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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001313 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM HO
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS 
POLITICAL AND POLICY MATTERS 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001313  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Ambassador met with Honduran 
President-elect Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo and discussed a full 
range of pertinent political and policy matters on December 
¶17.  Lobo told the Ambassador he remains committed to the 
implementation of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord and 
supported the creation of a government of national unity and 
a Truth Commission.  He reiterated his conviction that regime 
leader Micheletti needed to resign for the good of the 
country, but sought international support for achieve this 
end.  Lobo discussed his plans to create a strong team of 
technocrats to his cabinet.  He said he wants to appoint 
fresh talent to his foreign policy team and to the 
congressional leadership.  Lobo and the Ambassador discussed 
our common interest in fighting international crime and drug 
trafficking and agreed that the Merida Initiative provides a 
strategic framework for action.  Lobo expressed his 
commitment to reassert full civilian control of the military 
and strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
He also said he supported securing political asylum or safe 
passage for President Zelaya.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ambassador and President-elect Lobo met at the 
Residence on the afternoon of December 17 to review the 
current political situation.  Lobo appeared relaxed and 
confident, although very mindful of the significant 
diplomatic, political and economic challenges facing 
Honduras.  The following are the main elements of what was a 
lengthy 90 minute: 
 
---------------------------------- 
Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord (TSJA) 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Lobo said he was committed to the implementation of 
the Tegucigalpa San Jose Accord.  He pointed to a series of 
public statements he had made and actions taken over the past 
ten days in support of the TSJA.  He stressed that he 
believed the TSJA was critical to achieve unity, national 
reconciliation and give Honduras the diplomatic space to 
restore normal relations with the international community. 
He cited his meeting on December 15 with congressional 
leaders where he had pushed for political amnesty.  He said 
he was keen on securing this piece of legislation, which he 
and President Arias believe was an important element in 
easing tensions and avoiding judicial chaos resulting from 
the multiple legal violations potentially committed by 
President Zelaya (and his associates), regime leader 
Micheletti (and his associates), and the Honduran military 
related to the coup and events leading up to the coup.  The 
Ambassador and Lobo both were in full agreement that 
Micheletti needed to resign in order to pave the way for the 
creation of a government of national unity.  Lobo confirmed 
to the Ambassador that he had discussed the matter for a 
second time with Micheletti on Monday, December 14.  Lobo 
said he had told Micheletti respectfully but in a firm manner 
that he needed to consider resigning for the good of the 
nation.  Lobo expressed confidence that a legal formula could 
be found under the Accord for him to step down, without 
facing a humiliating exit.  Lobo told Micheletti he would be 
willing to work with him to achieve this objective.  He said 
Micheletti resisted, but not as strongly as in their first 
meeting after the election.  The Ambassador interjected that 
although Micheletti had stated publicly that he would not 
step down under any circumstances, in private he was 
beginning to engage in discussions with key advisors, 
including Arturo Corrales and Vilma Morales, on this issue. 
Lobo mused that in the meeting Micheletti at first boasted 
that he didn't care if the Americans took his visa away, but 
later asked, "Do you really think the gringos will give me 
back my visa?"  Lobo took the vacillating comments as 
evidence that this issue was very much on his mind.  Lobo and 
the Ambassador spoke about the possibility of Washington and 
others in the international community helping him on this 
issue.  The Ambassador confirmed that messages were being 
passed in Washington and in Tegucigalpa to the Micheletti 
regime officials for him to step down.  The Ambassador told 
Lobo in confidence that if we didn't get any movement from 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001313  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
the Micheletti side, we would consider having U.S. officials 
come to Tegucigalpa to directly deliver a very clear and 
blunt message on this issue.  Lobo welcomed the U.S. actions 
and plans. 
 
---------------- 
Truth Commission 
---------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Ambassador stressed the importance of creating 
a Truth Commission as an important element in the TSJA that 
would contribute to achieving national reconciliation and 
healing.  The Ambassador briefed Lobo on the workings of 
these Truth Commissions in several other countries (including 
Chile and South Africa) and counseled that he as President 
would needed to give this process guidance and direction 
working closely with the international community.  Both 
discussed the possibility of inviting the Verification 
Commission (including Secretary Solis and President Lagos) to 
convene back in Tegucigalpa some time after his January 27, 
2010 inauguration, and possibly contribute to the launch of 
the Truth Commission. 
 
------------------------- 
Presidential Appointments 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Ambassador and Lobo discussed the make-up of 
his government.  Lobo said he had created a series of 
transition working groups to assist him in forming a 
government.  For example, former President Ricardo Maduro 
would be heading the foreign policy working group, which 
would be responsible for recommending candidates for both 
Foreign Minister and key ambassadorships.  Lobo stressed that 
he wanted to appoint young and energetic people to his 
foreign policy team.  He was considering several 
entrepreneurs for various key jobs, including Ambassador to 
the U.S.  Lobo said he would review the short lists in early 
January and make the decisions in close consultation with the 
Ambassador. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Lobo said that would be a chief executive with a 
strong institutionalist bent who would govern in close 
coordination with Congress and the judicial branch.  In this 
regard, he was weighing several names for consideration as 
President of the National Congress.  The traditional 
establishment candidates included former Congress President 
Fito Irias, former Congress Secretary Jose Hernandez, Antonio 
Rivera and Celin Discua.  Lobo noted that he was under great 
pressure from the party to name one of these "insider" 
politicians.  However, he was considering a appointing 
someone with a clean image, including a women legislator, to 
send a message of his commitment to change and to diversity. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Merida and the Fight Against International Crime 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Both the Ambassador and Lobo agreed that Honduras 
faced a serious threat to its national security from 
international crime syndicates, particularly the drug 
cartels.  The Ambassador gave Lobo an overview of the Merida 
Initiative.  He proposed resurrecting the two-country 
multiagency U.S.-Honduran Merida Task Force, which 
represented the most effective and holistic way for us to 
deal bilaterally and regionally with the international crime 
threat.  Lobo said that one of his top priorities was dealing 
"head on" with the grave threat spawned by international drug 
cartels and gangs.  He said that the Honduran people were 
demanding a more concerted campaign by their government to 
provide security and protect them against criminals.  He said 
he would be very tough on criminals, gang members and drug 
traffickers, and was not sensitive to sovereignty issues when 
the issue of narcotics and crime was at stake.  Lobo said he 
planned to appoint Oscar Alvarez as his Security Minister. 
He had great confidence in Alvarez as a courageous and 
dynamic leader in the fight against crime and drugs.  We 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001313  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
agreed to discuss these issues in more detail with our 
respective teams in the future. 
 
------------------- 
Taming the Military 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Ambassador said it was critically important for 
Lobo to establish an effective and productive relationship 
with the military, but equally to restore firm civilian 
control over the officer corps.  The Ambassador noted that 
military's current influence permeated all senior levels of 
the Micheletti regime, whose authority to a significant 
degree rested on military acquiescence.  The Ambassador said 
that this all needed to change.  As the legitimate 
democratically elected president he needed to reestablish his 
control and authority over the military.  The Ambassador 
added that the military had to return to the barracks and let 
the police deal with basic security and law enforcement.  He 
said that even beyond the coup, the presence of large numbers 
of troops on Tegucigalpa's streets was an eyesore which was 
resented by most Hondurans, and had further undermined the 
international reputation of the armed forces.  Looking to the 
longer term, the Ambassador pointed out that the Honduran 
government needed to reform the legal and constitutional 
framework to ensure that the military would never again be 
dragged into a political crisis that resulted in a coup 
d'etat.  The Ambassador noted that both President Zelaya's 
decision to ask the military to carry out the logistics for 
his planned poll on June 28, as well as the military's own 
role in plotting and executing the coup against Zelaya, was a 
major political setback for Honduras.  The legal reforms 
needed to be urgently considered to ensure that the military 
would never do this again. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Lobo agreed that he needed to restore military 
subservience to civilian rule.  He also concurred that his 
government needed to consider adopting the legal and 
constitutional reforms necessary to distance the military 
from politics.  As an institutionalist, he was considering 
supporting legislation so that the nominations of the Chief 
of Defense and the service commanders would be subject to 
congressional approval unlike at present where it was 
strictly a presidential decision.  Obviously, the existing 
process in which the president fully controlled the 
nomination and appointment of senior military officers was 
open to abuse if a president chose to appoint a friend or 
individual who shared his political or ideological views. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Ambassador said that since the coup there had 
been a serious deterioration in the human rights situation in 
Honduras.  The Micheletti regime, the Honduran military, 
police and the attorney general's office had all been tainted 
with the brush of being systemic violators of human rights. 
The Ambassador said that part of the process of restoring the 
democratic order and supporting the rule of law required the 
new government to be very sensitive to human rights issues. 
The Ambassador suggested that Lobo consider sending a clear 
public message once in office of his support for human rights 
and consider involving the human rights community in the work 
of the Truth Commission.  Lobo said he would be open to 
working with local and human rights groups to restore the 
rule of law and strengthen human rights practices in the 
country. 
 
------ 
Zelaya 
------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Lobo made clear that he continued to support 
allowing President Zelaya to leave the country either through 
a safe conduct pass or through the granting of political 
asylum.  If this was not granted by Micheletti, he would 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001313  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
authorize soon after assuming office. 
LLORENS