VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTG #1317/01 3552303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 212303Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1363
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 001317 
 
FOR S/CT: Rhonda Shore and NCTC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM KJUS EFIN SNAR PREL HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAS: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 109980 
 
¶1. On June 28, President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya was removed from 
office in a coup d'etat.  The de facto government that took power 
was not recognized by the U.S. or any other country, and Honduras 
was suspended from the Organization of American States.  Honduras's 
resulting international isolation, including the suspension of 
programs by donors and international organizations aimed at 
strengthening Honduras's capacity to combat economic crimes, 
diminished its capacity to combat such crimes, including terrorist 
financing.  However, there were no known instances of terrorist 
organizations using Honduras's financial system to deposit or 
launder funds.  Prior to the coup, Honduran cooperation with the 
United States on combating terrorist financing was strong.  The 
Honduran Banking and Insurance Commission, through instruction from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, promptly sent freeze orders to the 
entire regulated financial sector every time the United States 
amended Executive Order lists.  Financial entities, particularly the 
commercial banks, undertook the requested searches for accounts by 
terrorist entities.   There were no amendments to the Executive 
Order lists after the coup that required notification of the 
Honduran government. 
 
¶2. The Honduran government continued to implement steps in 
accordance with their 2007 National Security Strategy, which 
included counterterrorism as an objective, and stressed regional and 
international cooperation.  For example, in November 2009, the 
Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) and the Honduran National Police (HNP) 
took steps towards the creation of Joint Interagency Task Force. 
This joint task force should improve inter-agency intelligence 
cooperation and should potentially decrease illicit trafficking and 
minimize terrorist threats within the country. 
 
¶3. Honduras signed the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Financing in 2001 and ratified it in 2003.  On April 
24, 2008, Article 335 of the penal code (which describes terrorism 
and its sanctions) was amended by Congress.  Congress added eight 
amendments to Article 335 - four of which refer specifically to 
terrorist financing.  Sanctions for terrorist financing include a 
20-30 year prison sentence and a fine of 1-5 million Lempiras 
(approximately USD 53,000-263,000). 
 
¶4. Organized crime and illicit trafficking continue to plague 
Honduras.  Their organizations and networks are robust and mature 
and are ripe for exploitation by terrorist elements with the intent 
of entering and attacking the US.  While there is no conclusive 
evidence that terrorist groups are working with illicit trafficking 
organizations at this time, the United States continues to assist 
the HOAF and HNP with their counterterrorism efforts in order to 
prevent the very real threat of terrorist groups exploiting illicit 
trafficking networks.  The predominant region used and exploited by 
narco-traffickers is La Mosquitia (part of the Gracias a Dios 
department in northeastern Honduras).  The region's inaccessibility 
to Honduran law enforcement and military, relatively small 
population and poverty have made it relatively easy for traffickers 
to establish a presence.  The Honduran military lacks sufficient 
resources to adequately control the area and the police and 
judiciary are spread thin, poorly trained and susceptible to threats 
and corruption.  In the first half of 2009 until June 28 when a coup 
d'etat took place, the United States continued to provide the HOAF 
and HNP with training, equipment and base construction-dramatically 
improving their ability to interdict illicit trafficking and protect 
the country against terrorist threats.  However, in response to the 
coup d'etat on June 28, the USG suspended all counterterrorism 
training and equipage pending restoration of the democratic, 
constitutional order. 
 
¶5. Following the 28 June 2009 coup d'etat that deposed Honduran 
President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, several dozen domestic 
terrorist attacks were conducted by opponents of the de facto 
regime.  These attacks, which targeted pro-regime television and 
radio stations, businesses, and infrastructure, included the 
planting of improvised explosive devices, throwing grenades and 
Molotov cocktails, sabotaging electrical towers and launching rocket 
propelled grenades (RPG-7).  In most cases, the attacks were 
conducted at night and were not designed to hurt anyone.  The 
attacks diminished following the general election held on November 
¶29. 
 
¶6. There was no indication of terrorist groups using illegal 
immigration networks.  Over the past five years, however, smuggling 
rings have been detected moving people from East Africa (in 
particular Somalia in 2009), the Middle East, and Southwest Asia to 
Honduras or through its territory.  Nationals of countries without 
Honduran visa requirements, especially Ecuador and Colombia, were 
involved in schemes to transit Honduras, often with the United 
States and Europe as their final destination.  Foreign nationals 
have successfully obtained valid Honduran identity cards and 
passports under their own or false identities.  The Honduran 
government's ability to combat transnational crime was limited by 
sparsely populated and isolated jungle regions, limited resources, 
corruption, and poor control of the north coast and eastern border. 
While increased U.S. and Honduran government investment and training 
for members of the judicial branch, law enforcement entities, and 
the military had begun to decrease criminal activity and reduce the 
potential appeal of using the criminal infrastructure in these 
remote areas for the movement of terrorists and their resources 
prior to the June 28 coup d'etat, these efforts were largely 
suspended as a result of the coup. 
 
HENSHAW