Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09TOKYO2748, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/01/09

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TOKYO2748.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO2748 2009-12-01 22:57 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4572
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2748/01 3352257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 012257Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7865
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0007
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 7656
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 1467
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 4819
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 8164
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2061
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8729
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8185
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 18 TOKYO 002748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/01/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) U.S. Ambassador Roos tells Okinawa governor Japan-U.S. Futenma 
relocation accord is only viable option (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(2) Government moving toward settling Futenma relocation issue 
before year's end; plan centers on shifting the replacement facility 
farther offshore than in existing plan (Sankei) 
 
(3) Futenma relocation issue: There is now an urgent need to reach a 
decision with an eye on year-end budget compilation (Sankei) 
 
(4) Obstacles to resolving Futenma issue by year's end; difficult 
coordination likely to continue (Nikkei) 
 
(5) Futenma Air Station relocation: Foreign minister to give up on 
Kadena integration idea, leaning toward Henoko plan (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
 
(6) Focus of investigation by expert committee on why secret accords 
were concluded (Asahi) 
 
(7) Editorial: Put end to lie to people over Japan-U.S. secret 
nuclear accords (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(8) Interview with Columbia University Professor Gerald Curtis on 
assessment of Hatoyama administration's performance (Nikkei) 
 
(9) Editorial: COP15 - U.S., China set own targets for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions; seeds of progress should be carefully 
nurtured (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(10) Editorial: CO2 reduction goals set by U.S., China insufficient 
(Nikkei) 
 
(11) Media polls show majority favors Futenma relocation outside 
Okinawa (Okinawa Times) 
 
(12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Nikkei) 
 
(13) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(14) Japanese woman in Gifu to appeal to Diet members over her son 
taken away by Czech father (Chunichi Shimbun) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) U.S. Ambassador Roos tells Okinawa governor Japan-U.S. Futenma 
relocation accord is only viable option 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 1) (Full) 
December 1, 2009 
 
Gov. Kazuhiro Nakaima met yesterday afternoon with U.S. Ambassador 
John Roos, visiting Okinawa Prefecture for the first time, at the 
prefectural government office. In connection with the issue of 
relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station, Roos told 
Nakaima: "The United States believes that the alternate facility for 
Futenma Air Station (agreed between Japan and the U.S.) is the best 
and only viable option," stressing that the Futenma base should be 
moved to the Henoko district in Nago City. Nakaima asked when the 
Japan-U.S. ministerial-level task force would reach a conclusion, 
but Roos said, "A conclusion has not yet been reached. I hope a 
 
TOKYO 00002748  002 OF 018 
 
 
conclusion will be arrived at as soon as possible, and doing so is 
important." 
 
Mentioning his meeting with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on the 
morning of Nov. 30, Nakaima said: "I told the Prime Minister that 
residents of Okinawa have been stepping up calls for relocating the 
Futenma facility outside the prefecture." Roos only said: "The 
ministerial task force is working to resolve the issue." 
 
With regard to the hit-and-run incident that occurred in the village 
of Yomitan and the stray bullet incident in the Ige district of the 
town of Kin, Nakaima asked for U.S. cooperation in investigations by 
the prefectural police. Roos said: "The hit-and-run incident 
resulted in a tragic death, and I offer my condolences to the 
victim's family. I will do what I can to help resolve these two 
cases." 
 
Roos described to Nakaima his 25-year-career in Silicon Valley, 
California. "I want to strengthen business ties between the United 
States and Okinawa. I especially want to collaborate in clean 
technology," he said, demonstrating enthusiasm. 
 
Yesterday Roos visited the Peace Memorial Museum and the Cornerstone 
of Peace memorial in Mabuni, Itoman City. 
 
(2) Government moving toward settling Futenma relocation issue 
before year's end; plan centers on shifting the replacement facility 
farther offshore than in existing plan 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
December 1, 2009 
 
The government has begun taking steps toward settling the U.S. 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan, Okinawa) by the end 
of the year. Before the press corps yesterday, Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama emphasized the need to settle the matter at an early date. 
The existing relocation plan is designed to build a V-shaped pair of 
runways on the coastal area of Camp Schwab (in Henoko, Nago). The 
government is now in the final phase of coordination for resolving 
the issue before year's end by building the replacement facility 
farther offshore than the planned site in order to reduce its 
danger. 
 
A Japan-U.S. cabinet-level working group involving their foreign and 
defense ministers is looking into the Futenma relocation issue. 
Given the working group's plan to reach a conclusion in 
mid-December, the government intends to convey its policy to the 
Okinawa side before the end of this month. 
 
A plan is also being floated to effectively close down Futenma Air 
Station by moving the Futenma-based helicopter unit's training area 
out of the prefecture as a measure for the people in Okinawa. 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama held talks with Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu 
Nakaima at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) 
yesterday. "There are growing demands for moving (Futenma) out of 
the prefecture or even out of the country," Nakaima said in 
explaining the sentiments of the people in Okinawa. The governor 
also urged the government to swiftly remove the danger of Futenma 
Air Station and to actively promote plans for reuse of vacated U.S. 
bases. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002748  003 OF 018 
 
 
During his talks with Nakaima, the Prime Minister simply said: "I 
want to deal with the matter after seeing the results of 
verification by the Japan-U.S. working group." But later in the day 
after the talks, the Prime Minister outlined before the press corps 
at the Kantei a plan aiming at an early solution, with a settlement 
before year's end in mind. He said: "Governor Nakaima called for a 
swift and concrete conclusion in view of the danger (of Futenma Air 
Station). I want to arrive at a conclusion to reduce the burden on 
Okinawa while maintaining close contact with the governor who has 
made a difficult decision (to accept the Henoko relocation plan)." 
 
According to some government sources, the government is studying a 
plan to move the replacement runways 55 to 100 meters farther 
offshore than in the existing plan with the aim of increasing the 
safety of the areas under the helicopter flight paths. Specifically, 
the government is considering reducing noise and the chances for 
accidents near Futenma Air Station by having the Futenma helicopter 
unit conduct training outside Okinawa, such as in Kyushu, until the 
replacement facility is completed in 2014. 
 
The governments of Japan and the United States agreed in 2006 to 
build the replacement facility on the coastal area of Camp Schwab. 
Nakaima has expressed his intention to accept the construction of 
the replacement facility on the condition of moving the runways 
farther offshore than the existing plan in order to eliminate the 
danger. If the Prime Minister officially presents a concrete plan to 
lessen the burden on Okinawa, Nakaima is expected to accept the 
relocation of Futenma functions to Nago. 
 
(3) Futenma relocation issue: There is now an urgent need to reach a 
decision with an eye on year-end budget compilation 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
December 1, 2009 
 
The government has decided to seek a settlement of the Futenma Air 
Station relocation issue before the end of the year. The compilation 
of the fiscal 2010 budget is close at hand later in the month. In 
addition, the government appears to have determined that if it puts 
off decision making, the U.S. Force Japan realignment plan itself 
could derail. However, with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
the People's New Party (PNP) increasingly calling for putting off 
the decision, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama will likely be pressed 
to undergo difficult coordination of views. 
 
Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima during a meeting with the prime 
minister conveyed a growing feeling of hope for the relocation out 
of the prefecture or the nation held by the people of Okinawa. He 
then called on the prime minister to reach a decision at an early 
date, noting, "I would like the government to come up with its 
policy and specific roadmap swiftly." 
 
Among government officials, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and 
Defense Minister Toshimi Okada are frequently holding talks in 
pursuit of a settlement before the end of the year. Okada, who met 
with the U.S. Forces Pacific Command commander on Nov. 30, told him 
of his strong desire to settle the issue before the end of the year. 
He said, "I would like to settle the issue before year's end, if 
possible." He is expected to make a second visit to Okinawa on the 
5th. During the visit, he will strengthen efforts to persuade local 
residents to agree on the relocation plan. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002748  004 OF 018 
 
 
Appearing on a commercial TV talk show, Defense Ministry 
Parliamentary Defense Secretary Akihisa Nagashima on the 30th said, 
"Saying one thing, doing another.  Realistically, relocation out of 
the prefecture or the nation is difficult. This notion is widely 
shared in the administration." 
 
The government will rush to settle the relocation issue before the 
end of the year in order to adopt the fiscal 2010 budget in late 
December. Unless the government earmarks necessary expenses for the 
relocation of the Futenma functions, it would become impossible to 
complete the relocation by 2014 as scheduled. There is only a slim 
chance of the U.S. approving a plan other than the Futenma plan. 
Depending on Japan's decision, the U.S. Forces realignment plan, 
including the transfer of about 8,000 U.S. Marines stationed in 
Okinawa to Guam, following the relocation of the Futenma facilities, 
would be put in limbo. Should that occur, the removal of the danger 
posed by Futenma Air Station - the major purpose of the Futenma 
relocation - would become unachievable. 
 
However, the views of the SDP, which is calling for the relocation 
out of the prefecture or the nation, and the PNP, which is calling 
for cautious consideration, cannot be ignored. SDP leader Mizuho 
Fukushima on the 30th at a meeting of the ministerial basic policy 
committee attended by the leaders of the ruling parties insisted, 
"We cannot possibly support the plans proposed up until now (the 
existing plan, the Kadena integration plan, etc.)." PNP leader 
Shizuka Kamei chimed in with Fukushima, noting, "There is a 
possibility of the SDP bolting from the coalition, unless a decision 
is reached by the three parties."As such, the DPJ agreed to undergo 
coordination of views of the ruling parties at the venue of the 
committee. 
 
The prime minister at the Upper House plenary session emphasized he 
"will make a final decision, including a decision on the timeframe." 
However, how he is going to allay opposition from within the ruling 
parties and realize the expectations of the people of Okinawa is 
unclear. A senior government official on the 30th said: "We must 
solve the complicated issue involving feelings of the people of 
Okinawa, the Japan-U.S. agreement and the agreement reached by the 
three parties. We must be cautious at any rate." 
 
(4) Obstacles to resolving Futenma issue by year's end; difficult 
coordination likely to continue 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
December 1, 2009 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama met with Okinawa Governor Hirokazu 
Nakaima yesterday to discuss the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine 
Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture, 
following their meeting on Nov. 27. Hatoyama also met with concerned 
cabinet ministers yesterday to discuss the Futenma issue. As it 
stands, coordination work has been actively carried out in the 
government, but there are a number of obstacles to resolving the 
issue by the end of the year, as proposed by the U.S. 
 
Speaking before reporters at the Prime Minister's Official Residence 
last evening, Hatoyama emphasized: "When considering the danger of 
the Futenma airfield, I think a conclusion should be reached as soon 
as possible." The Hatoyama-Nakaima meeting on the 27th lasted for 
about one hour, but their meeting yesterday lasted only for about 20 
minutes. It makes sense to assume that they had substantive 
 
TOKYO 00002748  005 OF 018 
 
 
discussions in the meeting on the 27th, but Hatoyama has only said: 
"I cannot disclose what we discussed." 
 
In a meeting of Japanese and U.S. bureau chiefs on Nov. 24, the 
Japanese side insisted on the need to remove the danger of the 
Futenma base, but coordination work has not progressed smoothly. 
Hatoyama reportedly heard about the current situation in Okinawa 
from Nakaima and explained the U.S. measures to remove the danger of 
the base. 
 
In an effort to break the impasse in the Futenma issue, the U.S. has 
also begun to approach Okinawa. U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos 
visited Okinawa and met Governor Nakaima at the prefectural office 
yesterday. Roos said: "The U.S. believes the current plan is the 
best and only viable option.... The U.S. is working hard to solve 
various problems." 
 
The Foreign Ministry and other relevant government agencies are 
becoming nervous about recent moves by Japan Research Institute 
Chairman Jitsuro Terashima, who is said to be on friendly terms with 
Hatoyama. Terashima, who met with Hatoyama on the night of Nov. 26 
for about 40 minutes, left for the U.S. on the 29th. Terashima has 
said: "The visit has nothing to do with the Futenma issue," but some 
government officials speculate that he might be visiting the U.S. as 
an envoy of the prime minister." Some Foreign Ministry officials are 
worried about "dual-track diplomacy." 
 
In addition, coordinating views among the ruling parties will be 
inevitably difficult. Social Democratic Party (SDP) President Mizuho 
Fukushima clearly said in a meeting of the Ministerial Committee on 
Basic Policies yesterday: "If a conclusion is reached on the 
(current) plan to relocate the Futenma base to the waters off 
Henoko, the SDP will oppose it." She also proposed setting up a 
working group on the Futenma issue of the three ruling parties under 
the said ministerial committee. 
 
After the meeting, Fukushima told reporters: "No discussions have 
been conducted on such options as moving the Futenma base outside 
the prefecture or the nation." She voiced her opposition to the 
proposal of reaching a settlement by the end of the year. Some party 
member takes the view that Fukushima, in the run-up to the party 
presidential election, might have no choice but to loudly assert 
what the party desires. People's New Party President Shizuka Kamei 
has also called for a settlement based on an agreement among the 
three ruling parties. Coordination among the three ruling parties 
will probably be difficult. 
 
(5) Futenma Air Station relocation: Foreign minister to give up on 
Kadena integration idea, leaning toward Henoko plan 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 1) (Full) 
December 1, 2009 
 
(Tokyo) 
 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada will likely give up on the idea of 
integrating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station into U.S. 
Force's Kadena Air Base. This was revealed by a government source 
and multiple ruling party members on Nov. 30. According to the 
government source, Okada has given up on the idea of integrating the 
Futenma facilities into Kadena Air Base, saying, "The Kadena idea 
has been defeated. I'm being pushed in the direction of the Henoko 
 
TOKYO 00002748  006 OF 018 
 
 
relocation plan." 
 
Okada until today has cited the advantage of the Kadena integration 
idea by saying: "It would be a major advantage if two major bases in 
Okinawa could be integrated into one. If the existing Henoko (in 
Nago City) plan is implemented, the two bases could become fixed." 
The U.S. side had proposed the Kadena plan in past talks. Based on 
this fact, Okada has been studying the feasibility of the Kadena 
integration plan, saying, "I would like to probe into (the Kadena 
plan) until I am convinced." The same government official said, "The 
foreign minister has been aware for a long time that the Kadena plan 
would be difficult. He has been reviewing the (Kadena integration 
idea) in order to give up on it." 
 
Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa on Nov. 30 discussed the 
Futenma relocation issue at the Prime Minister's Official Residence 
(the Kantei). They apparently talked about the timeframe for 
reaching a decision. 
 
The Japan-U.S. cabinet-level working group is expected to be held 
later in the week. Okada will visit Okinawa on Dec. 5. He hopes to 
hear a wide range of views of the people of Okinawa. He plans to 
hold meetings in Itoman City, where there are no U.S. military 
bases, as well as in Nago City to exchange views with residents 
there. 
 
(6) Focus of investigation by expert committee on why secret accords 
were concluded 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
November 27, 2009 
 
A committee consisting of experts will hold its first meeting on 
Nov. 27, following the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' launch of 
investigations into Japan-U.S. secret accords. The expert panel will 
cut to the core of the long-standing issue of whether there were 
secret accords between the two countries on such matters as the 
bringing of nuclear weapons into Japan. The panel will vet the 
documents discovered and focus on the process and circumstances 
where those accords were concluded. The panel is expected to submit 
a report of recommendations to Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada in 
mid-January next year. The report will affect the government's view 
on the secret accords and its three non-nuclear principles. 
 
Okada at a Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on the 25th 
stressed: "There is strong suspicion that (the secret accords) 
exist. I would like the panel to prove into under what historical 
backdrop the issue has come to light." 
 
The panel is made up of six members, including Tokyo University 
Professor Shinichi Kitaoka. One of the members views their role as 
double-checking MOFA's investigation. 
 
MOFA during the investigation found the Japanese government's 
documents bearing out the existence of a record of discussions held 
in 1960 between the two countries, in which they are believed to 
have reached a consensus. This record forms the basis of an arcane 
agreement on nuclear introduction into Japan. It is said that most 
of the secret accord-related documents specified by the 
investigative team are those compiled up until the 1970s. However, 
the committee will probe into documents compiled up until around 
ΒΆ1989. As a result, there is a possibility that (the Japanese side's) 
 
TOKYO 00002748  007 OF 018 
 
 
responses to former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Reischauer's 1981 
statement, which revealed the existence of the secret nuclear 
accords. 
 
Regarding the secret accords, some say that the Japanese negotiators 
were not aware that what they said during the meeting would be taken 
as allowing nuclear introduction into Japan. The expert committee 
will also look into the circumstances in which the Japanese side 
realized that (what the Japanese negotiators said during the talks) 
was taken as a secret accord. Another panel member said, "It is 
important to look into why Japan had to conclude the secret 
accords." The survey conducted by MOFA was unable to discover 
several documents that hold the key to that point. How the secret 
accords have been handled internally and to whom they have been 
passed on are also key points to be probed by the panel. Former 
senior MOFA officials have testified that around 2001 they ordered 
all documentations of the secret accords be scrapped. The panel will 
also check whether the documents were actually scrapped or not. 
Okada will attach importance to revealing the nuts and bolts of the 
mater, as he stated before the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on the 25th: "The objective of the investigation this time is to 
warn that continuing to insist that there are no secret accords will 
have an adverse impact on Japanese politics." 
 
However, confirming the secret nuclear accord would result in 
raising a fundamental question about Japan's three nuclear 
principles, which will have a major impact on the Japanese 
government's nuclear policy. 
 
The U.S. government has removed tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. 
naval vessels, so U.S. naval vessels carry no nuclear weapons 
onboard when calling at Japanese ports or passing through Japan's 
territorial waters. There is a possibility of nuclear arms once 
again being fitted to U.S. vessels in the event of emergency. Should 
that occur, the government would be urged to decide whether to 
accept such or not. 
 
There is a view that since the Social Democratic Party (SDP), one of 
the ruling coalition, advocates firmly upholding the three nuclear 
principles, it would be impossible for the Hatoyama administration 
to review the principles until the Upper House election next summer. 
U.S. Defense Secretary Gates warned when he visited Japan last 
month, "We would like Japan to be careful so that the matter will 
not have an adverse impact on extended deterrence and Japan-U.S. 
relations." Chances are that the issue could affect the Japan-U.S. 
alliance, depending on how the government will deal with it. 
 
(7) Editorial: Put end to lie to people over Japan-U.S. secret 
nuclear accords 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
November 28, 2009 
 
A panel of experts in the Foreign Ministry has started work to 
examine documents related to alleged secret accords between Japan 
and the U.S., including one on the introduction of nuclear weapons 
into the country. In the examination process, we expect the panel 
will put an end to the lie told to the people by successive 
governments and to restore public trust in the nation's foreign 
policy. 
 
The panel was established in response to Foreign Minister Katsuya 
 
TOKYO 00002748  008 OF 018 
 
 
Okada's strong desire. Six experts on the history of Japan-U.S. 
relations will closely examine the related documents found through 
the ministry's internal investigation and compile a report, 
including historical assessment, in January. 
 
The panel will look into four alleged secret accords: (1) a pact 
allowing U.S. military warships carrying nuclear weapons to make 
port calls in Japan; (2) a pact on combat action in times of 
emergency on the Korean Peninsula; (3) a pact regarding Japan's 
payment of fees for restoring the land the U.S. military has used to 
its original state; and (4) a pact allowing the U.S. military to 
reintroduce nuclear weapons into Japan in the event of a 
contingency. 
 
The secret deal regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
Japan was allegedly agreed to when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
was revised in 1960, although the treaty stipulates the need for 
Washington to hold prior consultations with Tokyo before its 
military aircraft or vessels carrying nuclear weapons make stopovers 
in Japanese territory. 
 
The presence of this secret pact has already been unveiled through 
the U.S. side's disclosure of related official documents and 
testimony by former Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata. But the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party continued to claim for years that 
such an agreement did not exist. 
 
If the government has hidden the truth about a matter that 
inevitably affects the foundation of the nation's security policy, 
it will never be able to obtain public trust in its foreign policy. 
 
Now that documents that support the presence of the secret pact have 
been discovered through the Foreign Ministry's internal 
investigation, Foreign Minister Okada is said to be going to admit 
the presence of the secret accord. This stance is welcomed as the 
first step for the government to regain public trust. 
 
If the government admits the presence of the secret pact, it will 
have to take the next step. If the government only lays the blame on 
the successive administrations, it will be irresponsible. 
 
Japan, the only nation to have suffered nuclear bombing, has put 
forth the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing 
and allowing nuclear weapons into the country as its national 
policy. 
 
Some persons suggest that the ministry's investigation into the 
alleged secret pacts should be used as an opportunity for Japan to 
decide to allow U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons to make 
stopovers in its territory, changing the three principles into "2.5 
principles." But the U.S. has removed tactical nuclear weapons from 
its warships and nuclear-powered submarines since the early 1990s. 
Given this, the U.S.'s nuclear umbrella" is functioning even under 
the three principles. 
 
In his speech in the latest UN general assembly, Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama said: "I renew my pledge to maintain the three 
non-nuclear principles." 
 
Japan has long called for nuclear abolition and has made efforts to 
bring about a nuclear-free world in cooperation with the 
administration of U.S. President Barack Obama since its 
 
TOKYO 00002748  009 OF 018 
 
 
inauguration. But if Japan changes its three non-nuclear principles, 
it may drop in status in the international community. 
 
What the Hatoyama administration should do after the documents 
related to the secret accords are examined is to reveal its stance 
of holding fast to the three principles and step up efforts for the 
challenge of abolishing nuclear weapons. 
 
(8) Interview with Columbia University Professor Gerald Curtis on 
assessment of Hatoyama administration's performance 
 
NIKKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
December 1, 2009 
 
Interviewer: Washington Bureau Chief Itaru Oishi 
 
Q: How do you assess the performance of the Hatoyama cabinet so 
far? 
 
Curtis: For an administration that is only two months old, it is 
doing quite well. I'll give it an A- or B+. 
 
Q: The administration seems to be bound hand and foot by its 
manifesto (campaign pledges). 
 
Curtis: A manifesto is only an indication of policy direction. If it 
has to be followed at all costs, then there will be no need for 
politics. If the economic situation is worse than previously 
expected after taking political power, politicians will change their 
policies, although they will be obliged to explain the reasons for 
the changes. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should be judged on his 
adaptability, leadership, decisiveness, and foresight. In some 
cases, he will need to have the courage not to stick to the 
manifesto. 
 
Purging bureaucratic control is revolutionary 
 
Q: Do you think (the Hatoyama administration's) efforts to move away 
from reliance on bureaucrats are successful? 
 
Curtis: The ruling party's reliance on bureaucrats is a tradition 
dating back to the Taisho era. (The Hatoyama administration) is 
trying to change this completely. Policymaking will be unified in 
the government. The Cabinet and not the bureaucrats will make the 
decisions. It is still premature to judge whether or not this will 
succeed, but the endeavor is revolutionary. 
 
Q: Is the administration not relying on the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF)? 
 
Curtis: The MOF very much welcomes spending cuts, but the Government 
Revitalization Unit is the one deciding which projects are to be 
eliminated. The budget formulation process is taking place with an 
unprecedented level of transparency. 
 
Q: Isn't the appointment of former Vice Finance Minister Jiro Saito 
as Japan Post president an indication of reliance on bureaucrats? 
 
Curtis: No matter how good Mr. Saito is, this will damage the image 
of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which has advocated the 
elimination of bureaucratic control. Although this was a decision 
made by the People's New Party's State Minister for Postal Reform 
 
TOKYO 00002748  010 OF 018 
 
 
Shizuka Kamei, Prime Minister Hatoyama should have said no. It is 
absurd for a minority party to wield that much power. 
 
Q: It is said that with DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa not 
joining the cabinet, there is a dual structure of power. 
 
Curtis: It is quite natural for Mr. Ozawa, who is good at managing 
elections and Diet affairs, to become the secretary general. While 
he has unrivalled power over party management, there is no evidence 
that he is interfering in government policymaking or manipulating 
the Prime Minister on such issues as spending cuts and the Futenma 
relocation issue. 
 
Q: Continuity is much more important in foreign policy than in 
domestic policy. 
 
Curtis: While continuity is important, in a democracy foreign policy 
may change with a change of administration. U.S. President Obama 
scrapped the plan to deploy missiles in Eastern Europe -- a plan 
decided by the previous administration. The question is whether 
policies serve the national interest. 
 
Q: Do you think the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air 
Station need not follow the existing plan? 
 
Curtis: Foreign policy cannot move forward on the basis of idealism 
alone. While I take issue with the U.S. Defense Department's 
high-handedness, the Hatoyama administration should look at reality 
and reach a conclusion at an early date if it has no prospect of 
finding a relocation site other than Nago City in Okinawa. The 
destabilization of the Japan-U.S. alliance is not in Japan's 
national interest. 
 
Come up with recommendations for an equal relationship 
 
Q: Don't you think Prime Minister Hatoyama lacks decisiveness? 
 
Curtis: President Obama is also being criticized for taking too much 
time to decide on the deployment of additional troops to 
Afghanistan. The problem is that the concerned ministers talk too 
much before a policy is made. In the case of foreign policy, it is 
not necessarily good to reveal all the details of the 
decision-making process. 
 
Prime Minister Hatoyama will probably make a decision before the end 
of 2009. The Nago mayoral election is taking place next year, so the 
situation will become even more complicated. However, next year 
marks the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. This 
will be a good opportunity to have a dialogue on how to develop the 
alliance in the future. The issues are not limited to the military 
alliance; there are also other issues, such as environmental 
destruction, climate change, prevention of epidemics, and 
terrorism. 
 
Q: The security treaty requires the U.S. to defend Japan, but Japan 
has no obligation to defend the U.S. 
 
Curtis: Prime Minister Hatoyama seeks a more equal Japan-U.S. 
relationship but the substance of his argument remains unclear. The 
Hatoyama administration should come up with concrete recommendations 
and proposals for greater equality. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002748  011 OF 018 
 
 
(9) Editorial: COP15 - U.S., China set own targets for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions; seeds of progress should be carefully 
nurtured 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
November 30, 2009 
 
Ahead of the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP15) starting on Dec. 7 in 
Copenhagen, the U.S. and China announced in succession their midterm 
targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. They are only seeds, 
but it is necessary to carefully nurture their growth. 
 
In COP15, the question of what targets should be set for curbing 
greenhouse gas emissions will take center stage. The U.S. has 
announced that in Copenhagen, President Barack Obama will announce 
the U.S. target of cutting carbon emissions by 17 PERCENT  from 2005 
levels by 2020. 
 
In the U.S., legislation that specified a 17 PERCENT  target passed 
the House in June, but deliberations are unlikely to take place 
before next spring on a bill presented by the Senate calling for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20 PERCENT . Under this 
situation, many observers had anticipated that it would be difficult 
for the U.S. to present any specific target at COP15. 
 
China has overtaken the U.S. and is now the world' largest emitter 
of global warming gases. Immediately after the U.S. announced its 
target, China also announced its goal of reducing emissions per unit 
of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40 to 45 PERCENT  compared with 
2005 levels by 2020. 
 
If calculated on the basis of 1990 levels, the U.S. offer is no more 
than just about 3 PERCENT , falling far short of the 25 PERCENT 
target of Japan and the European Union (EU). In the case of China, 
if its economy continues to grow, its greenhouse gas emissions may 
double as a result of GDP growth. Even so, in view of the U.S.'s 
refusal to undertake the obligations set in the Kyoto Protocol and 
China's stance of pushing for industrialized countries to take the 
lead in cutting greenhouse gas emissions, it is significant that 
these two countries, which have generated 40 PERCENT  of the world's 
emissions, set "their own obligations". 
 
In COP15, participants will aim at reaching a political agreement 
without trying to adopt new legal obligations for reducing gas 
emissions following the 2012 expiration of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
two countries' announcements of their "positive" commitments will 
surely contribute to moving the first environmental summit in 
history forward. 
 
To prevent global warming from causing major damage, scientists 
insist on the need to limit the rise in temperature from the level 
before the industrial revolution to within two degrees. To that end, 
it is necessary to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of the entire 
world by 25 PERCENT  to 40 PERCENT  from 1990 levels. The future of 
our earth hinges on more ambitious commitments by these two largest 
gas emitters. 
 
A game of tactics is usually played in international negotiations. 
In talks on global warming, however, all participants should discuss 
how to cooperate and avoid a common crisis, instead of engaging in a 
game. According to advice from scientists, all countries will have 
 
TOKYO 00002748  012 OF 018 
 
 
to attain the 25 PERCENT  goal offered by Japan sometime in the 
future. 
 
While upholding its goal, Japan should present specific mechanisms 
to provide financial aid and transfer technology to developing 
countries. By giving a supportive push to the two largest greenhouse 
gas emitters, which have finally begun to take action, Japan should 
pave the way for success at COP15 and for a new protocol to be 
adopted. 
 
(10) Editorial: CO2 reduction goals set by U.S., China insufficient 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
November 29, 2009 
 
The U.S. and China have moved forward in their efforts to curb 
global warming. They both have released goals to cut greenhouse-gas 
emissions to be proposed at the 15th session of the Conference of 
the Parties to the Climate Change (COP15) to be held in Copenhagen 
in December. 
 
The U.S. will cut emissions by 17 percent by 2020 in comparison with 
the 2005 level. China, which needs to emit carbon dioxide in order 
to achieve a GDP of a certain size, will curtail emissions by 40-45 
percent compared with the 2005 level by 2020. 
 
The U.S. and China are the two major carbon-dioxide emitters, 
accounting for 40 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions in the 
world. However, under the Kyoto Protocol, an international pledge 
aimed to prevent global warming, neither country is obligated to cut 
emissions. We would like to give high scores to proposals made by 
both countries as advancing efforts to create a new international 
system to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. However, we cannot say that 
their goals are sufficient. 
 
The U.S. goal is no more than a 3 percent cut, compared with the 
1990 level, which is smaller in comparison with Japan's mid-term 
goal of achieving a 25 percent cut from the 1990 level, and the 
European Union's goal of cutting emissions by between 20-30 percent 
from the same level. 
 
A 17 percent reduction by 2020 is merely the reduction factories and 
power stations can achieve without fail if a domestic emissions 
credit trading system is set up. In Japan, that would be equivalent 
to a reduction mainly in the industrial sector. The U.S. goal does 
not reflect the effects of improved automobile fuel efficiency or 
the conservation of forests. There is further room for the U.S. to 
reduce emissions. 
 
Deliberations in the U.S. Congress on legislation to combat 
greenhouse gas emissions, which will give a legal basis to the 17 
percent reduction goal, are facing rough going. The U.S. government 
is not empowered to refer to a figure higher than that mentioned in 
the legislation. U.S. President Obama will visit Copenhagen. 
However, he will not take part in any summit meetings. He is playing 
it safe, not wanting to stimulate Congress, even though he has 
demonstrated a desire to prevent global warming. 
 
According to the Chinese proposal, its total emissions will continue 
to increase as its economy grows. We give high scores to the fact 
that its goal largely exceeds the domestic target of improving 
energy efficiency (20 percent improvement from 2006 through 2010). 
 
TOKYO 00002748  013 OF 018 
 
 
However, there still is great room for improvement. A low-carbon 
economy should be desirable for China itself, which depends on 
imported crude oil. 
 
We would like to see the Chinese government aim to improve energy 
efficiency for the present time, while demonstrating a determination 
for a reduction in its total carbon emissions by 2020 and beyond. 
 
The Japanese government should not just accept the announcements 
made by the U.S. and China almost simultaneously as progress in the 
talks. We want the government to approach the talks with an eye on 
the national interest amid the two major emitters showing signs of 
trying to exercise leadership. 
 
(11) Media polls show majority favors Futenma relocation outside 
Okinawa 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 1) (Abridged) 
November 29, 2009 
 
A majority of the nation also wants the U.S. military's Futenma base 
moved out of Okinawa Prefecture. In all public opinion surveys 
conducted by four major dailies and NHK this November, those calling 
for the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to be relocated 
outside Okinawa Prefecture or Japan and those seeking to review and 
modify the current plan agreed on between Japan and the United 
States to relocate Futenma airfield to the Henoko area of Nago City 
outnumbered those insisting on relocating Futenma airfield as 
planned. There is even a survey with more than half of its 
respondents calling for a review of the bilateral agreement. 
 
In the polling of people in Okinawa Prefecture by two Okinawa-based 
dailies, the Okinawa Times and the Ryukyu Shimpo, the proportion of 
those calling for the Futenma base to be moved out of Okinawa 
Prefecture or Japan ranged between 63 PERCENT  and 69 PERCENT . All 
these polls, conducted not only by the local dailies in Okinawa 
Prefecture but also by the nation's major dailies, show a strong 
sense of resistance to the planned relocation of Futenma airfield 
within Okinawa Prefecture. 
 
The four major dailies are the Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, and Sankei 
Shimbun newspapers. The four papers carried findings from their 
respective nationwide public opinion surveys in their morning 
editions dated between Nov. 10 and Nov. 24. NHI aired its survey 
results on Nov. 9. 
 
Asahi (Nov. 17) 
 
Q: Japan, before its change of government, reached an 
intergovernmental agreement with the U.S. to relocate Futenma 
airfield to Okinawa Prefecture's Nago City. Do you think it would be 
better to honor this agreement, or do you think it would be better 
to review the agreement and renegotiate with the U.S.? 
 
Honor the agreement 28 PERCENT 
Review it and renegotiate with the U.S. 54 PERCENT 
 
Mainichi (Nov. 24) 
 
Q: What do you think Prime Minister Hatoyama should do? 
 
Negotiate with the U.S. to move Futenma airfield out of Okinawa 
 
TOKYO 00002748  014 OF 018 
 
 
Prefecture or Japan 50 PERCENT 
Look for another relocation site in Okinawa Prefecture 17 PERCENT 
Accept the current plan to relocate Futenma airfield to Henoko 22 
PERCENT 
 
Sankei (Nov. 24) 
 
Q: Do you think Futenma airfield should be relocated outside Okinawa 
Prefecture? 
 
Yes 46.2 PERCENT 
No 36.1 PERCENT 
Don't know, etc. 17.7 PERCENT 
 
Yomiuri (Nov. 10) 
 
Q: What do you think about the pending issue of relocating Futenma 
airfield? 
 
It would be better to relocate the airfield in line with the 
agreement reached between the Japanese and U.S. governments 31 
PERCENT 
It would be better to slightly modify the relocation plan 32 PERCENT 
 
It would be better to overhaul the relocation plan 19 PERCENT 
No answer 17 PERCENT 
 
NHK (Nov. 9) 
 
Q: What do you think Prime Minister Hatoyama should do about the 
Japan-U.S. agreement to relocate Futenma airfield to Nago City? 
 
He should push for the Japan-U.S. agreement 23 PERCENT 
He should review the Japan-U.S. agreement 35 PERCENT 
Can't say which 34 PERCENT 
 
(12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
November 30, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures are percentages. Parentheses denote results from the last 
survey conducted in October.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? 
 
Yes 68 (73) 
No 24 (21) 
Can't say (C/S) + don't know (D/K) 8 (6) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support or prefer? 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 56 (55) 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 19 (21) 
New Komeito (NK) 3 (4) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (3) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 3 (1) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 1 (0) 
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 1 (1) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 
Other political parties 1 (0) 
 
TOKYO 00002748  015 OF 018 
 
 
None 11 (9) 
C/S+D/K 3 (5) 
 
(Note) Percentages may not add up to 100 PERCENT  in some cases due 
to rounding. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was taken Nov. 27-29 by Nikkei 
Research Inc. over the telephone on a random digit dialing (RDD) 
basis. For the survey, samples were chosen from among men and women 
aged 20 and over across the nation. A total of 1,503 households with 
one or more eligible voters were sampled, and answers were obtained 
from 931 persons (61.9 PERCENT ). 
 
(13) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Abridged) 
November 30, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures are percentages. Parentheses denote the results of the last 
survey conducted Nov. 1.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? 
 
Yes 63.7 (61.8) 
No 25.1 (22.9) 
Don't know (D/K) + no answer (N/A) 11.2 (15.3) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the previous question) 
What's the primary reason for your approval of the Hatoyama cabinet? 
Pick only one from among those listed below. 
 
The prime minister is trustworthy 5.1 (11.5) 
Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Democratic Party of Japan, 
Social Democratic Party, and People's New Party 7.8 (6.7) 
The prime minister has leadership ability 1.8 (4.3) 
Something can be expected of its economic policies 10.2 (15.1) 
Something can be expected of its foreign policy 2.6 (1.5) 
Something can be expected of its political reforms 37.2 (29.6) 
Something can be expected of its tax reforms 6.1 (3.6) 
Something can be expected of its administrative reforms 13.7 (11.6) 
There's no other appropriate person (for prime minister) 13.9 
(14.4) 
Other answers (O/A) --- (0.7) 
D/K+N/A 1.6 (1.0) 
 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the first question) What's 
the primary reason for your disapproval of the Hatoyama cabinet? 
Pick only one from among those listed below. 
 
The prime minister is untrustworthy 20.2 (12.8) 
Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Democratic Party of Japan, 
Social Democratic Party, and People's New Party 12.9 (16.7) 
The prime minister lacks leadership ability 9.2 (5.0) 
Nothing can be expected of its economic policies 33.4 (25.3) 
Nothing can be expected of its foreign policy 2.0 (4.5) 
Nothing can be expected of its political reforms 5.9 (16.4) 
Nothing can be expected of its tax reforms 4.6 (7.0) 
Nothing can be expected of its administrative reforms 2.5 (2.0) 
Don't like the prime minister's personal character 7.2 (7.6) 
O/A --- (0.5) 
 
TOKYO 00002748  016 OF 018 
 
 
D/K+N/A 2.1 (2.2) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 45.0 (43.4) 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 16.2 (21.1) 
New Komeito (NK) 4.1 (3.4) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2.4 (2.7) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2.1 (1.9) 
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 1.4 (1.3) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.3 (0.5) 
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) --- (---) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.4 (0.4) 
Other political parties, groups --- (0.1) 
None 27.8 (24.5) 
D/K+N/A 0.3 (0.7) 
 
Q: The government has introduced a new method to screen budget 
requests from its ministries and agencies before compiling the 
budget for the next fiscal year. Do you approve of this budget 
screening? 
 
Yes 77.3 
No 13.2 
D/K+N/A 9.5 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the foregoing question) 
What's the primary reason for your approval? 
 
Because it's effective in reducing the budget 18.6 
Because disclosing the budget compilation process to the public is 
significant  54.8 
Because the budget screening teams' judgment is precise 2.8 
Because the budget also should be compiled from the private sector's 
perspective 23.1 
O/A 0.3 
D/K+N/A 0.4 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) 
What's the primary reason for your disapproval? 
 
Because it's less effective in reducing the budget 3.2 
Because the budget screening teams' discussion is unilateral and 
they should listen more to those concerned 67.5 
Because there is a problem regarding appointments to the budget 
screening teams 16.5 
Because the budget screening teams' discussion appears to be led by 
the Finance Ministry 11.6 
O/A --- 
D/K+N/A 1.2 
 
 
Q: There are also objections from among those concerned to the 
results of budget screening. Do you think the results of budget 
screening are appropriate? 
 
Appropriate 10.7 
Appropriate to a certain degree 62.0 
Not very appropriate 15.6 
Inappropriate 5.5 
D/K+N/A 6.2 
 
 
TOKYO 00002748  017 OF 018 
 
 
Q: Do you think the budget screening should be continued next fiscal 
year and beyond? 
 
Yes 83.6 
No 10.3 
D/K+N/A 6.1 
 
Q: What do you think should be done about the planned relocation of 
the U.S. military's Futenma airfield in Okinawa Prefecture's Ginowan 
City? 
 
Futenma airfield should be relocated to a coastal area of the U.S. 
military's Camp Schwab in line with a Japan-U.S. agreement 25.4 
Japan and the U.S. should review their agreement and reconsider 
Futenma relocation outside Okinawa Prefecture or Japan 32.8 
Japan and the U.S. should review their agreement and consider 
integrating Futenma airfield's functions with the U.S. Kadena base 
in Okinawa Prefecture 26.8 
O/A 0.2 
D/K+N/A 14.8 
 
 
Q: Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's fund-managing body has falsified 
its political fund reports. On this issue, his former secretary, who 
was in charge of accounting, is alleged to have violated the 
Political Funds Control Law. The prime minister said: "I don't know 
the details because I have entrusted them to the accounting chief. I 
will leave it to the prosecutors." Is this account convincing to 
you? 
 
Yes 18.9 
No 74.9 
D/K+N/A 6.2 
 
Q: What do you think Prime Minister Hatoyama should do about this 
problem? 
 
He should resign as prime minister to take responsibility 11.4 
He should fulfill his accountability and stay on as prime minister 
while taking steps to improve the situation 75.5 
He should dissolve the House of Representatives to elicit public 
opinion 3.9 
The act was committed by his former secretary, so Prime Minister 
Hatoyama does not need to take responsibility 4.3 
O/A 0.2 
D/K+N/A 4.7 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted across the nation on 
Nov. 28-29 by Kyodo News Service on a computer-aided random digit 
dialing (RDD) basis. Among randomly generated telephone numbers, 
those actually for household use with one or more eligible voters 
totaled 1,471. Answers were obtained from 1,026 persons. 
 
(14) Japanese woman in Gifu to appeal to Diet members over her son 
taken away by Czech father 
 
CHUNICHI SHIMBUN (Page 32) (Full) 
December 1, 2009 
 
Marie Kubota, Gifu Reporting Team 
 
Over three months have passed since the son, 5, of Kayoko Yamada, 
 
TOKYO 00002748  018 OF 018 
 
 
40, a nurse living in Yamagata City, Gifu Prefecture, disappeared 
from their home. There is a strong possibility that he was taken 
away by Yamada's Czech husband, 31, to the Czech Republic. Since 
Japan is not a signatory to the Hague Convention that prevents 
either parent from taking away children (without the other parent's 
consent), Yamada has no way to look for her son. She will go to 
Tokyo on Dec. 3 to tell Diet members about how hard it is to be 
separated from her son at a symposium. 
 
Yamada misses her son very much. "Did he cry when he was taken away 
or was he resigned to what happened? Since he has nobody to go to 
now except his father, he may not be able to speak his mind." 
 
On Aug. 23, Yamada's husband told the boy, "I will buy you some 
toys," took him out, and never returned. When Yamada returned home 
in the evening, the husband's computer and other belongings were 
gone. On the evening of Aug. 24, the husband made an international 
call to tell her that he was in Frankfurt (with the son). She went 
to the Gifu Prefectural Police for advice, but was told that since 
the boy is with his father, this "does not constitute a criminal 
case." 
 
Yamada married her Czech husband, whom she met when she was studying 
overseas, in Japan five years ago. They lived in the Czech Republic 
from autumn last year to last March according to the husband's 
wishes, but returned to Japan because his job did not go well. 
Discord between the husband and wife in their daily life had 
escalated, and they were at the point of beginning to discuss their 
plans for the future. 
 
In mid-October, after pleading with her husband many times, Yamada 
was informed of her husband's new cell phone number via e-mail, and 
she was able to talk to the son just once. She told him: "Mama will 
go and rescue you. Wait for me." The husband probably learned about 
what she told the boy. He wrote back in his e-mail that: "We are 
living happily. There is no need for you to rescue him." Yamada has 
not been able to call her son again after that, fearing that calling 
him will make his position even more difficult in a foreign 
country. 
 
The symposium to be held at the Diet members' office building in 
Nagata-cho, Tokyo will be about the Hague Convention and the 
enactment of related domestic legislation. 
 
Yamada sometimes thinks that the only thing she can do is to wait 
for her son's return. Yet, she says: "The situation in Japan is such 
that whoever takes the children away wins. This case is different 
from one in which a husband and wife have agreed to divorce. I think 
there must be other people in the same situation as me. I hope that 
more people will find out about the Convention and that it will be 
ratified." 
 
ROOS