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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1941, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; December 11, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1941 2009-12-14 01:17 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO4749
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1941/01 3480117
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140117Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6464
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9508
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0603
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7038
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7097
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1592
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5415
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4345
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7558
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1831
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3134
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2211
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2817
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 001941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; December 11, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, All TVs 
Foreign Language High Schools Get Handed New Rules; 
Must Trim Class Sizes, Adopt Admissions Officer System and Reflect 
Only English Scores in Screening Process 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Bosworth Says U.S., N. Korea Reach Common Understanding 
to Resume Six-Party Talks and Implement 
September 19 Joint Statement 
 
Segye Ilbo 
ROK's Economic Growth Expected to Hit 5 Percent Next Year 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
ROKG to Create 200,000 More Jobs Next Year 
 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
-------------------- 
 
North Korea yesterday accepted the ROKG's offer of antiviral drugs 
aimed at helping the North deal with H1N1 flu. The ROKG plans to 
provide antiviral drugs for about 500,000 people to the North. 
(All) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea 
Policy, told reporters after returning to Seoul yesterday from his 
three-day trip to Pyongyang that the U.S. and North Korea reached a 
common understanding on the need to resume the Six-Party Talks. 
(All) 
 
Ambassador Bosworth, however, said that it remains to be seen when 
or how the North will return to the Six-Party Talks, adding, "This 
is something that will require further consultations among all six 
of us." (All) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-N. Korea: Ambassador Bosworth's Visit 
-------------------------------------- 
Coverage of yesterday's press remarks in Seoul by U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth was 
extensive, with most newspapers offering front-page articles about 
his three-day visit to North Korea. 
 
Coverage highlighted Ambassador Bosworth's statements: "We 
identified some common understandings on the need for, and the role 
of, the Six-Party Talks and the importance of implementation of the 
2005 Joint Statement;" "It remains to be seen when and how the DPRK 
(North Korea) will return to the Six-Party Talks;" "We did not ask 
for, nor did we meet with, Chairman Kim Jong-il;" "These (meetings) 
were exploratory talks, not negotiations;" and "As for a message to 
the North Koreans from President Obama, in effect, I am the 
message." 
 
Most media expected further U.S.-North Korea talks to come after 
consultations among the five members of the Six-Party Talks 
excluding North Korea. 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo viewed this visit to Pyongyang by 
Ambassador Bosworth as successful in maintaining the momentum of 
dialogue, and observed in an editorial: "(Ambassador Bosworth's 
 
SEOUL 00001941  002 OF 005 
 
 
remarks) mean that there will be difficult diplomatic negotiations 
between the North and the other parties of the Six-Party Talks 
before the multilateral talks actually resume." 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized: "We cannot give good marks 
to North Korea, which did not clearly promise to return to the 
Six-Party Talks.  If we must talk about the achievement of this 
dialogue, it seems to be that the U.S. and North Korea exchanged 
their true intentions for the first time. ...  If North Korea 
acknowledged the need for the Six-Party Talks, it has no reason to 
drag its feet.  The later the North rejoins the Six-Party Talks, the 
harsher the suffering caused by the UN sanctions." 
 
An editorial in moderate Hankook Ilbo stated: "We don't think that 
Ambassador Bosworth's visit to North Korea was meaningless.  The 
fact that the two sides have shared the importance of implementing 
the September 19 Joint Statement, which provides the raison d'tre 
of the Six-Party Talks, represents a great step forward toward 
restarting the Six-Party Talks.  As Ambassador Bosworth put it, if 
the two sides had candid and sincere talks, their mutual trust could 
also be deepened further.  We hope that this (momentum) will lead 
the U.S. and North Korea to reach an agreement to resume the 
Six-Party Talks as early as possible through ... further dialogue." 
 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun editorialized: "Since the U.S. has 
demonstrated its determination for negotiations, it is North Korea's 
turn to make a decision.  More than anything else, there is no 
reason for the North to delay its return to the Six-Party Talks. 
Any issues of concern - whether it is a peace treaty, normalization 
of ties or economic aid - can be discussed only when the Six-Party 
Talks resume." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
WHAT NEXT IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH N. KOREA? 
(Chosun Ilbo, December 11, 2009, Page 35) 
 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth 
returned empty-handed from a three-day visit to North Korea.  But he 
said he had "extensive and useful talks" with North Korea's Vice 
Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, identifying "some common ground" on 
the need for and the role of the Six-Party Talks and the importance 
of the implementation of the 2005 statement of principles. 
 
However, Bosworth said it remains to be seen when and how North 
Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks, and that further 
negotiations would be necessary with the ROK, China, Japan and 
Russia.  In other words, tough negotiations remain. 
 
Regarding North Korea's demand for Washington to sign a peace treaty 
to replace the armistice that halted the Korean War, Bosworth said 
all of the participants are ready to discuss a peace regime once the 
Six-Party Talks resume.  The September 19 statement of principles 
adopted during the Six-Party Talks back in 2005 stipulates that 
negotiations will take place over a permanent peace framework on the 
Korean Peninsula.  The offer by the U.S. does therefore not go 
beyond the parameters of the terms agreed so far. 
 
North Korea will try to use the peace treaty as a reason for 
returning to the Six-Party Talks, and once the negotiations resume, 
the North could even demand a withdrawal of U.S. troops from the 
ROK.  A peace treaty should be discussed between the ROK and North 
Korea, with the U.S. and China playing supporting roles.  Seoul must 
come up with compelling logic to convince the U.S., China, Japan and 
Russia (to take supporting roles, instead of lead roles, with 
respect to a peace treaty) and map out precautionary measures. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
LEE ADMINISTRATION MUST TAKE FIRST STEP TOWARDS DIALOGUE WITH N. 
 
SEOUL 00001941  003 OF 005 
 
 
KOREA 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, December 11, 2009, Page 35) 
 
Steven Bosworth, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, 
made the statement, "Talks in North Korea have been worthwhile" on 
Thursday after completing his three-day visit to North Korea.  This 
statement can be interpreted to mean that although Bosworth did not 
obtain North Korea's pledge to return to the Six-Party Talks, he 
believes that both the U.S. and North Korea felt that they were able 
to communicate their intended messages to each other.  It also seems 
from what was the first official meeting of high-ranking officials 
between the U.S. and North Korea since Barack Obama's inauguration 
that both sides are committed to increasing their efforts to resolve 
the North Korea nuclear issue. 
 
The U.S. has clearly shown its commitment to resolving the core 
problems that North Korea has discussed at the negotiation tables. 
Representative examples are the matter of the peace agreement and 
building a peace system.  Bosworth explained the U.S. intention to 
directly present the peace agreement that U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton has made reference to several times.  Accordingly, 
there is a high possibility that if the Six-Party Talks restart, the 
framework for a peace agreement more concrete than the September 19, 
2005 Joint Statement could be made.  The six parties could 
immediately begin to work on peace agreement negotiations. 
 
The reason why North Korea has been emphasizing the peace agreement 
is that it wants to receive a security guarantee from the U.S. that 
would carry over in the event of a transition in administrations. 
The Obama Administration seems to recognize that request in light of 
the fact that the nuclear negotiations have been so full of twists 
and turns. 
 
Since the U.S. has demonstrated its determination for negotiations, 
it is North Korea's turn to make a decision.  More than anything 
else, there is no reason for the North to delay its return to the 
Six-Party Talks.  Any issues of concern - whether it is a peace 
treaty, normalization of ties or economic aid - can be discussed 
only when the Six-Party Talks resume. 
 
The Lee Administration should reset its North Korea policy in order 
to increase its role in negotiations on denuclearization of the 
peninsula.  Up until now, the Lee Administration has put weight on a 
policy of pressure that has slowed down any progress towards 
dialogue.  Moreover, inter-Korean relations have been in a stalemate 
as a result of insisting on denuclearization as a prerequisite for 
dialogue.  This kind of attitude from the Lee Administration makes 
the nuclear issue much more difficult to resolve in that it also has 
narrowed North Korea's options. 
 
From this point forward, the Lee Administration should enact a 
policy that supports nuclear negotiations and a positive circle of 
communication surrounding inter-Korean relations and the North Korea 
nuclear issue.  Above all, the ROKG should resolve the issues 
concerning the resumption of the Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong tourism 
projects as soon as possible and secure a channel of communication 
between high-ranking officials of both countries. 
 
Presently, other participants in the Six-Party Talks are moving 
towards earnest nuclear negotiations in a calm but clear manner.  It 
is essential for the Lee Administration to make a sincere 
contribution now in order to bear the fruits that could come from 
the current situation. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
EVEN THOUGH OUTCOME OF BOSWORTH'S N. KOREA VISIT IS DISAPPOINTING 
(Hankook Ilbo, December 11, Page 39) 
 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth 
returned to Seoul yesterday after his three-day visit to Pyongyang. 
But the outcome of his visit seems disappointing.  At a press 
 
SEOUL 00001941  004 OF 005 
 
 
conference, Ambassador Bosworth said, "We identified some common 
understandings on the need for, and the role of, the Six-Party Talks 
and the importance of implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement." 
He added, however, "It remains to be seen when and how the DPRK 
(North Korea) will return to the Six-Party Talks."  This shows that 
he didn't receive assurances from North Korea that it will return to 
the Six-Party Talks.  That is why his remarks that this visit was 
very useful sound quite hollow. 
 
Of course, we did not expect that his visit would lead to an 
immediate resolution of the North Korean (nuclear) issue.  The North 
demanded a peace treaty (with the U.S.), which the U.S. is unlikely 
to accept, as a precondition (for returning to the Six-Party Talks.) 
 Meanwhile, the U.S. wanted to limit the bilateral talks to a 
discussion of the North's return to the Six-Party Talks  and the 
implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement.  Still, we 
considered the possibility that both sides might reach an agreement 
dramatically and achieve a breakthrough in resuming the Six-Party 
Talks.  However, this did not happen.  In addition, the U.S. and 
North Korea did not agree on the schedule of their future talks. 
 
But we don't think that Ambassador Bosworth's visit to North Korea 
was meaningless.  The fact that the two sides shared the importance 
of implementing the September 19 Joint Statement, which provides the 
raison d'tre of the Six-Party Talks, represents a great step 
forward toward restarting the Six-Party Talks.  As Ambassador 
Bosworth put it, if the two sides had candid and sincere talks, 
their mutual trust could also be deepened further.  We hope that 
this (momentum) will lead the U.S. and North Korea to reach an 
agreement to resume the Six-Party Talks as early as possible through 
a New York channel or further dialogue. 
 
A peace treaty, which North Korea strongly demands, should be 
discussed within the framework of the Six-Party Talks because it is 
stipulated in the September 19 Joint Statement.  If North Korea 
insists on signing a peace treaty (with the U.S.) without pledging 
to return to the Six-Party Talks, we cannot but suspect that the 
North has ulterior motives.  Six-Party countries need to pay more 
attention to establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula in 
order to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. 
 
 
DELAYED RESUMPTION OF SIX-PARTY TALKS WILL INCREASE N. KOREA'S 
SUFFERING 
(Dong-a Ilbo, December 11, 2009, Page 35) 
 
The U.S.-North Korea dialogue was held for the first time since the 
launch of the Barack Obama Administration, but, in the end, the 
North did not promise to return to the Six-Party Talks.  During his 
three-day two-night stay in Pyongyang, U.S. Special Representative 
for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth only met with North Korea's 
First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju and Chief Nuclear Envoy Kim 
Kye-gwan.  Ambassador Bosworth said at yesterday's press conference 
in Seoul that he did not request a meeting with North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-il, nor did he carry President Obama's personal letter for 
Kim.  In other words, it was a working-level dialogue where both 
sides exchanged what they wanted to say. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth said, "(The U.S. and North Korea) identified 
some common understandings on the need for and the role of the 
Six-Party Talks and the importance of the implementation of the 2005 
Joint Statement."  He indicated that the dialogue was meaningful. 
Although it is encouraging that the North, which had declared the 
Six-Party Talks dead, acknowledged the need for the multilateral 
talks and mentioned the implementation of the September 19, 2005 
Joint Statement, it is too early to say that North Korea will 
change.  The U.S. repeatedly emphasized that it would not reward 
North Korea simply for returning to the Six-Party Talks.  We cannot 
give good marks to North Korea, which did not clearly promise to 
return to the Six-Party Talks. 
 
If we must talk about the achievement of this dialogue, it seems to 
be that the U.S. and North Korea exchanged their true intentions for 
the first time.  While mentioning the possibility of dialogue, North 
 
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Korea hinted that it would not continuously aggravate the situation 
with its brinkmanship tactics.  Ambassador Bosworth also stressed 
that he had "very useful" talks in North Korea.  The talks can be 
said to be beneficial to the U.S., too, since it obtained direct 
information on the North, based on which Washington can judge North 
Korea's intention and future strategy.  An ROKG official took a 
neutral view of the dialogue, saying that it was neither a success 
nor a failure. 
 
Following his briefing to the ROKG, Ambassador Bosworth will visit 
China, Japan, and Russia starting today to explain the results of 
the meeting with the North and discuss future measures.  Follow-up 
consultations will continue to assess the outcome of the U.S.-North 
Korea dialogue and determine how to respond (to the North Korean 
issue). 
 
North Korean leader Kim has said that he would decide whether to 
participate in the Six-Party Talks, depending on the outcome of the 
U.S.-North Korea contact.  If North Korea acknowledged the need for 
the Six-Party Talks, it has no reason to drag its feet.  The later 
the North rejoins the Six-Party Talks, the harsher the suffering 
caused by the UN sanctions.  As President Obama said to the North 
through Ambassador Bosworth, if the North abandons its nuclear 
ambitions, it will have a different future.  A return to the 
Six-Party Talks is the starting point of that road. 
 
 
STEPHENS