VZCZCXRO6445
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1005 3621415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281415Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0995
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS RABAT 001005 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR DRL, IO AND NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KISL KDEM PREL PGOV OPDC MO
SUBJECT: FORWARD THINKING TO NEGATE "DEFAMATION OF 
RELIGION" IN THE UN (S/ES: 200922459) - MOROCCO STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. STATE 128320 
     ¶B. RABAT 0994 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Mission Morocco's strategy for engaging 
the host government and civil society to cease supporting 
"defamation of religions" proposals at the UN Human Rights 
Council (HRC) and elsewhere focuses on two main strategic 
objectives:  (1) urging the GOM to vote against such 
resolutions (or at least abstain), in a manner that reflects 
its already proven reputation as a moderate, tolerant 
majority-Muslim nation; and (2) to continue to be a voice of 
reason, behind the scenes, within the Arab League and other 
groupings typically vote in favor of such resolutions.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In our formal demarches to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation and our less formal discussions with 
Moroccan officials in other ministries -- including most 
notably the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs 
(MOEIA) (Septel) -- we consistently find our interlocutors to 
be reasonable, tolerant and broadminded regarding the 
counterproductive nature of "defamation of religion" 
proposals and the divisiveness the engender.  The vast range 
of GOM officials, including King Mohammed VI in his role as 
"The Commander of the Faithful," are proud of Morocco's 
long-standing traditions as a tolerant, moderate nation. 
Morocco's domestic and foreign policies emphasize the 
importance of accepting and accommodating religious diversity 
at home, and of engaging in cross-cultural and cross-cult 
dialogue abroad.  The GOM is rightly proud of the fact that 
the tiny Christian and Jewish minorities in Morocco are 
generally free to worship as they please, protected as 
necessary under Moroccan legislation, and socially accepted 
by the vast majority of Moroccans.  It has also consistently 
reached out to Israeli officials, despite mounting and shrill 
criticism from domestic Islamist factions and some of its 
more hard-line Arab allies. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Within this positive context, our challenge is to 
convince the Moroccan MFA to vote against (or abstain from 
voting on) "defamation of religion" proposals in the 
international arena in a way that reflects the tolerance and 
domestic policies toward religion evinced by the GOM at home. 
 We know that Morocco consistently seeks to act as a "voice 
of reason" within the Arab League and the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) in its discussions with Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) partners who are members of the HRC. 
However, despite this helpful role, the GOM still tends to 
vote with the Arab League bloc once the internal discussions 
have finished and the unhelpful resolutions move to the 
floor.  Recently, we have had some luck in moving Morocco 
toward "abstain" on other issues (namely Iran) despite the 
pressure it faces from its Arab allies, but not on others. 
This includes "defamation" resolutions, despite 
off-the-record acknowledgments from MFA officials that those 
resolutions do nothing to forward the GOM's other policy 
goals -- i.e., dialogue, exchange, tolerance -- for the 
region. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) We should not underestimate the importance of 
voices of reason, such as Morocco's, within the Arab League 
and OIC, even if those voices do not ultimately prevent 
defamation resolutions from coming forward or vote with us 
when a resolution comes to the floor.  We view our MFA, MOEIA 
and other GOM interlocutors as intellectual allies on these 
issues, and will continue to dialogue with them in hopes of 
expanding their room to maneuver against the defamation 
resolutions.  Finally, we note that as Staffdel Hogrefe heard 
in September, intervening early so that the Moroccans can 
assist us before the OIC and Arab League agree on language, 
is vital. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
JACKSON