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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1925, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; December 7, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1925 2009-12-07 07:58 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO9097
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1925/01 3410758
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070758Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6427
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9484
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0579
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7013
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7072
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1567
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5390
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4321
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7534
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1807
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3110
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2187
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2793
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 001925 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; December 7, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
ROKG, Representatives of Labor and Management Agree to Allow Company 
to Pay One or Two Full-Time Unionists 
at Small and Mid-Sized Companies 
after Company-Paid Wage Ban Takes Effect Next July 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Climate Talks Begin in Copenhagen Today 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
ROKG Spares No Pains to Make Upcoming Visit by China's Vice 
President Xi Jinping Successful 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
"Slow" Is Keyword for New Year's ROK Economy; Major Economic 
Research Institutes Predict Slow Economic Recovery in ROK Next Year 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun, Segye Ilbo 
Clash Expected between Ruling Party and Main Opposition Democratic 
Party (DP) over New Labor Agreement, 
as DP Opposes It 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
Price Caps on New Real Estate in Free Economic Zones 
to be Eliminated Next Year 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth 
arrived in Seoul yesterday for talks with ROK officials on agenda 
items ahead of his Dec. 8-10 visit to North Korea. (All) 
 
According to sources with the National Assembly, the Defense 
Ministry will review the ROKG's plan to extend the tour of troops to 
be dispatched to Afghanistan from the original one year to two and a 
half years, because ruling and opposition lawmakers called for a 
review of the period, claiming: "It's not appropriate for Korean 
troops to stay in Afghanistan when President Barack Obama has 
announced plans to start withdrawing U.S. troops beginning in July 
2011." (JoongAng) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-Afghanistan Strategy 
---------------------- 
State-run Yonhap News Agency carried a report from Washington on 
Saturday (Dec. 5) quoting U.S. National Security Adviser James Jones 
as saying in a Dec. 4 press briefing: "The U.S. has no intention of 
leaving Afghanistan in the near future, certainly not in 2011."  The 
report viewed this remark as aimed at precluding concerns in the 
region - following President Obama's statement on withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011 - that the U.S. may 
completely pull out troops from the war-torn country by 2011. 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
All ROK media today covered U.S. Special Representative for North 
Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth's arrival in Seoul yesterday for talks 
with ROK officials on agenda items ahead of his Dec. 8-10 visit to 
the North. 
 
Most media noted that Ambassador Bosworth dodged reporters waiting 
at the arrivals terminal by getting into a car on the tarmac and 
went to his quarters in downtown Seoul.  An ROKG source was quoted 
 
SEOUL 00001925  002 OF 006 
 
 
as saying: "It seems that he made a strategic decision to refrain 
from any public statement before he attends the first bilateral 
talks with North Korea." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo observed: "There are fears that the 
(upcoming U.S.-North Korea) talks will not produce  tangible 
results, because North Korea wants a peace treaty to replace the 
armistice before it even thinks about returning to the Six-Party 
Talks." 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo editorialized: "If North Korea demands a peace 
treaty on the Korean Peninsula and improved relations with the U.S. 
as preconditions for returning to the Six-Party Talks and 
implementing the September 19 Joint Statement, the U.S. may respond 
in a flexible manner.  The U.S. may judge that a rigid attitude - 
offering rewards only when the North dismantles its nuclear weapons 
completely - will not bring any changes to North Korea, and seek the 
North's nuclear dismantlement through the normalization of bilateral 
ties. ... The ROKG should proactively prepare for any changes (on 
the Peninsula) which may occur due to improvements in U.S.-North 
Korea relations, rather than simply being wary of possible 
discussions on a peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea." 
 
-Climate Change 
--------------- 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized today: "It is still unclear 
whether the 192-nation Copenhagen climate change conference will 
produce an agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol.  However, even 
though the conference fails to work out a legally binding agreement, 
the prevailing opinion is that a new agreement will be coming in six 
months or a year because the international community must prepare 
for a situation after (the Kyoto Protocol expires in) 2012 by 
developing an agreement on climate change." 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo, in a joint editorial with 56 
newspapers around the world, argued: "Few believe that Copenhagen 
can produce a fully polished treaty; real progress towards one could 
only begin with the arrival of President Obama in the White House 
and the reversal of years of U.S. obstructionism.  Even now the 
world finds itself at the mercy of American domestic politics, for 
the president cannot fully commit to the action required until the 
U.S. Congress has done so.  But the politicians in Copenhagen can 
and must agree on the essential elements of a fair and effective 
deal and, crucially, a firm timetable for turning it into a treaty. 
Next June's UN climate meeting in Bonn should be their deadline." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
(WE) SHOULD BE WELL PREPARED FOR SITUATION FOLLOWING BOSWORTH'S 
VISIT TO N. KOREA 
(Hankook Ilbo, December 7, Page 39) 
 
A five-member U.S. delegation led by U.S. Special Representative for 
North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth will visit North Korea tomorrow 
to hold bilateral talks with the North.  Bosworth's delegation, 
which arrived in the ROK yesterday, will fly to Pyongyang from Osan 
Air Base and stay until December 10.  He will have a meeting with 
Kang Sok-ju, the North's First Vice Foreign Minister and is expected 
to call on North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. 
 
The visit by Ambassador Bosworth as President Obama's special envoy 
to North Korea will serve as an important turning point in the North 
Korean nuclear issue.  His visit draws extraordinary attention since 
it marks the first official U.S.-North Korea talks during the Obama 
Administration.  The U.S. said that it will not engage in 
negotiations (with the North) but focus on urging the North to 
rejoin the Six-Party Talks and to implement the September 19 Joint 
Statement.  However, we take this with a grain of salt.  It is 
highly likely that both sides will extensively discuss how to make 
progress on the North Korean nuclear issue, improve bilateral 
relations and establish a security regime on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
 
SEOUL 00001925  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
There are both optimistic and pessimistic outlooks for the bilateral 
talks.  Some worry that the North may attempt to back away from the 
September 19 Joint Statement that calls on the North to abandon its 
nuclear programs in return for receiving a security guarantee and 
economic assistance, while demanding a peace treaty in order to be 
recognized as a nuclear state.  This will dampen the rare atmosphere 
of dialogue and lead to an escalation of conflict and confrontation 
between the two countries again. .  North Korea should not try to 
test the will of the other Six-Party countries and the international 
community.  The North will never be allowed to develop its nuclear 
programs. 
 
However, If North Korea demands a peace treaty on the Korean 
Peninsula and improved relations with the U.S. as preconditions for 
returning to the Six-Party Talks and implementing the September 19 
Joint Statement, the U.S. may respond in a flexible manner.  The 
U.S. may judge that a rigid attitude - offering rewards only when 
the North dismantles its nuclear weapons completely - will not bring 
any changes to North Korea, and seek the North's nuclear 
dismantlement through the normalization of bilateral ties.  A peace 
regime on the Korean Peninsula, which is stipulated in the September 
19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement, should be 
discussed within the framework of the Six-Party Talks.  The ROKG 
should proactively prepare for any changes (on the Peninsula) which 
may occur due to improvements in U.S.-North Korea relations, rather 
than simply being wary of possible discussions on a peace treaty 
between the U.S. and North Korea. 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
U.S. ENVOY IN SEOUL BEFORE N. KOREA TRIP 
(Chosun Ilbo, December 7, 2009, Page 4) 
 
By Reporter Lim Min-hyuk 
 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth, 
who visits Pyongyang on Dec. 8-10, arrived in Seoul on Sunday for 
talks before he heads for the North. 
 
Bosworth arrived at Incheon International Airport but dodged 
reporters waiting at the arrivals terminal by getting into a car on 
the tarmac, which was arranged by the U.S. Embassy, and went to his 
quarters in downtown Seoul. 
 
An ROKG source said that the USG requested cooperation from the ROKG 
to minimize ROK media contact with Ambassador Bosworth. 
 
On the flight, Ambassador Bosworth happened to meet and talk with 
Grand National Party lawmaker Chung Mong-joon who was returning from 
his trip to South Africa.  However, Bosworth refrained from talking 
about his visit to North Korea, saying no one knows how the North 
will respond. 
 
Ambassador Bosworth will meet the chief ROK envoy to Six-Party 
denuclearization talks Wi Sung-lac on Monday to discuss the agenda 
of the Washington-Pyongyang talks, and will also meet Foreign 
Minister Yu Myung-hwan and Kim Sung-hwan, the Senior Presidential 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security. 
 
He flies to Pyongyang from the U.S. Air Base in Osan on Tuesday 
afternoon and there he will meet with First Vice Foreign Minister 
Kang Sok-ju and other officials. 
 
There are fears that the upcoming U.S.-North Korea talks will not 
produce tangible results, because North Korea wants a peace treaty 
to replace the armistice before it even thinks about returning to 
the Six-Party talks. 
 
(This is a translation prepared by the newspaper.  We have compared 
the English version on the website with the Korean version and added 
some sentences to make them identical.) 
 
 
SEOUL 00001925  004 OF 006 
 
 
 
CLOSE COVERAGE COMPLETELY BANNED FOR BOSWORTH'S ARRIVAL 
(Yonhap News, December 6, 2009) 
 
By Reporter Yu Hyun-min 
 
Ambassador Bosworth dodged reporters by moving straight out of the 
tarmac. 
 
On the afternoon of December 6, U.S. Special Representative for 
North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth arrived at Incheon International 
Airport to have consultations with the ROK before his December 8 
visit to the North.  However, he did not allow "close media 
coverage." 
 
After arriving at Incheon International Airport around 4 p.m. on a 
Korean Air flight from London, Ambassador Bosworth landed on the 
tarmac by going down the emergency stairs, which are installed at 
the boarding bridge linking an aircraft with an airport terminal, 
and left the airport in a black Ford passenger car arranged by the 
U.S. Embassy in Seoul. 
 
In order to avoid reporters, he did not enter the terminal but 
headed straight for a hotel in downtown Seoul. 
 
Therefore, 38 domestic and foreign reporters, who were staking out 
(the airport) were only able to see him going down the stairs and 
boarding the car through the (airport) window. 
 
This "ban on close coverage" was reportedly requested by the U.S. 
Department of State. 
 
An ROK Foreign Ministry official said, "At the request of the U.S. 
Embassy in Seoul, Ambassador Bosworth will not enter the airport 
terminal but move right from the tarmac to a hotel by car," adding, 
"It seems that he made a strategic decision to refrain from any 
public statement before he attends the bilateral talks with North 
Korea." 
 
Besides this, it was reported that the U.S. did not notify Foreign 
Ministry officials which hotel Ambassador Bosworth and his 
delegation would stay during their visit to Seoul. 
 
Another official noted, "The U.S. Embassy in Seoul did not inform us 
where Ambassador Bosworth is going to stay in downtown Seoul.  This 
is unusual, considering the customs so far." 
 
Ambassador Bosworth reportedly even plans to keep his schedule and 
movements in Seoul s-e-c-r-e-t, except the opening (photo spray) at 
a December 7 meeting with the ROK's chief nuclear envoy, Wi 
Sung-lac. 
 
In particular, according to sources, he will skip a "door step 
(photo opportunity and press availability in public)" after the 
meeting with Wi, and he has not yet determined when he will brief 
the media on his visit to the North after returning from Pyongyang 
(to Seoul). 
 
In this regard, some observers point out that even though Ambassador 
Bosworth's "media-averse" attitude can be seen as a strategic 
judgment on U.S.-North Korea bilateral dialogue, this is too much. 
 
In other words, while  media contact before his dialogue with the 
North could be burdensome, it is hardly understandable that he will 
not "expose" his movements, which draw local and global attention, 
without any clear explanation in advance. 
 
A diplomatic source said, "Although it could be a matter of personal 
style regarding the media, I cannot understand how he can think he 
is able to avoid contact with the media on such a significant issue. 
 I wonder if he would take the same attitude in a similar situation 
in the U.S." 
 
 
 
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AFGHANISTAN STAYS COULD BE SHORTENED 
(JoongAng Daily, December 7, 2009) 
 
By Reporters Kang Joo-an and Seo Ji-eun 
 
The Defense Ministry is considering reversing the government's plan 
to extend the tour for troops dispatched to Afghanistan from the 
original one year to two and a half years, said sources with 
National Assembly. 
 
Reporting to the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly 
in a closed-door meeting last Friday, the ministry said, "We will 
submit a plan to the National Assembly around Friday to dispatch 340 
troops (to Afghanistan.) 
 
The dispatch period will be from July next year until December 2012, 
it said.  On Oct. 30, the ROKG announced it would send troops to 
protect civilian professionals working on reconstruction projects in 
the war-torn Central Asian country. 
 
However, opposition lawmakers and even some ruling Grand National 
Party members asked the ministry to review the period, claiming it 
is too long.  To date, military deployment has been made on a yearly 
basis and the period has been extended with approval from the 
National Assembly. 
 
"It's not appropriate for ROK troops to stay in Afghanistan when 
U.S. President Barack Obama announced plans to begin withdrawing the 
U.S. army beginning in July 2011," according to multiple sources who 
attended the meeting. Defense ministry officials answered that they 
"will review" the lawmakers' proposal. 
 
Separately, one source said some of the attendants said that UH-60 
Black Hawks are feared to be vulnerable to surface-to-air missile 
attacks.  The ministry said troops "should move in the helicopters 
due to the danger of improvised explosive devices." 
 
 
JAMES JONES SAYS U.S. WON'T LEAVE AFGHANISTAN IN 2011 
(Yonhap News, December 5, 2009) 
 
By Correspondent Seong Ki-hong 
 
U.S. National Security Advisor James Jones said on December 4 that 
the U.S. will not pull out its troops from Afghanistan in the near 
future and certainly not in 2011. 
 
During a press conference with foreign reporters on the U.S.'s 
strategy on the Afghan war, Jones said, "The U.S has no intention of 
leaving Afghanistan in the near future, certainly not in 2011" 
 
It seems that this remark is aimed at precluding concerns in the 
region - following President Obama's statement on withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011 - that the U.S. may 
completely pull out troops from the war-torn country by 2011. 
 
Johns said, "We are very confident that by the application of over 
100,000 U.S. troops and a significant increase in the (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) NATO and non-NATO contributing 
countries, we will be able to achieve the conditions by which 
Afghans will be able to take more responsibility for the conduct of 
their internal affairs."  He emphasized, "That will allow us to 
start bringing some of our troops home.  Of course that will have to 
be conditioned obviously on the situation on the ground." 
 
However, Jones noted, "But when you have a mission like this, it 
simply cannot be that it's just going to go on forever.  And the 
President has decided to focus everyone's attention on a reasonable 
time frame in which we can see real change." 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. expressed its gratitude to the international 
community including NATO nations for deciding to deploy an 
additional 7,000 troops in line with President Obama's plan to 
infuse more troops in Afghanistan.  The U.S. also added that it 
 
SEOUL 00001925  006 OF 006 
 
 
expects additional military contributions in the near future. 
 
White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs said, "I think 7,000 additional 
NATO troops is a hefty contribution on their part," adding, "That is 
obviously a very, very positive development." 
 
In a regular briefing, State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly said, 
"NATO and (the International Security Assistance Force) ISAF - and 
their ISAF partners pledged to contribute about 7,000 more troops, 
and we expect that there will be several thousand more likely in the 
near future." 
 
 
STEPHENS