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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 21 STATE 123222 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D  COPY CAPTION 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL AF PK
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE WAY 
FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: TEXT OF SPEECH, 
FACT SHEET, AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
 
REFS:  (A) STATE 122731   (B) STATE 122234 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The President will announce his 
decision on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
in an address to the nation from the United States 
Military Academy at West Point on December 1 at 8:00 
p.m. eastern standard time.  This cable contains 
information which we hope will be useful to you in 
engaging host governments, media, and the public after 
the President's address.  The contents of the cable are 
strictly embargoed until December 1 at 8:00 p.m. eastern 
standard time.  Please see paragraph two for the text of 
the President's speech; paragraphs three through seven 
for the fact sheet describing the way forward in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; and paragraph eight for 
questions and answers on the review and the President's 
decision.  The questions and answers are for internal 
use only and should not be released to the public.  The 
fact sheet and transcript of the President's remarks 
will be posted on the White House public website at 
www.whitehouse.gov, along with translated versions in 
several languages.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Remarks of President Barack Obama: The Way 
Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, West Point, New 
York 
 
BEGIN TEXT OF SPEECH.  Good evening.  To the United 
States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our 
armed services, and to my fellow Americans: I want to 
speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan 
the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our 
interests, and the strategy that my Administration will 
pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion.  It 
is an honor for me to do so here  at West Point  where 
so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our 
security, and to represent what is finest about our 
country. 
 
To address these issues, it is important to recall why 
America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in 
Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this 
fight.  On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked 
four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 
people. They struck at our military and economic nerve 
centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and 
children without regard to their faith or race or 
station.  Were it not for the heroic actions of the 
passengers on board one of those flights, they could 
have also struck at one of the great symbols of our 
democracy in Washington, and killed many more. 
 
As we know, these men belonged to al-Qa'ida  a group of 
extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of 
the world's great religions, to justify the slaughter of 
innocents.  Al-Qa'ida's base of operations was in 
Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban  a 
ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized 
control of that country after it was ravaged by years of 
Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention 
of America and our friends had turned elsewhere. 
 
Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of 
force against al-Qa'ida and those who harbored them  an 
authorization that continues to this day.  The vote in 
the Senate was 98 to 0.  The vote in the House was 420 
to 1. For the first time in its history, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5  the 
commitment that says an attack on one member nation is 
an attack on all.  And the United Nations Security 
Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to 
respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the 
world were acting as one to destroy al-Qa'ida's 
terrorist network, and to protect our common security. 
 
Under the banner of this domestic unity and 
international legitimacy  and only after the Taliban 
refused to turn over Osama bin Laden  we sent our 
troops into Afghanistan.  Within a matter of months, al- 
Qa'ida was scattered and many of its operatives were 
killed.  The Taliban was driven from power and pushed 
back on its heels.  A place that had known decades of 
fear now had reason to hope.  At a conference convened 
by the UN, a provisional government was established 
under President Hamid Karzai.  And an International 
Security Assistance Force was established to help bring 
a lasting peace to a war-torn country. 
 
Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a 
second war in Iraq.  The wrenching debate over the Iraq 
War is well-known and need not be repeated here.  It is 
enough to say that for the next six years, the Iraq War 
drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, 
our diplomacy, and our national attention  and that the 
decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts 
between America and much of the world. 
 
Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the 
Iraq war to a responsible end.  We will remove our 
combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and 
all of our troops by the end of 2011.  That we are doing 
so is a testament to the character of our men and women 
in uniform.  Thanks to their courage, grit and 
perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape 
their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to 
its people. 
 
But while we have achieved hard-earned milestones in 
Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. 
After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 
and 2002, al-Qa'ida's leadership established a safe- 
haven there. Although a legitimate government was 
elected by the Afghan people, it has been hampered by 
corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, 
and insufficient Security Forces.  Over the last several 
years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al- 
Qa'ida, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan 
government.  Gradually, the Taliban has begun to take 
control over swaths of Afghanistan, while engaging in 
increasingly brazen and devastating acts of terrorism 
against the Pakistani people. 
 
Throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan 
remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I 
took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving 
in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak 
of the war.  Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked 
for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, 
but these reinforcements did not arrive.  That's why, 
shortly after taking office, I approved a long-standing 
request for more troops. After consultations with our 
allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the 
fundamental connection between our war effort in 
Afghanistan, and the extremist safe-havens in Pakistan. 
I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, 
dismantling, and defeating al-Qa'ida and its extremist 
allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military 
and civilian effort. 
 
Since then, we have made progress on some important 
objectives.  High-ranking al-Qa'ida and Taliban leaders 
have been killed, and we have stepped up the pressure on 
al-Qa'ida world-wide.  In Pakistan, that nation's Army 
has gone on its largest offensive in years.  In 
Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban 
from stopping a presidential election, and  although it 
was marred by fraud  that election produced a 
government that is consistent with Afghanistan's laws 
and Constitution. 
 
Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but 
for several years it has moved backwards. There is no 
imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but 
the Taliban has gained momentum.  Al-Qa'ida has not 
reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 
9/11, but they retain their safe-havens along the 
border. And our forces lack the full support they need 
to effectively train and partner with Afghan Security 
Forces and better secure the population.  Our new 
Commander in Afghanistan  General McChrystal  has 
reported that the security situation is more serious 
than he anticipated. In short:  the status quo is not 
sustainable. 
 
As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time 
of danger. Some of you have fought in Afghanistan. Many 
will deploy there.  As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe 
you a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of 
your service.  That is why, after the Afghan voting was 
completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our 
strategy.  Let me be clear: there has never been an 
option before me that called for troop deployments 
before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of 
resources necessary for the conduct of the war. 
Instead, the review has allowed me ask the hard 
questions, and to explore all of the different options 
along with my national security team, our military and 
civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and with our key 
partners.  Given the stakes involved, I owed the 
American people  and our troops  no less. 
 
This review is now complete. And as Commander-in-Chief, 
I have determined that it is in our vital national 
interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to 
Afghanistan.  After 18 months, our troops will begin to 
come home.  These are the resources that we need to 
seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity 
that can allow for a responsible transition of our 
forces out of Afghanistan. 
 
I do not make this decision lightly.  I opposed the war 
in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must 
exercise restraint in the use of military force, and 
always consider the long-term consequences of our 
actions.  We have been at war for eight years, at 
enormous cost in lives and resources.  Years of debate 
over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national 
security issues in tatters, and created a highly 
polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort.  And 
having just experienced the worst economic crisis since 
the Great Depression, the American people are 
understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and 
putting people to work here at home. 
 
Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of 
you - a military that, along with your families, has 
already borne the heaviest of all burdens.  As 
President, I have signed a letter of condolence to the 
family of each American who gives their life in these 
wars.  I have read the letters from the parents and 
spouses of those who deployed.  I have visited our 
courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed.  I have 
travelled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 
Americans returning home to their final resting place. 
I see firsthand the terrible wages of war.  If I did not 
think that the security of the United States and the 
safety of the American people were at stake in 
Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of 
our troops home tomorrow. 
 
So no  I do not make this decision lightly.  I make 
this decision because I am convinced that our security 
is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  This is the 
epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by al- 
Qa'ida.  It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, 
and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted 
as I speak.  This is no idle danger; no hypothetical 
threat.  In the last few months alone, we have 
apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent 
here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
to commit new acts of terror. This danger will only grow 
if the region slides backwards, and al-Qa'ida can 
operate with impunity.  We must keep the pressure on al- 
Qa'ida, and to do that, we must increase the stability 
and capacity of our partners in the region. 
 
Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. This 
is not just America's war.  Since 9/11, al-Qa'ida's 
safe-havens have been the source of attacks against 
London and Amman and Bali.  The people and governments 
of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the 
stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, 
because we know that al-Qa'ida and other extremists seek 
nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe 
that they would use them. 
 
These facts compel us to act along with our friends and 
allies.  Our overarching goal remains the same: to 
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten 
America and our allies in the future. 
 
To meet that goal, we will pursue the following 
objectives within Afghanistan.  We must deny al-Qa'ida a 
safe-haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and 
deny it the ability to overthrow the government.  And we 
must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's Security 
Forces and government, so that they can take lead 
responsibility for Afghanistan's future. 
 
We will meet these objectives in three ways.  First, we 
will pursue a military strategy that will break the 
Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity. 
The 30,000 additional troops that I am announcing 
tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010  the 
fastest pace possible  so that they can target the 
insurgency and secure key population centers.  They will 
increase our ability to train competent Afghan Security 
Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans 
can get into the fight.  And they will help create the 
conditions for the United States to transfer 
responsibility to the Afghans. 
 
Because this is an international effort, I have asked 
that our commitment be joined by contributions from our 
allies. Some have already provided additional troops, 
and we are confident that there will be further 
contributions in the days and weeks ahead.  Our friends 
have fought and bled and died alongside us in 
Afghanistan. Now, we must come together to end this war 
successfully.  For what's at stake is not simply a test 
of NATO's credibility  what's at stake is the security 
of our Allies, and the common security of the world. 
 
Taken together, these additional American and 
international troops will allow us to accelerate handing 
over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to 
begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in 
July of 2011.  Just as we have done in Iraq, we will 
execute this transition responsibly, taking into account 
conditions on the ground.  We will continue to advise 
and assist Afghanistan's Security Forces to ensure that 
they can succeed over the long haul.  But it will be 
clear to the Afghan government  and, more importantly, 
to the Afghan people  that they will ultimately be 
responsible for their own country. 
 
Second, we will work with our partners, the UN, and the 
Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian 
strategy, so that the government can take advantage of 
improved security. 
 
This effort must be based on performance. The days of 
providing a blank check are over.  President Karzai's 
inauguration speech sent the right message about moving 
in a new direction.  And going forward, we will be clear 
about what we expect from those who receive our 
assistance.  We will support Afghan Ministries, 
Governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and 
deliver for the people.  We expect those who are 
ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.  And we 
will also focus our assistance in areas  such as 
agriculture  that can make an immediate impact in the 
lives of the Afghan people. 
 
The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for 
decades.  They have been confronted with occupation  by 
the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al-Qa'ida fighters 
who used Afghan land for their own purposes.  So 
tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand 
America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. 
We have no interest in occupying your country.  We will 
support efforts by the Afghan government to open the 
door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect 
the human rights of their fellow citizens.  And we will 
seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual 
respect  to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen 
those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will 
leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which 
America is your partner, and never your patron. 
 
Third, we will act with the full recognition that our 
success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our 
partnership with Pakistan. 
 
We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once 
again spreading through that country.  But this same 
cancer has also taken root in the border region of 
Pakistan.  That is why we need a strategy that works on 
both sides of the border. 
 
In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who have 
argued that the struggle against extremism is not their 
fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or 
seeking accommodation with those who use violence.  But 
in recent years, as innocents have been killed from 
Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the 
Pakistani people who are the most endangered by 
extremism. Public opinion has turned.  The Pakistani 
Army has waged an offensive in Swat and South 
Waziristan.  And there is no doubt that the United 
States and Pakistan share a common enemy. 
 
In the past, we too often defined our relationship with 
Pakistan narrowly.  Those days are over. Moving forward, 
we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is 
built on a foundation of mutual interests, mutual 
respect, and mutual trust.  We will strengthen 
Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten 
our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot 
tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is 
known, and whose intentions are clear.  America is also 
providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's 
democracy and development.  We are the largest 
international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced 
by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistani people 
must know:  America will remain a strong supporter of 
Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns 
have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its 
people can be unleashed. 
 
These are the three core elements of our strategy: a 
military effort to create the conditions for a 
transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive 
action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan. 
 
I recognize that there are a range of concerns about our 
approach.  So let me briefly address a few of the 
prominent arguments that I have heard, and which I take 
very seriously. 
 
First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is 
another Vietnam.  They argue that it cannot be 
stabilized, and we are better off cutting our losses and 
rapidly withdrawing.  Yet this argument depends upon a 
false reading of history.  Unlike Vietnam, we are joined 
by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the 
legitimacy of our action.  Unlike Vietnam, we are not 
facing a broad-based popular insurgency.  And most 
importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were 
viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target 
for those same extremists who are plotting along its 
border.  To abandon this area now  and to rely only on 
efforts against al-Qa'ida from a distance  would 
significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on 
al-Qa'ida, and create an unacceptable risk of additional 
attacks on our homeland and our allies. 
 
Second, there are those who acknowledge that we cannot 
leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that 
we go forward with the troops that we have.  But this 
would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle 
through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions 
there.  It would ultimately prove more costly and 
prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never 
be able to generate the conditions needed to train 
Afghan Security Forces and give them the space to take 
over. 
 
Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a 
timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. 
Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended 
escalation of our war effort  one that would commit us 
to a nation building project of up to a decade.  I 
reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond 
what we can achieve at a reasonable cost, and what we 
need to achieve to secure our interests.  Furthermore, 
the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us 
any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan 
government.  It must be clear that Afghans will have to 
take responsibility for their security, and that America 
has no interest in fighting an endless war in 
Afghanistan. 
 
As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our 
responsibility, our means, our or interests.  And I must 
weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I do 
not have the luxury of committing to just one.  Indeed, 
I am mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who 
in discussing our national security  said, "Each 
proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader 
consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among 
national programs." 
 
Over the past several years, we have lost that balance, 
and failed to appreciate the connection between our 
national security and our economy.  In the wake of an 
economic crisis, too many of our friends and neighbors 
are out of work and struggle to pay the bills, and too 
many Americans are worried about the future facing our 
children.  Meanwhile, competition within the global 
economy has grown more fierce.  So we simply cannot 
afford to ignore the price of these wars. 
 
All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars. 
Going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs 
openly and honestly.  Our new approach in Afghanistan is 
likely to cost us roughly 30 billion dollars for the 
military this year, and I will work closely with 
Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down 
our deficit. 
 
But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan 
responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at 
home. Our prosperity provides a foundation for our 
power.  It pays for our military.  It underwrites our 
diplomacy.  It taps the potential of our people, and 
allows investment in new industry.  And it will allow us 
to compete in this century as successfully as we did in 
the last.  That is why our troop commitment in 
Afghanistan cannot be open-ended  because the nation 
that I am most interested in building is our own. 
 
Let me be clear: none of this will be easy.  The 
struggle against violent extremism will not be finished 
quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free 
society, and our leadership in the world.  And unlike 
the great power conflicts and clear lines of division 
that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve 
disorderly regions and diffuse enemies. 
 
So as a result, America will have to show our strength 
in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict.  We 
will have to be nimble and precise in our use of 
military power.  Where al-Qa'ida and its allies attempt 
to establish a foothold  whether in Somalia or Yemen or 
elsewhere  they must be confronted by growing pressure 
and strong partnerships. 
 
And we cannot count on military might alone.  We have to 
invest in our homeland security, because we cannot 
capture or kill every violent extremist abroad.  We have 
to improve and better coordinate our intelligence, so 
that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks. 
 
We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. 
That is why I have made it a central pillar of my 
foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from 
terrorists; to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; and 
to pursue the goal of a world without them.  Because 
every nation must understand that true security will 
never come from an endless race for ever-more 
destructive weapons  true security will come for those 
who reject them. 
 
We will have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can 
meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting 
alone.  I have spent this year renewing our alliances 
and forging new partnerships.  And we have forged a new 
beginning between America and the Muslim World  one 
that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle 
of conflict, and that promises a future in which those 
who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up 
for peace and prosperity and human dignity. 
 
Finally, we must draw on the strength of our values 
for the challenges that we face may have changed, but 
the things that we believe in must not.  That is why we 
must promote our values by living them at home  which 
is why I have prohibited torture and will close the 
prison at Guantanamo Bay.  And we must make it clear to 
every man, woman and child around the world who lives 
under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak 
out on behalf of their human rights, and tend to the 
light of freedom, and justice, and opportunity, and 
respect for the dignity of all peoples.  That is who we 
are.  That is the moral source of America's authority. 
 
Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service 
and sacrifice of our grandparents, our country has borne 
a special burden in global affairs.  We have spilled 
American blood in many countries on multiple continents. 
We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from 
rubble and develop their own economies.  We have joined 
with others to develop an architecture of institutions 
from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank  that 
provide for the common security and prosperity of human 
beings. 
 
We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and 
we have at times made mistakes.  But more than any other 
nation, the United States of America has underwritten 
global security for over six decades  a time that, for 
all its problems, has seen walls come down, markets 
open, billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled 
scientific progress, and advancing frontiers of human 
liberty. 
 
For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought 
world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to 
oppression.  We do not seek to occupy other nations.  We 
will not claim another nation's resources or target 
other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is 
different from ours.  What we have fought for  and what 
we continue to fight for  is a better future for our 
children and grandchildren, and we believe that their 
lives will be better if other peoples' children and 
grandchildren can live in freedom and access 
opportunity. 
 
As a country, we are not as young  and perhaps not as 
innocent  as we were when Roosevelt was President.  Yet 
we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom.  Now 
we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to 
meet the challenges of a new age. 
 
In the end, our security and leadership does not come 
solely from the strength of our arms.  It derives from 
our people  from the workers and businesses who will 
rebuild our economy; from the entrepreneurs and 
researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the 
teachers that will educate our children, and the service 
of those who work in our communities at home; from the 
diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope 
abroad; and from the men and women in uniform who are 
part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made 
government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people a reality on this Earth. 
 
This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on 
every issue  nor should we.  But I also know that we, 
as a country, cannot sustain our leadership nor navigate 
the momentous challenges of our time if we allow 
ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and 
cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times 
poisoned our national discourse. 
 
It is easy to forget that when this war began, we were 
united  bound together by the fresh memory of a 
horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our 
homeland and the values we hold dear.  I refuse to 
accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity 
again.  I believe with every fiber of my being that we 
as Americans  can still come together behind a common 
purpose.  For our values are not simply words written 
into parchment  they are a creed that calls us 
together, and that has carried us through the darkest of 
storms as one nation, one people. 
 
America  we are passing through a time of great trial. 
And the message that we send in the midst of these 
storms must be clear: that our cause is just, our 
resolve unwavering.  We will go forward with the 
confidence that right makes might, and with the 
commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world 
that is more secure, and a future that represents not 
the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes.  Thank 
you, God Bless you, God Bless our troops, and may God 
Bless the United States of America.  END TEXT OF SPEECH. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
FACT SHEET: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Our Mission:  The President's speech reaffirms 
the March 2009 core goal:  to disrupt, dismantle, and 
eventually defeat al-Qa'ida and to prevent their return 
to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.  To do so, we and our 
allies will surge our forces, targeting elements of the 
insurgency and securing key population centers, training 
Afghan forces, transferring responsibility to a capable 
Afghan partner, and increasing our partnership with 
Pakistanis who are facing the same threats. 
 
This region is the heart of the global violent extremism 
pursued by al-Qa'ida, and the region from which we were 
attacked on 9/11.  New attacks are being planned there 
now, a fact borne out by a recent plot, uncovered and 
disrupted by American authorities.  We will prevent the 
Taliban from turning Afghanistan back into a safe haven 
from which international terrorists can strike at us or 
our allies.  This would pose a direct threat to the 
American homeland, and that is a threat that we cannot 
tolerate.  Al-Qa'ida remains in Pakistan where they 
continue to plot attacks against us and where they and 
their extremist allies pose a threat to the Pakistani 
state.  Our goal in Pakistan will be to ensure that al- 
Qa'ida is defeated and Pakistan remains stable. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Review Process:  The review was a deliberate 
and disciplined three-stage process to check alignment 
of goals, methods for attaining those goals, and finally 
resources required.  Over ten weeks, the President 
chaired nine meetings with his national security team, 
and consulted key allies and partners, including the 
governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The President 
focused on asking the hard questions, took the time to 
carefully consider all of the options, and united a 
variety of competing views in his cabinet before 
agreeing to send any additional Americans to war. 
 
As a result of the review, we have focused our mission 
and developed a common understanding regarding our 
regional approach and the need for international 
support.  We will deploy forces into Afghanistan rapidly 
and will take advantage of these additional resources to 
create the conditions to begin to draw down combat 
forces in the summer of 2011, while maintaining a 
partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan to protect our 
enduring interests in that region. 
 
The meetings were focused on how best to ensure the al- 
Qa'ida threat is eliminated from the region and that 
regional stability is restored.  We looked closely at 
the alignment of our efforts and the balance between 
civilian and military resources, both in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and the efforts of the U.S. and the 
international community. 
 
A number of issues were explored in depth:  national 
interests, core objectives and goals, counterterrorism 
priorities, safe havens for terrorist groups in 
Pakistan, the health of the global U.S. military force, 
risks and costs associated with troop deployments, 
global deployment requirements, international 
cooperation and commitments for both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and Afghan capacity in all areas to include 
Afghan security forces, central and sub-national 
governance and corruption (including the narcotics 
trade), and development and economic issues. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) What Has Changed Since March:  Since the 
President announced our renewed commitment in March, a 
number of key developments led the Administration to 
review its approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan:  new 
attention was focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, new 
U.S. leadership was established in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
increased its efforts to combat extremists, and the 
situation in Afghanistan has become more grave. 
 
The United States assigned new civilian and military 
leadership in Afghanistan, with the appointments of 
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry as U.S. Ambassador to 
Afghanistan, and General Stanley McChrystal as the new 
Commander of ISAF military forces in Afghanistan.  Upon 
arrival in Afghanistan, both Ambassador Eikenberry and 
General McChrystal recognized that after eight years of 
underresourcing, the situation was worse than expected. 
Together, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChyrstal 
published a new Civilian-Military Campaign Plan to 
integrate U.S. efforts across the country. 
 
Afghanistan's difficult, extended election process and 
evident signs of the absence of rule of law made clear 
the limits of the central government in Kabul. 
 
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the Pakistanis showed new 
resolve in defeating militants who had taken control of 
the Swat Valley, just 60 miles from Islamabad. 
Pakistani political leadersincluding opposition party 
leaderscame together to support the Pakistani military 
operations.  This fall, the Pakistanis expanded their 
fight against extremists into the Mehsud tribal areas of 
South Waziristan along the border with Afghanistan. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Way Forward:  The President has decided to 
deploy an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. 
These troops will deploy on an accelerated timeline to 
reinforce the 68,000 Americans and 39,000 non-U.S. ISAF 
troops already there, so that we can target the 
insurgency, break its momentum, and better secure 
population centers.  These forces will increase our 
capacity to train effective Afghan Security Forces, and 
to partner with them so that more Afghans get into the 
fight.  And by pursuing these partnerships, we can 
transition to Afghan responsibility, and begin to reduce 
our combat troops in the summer of 2011.  In short, 
these resources will allow us to make the final push 
that is necessary to train Afghans so that we can 
transfer responsibility. 
 
We will maintain this increased force level for the next 
18 months. During this time, we will regularly measure 
our progress.  And beginning in July 2011, we will 
transfer lead security responsibility to Afghans and 
start to transition our combat forces out of 
Afghanistan.  As Afghans take on responsibility for 
their security, we will continue to advise and assist 
Afghanistan's Security Forces, and maintain a 
partnership on behalf of their security so that they can 
sustain this effort.  Afghans are tired of war and long 
for peace, justice, and economic security.  We intend to 
help them achieve these goals and end this war and the 
threat of reoccupation by the foreign fighters 
associated with al-Qa'ida. 
 
We will not be in this effort alone.  We will continue 
to be joined in the fight by the Afghans, and the 
aggressive partnering effort envisioned by General 
McChrystal will get more Afghans into the fight for 
their country's future.  There will also be additional 
resources from NATO.  These allies have already made 
significant commitments of their own in Afghanistan, and 
we will be discussing additional alliance contributions 
 in troops, trainers, and resources  in the days and 
weeks ahead.  This is not simply a test of the 
alliance's credibility  what is at stake is even more 
fundamental.  It is the security of London and Madrid; 
of Paris and Berlin; of Prague, New York, and our 
broader collective security. 
 
We will work with our partners, the United Nations, and 
the Afghan people to strengthen our civilian effort, so 
that Afghanistan's government can step in as we 
establish better security.  President Karzai's 
inauguration speech sent the right message about moving 
in a new direction, including his commitment to 
reintegration and reconciliation, improving relations 
with Afghanistan's regional partners, and steadily 
increasing the security responsibilities of Afghan 
security forces.  But we must see action and progress. 
We will be clear about our expectations, and we will 
encourage and reinforce Afghan Ministries, Governors, 
and local leaders who deliver for the people and combat 
corruption.  We will not reinforce those who are not 
accountable and not acting in the service of the Afghan 
people and the state.  And we will also focus our 
assistance in areas  such as agriculture  that can 
make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan 
people. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Civilian Assistance:  A continuing significant 
increase in civilian experts will accompany a sizable 
infusion of additional civilian assistance.  They will 
partner with Afghans over the long term to enhance the 
capacity of national and sub-national government 
institutions and to help rehabilitate Afghanistan's key 
economic sectors so that Afghans can defeat the 
insurgents who promise only more violence. 
 
Growth is critical to undermine extremists' appeal in 
the short term and for sustainable economic development 
in the long term.  Our top reconstruction priority is 
implementing a civilian-military agriculture 
redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan's once 
vibrant agriculture sector.  This will help sap the 
insurgency of fighters and of income from poppy 
cultivation. 
 
An emphasis of our governance efforts will be on 
developing more responsive, visible, and accountable 
institutions at the provincial, district, and local 
level, where everyday Afghans encounter their 
government.  We will also encourage and support the 
Afghan Government's reinvigorated plans to fight 
corruption, with concrete measures of progress toward 
greater accountability. 
 
A key element of our political strategy will be 
supporting Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate Taliban who 
renounce al-Qa'ida, lay down their arms, and engage in 
the political process. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Our Partner in Pakistan:  Our partnership with 
Pakistan is inextricably linked to our efforts in 
Afghanistan.  To secure our country, we need a strategy 
that works on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border.  The costs of inaction are far greater. 
 
The United States is committed to strengthening 
Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that pose the 
greatest threat to both of our countries.  A safe haven 
for those high-level terrorists whose location is known, 
and whose intentions are clear, cannot be tolerated. 
For Pakistan, we continue to encourage civilian and 
military leadership to sustain their fight against 
extremists and to eliminate terrorists' safe havens in 
their country. 
 
We are now focused on working with Pakistan's democratic 
institutions, deepening the ties among our governments 
and people for our common interests and concerns.  We 
are committed to a strategic relationship with Pakistan 
for the long term.  We have affirmed this commitment to 
Pakistan by providing $1.5 billion each year over the 
next five years to support Pakistan's development and 
democracy, and have led a global effort to rally 
additional pledges of support.  This sizable, long-term 
commitment of assistance addresses the following 
objectives: 
 
(1) Helping Pakistan address immediate energy, water, 
and related economic crises, thereby deepening our 
partnership with the Pakistani people and decreasing the 
appeal of extremists; 
 
(2) Supporting broader economic reforms that are 
necessary to put Pakistan on a path towards sustainable 
job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for 
long-term Pakistani stability and progress; and 
 
(3) Helping Pakistan build on its success against 
militants to eliminate extremist sanctuaries that 
threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the wider region, and 
people around the world. 
 
---------------------------------- 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS  THE REVIEW 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Why Review? 
 
-   In the six months after the strategy was announced 
in March, several important factors changed: 
 
-   New U.S leaders were assigned to Afghanistan, with 
both a new Ambassador and a new NATO commander 
arriving in Kabul; 
 
-   The Taliban proved resilient as General McChrystal 
reported in his assessment; 
 
-   Across the border, Pakistanis took the fight to the 
extremists that threatened their state; and 
 
-   The Afghan election process highlighted serious 
questions of corruption which hampers effective 
governance in Afghanistan. 
What is the President's decision? 
 
-   Our overall goal remains consistent:  "to disrupt, 
dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qa'ida and to 
prevent their return to either Afghanistan or 
Pakistan." 
 
-   This more focused strategy includes four main 
objectives for Afghanistan: 
 
-   Targeting the insurgency to prevent a return of al- 
Qa'ida and the Taliban's overthrow of the Afghan 
Government. 
 
-   Denying the insurgency access to and control of key 
population centers. 
 
-   Training Afghan forces so that they can secure 
their own country. 
 
-   Transferring responsibility for security to 
Afghanistan by creating conditions that will allow 
us to reduce the U.S. and international force level 
in Afghanistan beginning in 2011. 
 
-   Our strategy is refined to reflect changing 
regional realities, and our desire to send a clear 
message of international resolve to our allies and 
the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
demonstrated by: 
 
-   Serious long-term investments in our partnership 
with Pakistan and redoubling efforts to assist 
Pakistan in its fight against extremists. 
 
-   Working in Afghanistan toward realistic and 
targeted improvements in security, governance, and 
development, which are focused on key ministries in 
the center and specific sub-national elements of 
government. 
 
-   As the President said in March:  "Going forward, we 
will not blindly stay the course.  Instead, we will 
set clear metrics to measure progress and hold 
ourselves accountable.  We'll consistently assess 
our efforts to train Afghan security forces and our 
progress in combating insurgents.  We will measure 
the growth of Afghanistan's economy, and its 
illicit narcotics production.  And we will review 
whether we are using the right tools and tactics to 
make progress towards accomplishing our goals." 
Why are we adding tens of thousands of additional troops 
into Afghanistan when al-Qa'ida is not there?  Why are 
you proposing this enormous military footprint in 
Afghanistan when there are all sorts of other places 
that al-Qa'ida actually is  e.g., Somalia, Yemen, 
Pakistan, etc.? 
 
-   Al-Qa'ida designed the 9/11 attack in Afghanistan. 
 
-   Afghanistan remains vulnerable to al-Qa'ida 
reestablishing safe havens. 
 
-   The terrain, strategic location, and governance 
structures of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 
region make it uniquely attractive and useful as a 
safe haven for al-Qa'ida. 
What is different about the new approach? 
 
-   Target, Train and Transfer:  The new plan gets more 
troops into the region  a surge  sooner than 
initially anticipated.  It will allow us to target 
insurgent forces.  By relying on the partnering 
plan outlined by General McChrystal, it also 
accelerates the timeline for building the Afghan 
security forces.  With more capable Afghan National 
Security Forces, we are creating the conditions to 
begin to hand over the main responsibility for 
security to Afghan forces starting July 2011. 
 
-   Pakistan:  Pakistani political leadersincluding 
opposition party leaderscame together to support 
the Pakistani military operations.  This fall, the 
Pakistanis expanded their fight against extremists 
into the Mehsud tribal areas of South Waziristan 
along the border with Afghanistan.  Our strategy 
recognizes this shift and is designed to deepen our 
partnership with Pakistan as we redouble our 
efforts to assist the Pakistanis in their fight 
against our common enemy, the extremists. 
 
-   International Engagement:  The new implementation 
guidance places greater emphasis on an 
international contribution to Afghanistan, asking 
our allies to do more to support the civilian 
government and the growth of the Afghan National 
Army and Afghan National Police. 
 
-   Governance:  The new plan puts the emphasis on the 
Afghan Government to assume greater responsibility 
for combating corruption, improving governance and 
providing security for the Afghan people. 
If you are stating that you are withdrawing in 2011, 
won't the enemy just wait us out? Aren't you signaling a 
lack of resolve to the Afghans and the enemy? 
 
-   Let's be clear here.  Since President Obama came 
into office, he has nearly tripled the amount of 
U.S. forces and civilians in Afghanistan.  Our U.S. 
commitment speaks for itself.  This commitment, 
however, cannot and should not be open-ended.  The 
Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan people 
are capable and want to be self-governing and self- 
securing.  We will help them set the conditions 
over the next two years so that we can begin to 
transfer responsibility to them for security in 
July 2011. 
 
Why did the review take so long? 
 
-   This review looked at the problem from all 
directions and represented a whole of government 
approach. The President  by his deep personal 
engagement  took a team with a range of views on 
this matter and developed a consensus approach that 
creates an all-of-government effort in Afghanistan. 
 
-   The process was a serious look at the situation on 
the ground, the assumptions under which we were 
operating, and our goals and objectives in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The President led a 
serious review, ensured all views were heard, asked 
the central and important questions that forced 
members of his national security team to challenge 
their own staffs to think hard about the problem 
and even harder about the solutions. 
 
-   The President wanted to make sure that his effort 
to get the strategy right honored the men and 
women, military and civilian, U.S. and allied, who 
are risking their lives to implement it on the 
ground  as well as to our allies in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and elsewhere in the region, who are 
counting on this international effort to ensure 
regional security that goes far beyond the borders 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 
-   No additional units were sought before 2010, so the 
review did not result in any delay in getting 
additional troops into Afghanistan. 
Why should the American people support this revised 
strategy? 
 
-   Affording al-Qa'ida and its extremists allies an 
unchallenged safe haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan 
puts the United States and our allies around the 
world at an unacceptable level of risk. 
 
-   This strategy ensures that we are clearly focused 
on al-Qa'ida and the threat it poses to the 
Homeland. 
What is our strategy in Pakistan? 
 
-   Our partnership with Pakistan is linked to our 
efforts in Afghanistan.  To secure our country, we 
need a strategy that works on both sides of the 
border to ensure that al-Qa'ida cannot count on a 
safe haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan from which it 
plans attacks on us or our interests. 
 
-   The United States is committed to strengthening 
Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that 
pose the greatest threat to both of our countries. 
A safe haven for those high-level terrorists whose 
location is known, and whose intentions are clear, 
cannot be tolerated. 
 
-   Defeating these extremists requires a partnership 
with Pakistan.  This strategy affirms that 
partnership by providing $1.5 billion each year 
over the next five years to support Pakistan's 
development and democracy.  The United States has 
led a global effort to rally additional pledges of 
support. 
 
What is our new strategy in Afghanistan? 
 
-   We have a vital interest in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  We must keep the pressure on al-Qa'ida, 
and we must bring stability to the region.  This is 
the wellspring of the violent extremism practiced 
by al-Qa'ida.  It is from here that we were 
attacked on 9/11.  It is from here that new attacks 
are being plotted as we speak.  This is no idle 
danger, nor hypothetical threat.  In the last few 
months alone, we have apprehended extremists within 
our borders who were sent here from these safe 
havens to commit acts of terrorism. 
 
-   This danger will only grow if the region slides 
backwards, and al-Qa'ida can operate with impunity. 
And this burden is not ours alone to bear.  This is 
not just America's war.  Since 9/11, al-Qa'ida's 
safe havens have been the source of attacks against 
London and Amman and Bali.  The people and 
governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are 
endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a 
nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that 
al-Qa'ida and their allies seek nuclear weapons, 
and we have every reason to believe that they would 
use them. 
 
-   These facts compel us to act.  And our overarching 
goal remains the same:  to disrupt, dismantle, and 
defeat al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 
to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our 
allies from either country in the future. 
 
-   To meet that goal, we will pursue the following 
objectives within Afghanistan.  We must deny al- 
Qa'ida a safe haven.  We must reverse the Taliban's 
momentum and deny it the ability to control 
population centers.  And we must strengthen the 
capacity of Afghanistan's National Security Forces 
and government, so that they can take the lead and 
take responsibility for Afghanistan's future. 
Is the new approach COIN or CT? 
 
-   The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is 
complex requiring a multi-disciplined approach.  It 
includes elements of counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency. 
 
-   The President has committed the resources to 
degrade the Taliban and ensure it does not 
overthrow the Afghan Government. 
 
-   At the same time, we are expanding our 
counterterrorism campaign. 
 
-   The new approach draws on the expertise of General 
Petraeus  the country's foremost expert on COIN 
and General McChrystal  the country's foremost 
expert on counterterrorism, and is reinforced by 
Ambassador Eikenberry, who has served three tours 
in Afghanistan in both civilian and military 
capacities.  We will use both approaches to target 
extremists, train new security forces, and transfer 
authority to a capable Afghan force. 
The American public seems to no longer support sending 
troops to Afghanistan - is it time to leave? 
 
-   The President recognizes that this may not be the 
most popular decision, including within his own 
party.  But he is committed to keeping the American 
people safe. And this strategy will keep the heat 
on al-Qa'ida, which still seeks to do us harm, 
while more rapidly training Afghans to assume 
security operations in their own country.  As we 
transition to Afghan lead, we will begin to bring 
our troops home. 
I have heard analysts say that al-Qa'ida is in Pakistan 
and not in Afghanistan.  Why aren't we focusing more on 
Pakistan? 
 
-   We are focusing on both Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
We are working closely with the Pakistani military 
to support their efforts to country extremists in 
their territory, while continuing to train Afghans 
so that al-Qa'ida will not have a safe haven in 
either country. 
 
-   We have a vital interest in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  We must keep the pressure on al-Qa'ida, 
and we must bring stability to the region.  It is 
from here that we were attacked on 9/11.  It is 
from here that new attacks are being plotted as we 
speak.  This is no idle danger, nor hypothetical 
threat.  In the last few months alone, we have 
apprehended extremists within our borders who were 
sent here from these safe havens to commit acts of 
terrorism. President Karzai has done little to 
demonstrate that he has changed.  Why should we invest 
further in Afghanistan without first seeing progress 
in improving Afghanistan governance from Karzai? 
 
-   In his inauguration speech, President Karzai 
announced a new chapter with the Afghan people and 
outlined a new Compact with his people focused on 
improving governance, reducing corruption, 
reintegrating insurgents who wish to come back into 
Afghan society, enhancing economic development, and 
helping Afghanistan establish its role in the 
region. 
 
-   In the area of corruption, President Karzai has 
already established a Major Crimes Task Force and 
an Anti-Corruption Tribunal, demonstrating his 
commitment to fighting corruption. 
 
-   President Karzai has publicly and privately 
expressed his desire for progress in these key 
areas in Afghanistan in the months and years ahead, 
and renewed his commitment to serve the Afghan 
people who have reelected him as their President. 
We will continue to demand results from the Afghan 
Government and will ensure that our investments are 
targeted to well-functioning and transparent 
institutions and individuals. 
 
This year, Afghanistan became the second most corrupt 
nation in the world, ranking 179th out of 180 countries 
on Transparency International's 2009 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, falling from 176th in 2008 and 172nd 
in 2007.  Why hasn't the United States been able to 
reduce corruption in Afghanistan, and what does the 
United States intend to do differently under the new 
strategy? 
 
-   The United States Government recognizes that the 
high level of corruption in Afghanistan undermines 
security, development, and rule of law objectives, 
undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan Government, 
and contributes to the country's illicit narcotics 
trade. 
 
-   In his inauguration speech, President Karzai has 
announced his desire to address corruption and 
recently announced the establishment of a Major 
Crimes Task Force (MCTF) and the Anti-Corruption 
Tribunal (ACT).  He also announced plans to reform 
the existing High Office of Oversight. 
 
-   President Karzai has publicly and privately 
expressed his desire for progress in these key 
areas in Afghanistan in the months and years ahead, 
and renewed his commitment to serve the Afghan 
people who have reelected him as their President. 
We will continue to demand results from the Afghan 
Government and will ensure that our investments are 
targeted to well-functioning and transparent 
institutions and individuals. 
We haven't seen much progress in building the Afghan 
police and military in the past few years?  Why should 
we believe that we will be able to hand over to Afghans 
anytime soon? 
 
-   Training efforts to date have been underresourced, 
and the plan developed by General McChrystal draws 
on the lessons learned from Iraq. 
 
-   General McChrystal's plan calls for us and our 
allies to accelerate our efforts to build the 
Afghan National Security Forces, and calls for a 
substantial increase in trainers and support to 
grow the Afghan National Security Forces. 
 
-   Until this year, training the Afghan National 
Security Forces was not a priority and not properly 
resourced.  We have not yet begun to feel the full 
effect of the 4,000 new U.S. trainers we deployed 
in September.  Increased participation by our NATO 
allies in training efforts, focused leadership 
development, expanded training units, and other 
efforts aimed at improving retention within the 
forces, will accelerate progress. 
 
We have heard a lot about the disagreement between 
General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry.  What has 
been the reaction of Ambassador Eikenberry and General 
McChrystal to the President's decision?  Will the 
additional resources and guidance meet General 
McChrystal's needs as outlined in his assessment? 
 
-   General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry 
released statements affirming their commitment to 
our mission in Afghanistan. 
 
-   The President has full confidence in General 
McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry. 
 
-   They will testify together soon after the 
President's announcement. 
 
Your own Ambassador to Afghanistan questioned the wisdom 
of adding new troops.  Why was Ambassador Eikenberry 
wrong? 
 
-   You know, the President did bring together people 
with a range of views on this effort.  And over the 
course of 10 meetings and 30 hours of 
deliberations, he brought them together to a 
consensus, all-of-government approach on one of the 
world's most volatile regions. 
 
-   Ambassador Eikenberry fully supports General 
McChrystal's assessment and has never opposed the 
addition of troops, which are necessary to bolster 
the Afghan National Security Forces.  He fully 
supports the President's decision.  Ambassador 
Eikenberry was a key participant of the review 
process, and he expressed his views fully and 
privately. 
 
Can Congress have access to the Eikenberry cables?  If 
not, why not? 
 
-   Ambassador Eikenberry will be available to discuss 
his viewpoints with Members. 
 
-   His communications were part of a confidential, 
presidential deliberative process. 
 
What is the political solution in Afghanistan?  We were 
hoping for an Afghan President with a mandate from the 
electorate and the legitimacy that entails.  We don't 
have that; so can we achieve our mission with this 
current Afghan Government? 
 
-   President Karzai has an extraordinarily difficult 
job.  He had important accomplishments during his 
first term, but there were also disappointments. 
We welcome President Karzai's inaugural commitment 
to working towards our common goals in security, 
providing services to the Afghan people, anti- 
corruption, and economic reconstruction. 
 
-   Governance is not just about Kabul or President 
Karzai; legitimacy is not just about elections. 
 
-   Our new strategy recognizes the political 
dimensions of the Afghan conflict.  It supports 
Afghan Government efforts to reintegrate those 
willing to renounce al-Qa'ida, lay down arms, and 
participate in the free and open society enshrined 
in Afghan constitution. 
 
President Karzai has as his Vice President a known 
warlord and as a key backer an accused war criminal. 
How can the United States Government do business with 
these kinds of people? 
 
-   In recent years, President Karzai has appointed 
competent ministers in key ministries, and we will 
continue to partner with such ministers. 
 
-   The face of the Afghan Government for many Afghans 
is their local leadership, tribal elders, or 
religious figures, not the central government. 
 
-   Our new strategy is to expand our partnership with 
these and other sub-national actors and 
institutions, in coordination with the national 
government. 
 
What steps will you take to make sure our own aid and 
contracting doesn't fuel corruption? 
 
-   Given the great amount of resources devoted to 
Afghanistan, our programs and processes receive 
extraordinary measures of oversight, including by a 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction. 
 
-   USAID programs have been audited multiple times, 
and all United States Government agencies are 
required by law to vet potential contractors' names 
against public websites to ensure that money isn't 
going into the hands of known terrorists and 
criminals. 
 
-   A viable, licit economy and increased security are 
the long-term solutions to cutting down on this 
kind of criminality. 
 
-   We work closely with the Afghans and international 
partners to take tactical action against specific 
targets involved in financing of the Taliban and 
al-Qa'ida and to build the capacity of our Afghan 
partners in strategic areas to better track their 
funds. 
 
Aren't we going to be continuing to have to put in 
billions of dollars per year for the next 10, 20, 30 
years, and aren't we going to have to leave our troops 
there for the foreseeable future?  When does it end? 
How long will we have our troops there, and how long 
 
 
-   This new strategy is designed to more rapidly train 
Afghans so they can join in the fight to secure 
their country.  President Karzai wants Afghanistan 
to assume security responsibilities as soon as 
possible  and that is what this strategy will do. 
 
-   And even as we drawdown our combat forces at the 
end of this extended surge, we will contribute to 
international training and financial support to 
Afghan National Security Forces. 
 
-   Our economic assistance and civilian support to 
Afghanistan will be long term.  Afghanistan is one 
of the world's poorest countries and is susceptible 
to violent extremism that impacts U.S. interests. 
 
To me this plan and the vast amounts of resources that 
will inevitably come with it are nation-building 
extraordinaire (Senator Corker characterized the 
Administration's efforts this way at an earlier 
briefing).  How can we afford to do this during a time 
when Americans are out of work and hurting; and when we 
have record deficits?  Are you proposing to pay for this 
new Afghanistan surge by just adding to the debt and 
putting it on the backs of our kids and grandkids or are 
you going to raise taxes?  Is the Administration willing 
to make some tough trade-offs here? 
 
-   All of our programs in Afghanistan are tied to our 
national security objective  to prevent the return 
of al-Qa'ida.  Preventing al-Qa'ida's return 
requires strengthening Afghan institutions to 
oppose violent extremism. 
 
-   This is not nation building.  It is a targeted 
effort to target extremists, train capable Afghan 
forces, and transfer authority to those forces and 
the Afghan Government. 
 
Why aren't NATO countries and the rest of our allies 
putting more troops and resources on the table? 
 
-   Other allies and partners have indicated support 
for the President's announcement, and we are now 
engaged in extensive discussions regarding 
additional assistance, including troops, trainers, 
and financial commitments. 
 
-   NATO committed additional resources following our 
March 2009 strategy announcement. 
 
-   Japan recently announced $5 billion in assistance 
for Afghanistan, and many other countries have 
expanded their support. 
 
What does victory in Afghanistan look like? 
 
-   When the Afghans can take control of their own 
security and can handle a degraded Taliban and when 
al-Qa'ida does not have a safe haven in either 
Afghanistan or Pakistan. 
 
Aren't you coming up short on your promised tripling of 
civilians?  When are they all going be on the ground? 
What's taking so long? 
 
-   State and other civilian agencies have moved faster 
in surging staff into Afghanistan than ever before; 
we have more than doubled the number of civilians 
already on the ground since January, and we are on 
track to meet the goal of tripling the number of 
civilians  with the right people in the right 
place at the right time.  This is a sharp contrast 
to the experience in Iraq where civilians were 
deployed to meet numerical goals but without the 
right skills. 
 
-   Today, we have names and arrival dates for all but 
66 positions  which means that 94 percent of the 
positions will be filled by the end of the year or 
very early next year. 
 
-   The civilian plan has adapted to evolving 
requirements -- we accelerated our schedule by 
three months and expanded the number to incorporate 
new needs identified by Ambassador Eikenberry and 
his team during the course of the strategic review. 
 
If Afghanistan is the national security priority you say 
it is, why do we not even have 1,000 civilians serving 
there versus the tens of thousands of troops?  When is 
the State Department finally going to step up to the 
plate and have some capacity? 
 
-   Unlike their military counterparts, civilians are 
selected and deploy as individuals, not battalions. 
 
-   The civilian impact is far greater than numbers: 
the average civilian leverages 10 partners -- 
locally employed staff, Afghan and international 
experts from U.S.-funded NGOs. 
 
-   There's a different purpose and way of working on 
the civilian side:  we want the civilians 
supporting and building the capacity of their 
Afghan counterparts who must be the forward face of 
these shared programs. 
 
Why are we still so reliant on private contractors in 
Afghanistan and even in Pakistan?  Why is Blackwater / 
Xe still operating in both countries? 
 
-   We do not want to get into a discussion about what 
contractors may or may not be operating in 
Afghanistan or Pakistan. 
 
-   Even while we are providing greater resources to 
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, State and USAID are 
implementing a major shift in how we program funds. 
 
-   Pursuant to the President's push to move away from 
contractors, we are: 
 
-   Doing more through the governments of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, even while reinforcing their 
Ministries' abilities to account for and implement 
programs; and 
 
-   Identifying local NGOs who can take on more 
programs, with oversight from a larger number of 
direct-hire Americans who are more directly 
involved in designing and monitoring programs. 
 
-   Contract services are sometimes needed.  For those 
cases, we have strengthened monitoring and 
contracts.  We have clearly signaled zero tolerance 
of contractor impropriety and our actions to force 
the removal of misbehaving employees and to review 
terms of such contracts sends that message loudly. 
 
Al-Qa'ida's top leadership is in Pakistan; terrorists 
from Pakistan infiltrated Mumbai, India, and killed 
dozens of people; and all I see in this latest plan is 
more coddling of the Pakistani Government.  We've 
treated the Pakistanis with kid gloves the past eight 
years..when are we finally going to play some hard 
ball? 
 
-   Pakistan is a complex country, but also a critical 
ally in our common effort to fight violent 
extremists and promote regional security.  We have 
a serious and ongoing dialogue with Pakistan on 
combating al-Qa'ida and other extremists in South 
Asia.  We work cooperatively with Pakistan to 
strengthen its counterinsurgency capacities to 
combat extremists. 
 
-   We understand and appreciate the sacrifices the 
people of Pakistan are making to win the war 
against extremism and bring security and peace to 
their country.  Hundreds of Pakistani security 
officials have been killed in the fight against al- 
Qa'ida and the Taliban in Pakistan. 
 
Do you believe the Pakistani Government maintains ties 
to extremist groups? 
 
-   We have made clear to Pakistan that confronting 
violent extremism of all types is in its own 
interest and in the interest of regional stability. 
 
-   The Government of Pakistan increasingly sees 
violent extremists as a threat to the Pakistani 
state as well as to regional stability. 
 
Isn't the Pakistani Government just as corrupt as the 
Afghan Government?  Isn't our money going to be wasted, 
especially if you move ahead with your plans to put more 
money through Pakistani organizations? 
 
-   We take corruption in Pakistan seriously and are 
taking measures to monitor closely our aid 
disbursement in Pakistan and to make sure that it 
accomplishes its intended purpose. 
 
-   Among the steps we are taking: 
 
-   The appointment of Ambassador Robin Raphael as the 
economic assistance coordinator in Pakistan to 
closely supervise all assistance to the country; 
 
-   Establishment at Embassy Islamabad of offices for 
the Inspectors General for State, USAID, and DOD; 
and 
 
-   Planning to increase the number of USAID personnel 
in Pakistan to supervise ongoing projects there, 
including at the provincial and local levels. 
 
If we can't make progress without India and Pakistan 
coming to some agreement, what are you doing to work on 
that? 
 
-   We have strong bilateral relations with India and 
Pakistan that are based on shared interests. 
 
-   We believe both India and Pakistan have an 
important role to play in stability and security of 
South Asia.  We are engaged with them both and 
encourage them to work together to bring peace to 
their region. 
 
-   Ultimately, it is up to India and Pakistan to set 
the pace and parameters for improving their 
relations. 
 
Recent reporting, including by Seymour Hersh, indicate 
that Pakistani nuclear weapons are unsafe and that the 
United States has plans to seize Pakistan's nuclear 
assets.  Can you assure the American people that 
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is 100 percent safe? 
 
-   The United States has no intention to seize 
Pakistani nuclear weapons or material and has 
confidence in the ability of the Pakistani 
Government to protect is nuclear assets. 
 
Does the United States have plans to seize Pakistan's 
nuclear weapons if they are in danger? 
 
-   The United States has no intention to seize 
Pakistani nuclear weapons or material and has 
confidence in the ability of the Pakistani 
Government to protect is nuclear assets. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Budgetary Implications of the Af-Pak Strategy 
 
The President's decision to expand the U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan is based on the best interests of U.S. 
security.  The financial costs were a concern, but not 
the concern. 
 
The direct costs for the military related to the new 
strategy in Fiscal Year 2010 are expected to range 
between $25 billion and $30 billion.  There may be 
additional costs associated with, for instance, the 
diplomatic and civilian components of this strategy. 
More precise figures will be determined in the next two 
weeks. 
 
How much will it cost to deploy these troops to 
Afghanistan? 
 
-   The direct costs for the military related to the 
new strategy in Fiscal Year 2010 are expected to 
range between $25 billion and $30 billion.  More 
precise costs will be determined in the next two 
weeks. 
 
-   In addition, there may be costs associated with the 
diplomatic and civilian components of this 
strategy, as well as some limited DOD and 
intelligence costs not directly related to the 
surge (higher fuel costs, for instance). 
 
-   Let's be clear: the President's decision to expand 
the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is based on the 
best interests of U.S. security.  The financial 
costs were a concern, but not the concern. 
 
-   The Administration is in the process of finalizing 
the financial side of this strategy.  We will look 
to see how much of these costs can be addressed 
through the funds already budgeted.  The 
Administration will work with Congress on any 
necessary additional funding. 
 
Won't this lead to more deficit spending? 
 
-   All war costs are  and will be  accounted for in 
the President's budget unlike the practice of the 
previous administration. 
 
-   As the President has made clear time and again, he 
takes our large deficits seriously, and as part of 
the FY 2011 budget process, we are exploring ways 
to put our nation on a more solid fiscal footing. 
 
Does the Administration support a war tax to pay for 
this escalation? 
 
-   The President has demonstrated his commitment to 
being honest and upfront about the costs of 
military operations, and included $130 billion to 
cover the anticipated costs of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in his Fiscal Year 2010 budget.  That 
transparency makes the fiscal impacts clear and 
understandable. 
 
-   The Administration is in the process of finalizing 
the financial side of this strategy.  We will look 
to see how much of these costs can be addressed 
through the funds already budgeted.  The 
Administration will work with Congress on any 
necessary additional funding. 
 
IF PRESSED:  Are you ruling out a war tax? 
 
-   The Administration will work with Congress to find 
the best way to pay for the new strategy in 
Afghanistan, as well as for the 68,000 troops 
already there and the troops who continue to serve 
in Iraq  costs that have been pushed aside for too 
long. 
 
-   The President has demonstrated his commitment to 
being honest and upfront about the costs of 
military operations, and included $130 billion to 
cover the anticipated costs of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in his Fiscal Year 2010 budget.  That 
transparency fully owns up to the costs of this war 
and insists that they get added to the overall 
budget debate that is going to have to take place 
over the next several years. 
 
Do you think these increased war costs will jeopardize 
your domestic agenda? 
 
-   No. 
 
-   In developing his budget, the President is keenly 
aware of the interaction between domestic and 
international priorities and the importance of 
both. 
 
Why are the final cost numbers not available now? 
Weren't they essential to the President's decision 
process? 
 
-   The President's decision was informed by a reliable 
estimate of approximately $1 million per soldier 
per year.  The costs informed the President's 
decision, but did not determine it. 
 
-   The President's decision to expand the U.S. mission 
in Afghanistan is based on the best interests of 
U.S. security.  The financial costs were a concern, 
but not the concern.  They informed the President's 
decision, but did not drive it. 
 
-   Final figures are dependent in part on operational 
decisions (i.e., speed of deployment, timing of 
deployment).  Now that the strategy decision is 
final, the Administration will work to provide more 
thorough data on the best approaches to execute the 
mission. 
 
Will additional funding only be requested for the 
Defense Department?  Or does the Administration 
anticipate needing funds for other departments? 
 
-   The President outlined a comprehensive strategy for 
Afghanistan.  While the major funding will be for 
the military, there also may be requirements for 
the State Department, for medical care for our 
troops, and for other activities. 
 
-   The Administration is working through the overall 
mission requirements now and expects final 
financial cost data within two weeks. 
 
Surely, the State Department will need more funding. 
You're talking about a civilian surge to help with 
humanitarian and development needs.  How much will that 
require? 
 
-   There may be additional costs associated with the 
diplomatic and civilian components of this 
strategy.  There also are programmatic activities 
that may be necessary as the troop level expands in 
Afghanistan. 
 
-   The Administration is working through the potential 
policy and resource implications for all of the 
departments and agencies. More precise figures will 
be determined in the next two weeks. 
 
-   Final figures are dependent in part on operational 
decisions (i.e., speed of deployment, timing of 
deployment) and a consideration of the overall 
impacts.  Now that the strategy decision is final, 
the Administration will work to provide more 
thorough data on the best approaches to execute the 
mission. 
 
Will you need more money to pay for the medical care for 
our troops, especially when they come home? 
 
-   The medical care of our troops and our veterans is 
a top priority for this President.  The 
Administration is committed to ensuring that our 
troops receive the best quality care for their 
injuries, and the best support as they return home. 
 
-   If it's determined that additional funds are 
necessary to ensure that quality of care for our 
troops and veterans, then the Administration will 
work with Congress to provide those resources. 
 
IF PRESSED:  But are you doing enough now to prepare for 
what will surely be a bigger strain on Defense and VA 
medical care? 
 
-   The President has proposed a record funding 
increase for the VA  providing over $25 billion in 
new money over the next five years.  A primary 
focus area is improving treatment for post- 
traumatic stress, traumatic brain injury (TBI), and 
associated ailments -- the signature military 
medical challenges facing the Department for years 
to come. 
 
-   The President also pressed the Defense Department 
for substantial improvements to the care for 
wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers -- 
especially increased screening and treatment of 
mental health conditions.  The Defense Department 
is completing additional wounded warrior complexes 
at posts throughout the continental U.S., as well 
as sites in Alaska, Hawaii and Germany. 
 
-   If it's determined that additional funds are 
necessary to continue providing high-quality care 
to our troops and veterans, then the Administration 
will work with Congress to provide those resources. 
 
Will you need to request supplemental funding? 
 
-   The Administration will look to see how much of 
these costs can be addressed through the funds 
already budgeted.  The Administration will work 
with Congress on any necessary additional funding. 
 
Earlier this year, didn't you say, "No more supplemental 
bills"? 
 
-   The President's budget requested $130 billion for 
full-year funding for the then-anticipated costs in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  The President has made clear 
his commitment to funding the wars in an upfront, 
transparent manner. 
 
-   The Administration will work with Congress on any 
additional funding necessary because of changes to 
our strategy. 
 
Isn't the Administration's estimate  roughly $1 
million/troop  larger than the Pentagon early cost 
estimate (approximately $500k/troop)? 
 
-   In the initial accounting, DOD provided estimates 
with a limited scope, looking almost exclusively at 
direct costs per soldier, such as pay, food, 
medical support, and personal equipment like body 
armor. 
 
-   In the final accounting, the Administration builds 
on the Pentagon data, providing more thorough cost 
estimates that include support and equipment 
functions such as mine resistant, ambush-protected 
(MRAP) armored vehicles and other major, necessary 
items.  These costs tend to increase as troop 
levels increase. 
 
-   The final Administration accounting also may 
include funding needed for the other departments. 
 
IF PRESSED for more on the differences between early 
Pentagon cost assessments and Administration 
assessments: 
 
There are two basic methods used to estimate the costs 
of additional troops for Afghanistan.  Both methods 
provide only rule-of-thumb estimates of the potential 
costs of adding more troops.  The cost estimates below 
are therefore a range of the potential costs rather than 
an exact number. 
 
-   The first method (DOD method) captures costs that 
result directly from deploying more troops, such as 
pay, food, medical support, fuel, equipment 
maintenance and repair, and personal equipment 
(e.g., body armor).  This method yields an 
estimated cost per troop of about $500,000, taking 
into account costs in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
well as support costs in the region.  In 
Afghanistan, where costs are generally higher due 
to its difficult terrain and poor infrastructure, 
the estimated cost per troop is roughly $700,000. 
 
-   The second method (Administration method) "fully 
burdens" the cost per troop with a pro-rata share 
of other war-related costs in Afghanistan, such as 
major end-item purchases like airplanes, 
helicopters, trucks (including mine-resistant 
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles), as well as 
military construction and the costs to train and 
equip the Afghan security forces.  These costs are 
not directly linked to the number of deployed 
troops, but tend to increase as troop levels 
increase.  This method yields an estimated cost per 
troop of roughly $1 million. 
 
¶11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
CLINTON