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UNCLAS QUITO 001218 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN PINS PREL AEMR KCRM KHLS EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 122733; STATE 109980 
 
¶1. (U) Embassy submits the narrative in paragraphs 2-9 for the 2009 
Country Report on Terrorism: 
 
¶2. (U) Ecuador's greatest counterterrorism and security challenge 
remained the presence of Colombian narcotics, criminal and 
terrorist groups in the northern border region.  In order to evade 
Colombian military operations, these groups, principally the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), regularly used 
Ecuadorian territory for rest, medical aid, weapons and explosives 
procurement, recuperation, resupply, and training, as well as coca 
processing and limited planting and production.  This involved 
significant numbers of Ecuadorians and Colombian refugees in 
northern Ecuador in direct or indirect ways.  The extremely 
difficult terrain along the porous 450-mile border with Colombia, 
and the lack of adequate licit employment opportunities for 
Ecuadorians and Colombian refugees in the region, have made the 
area vulnerable to narcoterrorist influence and created a 
contraband economy.  Some Ecuadorian officials along the border 
believed that the FARC's economic impact allowed it to buy silence 
and compliance. Another factor that may deter a stronger stance 
against the FARC is that the group could carry out reprisals, 
particularly against the oil industry in the northern region of the 
country. 
 
¶3. (U) Ecuador continued its response to this threat, although it 
still faced constraints on resources and limited capabilities.  The 
Correa Administration, while maintaining the country's traditional 
with respect to the Colombian conflict, has stated that it opposed 
armed encroachments of any kind across its borders.  Tensions 
between the governments of Ecuador and Colombia were elevated 
following the March 2008 Colombian bombing of a FARC camp in 
Ecuador, which resulted in the killing of the FARC's number two in 
command Raul Reyes, plus 24 Colombians and one Ecuadorian 
associated with the FARC.  However, the two governments embarked on 
a path of rapprochement in September and assigned charges 
d'affaires in November.   Although Ecuador-Colombia security 
mechanisms have been reactivated, reestablishment of full 
diplomatic ties would be important to making further progress in 
disrupting and dismantling FARC-associated narcotics traffickers' 
operations in the region. 
 
¶4. (U) Ecuador's security forces continued their operations against 
FARC training and logistical resupply camps along the northern 
border.  The Ecuadorian military continued to increase the number 
of troops in the north in 2009.  Ecuador augmented its security 
presence in the northern border region in response to persistent 
narcotics activity by armed insurgent and criminal groups that had 
rendered the northern border region particularly vulnerable and 
dangerous.  The GOE increased its emphasis on protection of 
national sovereignty against illegal armed incursions and and 
improved efforts to counter a perception that Ecuador was not 
shouldering its burden in fighting drug traffickers along its 
northern border. 
 
¶5. (U) While GOE security forces increased their presence, the pace 
of their operations remained roughly the same and level of success 
against narcoterrorists declined from 2008.  The Ecuadorian 
military reports that it conducted four counterdrug operations at 
the brigade level, 219 battalion-level operations and 159 patrols 
that led to the destruction of nine cocaine laboratories, 253 FARC 
base camps, houses and resupply facilities; the eradication of one 
hectare of coca; and the confiscation of weapons, communications 
equipment, and other support equipment. 
 
¶6. (U) The Ecuadorian military's operations netted information on 
FARC activities and infrastructure both inside and outside of 
Ecuador, and resulted in the detention of more than 75 narcotics 
traffickers, the killing of three FARC members and the wounding of 
seven others during the year.  However, insufficient resources, 
corruption among members of the military and police assigned to the 
area, the challenging border region terrain (which includes coastal 
mangrove swamps, the Andes mountains and the Amazon jungle), and a 
tense bilateral relationship with Colombia since the March 2008 
raid made it difficult to thwart cross-border incursions. 
 
¶7. (U) Other terrorist groups present in Ecuador, although less 
active in the last few years, included the Popular Combatants 
Group, the Revolutionary Militia of the People, the 
Marxist-Leninist Party of Ecuador, and the Alfarista Liberation 
Army. 
 
¶8. (U) The Ecuadorian government continued to strengthen controls 
over money laundering through the Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU), which it established under a 2005 Money Laundering Law.  The 
FIU improved cooperation with the Anti-Narcotics Police 
Directorate, the Superintendent of Banks, the courts, and the 
private banker association to identify suspicious transactions and 
develop information for the prosecution of cases.  An important 
current emphasis of the FIU is to monitor casinos for money 
laundering activities.  The Prosecutor General fully established a 
Major Crimes Specialized Unit, which includes a specialized 
anti-money laundering unit to address the need for the interdiction 
of passengers and cargo for undeclared currency, and the National 
Police have set up an anti-money laundering unit to carry out 
investigations into financial crimes.  Ecuador has not criminalized 
terrorist financing, although the government is reportedly 
considering adopting counter-terrorism financing legislation. 
 
¶9. (U) Ecuador's judicial institutions remained weak, susceptible 
to corruption, and heavily backlogged with pending cases.  While 
the military and police made numerous arrests, the judicial system 
had a poor record of achieving convictions. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Embassy Quito POC is: Mark Pannell, Political Officer, 
PannellMA@state.gov, 593-2-398-5502. 
HODGES