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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001312 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM HO
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS 
POLITICAL AND POLICY MATTERS 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001312  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
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TEGUCIGALP 00001312  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
the Micheletti side, we would consider having U.S. officials 
come to Tegucigalpa to directly deliver a very clear and 
blunt message on this issue.  Lobo welcomed the U.S. actions 
and plans. 
 
---------------- 
Truth Commission 
---------------- 
 
¶4.  The Ambassador stressed the importance of creating a 
Truth Commission as an important element in the TSJA that 
would contribute to achieving national reconciliation and 
healing.  The Ambassador briefed Lobo on the workings of 
these Truth Commissions in several other countries (including 
Chile and South Africa) and counseled that he as President 
would needed to give this process guidance and direction 
working closely with the international community.  Both 
discussed the possibility of inviting the Verification 
Commission (including Secretary Solis and President Lagos) to 
convene back in Tegucigalpa some time after his January 27, 
2010 inauguration, and possibly contribute to the launch of 
the Truth Commission. 
 
------------------------- 
Presidential Appointments 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  The Ambassador and Lobo discussed the make-up of his 
government.  Lobo said he had created a series of transition 
working groups to assist him in forming a government.  For 
example, former President Ricardo Maduro would be heading the 
foreign policy working group, which would be responsible for 
recommending candidates for both Foreign Minister and key 
ambassadorships.  Lobo stressed that he wanted to appoint 
young and energetic people to his foreign policy team.  He 
was considering several entrepreneurs for various key jobs, 
including Ambassador to the U.S.  Lobo said he would review 
the short lists in early January and make the decisions in 
close consultation with the Ambassador. 
 
¶6.  Lobo said that would be a chief executive with a strong 
institutionalist bent who would govern in close coordination 
with Congress and the judicial branch.  In this regard, he 
was weighing several names for consideration as President of 
the National Congress.  The traditional establishment 
candidates included former Congress President Fito Irias, 
former Congress Secretary Jose Hernandez, Antonio Rivera and 
Celin Discua.  Lobo noted that he was under great pressure 
from the party to name one of these "insider" politicians. 
However, he was considering a appointing someone with a clean 
image, including a women legislator, to send a message of his 
commitment to change and to diversity. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Merida and the Fight Against International Crime 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7.  Both the Ambassador and Lobo agreed that Honduras faced a 
serious threat to its national security from international 
crime syndicates, particularly the drug cartels.  The 
Ambassador gave Lobo an overview of the Merida Initiative. 
He proposed resurrecting the two-country multiagency 
U.S.-Honduran Merida Task Force, which represented the most 
effective and holistic way for us to deal bilaterally and 
regionally with the international crime threat.  Lobo said 
that one of his top priorities was dealing "head on" with the 
grave threat spawned by international drug cartels and gangs. 
 He said that the Honduran people were demanding a more 
concerted campaign by their government to provide security 
and protect them against criminals.  He said he would be very 
tough on criminals, gang members and drug traffickers, and 
was not sensitive to sovereignty issues when the issue of 
narcotics and crime was at stake.  Lobo said he planned to 
appoint Oscar Alvarez as his Security Minister.  He had great 
confidence in Alvarez as a courageous and dynamic leader in 
the fight against crime and drugs.  We agreed to discuss 
these issues in more detail with our respective teams in the 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001312  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
future. 
 
------------------- 
Taming the Military 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  The Ambassador said it was critically important for Lobo 
to establish an effective and productive relationship with 
the military, but equally to restore firm civilian control 
over the officer corps.  The Ambassador noted that military's 
current influence permeated all senior levels of the 
Micheletti regime, whose authority to a significant degree 
rested on military acquiescence.  The Ambassador said that 
this all needed to change.  As the legitimate democratically 
elected president he needed to reestablish his control and 
authority over the military.  The Ambassador added that the 
military had to return to the barracks and let the police 
deal with basic security and law enforcement.  He said that 
even beyond the coup, the presence of large numbers of troops 
on Tegucigalpa's streets was an eyesore which was resented by 
most Hondurans, and had further undermined the international 
reputation of the armed forces.  Looking to the longer term, 
the Ambassador pointed out that the Honduran government 
needed to reform the legal and constitutional framework to 
ensure that the military would never again be dragged into a 
political crisis that resulted in a coup d'etat.  The 
Ambassador noted that both President Zelaya's decision to ask 
the military to carry out the logistics for his planned poll 
on June 28, as well as the military's own role in plotting 
and executing the coup against Zelaya, was a major political 
setback for Honduras.  The legal reforms needed to be 
urgently considered to ensure that the military would never 
do this again. 
 
¶9.  Lobo agreed that he needed to restore military 
subservience to civilian rule.  He also concurred that his 
government needed to consider adopting the legal and 
constitutional reforms necessary to distance the military 
from politics.  As an institutionalist, he was considering 
supporting legislation so that the nominations of the Chief 
of Defense and the service commanders would be subject to 
congressional approval unlike at present where it was 
strictly a presidential decision.  Obviously, the existing 
process in which the president fully controlled the 
nomination and appointment of senior military officers was 
open to abuse if a president chose to appoint a friend or 
individual who shared his political or ideological views. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶10.  The Ambassador said that since the coup there had been a 
serious deterioration in the human rights situation in 
Honduras.  The Micheletti regime, the Honduran military, 
police and the attorney general's office had all been tainted 
with the brush of being systemic violators of human rights. 
The Ambassador said that part of the process of restoring the 
democratic order and supporting the rule of law required the 
new government to be very sensitive to human rights issues. 
The Ambassador suggested that Lobo consider sending a clear 
public message once in office of his support for human rights 
and consider involving the human rights community in the work 
of the Truth Commission.  Lobo said he would be open to 
working with local and human rights groups to restore the 
rule of law and strengthen human rights practices in the 
country. 
 
------ 
Zelaya 
------ 
 
¶11.  Lobo made clear that he continued to support allowing 
President Zelaya to leave the country either through a safe 
conduct pass or through the granting of political asylum.  If 
this was not granted by Micheletti, he would authorize soon 
after assuming office. 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001312  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
LLORENS