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Viewing cable 09SANTIAGO1188, Elections in Chile: Media Impact on Public Opinion

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SANTIAGO1188 2009-12-07 16:55 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Santiago
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #1188/01 3411659
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071655Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0381
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
UNCLAS SANTIAGO 001188 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR R/MR, I/PP, WHA/BSC, WHA/PDA, INR/IAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KMDR KPAO CI
SUBJECT: Elections in Chile: Media Impact on Public Opinion 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Despite extensive and well-developed media in Chile, 
there is little evidence that it has played a large role in shaping 
public opinion in the national elections of 2009.  While 
even-handed coverage of the main presidential candidates is 
indicative of a healthy and free press in democratic Chile, it also 
suggests that the Chilean news media do not have a specific agenda 
to influence votes.  The rise of social media such as Facebook, 
Flickr, YouTube, and Twitter as electoral media tools has been an 
innovation in the 2009 contest.  This is an important first for 
Chile and reflects an assessment by the candidates and their teams 
about the importance of the youth vote and the need to reach out to 
first-time voters. Strict legal limits on political advertising do 
result in an effort to gain press coverage by the staging of 
"events" and personal appearances to draw publicity.  Television 
advertising is especially tightly controlled and exists only in 
electoral spots called franjas electorales which are permitted in 
highly structured time segments and formats beginning 30 days prior 
to the election.  Although journalists say that once the first 
round of voting concludes and the candidates for the second round 
are known, there will be a renewed media push to do more in-depth 
reporting on the contenders, it appears unlikely that, with the 
exception of the need to keep their faces before the public, media 
coverage and opinion will significantly influence Chilean public 
opinion and the outcome of the election.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
2. The response of the Chilean electorate to press coverage and 
press opinion is decidedly different from that of many other 
countries.  Despite an extensive and well-developed media spectrum 
in Chile, the news media are not widely considered to play a large 
role in shaping public opinion in the national elections.  Most 
experts believe that informed audiences, who are the primary 
consumers of print, TV, and radio political reporting, are fixed in 
their positions on the political spectrum and that media coverage 
has not been and will not be a factor that changes voting patterns, 
particularly among older, experienced voters. 
 
 
 
3.  Chile has a robust and professional fourth estate.  Multiple 
national and local media outlets have carried extensive coverage of 
the presidential election campaign over the last year, with print 
and electronic media playing a key role in providing information 
about the candidates and their platforms.  During the past year, 
the three principal candidates -- Sebastian Pinera, Eduardo Frei, 
and Marco-Enriquez-Ominami -- have appeared in news reports and 
editorials thousands of times each. Even Communist Party candidate 
Jorge Arrate, whose candidacy remains a distant fourth, has been 
able to achieve reasonable and non-polemic coverage.  Clearly, 
while coverage totals have varied from month to month, no single 
candidate has dominated the media notably, with the possible 
exception of a slight edge for Pinera, which is understandable 
given his position as consistent front-runner in the opinion polls. 
 
 
 
 
4.  The even-handed coverage of the main presidential candidates is 
indicative of a healthy and free press and suggests that, with the 
exception of op-eds and other punditry, the Chilean news media do 
not have an aggressive agenda to influence votes.  While most media 
outlets, particularly newspapers, have an editorial position that 
favors more conservative status-quo politics and candidates, the 
young, media-savvy, left-of-center newcomer Enriquez-Ominami has 
been able -- despite controversial positions on issues such as gay 
marriage and drug use -- to gain significant positive coverage for 
his candidacy, even in more conservative publications.  Although 
some experienced political observers see darker underlying patterns 
in media coverage (for example, hyping the activities of one 
candidate during the time of political polling to detract public 
attention from another), no media blackout or unfair coverage of 
any of the candidates is apparent to most fair-minded observers. 
 
5.  The ascent of social media such as Facebook, Flickr, YouTube, 
and Twitter as electoral media tools has marked the 2009 
Presidential contest.  This is an important first for Chile and 
reflects the candidates'assessment that the youth vote matters and 
they to reach out to first-time voters.  In a November article, 
noted Chilean journalist and sociologist Arturo Arriagada offered 
his analysis of the success of the presidential candidates in 
exploiting the new media.  According to Arriagada, among the four 
social networks studied -- -- Pi????era leads with more than 66,000 
followers on Facebook; 22,000 on Twitter; and 162 videos on 
YouTube, although Enriquez-Ominami has the highest number of views 
on YouTube.  Enriquez Ominami is also the frontrunner in Twitter 
postings, and the most photos on Flickr.  Far behind in their use 
of social media are Frei and Arrate, who have not been able to 
attract audiences with their online presence.  The November 16 TV 
debate garnered unexpected interest among users of Twitter in 
Chile.  Immediately prior to the debate, the debate was among the 
top 10 "trending topics" in the country and during the debate 
itself, was one four most followed topics.  The impact of the 
social media on the final outcome remains to be studied but their 
entrance into the political arena as a new tool of persuasion is 
unlikely to diminish or disappear. 
 
 
 
6.  Although the perception among informed observers and political 
scientists is that the media have little real impact on voting 
patterns during the presidential elections, the candidates devote 
large amounts of time to organizing public events and making 
themselves available to the media for interviews and comment.  This 
openness and reach for media coverage may, in part, be due to the 
unusually strict legal limits on political advertising.  No 
political advertising is permitted in the mass media until one 
month prior to the election.  Beginning 30 days prior, all licensed 
broadcast television stations are required to air electoral spots 
(franjas electorales, produced by the campaigns for their candidate 
much in the manner of U.S. electoral advertising).  Even the manner 
of broadcast of the franjas is carefully controlled and balanced to 
prevent any candidate from gaining an advantage and to reduce the 
power of money on the purchase of television advertising.  For 
example, two 20-minute segments of franjas are aired daily at 
specified times.  One is dedicated to the presidential candidates, 
who are each allotted five minutes of air time, and the other to 
Congressional candidates.  Political advertising on radio and in 
print media, meanwhile, is less controlled and may be purchased 
like any other advertising, and there are no spending limits once 
the 30-day period commences.  Still, the paucity of paid political 
advertising in print and radio suggests that even media consultants 
are dubious about the ability of advertising anywhere to sway 
political positions in Chile.  In fact, in a November 20 national 
poll, nearly half (46 percent) claimed that not even electoral 
franjas would not sway their decision for President. 
 
 
 
7.  COMMENT:  In the final weeks before the first round of the 
presidential election on December 13, Chilean media continue to 
cover the candidates in their respective campaigns but the volume 
of reporting has decreased and coverage has a decidedly "tired" 
quality to it, perhaps a reflection of the campaigns themselves. 
Privately, journalists say that, once the first round of voting 
concludes and the two candidates for the second round are known, 
there will be a renewed push to do more in-depth reporting on the 
contenders.  It appears unlikely that, with the exception of the 
publicity factor, media coverage or opinion will be significantly 
influential on the outcome of the election.  Still, with gains from 
political advertising so limited, both candidates will feel the 
need to maintain highly visible public profiles to keep their faces 
and programs before the electorate.  In spite of the assessment 
that the media is not hugely influential once the voter reaches the 
voting booth, no candidate is willing to forego daily coverage, and 
the more media exposure, the better.    END COMMENT. 
SIMONS