VZCZCXYZ1750
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0996/01 3551404
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211404Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0971
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS RABAT 000996 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT-SHORE 
STATE PLS PASS NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. STATE 109980 
     ¶B. STATE 122733 
 
¶1.  Morocco pursued a comprehensive counterterrorism 
approach that emphasized vigilant security measures, 
including international cooperation and to a lesser 
degree counter-radicalization policies.  Evidence 
gained from Moroccan authorities' disruption of 
certain groups -- and the common characteristics of 
those groups -- supported previous analysis that 
Morocco's threat of terrorist attack continued to 
stem largely from the existence of numerous small 
"grassroots" extremist cells.  These groups, 
sometimes referred to collectively as adherents of 
Moroccan Salafia Jihadia ideology, remained isolated 
from one another, small in size (less than 50 
individuals each), and tactically limited.  Their 
international connections were also limited.  The 
Government of Morocco's counterterrorism efforts 
have effectively reduced the threat, but the 
existence of these relatively small groups pointed 
to the need for continued vigilance. 
 
¶2.  There were reports of Moroccans going to 
northern Mali and Algeria to receive training from 
elements of Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), with some returning to Morocco but 
the majority traveling to Iraq and other locations 
abroad to conduct terrorist attacks.  Although AQIM 
has been unable to support a successful terrorist 
attack in Morocco to date, Moroccan authorities 
remained concerned about the "inspiration" and 
knowledge transfer that AQIM may have provided to 
Moroccan extremists.  AQIM repeatedly tried to 
incite Moroccans to commit violence against their 
government through website propaganda.  The 
Government remained concerned about numbers of 
veteran Moroccan jihadists returning from Iraq to 
propagate and conduct terrorist attacks at home.  A 
further cause of concern is Moroccans who were 
radicalized during their stays in Western Europe, 
such as those connected with the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings. 
 
¶3.  The Moroccan Government pursued a comprehensive 
counterterrorism approach that, building on popular 
rejection of terrorism, emphasizes neutralizing 
existing terrorist cells through traditional 
intelligence work and preemptive security measures. 
Morocco aggressively targeted and dismantled 
terrorist cells within the Kingdom by leveraging 
intelligence collection, police work and 
collaboration with regional and other international 
partners.  These efforts resulted in the 
neutralization of several Salafi Jihadi-inspired 
terrorist groups.  Morocco's counterterrorism 
efforts led to the following disruptions of alleged 
terrorist cells: 
 
-- In February, Moroccan police arrested Abdelkebir 
Barka at the Mohammed V International Airport upon 
his return from Syria.  He was charged with forming 
a terrorist cell. 
 
-- In May, the Moroccan police arrested eight 
alleged members of the terrorist group "Jamaat al 
Mouslimoun al Joudoud." 
 
-- In June, Moroccan authorities arrested five 
members of a suspected terrorist cell operating in 
Morocco and Spain.  The group members were adherents 
of Salafiya Jihadia ideology. 
 
-- In late June, the security services arrested 
eight individuals on charges of forming a terrorist 
group, drug trafficking and corruption, among other 
charges.  The leader of the group was Abou Yassine, 
a former Salafia Jihadia prisoner who had been 
sentenced previously to two years in jail previously 
for his involvement in the "Ansar Al Mahdi" 
terrorist group.  The cell operated between Morocco 
and Spain, according to press reports. 
 
-- In September, security services arrested 24 
members of an alleged terrorist network linked to 
Al-Qa'ida that recruited volunteers for suicide 
bombings in Iraq, according to the Ministry of 
Interior.  The Interior Ministry stated that the 
network had coordinated with terrorists in Sweden, 
Belgium, Iraq and Syria and had sought recruits to 
fight in Afghanistan and Somalia in addition to 
Iraq.  Those arrested also intended to carry out 
terrorist acts in Morocco, according to the 
Ministry. 
 
¶4.  In addition to traditional security measures, 
Morocco's King Mohammed VI has promoted significant 
efforts to reduce extremism and dissuade individuals 
from becoming radicalized.  Each Ramadan, for 
example, the King hosts a series of religious 
lectures, inviting Muslim speakers from around the 
world to promote moderate and peaceful religious 
interpretations.  In his Throne Day speech in July, 
the King highlighted the moderate and tolerant 
nature of the Sunni Malekite rite, which, he 
emphasized, forms an integral part of Moroccan 
identity.  After the 2003 Casablanca bombings, 
Morocco increasingly focused on upgrading places of 
worship, modernizing the teaching of Islam, and 
strengthening the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic 
Affairs (MOIA).  Under the MOIA, the pioneering 
experiment, begun in 2007, of training and using 
women as spiritual guides continued.  Morocco also 
formed a Council of Ulema for Europe to train and 
send Moroccan imams and women spiritual guides to 
counter extremist messages in Moroccan expatriate 
communities in Europe. 
 
¶5.  During the year, the Moroccan Government 
continued to implement internal reforms aimed at 
ameliorating the socio-economic factors that 
terrorists exploit.  The National Initiative for 
Human Development, launched by the King in 2005, is 
a USD 1.2 billion program designed to generate 
employment, combat poverty, and improve 
infrastructure, with a special focus on rural areas. 
 
¶6.  The Government of Morocco made public 
commitments that the struggle against terrorism 
would not be used to deprive individuals of their 
rights and emphasized adherence to human rights 
standards and increased law enforcement transparency 
as part of its approach.  The Government generally 
accorded terrorist suspects and convicts their 
rights and due process of law, with more access for 
defense lawyers and more transparent court 
proceedings than in previous years.  Moroccan laws 
were effective in leading to numerous convictions 
and the upholding of convictions of multiple 
terrorism-related cases: 
 
-- In January, a Moroccan criminal court sentenced 
Abdelmajid Zerghout to five years in prison for 
forming a terrorist group.  Zerghout had been an 
imam in Italy before he was extradited to Morocco 
for his alleged involvement in the terrorist attacks 
of May 16, 2003 in Casablanca. 
 
-- In February, a Moroccan counterterrorism court 
condemned the key plotter of the Casablanca attacks, 
Saad al Husseini, to 15 years in prison.  His 
accomplices received between three and eight years. 
Then, in June, a Moroccan court raised the jail 
terms of Al Husseini and five accomplices, who were 
sentenced for "undermining the national security of 
the State" and forming a terrorist group, to 20 and 
10 years, respectively. 
 
-- In March, a Moroccan court condemned Hassan Haski 
to 10 years in prison for his involvement in the 
2003 terrorist attack in Casablanca. 
 
-- In July, Abdelkader Belliraj was condemned to 
life in prison for terrorist activities, 
premeditated murder, attempted murder, and 
possession of illegal arms and explosives among 
other charges.  The other 34 members of his cell 
were sentenced to between one and 30 years in 
prison.  According to the police, the network was 
preparing to carry out acts of violence in Morocco 
and abroad including assassinations of political 
figures and Moroccan Jews.  Belliraj is now 
appealing the court's decision. 
 
-- In September, 38 people suspected of belonging to 
a network that recruited Moroccans for Iraq and 
Algeria appeared before an anti-terrorist court. 
Police say the suspects intended to join terrorist 
groups in desert camps run by AQIM before proceeding 
to Iraq. 
 
¶7.  As part of its comprehensive approach in 
combating terrorism, Morocco is also addressing 
terrorist financing.  Although Morocco is not a 
regional financial center, its financial sector is 
integrated into international markets.  Money 
laundering is a concern due to the narcotics trade, 
vast informal sector, trafficking in persons, and 
large level of remittances from Moroccans living 
abroad.  The extent of the money laundering problem 
in the country is unknown, but conditions exist for 
it to occur.  In recent years, Morocco has taken a 
series of steps to address the problem, most notably 
with the enactment of a terrorism finance (CFT) law 
in May 2003; with a comprehensive anti-money 
laundering (AML) law in April 2007; and with the 
establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 
in April 2009.  These actions have provided the 
legal basis for the monitoring, investigation, and 
prosecution of illegal financial activities.  The 
new laws allow for the freezing of suspicious 
accounts and permit the prosecution of terrorist 
finance-related crimes.  U.S. and EU programs are 
providing Moroccan police, customs, central bank and 
government financial officials with training to 
recognize money laundering methods.  The FIU and its 
member organizations met with the U.S. Department of 
Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security in 
early October 2009 to discuss possible U.S. 
technical assistance to develop the AML/CFT regime. 
A formal request from the FIU and the Central Bank 
followed in November 2009.  Morocco has a relatively 
effective system through the newly established FIU 
for disseminating U.S. government and UN Security 
Council Resolution terrorist freeze lists to its 
financial sector and legal authorities. Morocco has 
frozen some terrorist-related accounts. 
 
¶8.  Another key to Morocco's counterterrorism 
efforts has been its emphasis on international 
cooperation.  Moroccan authorities continued to 
disrupt plots to attack Moroccan, U.S. and other 
Western-affiliated targets, and aggressively 
investigated numerous individuals associated with 
international terrorist groups, often in 
collaboration with international partners.  Morocco 
and the U.S. worked together extensively on 
counterterrorism efforts at the tactical level. 
Morocco and the U.S. made plans to begin joint 
counter-radicalization programs as well.  In the 
past years, Morocco has accepted prisoners formerly 
detained at Guantanamo Bay and prosecuted them under 
Moroccan law.  In May, a Moroccan criminal court 
reduced the sentence of former Guantanamo Bay 
detainee Mohammed Benmoujane from 10 to two years. 
 
¶9.  Morocco has also forged solid cooperative 
relationships with European and African partners by 
sharing information and conducting joint operations. 
Morocco is considered a Mediterranean Dialogue 
partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and also cooperates with regional partners on a 
bilateral basis.  In March, Spanish police arrested 
a Moroccan on an international warrant issued by 
Morocco on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist 
group that had planned attacks on official and 
tourist targets in Morocco.  Morocco also worked 
closely with African partners such as Mauritania and 
Senegal.  The Government used army and Ministry of 
Interior paramilitary forces to secure its borders 
as best it could but faced resource constraints and 
both a lengthy border and lengthy coastline. 
 
JACKSON