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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 001033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2029/12/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR MOPS EC CO
SUBJECT: Government Commission Report on Colombian Attack and FARC 
Ties 
 
REF: QUITO 933; QUITO 227 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Heath...



id: 239530
date: 12/11/2009 18:45
refid: 09QUITO1033
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classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO227|09QUITO933
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 001033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2029/12/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR MOPS EC CO
SUBJECT: Government Commission Report on Colombian Attack and FARC 
Ties 
 
REF: QUITO 933; QUITO 227 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Heather M. Hodges, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  A government-appointed commission's report 
revives allegations about the FOL's support (specifically in regard 
to satellite intelligence) for the 2008 Colombian military attack 
against a FARC camp in northern Ecuador, as well as allegations of 
inappropriate U.S. direction of local intelligence services and 
police units.  We would not be surprised if the GOE seeks to 
overcome its current political weakness by playing up the report's 
criticism of the U.S., which was harsher than we were led to expect 
in November (Ref A).  Concerns about the influence of the FARC and 
narcotics traffickers in Ecuador are a secondary theme of the 
report, but initially have equally captured local press attention. 
The report reviews, but does not reach conclusions on, allegations 
that former Security Minister Larrea, National Assembly member 
Calle, and others have ties to the FARC.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) The government appointed the Transparency and Truth 
Commission to look into the Colombian military operation of March 
1, 2008, against a FARC camp in northern Ecuador (reftels).  The 
commission's 130-page report makes a total of 88 references to the 
USG, most of which do not cast us in a favorable light.  It 
highlights the refusal of Colombian authorities to provide 
information.  Interestingly, the report admits that it does not 
seek to be objective, rather to enhance transparency, and that 
often it cannot draw conclusions on issues due to lack of access by 
the Commission. 
 
 
 
FOL, DEA, and CIA are Major Targets 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) The role of the U.S. Forward Operating Location (FOL) in 
Manta is a major focus of the commission's report.  The report 
accepts the Ambassador's statement in a July letter to the 
commission that FOL aircraft were not involved in the March 2008 
Colombian military operation.  However, it charges that FOL-based 
satellite intelligence was fundamental in locating FARC leader Raul 
Reyes, who was killed in the FARC camp.  The report points to an 
HC-130 aircraft that it says unusually flew at night on February 29 
- March 1 carrying a container with unknown contents.  It suggests 
that a third country was involved in the Colombian operation, 
arguing that the GBU 12 Paveway bomb could not be launched from the 
Super Tucano aircraft the Colombians used.  The report itself 
contradicts this three paragraphs later where it states that the 
websites consulted indicate the Super Tucanos do have the 
capability to drop such bombs.  The report also criticizes the 1999 
agreement allowing U.S. use of the FOL for not having been approved 
in accordance with legal norms, namely ratification by the 
Congress. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The report describes what it calls an unacceptable 
operational dependence on external agencies by the Special 
Investigations Unit (UIES) of the Ecuadorian police.  It claims 
that the UIES blocked information from reaching certain officials 
at senior levels and from President Correa.  The report charges 
that anti-drug agencies followed DEA and CIA priorities rather than 
those of the Ecuadorian government and did not always use legal 
methods. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Support for the Correa administration is currently the 
weakest it has been during his presidency.  In three recent polls, 
respondents' positive ratings of President Correa's performance 
declined to 58, 42, and 39 percent.  Given this weakness, the GOE 
may well decide to seize on the criticism of the USG in the 
commission's report to distract attention from other national 
 
 
problems that have affected its popularity, such as unemployment, 
crime, corruption, and electricity outages. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) The final report was more prejudicial to U.S. interests 
than we had expected, given what commission member Walter Gellibert 
Larreta told us in early November (Ref A).  When we asked Gellibert 
on December 11 about this contrast, he claimed that the commission 
member who drafted the FOL section, Israel Batista of the Latin 
American Council of Churches, had included what Gellibert called 
unsubstantiated allegations, e.g., that a FOL aircraft was involved 
in carrying out the attack on the FARC camp, but other commission 
members made him take those statements out. 
 
 
 
Concerns about FARC and Narco-Trafficker Influence 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) The report questions the channels of communication through 
which military and police intelligence reported information on the 
bombing to civilian authorities.  It states that "there are 
indications of inability, corruption and failures in military and 
police protocol" in authorities' failures to do more to combat the 
FARC and narco-traffickers.  The report also questions why the 
Ecuadorian government did not act on information about Raul Reyes' 
movements and places he frequented to attempt his capture, and why 
foreign visitors to the FARC camp prior to the bombing were not 
detected. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) The commission's report reviews possible ties to the FARC 
of a number of former government officials and other individuals: 
former Coordinating Minister for Internal and External Security 
Gustavo Larrea, former Government Ministry Under Secretary Jose 
Ignacio Chauvin, former Ambassador to Venezuela and retired general 
Rene Vargas Pazzos, National Assembly member Maria Augusta Calle, 
lawyer Luis Rubio Gallegos, and retired colonel Jorge Brito.  The 
report provides detailed information of the activities of these 
individuals, but does not reach any conclusions about alleged ties 
to the FARC and/or narco-trafficking.  Instead it refers the matter 
to judicial authorities for investigation.  It states that all of 
the individuals above denied any knowledge of the military and 
ideological objectives of the February 2008 Boliviarian Continental 
Congress, which was held in Quito. 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) The majority of the report's conclusions and 
recommendations are unfavorable to the U.S.  Among them are: 
 
 
 
-- The FOL was key to locating FARC leader Raul Reyes. 
 
-- FOL activities exceeded its stated mission of counternarcotics. 
 
-- The violation of national sovereignty of other countries cannot 
be justified by any judicial doctrine. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Several other conclusions/recommendations, however, are on 
the mark: 
 
 
-- Narco-trafficking and related activities are of such magnitude 
that combating them should involve the entire nation. 
 
-- The justice system has failed to determine who is responsible 
for narco-trafficking operations. 
 
-- The lack of control of precursor chemicals has allowed the 
country to start to be a processing site, in addition to serving 
for transit. 
 
-- The FARC and narcotrafficking have penetrated various the 
political, judicial, cultural, and social realms. 
 
-- The FARC had the capacity to develop its international relations 
strategy and spread its political project via the organization of 
the February 2008 Bolivarian congress. 
 
-- The state should guard its borders from foreign persons and 
groups. 
 
-- The free movement of people in the interior of the country 
should be regulated for reasons of national security. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C) The anti-American bias of the government commission's 
report and its failure to judge those accused of FARC ties bear out 
the low expectations of many commentators at the time of its 
establishment.  We do not see anything new in the charges against 
the USG, but rather a rehash of old allegations, which is not 
surprising given the commission's lack of access and expert staff. 
Government officials almost certainly influenced the report's 
conclusions, although we do not know to what extent. 
HODGES 

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