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DE RUEHRB #0998/01 3560852
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P 220852Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0979
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0018

UNCLAS RABAT 000998 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
AFRICA COMMAND FOR GENERAL WARD FROM CHARGE 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP MARR MASS PREL ECON PGOV PHUM EAID MO
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL WILLIAM WARD, COMMANDER, 
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  General Ward, we welcome you back to 
Morocco.  Morocco has been an exemplary partner in the 
struggle against terrorism, and our military and political 
cooperation is growing.  As a result, Morocco has been 
designated a Major non-NATO Ally.  Morocco serves as a 
regional model for economic change and democratic reform; yet 
it faces significant external and internal challenges, which 
U.S. assistance attempts to ameliorate. While Morocco's 
principal foreign tie is with Europe and it has advanced 
status with the European Union (EU), Morocco is one of our 
strongest allies in the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
(BMENA) region.  Its top priority is U.S. support for its 
position on the Western Sahara territorial dispute and for 
integration in North Africa.  End summary. 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Morocco is a country in the throes, albeit 
unevenly, of change and reform.  Economic growth has averaged 
about six percent per year; and investment, tourism and 
remittances have boomed, although they have been slowed by 
the global financial crisis.  Slums are coming down, and, 
according to the government of Morocco,s statistics, so is 
unemployment.  Freedom of the press has expanded, but there 
are still serious restrictions.  Those who challenge them can 
suffer heavy fines, libel judgments, and, more rarely, jail. 
Political freedoms have grown as well, although they remain 
constrained by a system in which Parliament lacks much power. 
 King Mohammed VI has stressed the need for judicial reform 
to revise a system that is widely seen as corrupt and 
inefficient.  Additional reforms could strengthen Morocco's 
democracy, but, with stability a priority, it could take 
decades. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Mission strategic goals are economic growth and 
reform, countering terrorism, promoting U.S.-Moroccan 
partnership, enhancing democracy and governance, and 
resolving regional conflicts while maintaining close 
strategic cooperation.  Military-to-military engagement 
contributes to advancing these goals.  We believe expanding 
Morocco,s economic base will do as much to address popular 
dissatisfaction with the political system as will 
strengthening democratic institutions.  The purchase of F-16 
and T-6 aircraft, and the enhanced engagement they will 
trigger, promotes modernization in a military already fully 
under civilian control.  U.S. military engagement focused on 
professional training and education programs helps 
counterterrorism efforts.  The robust interaction between our 
two militaries is an important example of institution 
building that is a centerpiece of our relationship.  The 
reinforcement of the Moroccan military helps maintain 
regional stability in a context of even greater Algerian 
modernization expenditure.  It assures the Government of 
Morocco that it is a strong, long-term Major non-NATO Ally, 
and it facilitates U.S. regional objectives not only in 
Africa but in the Middle East. 
 
------------------- 
Military Engagement 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Moroccan military has undertaken a sweeping 
effort to modernize a military force that fields 
predominantly Korean and Vietnam War era equipment.  While 
the F-16, T-6 and Gulfstream sales comprise the vast bulk of 
the dollar figure for this modernization, the total Foreign 
Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing portfolio 
totals some 100 cases in excess of USD 3 billion.  The list 
of pending or prospective sales includes 200 M1A1 main battle 
tanks; CH-47D and SH-60 rotary wing aircraft; Beechcraft 
operational/Distinguished Visitor (DV) support aircraft; 
Hawk, Chaparral and Stinger anti-aircraft systems; and 
solicitations for surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft 
and unmanned aerial vehicles.  Morocco is the second largest 
recipient of excess defense articles (EDA) from the U.S. 
These sales and transfers permit the Moroccan military both 
to hold its position as a regional power and be able to 
participate as a coalition partner.  They further solidify 
the substantial U.S. inclination by the Moroccan military, 
although there are competitors that can dramatically underbid 
U.S. offerings, and Morocco does not limit itself to U.S. 
equipment. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Military modernization further strengthens the 
Moroccan military by continuing and expanding exposure to 
 
U.S. doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and personnel. 
 The expanded requirement to train operators and maintainers 
in the U.S. for the F-16 and T-6 aircraft alone (over 160 
personnel) will practically equal the current annual training 
allocation for all Moroccan personnel across all the services 
and government organizations.  Moreover, the integration of a 
fourth generation fighter into the Royal Moroccan Air Force 
will stimulate a modernization of the full-spectrum approach 
to operating and sustaining such aircraft, from facilities to 
logistics to aerial employment to command and control.  This 
provides an unparalleled opportunity to shape our engagement 
with the Royal Air Force.  A superb boost this year was the 
selection of Morocco to participate in the CSAF Counterpart 
Visit program.  These engagement activities add to a robust 
exercise program that includes AFRICAN LION, PHOENIX EXPRESS, 
SAHARAN WIND, AFRICAN PARTNERSHIP STATION, AFRICAN ENDEAVOR 
and FLINTLOCK, in addition to at least two annual JCETs.  The 
Royal Moroccan Air Force has also requested the revival of 
MAJESTIC EAGLE, an annual air exercise that the U.S. 
suspended due to OIF and OEF commitments in 2003. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The GOM has been formally invited to participate in 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and extended 
USD 1 million to support a program in Morocco.  Under the 
GPOI program, the U.S. intends to provide peace keeping 
operations training and other support to the Moroccan 
military so that it can continue to develop and sustain peace 
operations capacity.  Africa Command proposed Morocco as a 
potential GPOI partner for FY 2009 during the Fall 2008 and 
the GPOI Coordinating Committee agreed to that proposal in 
Spring 2009.  The current plan proposed for Morocco is to 
provide training and facilities refurbishment to a peace 
operations training center in Morocco.  In order to ensure 
long-term sustainability, the GPOI program incorporates 
train-the-trainer elements into its training events.  The 
Mission is working with the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation, which will coordinate Morocco,s 
GPOI request, to finalize the program. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Embassy is currently engaged in negotiations 
with the GOM on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and 
Inspector General of the Armed Forces General (CHOD) Bennani 
has indicated interest in signing the Acquisition and Cross 
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the USG in the spring of 
¶2010.  However, the discussions over the SOFA have been 
ongoing for over a year.  The Moroccans, who hosted U.S. 
bases throughout the Cold War, may not be convinced a 
full-fledged SOFA is needed.  Unfounded rumors of prospective 
U.S. basing in connection with Africa Command have been 
publicly controversial here.  Nonetheless, both the SOFA and 
ACSA would benefit the Moroccan armed forces, and your 
support for these two efforts would be appreciated. 
 
--------------- 
External Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Troubles with Algeria:  The Moroccan relationship 
with Algeria is difficult, and the border between the two 
countries was closed by Algeria and remains closed.  While 
the King and other GOM officials have publicly proposed 
opening the border and upgrading bilateral relations between 
the two countries, their entreaties have been repeatedly 
rebuffed.  The Government of Algeria has linked progress on 
the border to all issues, particularly the Western Sahara. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Western Sahara:  Moroccan foreign policy is 
dominated by defending and seeking international recognition 
of its sovereignty claims over Western Sahara.  The issue 
remains the most visible source of tension with Algeria, 
which has historically supported the POLISARIO's quest for 
independence by way of a UN-sponsored referendum.  The issue 
led Morocco to leave the African Union and has been an 
obstacle to regional integration through the Arab Maghreb 
Union.  In April 2007, Morocco proposed a new autonomy plan 
for Western Sahara, and a series of UN-sponsored negotiations 
with the POLISARIO began in Manhasset, New York.  The 
Moroccan proposal, deemed "serious and credible" by the USG, 
would provide Sahrawis, the indigenous people of Western 
Sahara, autonomy in administering local affairs while 
respecting Moroccan sovereignty over the territory.  There 
have been four rounds of formal talks and one informal round 
near Vienna, Austria, in August. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Western Sahara Continued:  Following the 
controversial lapsing of the contract of the former UN 
Secretary General's Personal Envoy, the UN selected retired 
 
U.S. Ambassador Christopher Ross to be the new Personal 
Envoy, and he made his first visit to the region in February 
and his second in July.  While the informal talks produced no 
breakthroughs, the parties agreed to continue negotiations in 
an as-yet-to-be-determined format and location. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Western Sahara Continued:  Western Sahara 
experienced gross violations of human rights from 1975 until 
the end of King Hassan II,s regime, and repression 
intensified after the short-lived Sahrawi uprising of 2005. 
Since late 2006, Morocco has slowly improved the human rights 
situation in the territory.  Arbitrary arrests have sharply 
diminished and beatings and physical abuse by security forces 
have all but disappeared.  Dissenters cannot publish or speak 
publicly in support of independence or a vote on 
self-determination.  In 2008, known abusers were transferred, 
further easing the situation.  However, we saw an uptick in 
alleged abuses in early 2009. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Western Sahara Continued:  In Fall 2009, tensions 
rose as the Government arrested seven pro-independence 
activists and then deported Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights 
Prize recipient Aminatou Haidar.  Upon arrival in Laayoune 
from Lanzroute (Spain) on November 13, she had asserted that 
her nationality was Sahrawi and began the process to renounce 
Moroccan nationality.  Haidar is now recovering in Morocco 
from a hunger strike which she began in the Canary Islands 
(Spain) on November 14th.  The Embassy maintains a Human 
Rights Dialogue with the Moroccan government in order to 
address these and other human rights issues.  This situation 
was recently resolved.  The result was she was allowed into 
Morocco and is current in the hospital. 
 
--------------- 
Internal Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Current Government:  Prime Minister Abbas El 
Fassi's government, formed after the September 2007 
legislative elections, is currently built on a fragile 
coalition.  There has been periodic speculation that it might 
not last for the full five-year mandate.  El Fassi's 
government filled with young technocrats from within and 
outside his Istiqlal (Independence) party, has performed 
better than many expected, however, and it now looks capable 
of a full term.  El Fassi has participated extensively in 
international events and diplomacy.  Internal democracy is 
growing within political parties.  A political formation 
founded by Fouad Ali El Himma, an intimate of the King, has 
evolved into a new Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) 
by grouping several smaller parties.  It now constitutes the 
largest political bloc in Parliament, and could lead should 
the current coalition falter.  We currently see no prospect 
for a significant shift in Morocco's foreign and security 
policies.  However, neither Parliament nor the Prime Minister 
has much say in these issues, which are managed by the Throne 
directly with concerned ministries. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform:  Morocco's political parties 
and the bicameral parliament are weak and structurally 
hamstrung from taking legislative initiatives or strongly 
articulating dissent.  The Parliament provides no effective 
check on the monarchy or Government.  Changing the 
Constitution would be necessary in order to change the power 
imbalance and institute formal democracy, but both Parliament 
and parties will have to improve their capacity and 
performance first.  Nonetheless, both parties and Parliament 
have made some technical improvements, largely thanks to 
USG-funded programs from the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) and the State University of New York (SUNY), which have 
modestly improved the body's administrative capacity.  These 
include establishment of a budget analysis office, a verbatim 
transcription service, and a consistent forum for training 
and debate among parliamentary members and staff. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform Continued:  Although the 
September 2007 parliamentary elections were the most 
transparent in the country's history, record low 
participation (37 percent of registered voters) reflected the 
lack of voter confidence in the institution.  The State 
Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funded 
NDI to run the first ever international election observation 
in Morocco.  MEPI also supported an ambitious training 
program for women running for municipal councils in June 
after a quota was established reserving 12 percent of the 
seats for women.  Voter turnout in the June municipal 
elections was approximately 54 percent, and women captured 
 
nearly 13 percent of the seats, exceeding the number reserved 
for them. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Human Rights and Reform:  King Mohammed VI has 
embarked on a program of human rights reforms that include 
the Arab world's first truth commission and a revised Family 
Code.  Although Morocco is a paragon of reform in the region, 
the reforms are still not deeply rooted in law, tradition or 
Constitution and could be rolled back.  Continued support and 
encouragement from partners like the United States and Europe 
are essential. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Religious Freedom:  The Moroccan Constitution 
provides for the freedom to practice one's religion, although 
Islam is the official state religion.  The GOM prohibits the 
distribution of non-Muslim religious materials and bans all 
proselytizing, but tolerates several small religious 
minorities.  It also occasionally restricts Islamic 
organizations whose activities have exceeded the bounds of 
"acceptable religious practice" and become political in 
nature, lately targeting Shia.  Morocco has become protective 
of and even positive toward the tiny remnant of its once 
substantial Jewish minority. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Counterterrorism:  The terrorist threat in Morocco 
emanates especially from small grassroots radical Islamic 
cells, which have shown some capacity to attack.  In 2008, 
security forces disrupted six terrorist and foreign fighter 
cells, prosecuting 100 people.  So far this year, five cells 
have been disrupted, including one group of 24 who were 
detained in September.  The biggest threat is that attacks 
could deter tourism, an important component of the economy. 
The GOM's implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy emphasizing vigilant security measures, 
counter-radicalization policies, and robust international 
cooperation has been largely successful in containing the 
threat.  Economic disruption, whether from attacks or the 
global economic crisis, remains the principal threat to 
stability here, but most observers believe Morocco will 
manage, unless there is catastrophic collapse. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Counterterrorism Continued:  In early-October, a 
multi-agency Embassy team participated in two days of 
wide-ranging, frank discussions with representatives of the 
Moroccan Ministry of the Interior.  The discussions addressed 
issues including counterterrorism efforts, trafficking in 
persons, illegal migration, drug 
trafficking/counternarcotics, regional threats and stability, 
human rights, and assistance/development efforts.  Designed 
as a strategy session to share information and lay the 
groundwork for future engagement, both sides agreed that the 
talks were useful and could lead to substantive programmatic 
and other collaboration. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Counterterrorism Continued:  Under the King who as 
"Commander of the Faithful" leads Moroccan Muslims and Jews, 
Morocco has standardized religious doctrine, consolidated 
control over religious schools, and sent specially trained 
imams to Europe to preach moderate messages to the Moroccan 
Diaspora.  The vast majority of Morocco's population rejects 
Salafist and Wahhabist approaches to Islam and so does not 
support terrorist groups. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Economics, Trade, and Assistance 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) The economy is relatively healthy, with growth 
expected to be above five percent this year, but marred by 
increasing disparities in wealth.  Since implementation of 
our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on January 1, 2006, bilateral 
commerce has more than doubled.  A number of U.S. firms have 
increased their investment in Morocco, seeing new markets 
develop as a result of the FTA.  The Department of Commerce's 
Commercial Law Development Program and the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency conduct capacity building and technical 
assistance projects to assist Morocco to create an open and 
transparent trading environment and fully develop its trading 
potential. However, significant export growth to U.S. and 
other markets will also depend on Morocco's ability to 
capture a larger share of value added in its export products. 
 Targeted assistance programs from USAID and MEPI aim at 
improving Morocco's ability to produce and market its exports 
in key sectors. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) U.S. assistance to Morocco is focused on four 
priorities:  economic growth, counterterrorism, democracy and 
 
governance, and supporting quality education.  In addition to 
a 2009 USAID budget of USD 18 million, it includes projects 
through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and MEPI. 
 
¶23.  (U) The MCC signed a five-year, USD 697.5 million 
Millennium Challenge Account Compact with Morocco in 2007 to 
reduce poverty and increase economic growth.  The five-year 
clock started ticking on September 15, 2008, with the 
compact,s entry into force.  The MCA supports five major 
projects selected for their potential to increase 
productivity and improve employment in high potential sectors 
of Morocco's economy:  Fruit Tree Productivity, Small Scale 
Fisheries, Crafts, Financial Services, and Enterprise Support. 
 
¶24.  (U) Morocco benefits from several MEPI programs, 
including country-specific projects and inclusion in regional 
efforts.  Some recent and ongoing programs include the 
program for women candidates, breast cancer awareness, 
support for civil society and youth organizations, developing 
freedom of expression via the Internet, supporting 
development of democratic leaders, technical assistance to 
meet environmental obligations under the FTA, political party 
training and capacity building, and the Financial Services 
Volunteer Corps.  Other USG-funded projects support 
anti-corruption efforts (with the American Bar Association) 
and prison reform to undermine the foundations of extremism. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
JACKSON