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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1964, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; December 16, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1964 2009-12-18 02:55 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO9729
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1964/01 3520255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180255Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6492
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9522
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0618
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7055
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7114
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1609
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5431
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4361
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7572
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1845
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3149
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2225
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2831
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 001964 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; December 16, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, All TVs 
"People Have Misgivings;" President Lee Puts the Brakes on Allowing 
Profit-Seeking Hospitals 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Ministries Clash over For-Profit Hospitals 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
Ruling Party Seeks to Adopt ROKG's Soon-to-be-Unveiled 
New Sejong City Plan as Party Platform to Prevent Cross-Voting 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun, Seoul Shinmun 
President Lee's "Stubbornness on Four-River Project" 
Paralyzes National Assembly 
 
Segye Ilbo 
Number of College Students on Overseas Language Courses More Than 
Doubled in Eight Years 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
USFK Commander Gen. Walter Sharp, in a Dec. 14 forum organized by 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington, said that even after the ROK's takeover of wartime 
operational control from the U.S. in 2012, the ROK and the U.S. 
militaries will conduct joint military operations under a "single 
operational plan" in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. 
(Chosun) 
 
He was also quoted as saying: "Sometime in the future we could have 
forces (in Korea) that could, with consultations between both 
nations, be able to be deployed in different places around the 
world." (All) 
 
The ROK and the U.S. are reportedly seeking to establish a Defense 
Guideline in order to cooperate in the event of an emergency on the 
Korean Peninsula. (JoongAng, Hankook, Segye, Seoul) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
The U.S. said on Dec. 14 that it regards Thailand's recent seizure 
of a cargo plane carrying North Korean weapons as (North Korea's) 
violation of UN Resolution 1874 and will report the incident to the 
UN's North Korea Sanctions Committee. (Chosun, JoongAng, Hankook, 
Hankyoreh, Segye, Seoul) 
 
It was learned yesterday that North Korea has decided to ban 
foreigners from the country from Dec. 20 until early February. 
Experts viewed this move as designed to prepare for North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il's visit to China or to ease unrest caused by its 
recent currency reform. (Chosun) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
 
The media continues to follow the story of Thailand's recent seizure 
of a cargo plane carrying North Korean weapons.  Most media noted 
Dec. 14 press remarks by State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly, in 
which he said: "The next step here will be to report this incident 
to the UN's North Korea Sanctions Committee, the so-called 1718 
 
SEOUL 00001964  002 OF 004 
 
 
Committee, which has a mandate to investigate and take appropriate 
action in response to incidents like this." 
 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was also widely quoted as saying 
on Dec. 14: "We were very pleased to see the strong action taken by 
the Thais.  It shows that sanctions can work.  It shows that 
sanctions can prevent the proliferation of weapons." 
 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun, however, in an inside-page article, 
highlighted Secretary Clinton's statement: "I don't think anyone 
should be surprised that North Korea is continuing to attempt to 
evade the sanctions and export around the world, because that is 
their principal source of foreign currency,"   and interpreted this 
as indicating Washington's intention not to bring the seriousness of 
this incident to the spotlight. 
 
With regard to Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen 
Bosworth's recent visit to Pyongyang, a commentary in 
right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo observed: "North Korea will return to 
the Six-Party Talks, even if it takes some time.  The U.S. will have 
a dialogue with the North within the Six-Party framework in keeping 
with President Obama's grand design of a nuclear-free world.  A 
nuclear-free world will not come without the resolution of the North 
Korean nuclear issue.  ...   In a situation where the North is 
softening its rhetoric and the U.S. is taking a positive view of 
such change from the North, the ROK should also soften its North 
Korea policy before the gap between the views of the ROK and the 
U.S. regarding the North widens too much." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
-------------------- 
 
IT IS TIME TO SOFTEN HARD-LINE POLICY TOWARD N. KOREA 
(JoongAng Ilbo, December 16, 2009, Page 39) 
By Senior Reporter Kim Young-hie 
 
According to the ROKG's high-ranking source, U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth heard what he 
wanted to hear from North Korean officials in Pyongyang last week. 
The U.S. wanted to know North Korea's true intention about the 
September 19, 2005 Joint Statement.  North Korea, which considers 
the Statement still valid, expressed its intention to abide by it. 
The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement is the only agreement in 
which the North promised to give up its nuclear weapons and 
nuclear-weapons development programs.  The source said that 
Ambassador Bosworth was highly encouraged by North Korea's remarks 
that the Statement is valid and that the North will adhere to it. 
 
North Korea also acknowledged the need for the Six-Party Talks. 
This is welcome progress heralding the resumption of the 
multilateral talks, which were suspended after the sixth round of 
the talks broke down in December, 2008 due to conflicts over how to 
verify North Korea's nuclear declaration.  North Korea declared the 
Six-Party Talks "dead for good."  It boasted that, as a nuclear 
state not bound by the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, it 
will have a nuclear arms reduction negotiation with the U.S. on an 
equal footing.  In order to return to the Six-Party Talks that the 
North had declared "dead," however, the communist state needed a 
justification and therefore asked the U.S. to provide a 
"face-saving" way to rejoin the talks.    The U.S.'s position is 
that Ambassador Bosworth's visit to the North could serve as that 
justification. 
 
No one knows when the North will return to the Six-Party Talks. 
Ambassador Bosworth says that time for strategic patience is needed. 
Although the term "strategic" is often abused in international 
relations, in using the term "strategic patience" Ambassador 
Bosworth seems to mean that he will watch for changes in North 
Korea's attitude without being fussy about minor details.  If the 
U.S. exercises strategic patience, even the detention of a cargo 
plane in Thailand loaded with 30 tons of weaponry, including North 
Korean-made rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air missile 
launchers and modified missiles, will not likely change the course 
 
SEOUL 00001964  003 OF 004 
 
 
of defusing tension between the North and the U.S. 
 
The North's position that it will rejoin the Six-Party Talks 
whenever it is provided with appropriate justification implies a 
great deal.  Pyongyang seems to have realized that their tactic of 
pressuring the Obama Administration with the second nuclear test and 
missile launches, even before the newly launched administration 
could present its policy on North Korea, was rarely beneficial to 
the communist state.  One U.S. expert on North Korea said after 
visiting Pyongyang before Ambassador Bosworth that it appeared that 
North Korea did not feel the pain of international sanctions. 
However, North Korea's series of conciliatory gestures toward the 
ROK and the U.S. seems to be clear evidence showing that the 
sanctions against the North by the international community and the 
U.S. are hitting the North hard.  It appears, therefore, that North 
Korea started to launch its charm offensive on the U.S. after former 
U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit to Pyongyang this past August. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted in October, 2006, does 
not specify the conditions for lifting the sanctions.  Therefore, 
when the Democratic Party members of the U.S. Congress started to 
criticize the Bush Administration by saying that the sanctions, 
especially the financial sanctions, against the North was a failure, 
the administration resumed its bilateral talks with the North within 
the Six-Party framework, lifted the sanctions, and even took North 
Korea off the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries.  However, 
UNSC Resolution 1874, issued this June, clearly states that the 
lifting of sanctions is conditioned on North Korea's irreversible 
steps toward denuclearization.  Even if the U.S. wants to lift 
sanctions, it would be impossible without the consent of the 
international community, including other Six-Party nations.  North 
Korea must have been well aware of this.  This means that if the 
North implements its obligations under the September 19 Joint 
Statement and returns to the Six-Party Talks, the prospects for the 
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will be brighter than 
ever before. 
 
Judging from these results, it was effective in the short term for 
the ROK to have reacted coolly to the string of conciliatory 
gestures that the North has taken since this summer.  The ROK's 
strategy was to wait until the effect of the sanctions is maximized. 
 Now is the time for the ROK to also soften its hard-line stance in 
line with signs of change in the U.S. attitude toward North Korea. 
If the ROK continues in taking a hard-line stance against the North, 
it will be less effective.  President Obama won the Nobel Peace 
Prize "on credit."  He should pay for the prize by doing something 
for world peace. 
 
North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks, even if it takes 
some time.  The U.S. will have a dialogue with the North within the 
Six-Party framework in keeping with President Obama's grand design 
of a nuclear-free world.  A nuclear-free world will not come without 
the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.  For President 
Obama, success at the U.S.-organized Nuclear Security Summit 
scheduled for next spring and the 2010 Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty Review Conference is desperately needed.  In a situation 
where the North is softening its rhetoric and the U.S. is taking a 
positive view of such change from the North, the ROK should also 
soften its North Korea policy before the gap between the views of 
the ROK and the U.S. regarding the North widens too much. 
 
 
MEASURES NEEDED TO BRACE FOR USFK'S TRANSFORMATION INTO RAPID 
DEPLOYMENT TROOPS 
(JoonAng Ilbo, December 16, Page 38) 
 
The U.S. is preparing to transform U.S. forces in the ROK into rapid 
deployment troops that could be dispatched to other parts of the 
world (where the U.S. faces conflict.)  On December 14, USFK 
Commander Gen. Walter Sharp stressed the need for the USFK to be 
more regionally engaged and globally deployed.  Previously, in an 
address to US troops at Osan Air Base last month, President Barack 
Obama also hinted at the possibility of sending U.S. forces in the 
ROK to Afghanistan.  In October, Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of 
 
SEOUL 00001964  004 OF 004 
 
 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff made similar remarks.  An agreement on 
"strategic flexibility" was reached between the ROK and the U.S. in 
2006, paving the way for the USFK to be dispatched overseas.  So 
far, the USG has been cautious in adopting that policy.  But recent 
remarks by U.S. high-ranking officials show a change in the USG's 
position.  The USFK, which has been devoted to defending the Korean 
Peninsula since the Korean War, will soon serve as rapid deployment 
troops like U.S. soldiers stationed in Okinawa. 
 
Former President Roh Moo-hyun championed self-defense and demanded 
that the ROK take over wartime operational control from the U.S. 
Following his remarks, former U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who 
was considering ways to effectively utilize U.S. forces stationed in 
foreign countries, strongly argued that the U.S. and the ROK should 
leave open the possibility for the US Forces Korea (USFK) to be 
dispatched overseas.  This led both countries to strike an agreement 
on "strategic flexibility."  Before strategic flexibility was 
introduced, the U.S. bore the responsibility to defend the ROK. 
Under the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, the USFK Commander would 
exercise wartime operation control and fully utilize combat 
resources of the ROK and the U.S. in case of an emergency. 
(However,) strategic flexibility and transfer of wartime operational 
control to the ROK will allow the U.S. to alleviate its burden to 
defend the ROK and to transform the USFK into rapid deployment 
troops. 
 
This change means that the ROK should take a broader responsibility 
to defend itself.  Some observers say that this should be taken for 
granted due to an expansion of our national power.  However, the ROK 
still faces security concerns.  Such an argument will become 
realistic only after North Korea denuclearizes, the ROK and North 
Korea disarm and security takes hold on the Korean Peninsula and in 
East Asia.  If the USFK turns into rapid deployment troops under the 
concept of strategic flexibility, this will affect the ROK's 
relations with neighboring countries such as China, Japan, and 
Russia.  We may have to accept changes that accompany the 
implementation of this new approach.  We also should brace ourselves 
to minimize any ill effects (from the USFK becoming rapid deployment 
troops). 
 
We have argued that the ROK and the U.S. should review the ROK's 
takeover of wartime operational control from the U.S. in 2012.  This 
position is in keeping with the argument that it is too early to 
apply strategic flexibility to the USFK given the Korean Peninsula's 
security conditions. 
 
 
STEPHENS