrily said during a press 
conference on Dec. 1. "Simply accepting the previous 
administration's agreement is unacceptable." 
 
The SDP's goal is to prolong the debate in an attempt to block 
Futenma's relocation within Okinawa. For Fukushima, this issue is 
also significant because official declaration of candidacy for the 
election of the SDP's leader is scheduled for Dec. 4. She is seeking 
a fourth term. Fukushima had just been criticized at a meeting of 
SDP members of both houses of the Diet on Nov. 27 for being "soft" 
on the Futenma issue. A senior party official warns that "if the 
party compromises here, this will directly lead to bolting from the 
coalition and even affect the very survival of the party." 
 
The PNP, which includes senior party officials elected from Okinawa, 
is falling in step with the SDP. PNP leader Shizuka Kamei made 
remarks in support of the SDP at the Ministerial Committee meeting 
on Nov. 30. He said: "If a decision is not made by the three parties 
together, the SDP will break away. The government should impress 
upon the U.S. that the matter can't be settled by it and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone." 
 
Meanwhile, Okada and Kitazawa are taking steps to prepare for making 
a decision based on the current relocation plan before the end of 
the year. The Japan-U.S. cabinet level working group is expected to 
hold its second meeting this week at the earliest. Okada will make 
another visit to Okinawa on Dec. 4 and 5 to hear the Okinawan 
people's opinions. There is speculation in the ruling parties that 
the government may make a decision as soon as Dec. 7 after Okada's 
visit to Okinawa. 
 
"In that case," Ministry of Defense officials say, "coordination 
among the parties will be important. Someone who can play this role 
should step forward." They are beginning to voice hopes that 
Democratic Party of Japan Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa will do 
so. 
 
(6) Testimony acknowledging existence of secret Okinawa accord to 
give pressure for uncovering secret nuclear accord as well: Likely 
to affect discussion on review of diplomatic documents disclosure 
system 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
December 2, 2009 
 
Bunroku Yoshino, a former director general of the North American 
Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), has 
 
formally acknowledged the existence of a secret accord concerning 
the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. This will likely affect the 
investigation into Japan-U.S. secret accords on nuclear introduction 
into Japan and the way diplomatic documents are disclosed. 
 
TOKYO 00002757  006 OF 011 
 
 
 
The secret Okinawa accord, the target of the lawsuit this time, is 
one of the four secret accords the subject of a probe by the 
blue-ribbon panel (chaired by Tokyo University Professor Shinichi 
Kitaoka), established by Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada. The 
existence of another secret accord, which stipulates that the U.S. 
military can bring nuclear weapons into Japan in the event of 
emergency after the reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons, 
has also been pointed out. 
 
Yoshino's testimony is a powerful document for the investigation 
into the secret accord. It will help pressure the government to 
investigate further. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on Dec. 1 told 
reporters: "It is a precious testimony. The government is now 
confirming the facts. As soon as the matter is confirmed, I would 
like to let the people know about it." 
 
Some have pointed out that Yoshino's testimony could affect the 
ongoing discussion on the U.S. Forces Japan realignment plan. The 
Liberal Democratic Party-New Komeito administration decided to 
shoulder the cost of the transfer of about 8,000 U.S. Marines 
stationed in Okinawa. However, voices skeptical about the need for 
Japan to shoulder such a cost are deep rooted. Of the transfer cost 
totaling 10.27 billion dollars, Japan will disburse 6.09 billion 
dollars, including loans. However, the size of the actual transfer 
and details of the building of facilities in Guam are unclear. 
 
The testimony will also likely accelerate discussions for reviewing 
Japan's diplomatic documents disclosure system. The expert committee 
intends to propose improving the application of the system. 
 
Like the U.S, the Japanese government, in principle, discloses 
diplomatic documents that have been in custody more than 30 years. 
However, the propriety of doing so is relegated to MOFA to determine 
on its own. Relevant bureaus, such as the North American Affairs 
Bureau, determine whether to disclose such documents or not. There 
is strong criticism that MOFA has desired to conceal those 
documents. There is also a pattern of MOFA bureaucrats' keeping 
secret accords in an unbroken line, as there had been no change in 
the government for a long period of time, and controlling diplomacy 
toward the U.S. 
 
In the U.S., there is a bureau exclusively responsible for 
disclosing administrative documents. It adopts a mechanism of 
screening concerned documents from a third-party's standpoint. 
Procedures are speedier than in Japan. Documents control books are 
also consolidated. 
 
(7) Editorial: Truth revealed on history of secret accord 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
December 2, 2009 
 
A former Foreign Ministry bureau chief testified in court yesterday 
that he signed documents on a secret agreement on the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japanese administration. The meaning behind his testimony 
is deeply significance. The national government, which has denied 
the existence of the secret accord, will likely be forced to change 
its official stance. The Japanese public is not convinced that the 
historical truth should remain hidden. 
 
Bunroku Yoshino, the former Foreign Ministry bureau chief in 
 
TOKYO 00002757  007 OF 011 
 
 
question, admitted in the Tokyo District Court to the existence of 
the Okinawa secret accord, saying, "The words in the official 
Okinawa reversion accord and the facts are different." With regard 
to the documents declassified by the U.S. side, which disclosed the 
existence of the Okinawa secret deal, he said, "I signed the 
documents at my director general's office." 
 
The documents stipulated Japan's payment of 4 million dollars in 
costs for restoring returned military base land to its original 
state, which the United States was actually supposed to bear. 
 
Yoshino took the witness stand in a lawsuit filed by former Mainichi 
Shimbun reporter Takichi Nishiyama and other plaintiffs asking the 
government to disclose secret documents. All the more because the 
national government has consistently said that there is no secret 
accord, the testimony at a public occasion by the person who signed 
the documents is significant. It is inevitable that the government's 
accountability for the secret documents will be harshly questioned. 
 
Yoshino's testimony might also be a clue to exposing a secret. This 
is because there are apparently still some hidden secrets regarding 
the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration. For example, it 
has been said that although the Japanese side concluded an agreement 
that it would shoulder 320 million dollars for the reversion of 
Okinawan to Japan, the total amount Japan paid to the United States 
was far higher than that amount. 
 
Of the expenditures in the secret accord, 65 million dollars is said 
to be the origin of the Japan's current host nation support (or the 
so-called sympathy budget) for the U.S. forces in Japan. Therefore, 
the secret document issue is a problem linking to the present day. 
However, these facts have been disclosed by the U.S. side's 
diplomatic documents. Because the Japanese government has continued 
to conceal such facts, the Japanese people have not known anything 
about them. 
 
In the Foreign Ministry, a committee of experts has started 
examining a nuclear secret agreement. However, the Finance Ministry 
has not yet revealed its documents on the Okinawa secret. If the 
documents are disclosed, our national interests will no longer be 
damaged. We want the central government to shed light on the whole 
picture of the secret pact by quickly examining and disclosing the 
documents. 
 
At the time when Okinawa was returned to Japanese administration, 
Nishiyama was arrested for and convicted of obtaining a secret 
official telegram by tempting a Foreign Ministry employee. In the 
Tokyo District Court 37 years ago, Yoshino offered a false testimony 
that there was no secret agreement. In the court yesterday, Yoshino 
approached Nishiyama and they shook hands. This scene reveals how 
relieved Yoshino felt at disclosing the truth for the sake of future 
generations. 
 
How did the government of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato carry out 
negotiations with Washington on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan? 
As the people involved in the negotiations gradually begin to leave 
us behind, future generations will be unable to make judgments 
unless important records in Japan's postwar history are disclosed. 
The new administration is faced with the challenge of disclosing the 
truth behind the Okinawa secret accord, which was concluded under 
the Liberal Democratic Party governments. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002757  008 OF 011 
 
 
(8) Editorial: Former Foreign Ministry bureau chiefs' testimony must 
be utilized to restore trust in diplomacy 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
December 2, 2009 
 
Bunroku Yoshino, a former Foreign Ministry American Bureau chief who 
had held talks with the United States on the 1972 reversion of 
Okinawa, admitted for the first time in court yesterday the 
existence of a secret deal with the United States. The testimony by 
the former high-ranking government official, who served as a top 
negotiator, carries great significance. The Hatoyama cabinet must 
utilize this valuable testimony to restore trust in Japanese 
diplomacy. 
 
Yoshino made the statement in a lawsuit filed by a group of 
individuals, including former Mainichi Shimbun reporter Takichi 
Nishiyama, who are demanding the government disclose documents 
pertaining to the alleged secret pact. The plaintiffs are calling 
for the disclosure of documents specifying that Japan was to 
shoulder the costs of restoring land in Okinawa, which was supposed 
to be paid by the United States, and of moving the relay station of 
Voice of America (VOA), U.S. shortwave overseas radio broadcast, out 
of Japan. 
 
Taking the witness stand on behalf of the plaintiffs, Yoshino 
admitted that he had signed in the Foreign Ministry 
director-general's office a document (written in English) promising 
that Japan would shoulder 4 million dollars (1.2 billion yen at the 
exchange rate during that time) to restore land in Okinawa to its 
original state, adding that then Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi was 
also aware of it. "I think the memorandum in English was 
appropriately preserved and discarded later because it was 
unnecessary (for the Japanese side)," Yoshino said. He further 
admitted that he had also signed a document pertaining to Japan's 
payment (16 million dollars) for the relocation of the VOA relay 
station. 
 
The state has repeatedly insisted that those documents were not 
final agreements, but the current government has yet to clarify 
where it stands on the matter -- possibly in view of the 
verification of the secret agreements by the Foreign Ministry's 
experts' panel. 
 
In any case, the government should have changed its stance much 
earlier. Many documents proving the existence of the Japan-U.S. 
secret agreement on the revision of Okinawa have been found in the 
United States since 1998. In interviews given in February 2006 to 
the Mainichi Shimbun and other media outlets, Yoshino admitted the 
existence of the secret deal for the first time as a former top 
Japanese negotiator. 
 
Despite that, the former administration led by the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) consistently denied the existence of the 
secret pact. Above all, this pact is connected with talks on 
payments associated with the reversion of Okinawa. The weak 
reasoning behind the calculation is also being called into question. 
The deal can be described as a dual betrayal of the people. 
 
Under the Civil Proceedings Law, even an ex-civil servant cannot 
take the witness stand without the approval of the agency where 
he/she used to work. If the LDP was still in power, Yoshino would 
 
TOKYO 00002757  009 OF 011 
 
 
not have been able to testify in court. (Yoshino's testimony) is one 
positive effect of the change of administration. 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said on Yoshino's testimony: "It is 
one valuable testimony. After the facts are verified, the government 
wants to let the people know about them." We want to see the 
government totally uncover the facts about the secret deal based on 
this testimony. 
 
"Attempts to distort history are disadvantageous to the people," 
Yoshino said in a press conference. "The United States has disclosed 
official documents. I think this practice will be beneficial." The 
current system in which the Foreign Ministry can arbitrarily decide 
on whether or not to disclose diplomatic documents is also in need 
of drastic review. 
 
(9) "Protocol" fading, ahead of international conference on global 
warming (Part 1) 
 
MAINICHI (Page 1) (Excerpts) 
December 2, 2009 
 
U.S., China struggling for leadership in setting target for 
greenhouse gas emissions cuts; Japan may be left behind 
 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP15) will open in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, on Dec. 7. Attention is being focused on 
whether a significant political agreement will be reached in 
preparation for introducing a new international framework to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions beyond the timeframe set in the Kyoto 
Protocol. Under such a situation, a battle for leadership is 
intensifying as the U.S. and China announced in succession their 
targets to curb greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Early in the morning of Nov. 27 - the day after the U.S. and China 
announced their commitments, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada urgently 
called cabinet ministers in the Diet Building. Environment Minister 
Sakihito Ozawa proudly said: "Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's speech 
at the UN general assembly prompted the U.S. and China to come up 
with commitments and enabled Japan to take the leadership." 
Participants also decided to consider later what approach Japan 
should take in the international conference. As it stands, there was 
no sense of urgency detected in the meeting. 
 
The U.S. announced its target of reducing emissions by 17 PERCENT 
from 2005 levels by 2020, but if this figure is calculated on the 
basis of 1990 levels, it is less than 4 PERCENT . China's target 
could lead to remarkably increasing its gas emissions. Even so, the 
international community has welcomed the policy switch of these two 
largest gas emitters, which had refused to present any numerical 
targets. For this policy change, the U.S. and China reportedly made 
arrangements in a package agreement on a tie-up in the energy area 
reached in their summit meeting in Beijing in November. An 
international negotiation source said: "The U.S. and China also 
prearranged their reduction targets in the meeting." 
 
In the UN assembly in September, Hatoyama announced Japan's 
ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 25 PERCENT 
compared with 1990 levels as an international pledge. The prime 
minister appeared to have led the international community at that 
time. But Japan has been toyed with by prearrangements by the U.S. 
and China. 
 
TOKYO 00002757  010 OF 011 
 
 
 
"The world's emissions should be halved by 2050." This passage was 
dropped from the joint declaration issued in winding up the summit 
meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 
despite the Japanese government's call. This passage had been 
inserted in the draft declaration. One negotiator explained: "China 
voiced opposition to the last." That nation also succeeded in having 
its requests, including the transfer of technology to emerging 
countries, included in the declaration. The U.S. has also decided to 
dispatch seven minister-level officials to the COP15. A Japanese 
negotiator grumbled: "The U.S. will hijack the COP." 
 
"There is no negotiating card left for Japan," said Akihiro Sawa, 
senior executive fellow of the 21st Century Public Policy Institute. 
Other countries have secured a free hand to be able to change their 
numerical targets depending on circumstances, but he says, "Japan, 
which has announced a fixed ambitious figure, cannot take a flexible 
stance (only with 25 PERCENT ) in negotiations." 
 
An aide to Hatoyama said in a low voice on Nov. 26: "The prime 
minister has just begun to study the issue." Japan once led the 
world, but a government source is concerned that "if Japan cannot 
obtain information, it might be left out." There is even this 
indication that because information has not been provided to Japan, 
a sense of urgency was not detected in the emergency meeting on Nov. 
27." 
 
Projects to promote emissions trading also subject to review; road 
map for 25 PERCENT  target yet to be prepared 
 
In the budget-screening session on Nov. 25, the Government 
Revitalization Unit, chaired by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, 
decided to put off or scrap budgetary allocations for seven projects 
to promote measures to contain global warming, including one to 
disseminate the emissions trading system across the nation. In the 
screening session on the 26th, a senior Environment Ministry 
official vented to a senior Finance Ministry official who was 
sitting next to him: "If these projects are scrapped, it will be 
impossible for Japan to achieve the 25 PERCENT  target." 
 
The panel also decided to put off the budgetary allocation for 
developing smart grid technology - the next-generation power 
transmission network -- proposed by the Environment Ministry. This 
is a core technology in fighting global warming and was included in 
the action program on clean energy technology cooperation, which was 
agreed on in the latest Japan-U.S. summit held about two weeks ago. 
 
The Hatoyama administration has pledged to take every possible 
measure to achieve the 25 PERCENT -reduction goal, but a senior 
Environment Ministry official grumbled: "His words and deeds are 
inconsistent." 
 
Japan Iron and Steel Federation Chairman Shoji Muneoka told Economy, 
Trade and Industry Minister Masayuki Naoshima in their meeting on 
Nov. 25: "I ask you not to agree on a mechanism that excludes the 
U.S. and China." Cooperation from the steel industry, which has 
generated the largest volume of greenhouse gases, is absolutely 
necessary, but the chairman has complained that the Hatoyama 
administration's public pledge "will undermine the nation's 
competitiveness in the international market," and "The federation is 
against the target." 
 
 
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As its guidelines for gas emission cuts from 1990 levels, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) suggested 10 PERCENT  for Japan, 3 
PERCENT  for the U.S., and 23 PERCENT  for Europe. A senior IEA 
member commented: "Japan's 25 PERCENT  is too high." 
 
A UN executive praised Japan's 25 PERCENT  reduction target, saying: 
"We will push negotiations forward," but a road map for this target 
is still nowhere in sight. 
 
ROOS