VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #1001/01 3561613
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221613Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0985
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0758
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0113
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0120
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0836
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0023

UNCLAS RABAT 001001 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR H AND NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV PTER ECON MO
SUBJECT:SCENESETTER FOR CODEL GREGG 
 
REF: STATE 129364 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  Senator Gregg, we look forward to 
your arrival in Morocco, a long-standing U.S. ally 
and model in many respects for other Arab, Muslim 
and African countries.  The U.S. Mission's goals in 
Morocco are promoting economic growth, enhancing 
democracy and governance through political and 
economic reform, resolving regional conflicts while 
maintaining close strategic cooperation by promoting 
U.S.-Moroccan partnership in diplomacy, military 
engagement and countering terrorism.  Morocco itself 
is in mid-stride in far-reaching transformations, 
albeit uneven, addressing economic development, 
political reform, gender equality and religious 
tolerance.  We believe expanding Morocco's economic 
base will do as much to address popular 
dissatisfaction with the political system as will 
strengthening democratic institutions.  A bumper 
crop in 2009 buttressed growth against the backdrop 
of reduced exports, lower investment and declining 
remittances.  Thus, despite the global economic 
crisis Morocco's economy will grow by over five 
percent in 2009.  Slums are coming down, and 
according to official statistics, so is 
unemployment.  Morocco has made great strides in 
freedom of the press and remains a leader in the 
region, but those who cross redlines still face 
jail.  Other human rights have grown as well, 
although Morocco remains very much under the control 
of a monarchy and a system with roots going back 
hundreds of years.  Morocco's top priority in 
foreign relations is winning U.S. and other 
countries' support for its position on the Western 
Sahara territorial dispute and for North African 
integration.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Economic Development and U.S. Assistance 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The economy is relatively healthy, although 
marred by disparities in wealth.  Moroccan 
authorities are concerned, however, by the impacts 
on important export, tourism and remittance earnings 
of the global recession.  Growth is expected to be 
above five percent this year, despite the global 
economic slowdown, thanks to record agricultural 
harvests.  Since implementation of our Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) on January 1, 2006, bilateral 
commerce has more than doubled.  A number of U.S. 
firms have increased their investment in Morocco, 
seeing new markets develop as a result of the FTA. 
The Department of Commerce's Commercial Law 
Development Program and the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency conduct capacity building and 
technical assistance projects to assist Morocco. 
Both agencies help the Kingdom to create an open and 
transparent trading environment and to fully develop 
its trading potential.  However, significant export 
growth to U.S. and other markets will also depend on 
Morocco's ability to capture a larger share of value 
added in its export products. 
 
¶3.  (U) Millennium Challenge Account:  In 2007, 
building on decades of USAID and Peace Corps 
efforts, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
signed a five-year, USD 697.5 million Millennium 
Challenge Account Compact with Morocco in 2007 in 
order to reduce poverty and increase economic 
growth.  Currently, through the MCC the USG is 
advancing programs in Fruit Tree Productivity to 
stimulate growth in the agricultural sector and 
reduce volatility of agricultural production.  It is 
also working on an Artisanal Fisheries Program to 
modernize the means of catching, storing and 
marketing fish, thereby improving the quality of the 
catch, maintaining the value chain, and increasing 
fishermen's access to both local and export markets. 
It seeks to stimulate growth by leveraging the links 
between the craft sector, tourism, and the Fes 
Medina's cultural, historic and architectural 
resources.  The Compact will also increase financial 
services for micro-enterprises in Morocco by 
addressing key constraints to the development of the 
broader, market-based financial sector.  It will 
also help reduce high unemployment among young 
graduates and encourage a more entrepreneurial 
culture through two existing Moroccan government 
initiatives, Moukalawati (a program for supporting 
small businesses) and the National Initiative for 
Human Development (INDH), a framework of efforts 
aimed at creating opportunities for the poor, 
vulnerable and socially excluded.  Finally, the 
program is investing over USD 30 million in 
functional literacy. 
 
------------------------------- 
Government and Political Reform 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Government:  Prime Minister Abbas El 
Fassi's government, formed after the September 2007 
legislative elections, is currently built on a 
fragile coalition.  There has been periodic 
speculation that it might not last for the full 
five-year mandate.  El Fassi's government, filled 
with young technocrats from within and outside his 
Istiqlal (Independence) party, has performed better 
than many expected, however, and speculation 
regarding a change of government -- or at least a 
major cabinet reshuffle -- has intensified in the 
wake of the Aminatou Haidar case (see below).  El 
Fassi has participated extensively in international 
events and diplomacy.  Internal democracy is growing 
within political parties.  A political formation 
founded by Fouad Ali El Himma, an intimate of the 
King, has evolved into a new Party of Authenticity 
and Modernity (PAM) by grouping several smaller 
parties.  It now constitutes the largest political 
bloc in Parliament, and could lead should the 
current coalition falter.  In addition to the PAM, 
the leading parties are El Fassi's Istiqlal, the 
Islamist-referent Party of Justice and Development 
(PJD), the pro-Berber  Popular Movement (MP), the 
National Rally of Independents (RNI) and the 
Socialist USFP, which has seen its support decline 
steadily since 2007. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform:  Despite the 
emergence of the PAM and the increasingly democratic 
internal structures of the parties, we currently see 
no prospect for a significant shift in Morocco's 
foreign and security policies, nor in the way in 
which policy is formulated.  Neither Parliament nor 
the Prime Minister has much say in these issues, 
which the King manages directly with the concerned 
ministries.  Morocco's political parties and the 
bicameral parliament are weak and structurally 
hamstrung from taking legislative initiatives or 
strongly articulating dissent.  The Parliament 
provides no effective check on the monarchy or 
Government.  Changing the Constitution would be 
necessary in order to change the power imbalance and 
institute formal democracy, but both Parliament and 
parties will have to improve their capacity and 
performance first.  Nonetheless, the parties and 
Parliament have made some technical improvements, 
largely thanks to USG-funded programs from the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the State 
University of New York (SUNY), which have modestly 
improved the body's administrative capacity.  These 
include establishment of a budget analysis office, a 
verbatim transcription service, a consistent forum 
for training and debate among parliamentary members 
and staff, and the introduction of question time. 
This innovation has required the Government to 
answer over 2,800 questions in the last two years, 
with the PAM posing the over 1,000 and focusing on 
the work of the Ministries of Interior, Education, 
Health, Agriculture, Transport, Employment, Justice 
and Communications -- in that order. 
 
¶6.  (U) Political Reform:  Although the September 
2007 parliamentary elections were the most 
transparent in the country's history, record low 
participation (37 percent of registered voters) 
reflected the lack of voter confidence in the 
institution.  Despite this challenge, the State 
Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) funded NDI to run the first ever 
international election observation in Morocco.  MEPI 
also supported an ambitious training program for 
women running for municipal councils in June after a 
quota was established reserving 12 percent of the 
seats for women.  Voter turnout in the June 
municipal elections was approximately 54 percent, 
and women captured nearly 13 percent of the seats, 
exceeding the number reserved for them.  The USG had 
also sponsored the training of over 3,500 women via 
an unusual collaborative project between the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and 
International Republican Institute (IRI).  The entry 
into politics of over 3,000 elected women office 
holders (the 130 before local elections have 
historically been more effective and immune to 
corruption) and many thousands more candidates may 
have a potentially transformational impact. 
 
------------- 
Social Reform 
------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Human and Women's Rights:  King Mohammed VI 
has embarked on a determined and continuous program 
of human rights reforms that include the Arab 
world's first truth commission and a revised Family 
Code [Moudawana], granting expanded legal rights to 
women, growing government transparency, 
accountability and rule of law.  Palace support has 
produced more elected women officials than in any 
other Arab country.  Now women serve as policymakers 
and religious leaders, instructing women about their 
new-found legal rights, and advocating a more 
moderate view of Islam.  Although Morocco has become 
the leader of reform in the region, the reforms are 
still not deeply rooted in law, tradition or 
Constitution and could be rolled back.  Continued 
support and encouragement from partners like the 
United States and Europe are essential.  Another 
recent development has been the expansion of 
cultural rights and outlets for Berbers, one of the 
largest groups in Morocco and perhaps the largest. 
 
¶8.  (U) Religious Freedom:  The Moroccan 
Constitution provides for the freedom to practice 
one's religion, although Islam is the official state 
religion.  The GOM prohibits the distribution of 
non-Muslim religious materials and bans all 
proselytizing while tolerating several small 
religious minorities.  It also occasionally 
restricts Islamic organizations whose activities 
have exceeded the bounds of "acceptable religious 
practice" and become political in nature, lately 
targeting Shi'a.  Morocco has become protective of 
and even positive toward the tiny remnant of its 
once substantial Jewish minority. 
 
¶9.  (U) Social Reform:  Morocco benefits from 
several MEPI programs, including country-specific 
projects and inclusion in regional efforts.  Some 
recent and ongoing programs that include the above- 
mentioned program for women candidates [Political 
Reform], breast cancer awareness, sustaining civil 
society and youth associations, developing freedom 
of expression via the Internet, supporting 
development of democratic leaders, supporting 
technical assistance to meet environmental 
obligations under the FTA, political party training 
and capacity building, and the Financial Services 
Volunteer Corps.  Other USG-funded projects support 
anti-corruption efforts (with the American Bar 
Association) and prison reform to undermine the 
foundations of extremism. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Recent Developments:  Over the past 
several months, there have been some setbacks on the 
human rights front, notably in the areas of freedom 
of the press, of expression and of assembly.  The 
Aminatou Haidar case represented an extreme example 
of the difficulties those Moroccans who advocate the 
independence of Western Sahara or the right to self- 
determination of the Sahrawi people face when they 
seek to express their views publically and 
internationally.  On November 13, the GOM refused to 
allow Haidar -- a prominent Sahrawi pro-independence 
activist and human rights defender -- to enter 
Morocco, confiscated her passport and sent her to 
the Canary Islands.  Once there, she embarked on a 
34-day hunger strike until the GOM relented and 
allowed her to return on December 18.  Her health 
remains precarious, but she has safely returned to 
her residence in Laayoune, Western Sahara.  Now 
resolved, the case attracted significant 
international attention and widespread accusations 
that the GOM had come dangerously close to forced 
exile.  Likewise, there have been several recent 
incidents of limitations on the free press, 
including court cases in which journalists and 
bloggers have been sentenced to jail terms.  In all 
these cases, the Embassy has pressed the GOM to 
respect its international human rights commitments 
and to continue the impressive array of reforms that 
has characterized King Mohammed VI's overall human 
rights policy. 
 
------------------------ 
Regional Security Issues 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (U) Algeria:  Moroccan foreign policy is 
dominated by defending and seeking international 
recognition of its sovereignty claims over Western 
Sahara.  The issue remains the most visible source 
of tension with long-time rival Algeria, which has 
historically supported the POLISARIO Front's quest 
for independence by way of an UN-sponsored 
referendum.  Algeria closed the border between the 
two countries, and it remains closed.  While the 
King and other GOM officials have publicly proposed 
opening the border and upgrading bilateral relations 
between the two countries, their entreaties have 
been repeatedly rebuffed.  The Government of Algeria 
(GOA) has linked progress on the border to all 
issues, particularly the Western Sahara.  The issue 
led Morocco to leave the African Union and has been 
an obstacle to regional integration through the Arab 
Maghreb Union. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Western Sahara:  In April 2007, Morocco 
proposed a new autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and 
a series of UN-sponsored negotiations with the 
POLISARIO have taken place in Manhasset, New York. 
The Moroccan proposal would provide Sahrawis, the 
indigenous people of Western Sahara, autonomy in 
administering local affairs under Moroccan 
sovereignty.  In April, the UN renewed the mandate 
of the UN peacekeeping operation MINURSO until 2010. 
Following the controversial lapsing of the contract 
of the former UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy, 
the UN selected retired U.S. Ambassador Christopher 
Ross to be the new Personal Envoy, and he made his 
first visit to the region in February and his second 
in July.  He hosted informal talks near Vienna in 
August; while they produced no breakthroughs, the 
parties agreed to continue negotiations.  Over the 
past month, the Aminatou Haider case (see above) has 
dramatically increased tensions and the levels of 
distrust among the GOM, the GOA and the POLISARIO. 
In response, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and 
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called for 
a fifth round of formal negotiations, although 
bringing the parties to the table for productive 
discussions will be very difficult, at least in the 
near-term. 
 
¶13.  (U) Western Sahara Continued:  Western Sahara 
experienced gross violations of human rights from 
1975 until the end of King Hassan II's regime, and 
repression intensified after the short-lived Sahrawi 
uprising of 2005.  Since late 2006, Morocco has 
improved the human rights situation in the 
territory.  Arbitrary arrests have sharply 
diminished and beatings and physical abuse by 
security forces have all but disappeared.  However, 
dissenters still face harrassment and sometimes even 
criminal charges if they publish or speak too 
publicly in support of independence or on a vote for 
self-determination. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Military and Counterterrorism Cooperation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (U) Military Cooperation:  The GOM has been 
formally invited to participate in the Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI) and extended USD 1 
million to support a program in Morocco.  Under the 
GPOI program, the U.S. intends to provide peace 
operations training and other support to the 
Moroccan military so that it can continue to develop 
and sustain peace operations capacity.  Africa 
Command proposed Morocco as a potential GPOI partner 
for FY 2009 in Fall 2008, and the GPOI Coordinating 
Committee agreed to that proposal in Spring 2009. 
The current plan is to provide training and 
facilities refurbishment to a peace operations 
training center in Morocco.  In order to ensure 
long-term sustainability, the GPOI program 
incorporates train-the-trainer elements into its 
training events.  The Mission is working with the 
Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation, which will coordinate Morocco's GPOI 
request, to finalize the program.  In addition, the 
Embassy is currently engaged in negotiations with 
the GOM on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 
Moreover, Inspector General of the Armed Forces 
(CHOD) General Abdelaziz Bennani and Africa Command 
Commander General William Ward are scheduled to sign 
an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 
in late December. 
 
¶15.  (U) Military Cooperation Continued:  The 
Moroccan military has undertaken a sweeping effort 
to modernize a military force that fields 
predominantly Korean and Vietnam War-era equipment. 
While F-16 and T-6 sales form the bulk of the dollar 
figure for this modernization, the total Foreign 
Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing 
portfolio totals some 120 cases in excess of USD 3 
billion.  Military modernization further strengthens 
the Moroccan military by continuing and expanding 
exposure to U.S. doctrine, tactics, techniques, 
procedures and personnel.  The expanded requirement 
to train operators and maintenance staff for the F- 
16 and T-6 aircraft alone will practically equal the 
current annual training allocation for all Moroccan 
personnel across all the services and government 
organizations.  Moreover, the integration of a 
fourth generation fighter into the Royal Moroccan 
Air Force will stimulate a full spectrum 
modernization approach from operating and sustaining 
such aircraft, maintaining facilities, logistics and 
aerial deployment to command and control.  This 
provides an unparalleled opportunity to shape our 
engagement with the Royal Air Force.  A superb boost 
this year was the selection of Morocco to 
participate in the CSAF Counterpart Visit program, 
as well as Morocco's decision to send an observer to 
AMC's Airlift Rodeo.  These engagement activities 
add to a robust exercise program that includes 
AFRICAN LION, PHOENIX EXPRESS, SAHARAN WIND, AFRICAN 
PARTNERSHIP STATION, AFRICAN ENDEAVOR and FLINTLOCK, 
in addition to at least two annual JCETs. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Counterterrorism:  The terrorist threat 
in Morocco emanates especially from small grassroots 
radical Islamic cells, which have shown some 
capacity to attack.  In 2008, security forces 
disrupted six terrorist and foreign fighter cells, 
prosecuting 100 people.  So far this year, five 
cells have been disrupted, including one group of 24 
who were detained in September.  The biggest threat 
is that attacks could deter tourism, an important 
component of the economy.  The GOM's implementation 
of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy 
emphasizing vigilant security measures, counter- 
radicalization policies, and robust international 
cooperation has been largely successful in 
containing the threat.  Economic disruption, whether 
from attacks or the global economic crisis, remains 
the principal threat to stability here, but most 
observers believe Morocco will manage. 
 
¶17.  (U) Counterterrorism Continued:  In early- 
October, a multi-agency Embassy team participated in 
two days of wide-ranging, frank discussions with 
representatives of the Moroccan Ministry of the 
Interior.  Those discussions addressed issues 
including counterterrorism, trafficking in persons, 
illegal migration, drug 
trafficking/counternarcotics, regional threats and 
stability, human rights, and assistance/development 
efforts.  Designed as a strategy session to share 
information and lay the groundwork for future 
engagement, both sides agreed that the talks were 
useful and could lead to substantive programmatic 
and other collaboration.  Under the King who as 
"Commander of the Faithful" leads Moroccan Muslims 
and Jews, Morocco has standardized religious 
doctrine, consolidated control over religious 
schools and sent specially trained imams to Europe 
to preach moderate messages to the Moroccan 
Diaspora.  The vast majority of Morocco's population 
rejects Salafist and Wahhabist approaches to Islam 
and so does not support terrorist groups. 
 
JACKSON